NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CO. AND AMERICAN EXPRESS BANK, LTD., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, VICENTE T. TAN, VICTAN AND COMPANY, INC, TRANSWORLD I…

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the 11 April 1991 Resolution^[1]
of a Division of Five of the Court of Appeals which reconsidered and nullified
the 30 April 1990 Decision^[2] of
the former Sixth Division thereof in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 18865^[3] directing
the Regional Trial Court (Branch 134, Makati) of the National Capital Judicial
Region to dismiss private respondents’ complaint in Civil Case No. 15707.

The antecedents in this case are not disputed.

On 13 January 1987, private respondents filed a complaint in
Civil Case No. 15707 against the Central Bank of the Philippines (CB), the
National Development Company (NDC) and the American Express Bank, Ltd. (AMEX)
for the reconveyance of shares of stock in the International Corporate Bank
(Interbank) with damages and a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order.^[4]
They alleged inter alia that:

(a) as of June 1974, plaintiffs (the herein
private respondents) were the owners of some 359,615 shares of stock, with a
par value of P100.00 per share, which constitute 75% of the outstanding shares,
and controlling interest in Continental Bank, later named Interbank;

(b) on 15 and 16 June 1974, plaintiff Vicente T.
Tan and other key officials of Continental Bank were arrested by military
agents on the strength of Arrest Search and Seizure Orders (ASSOs) issued by
then Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile based on charges filed before the PC
Criminal Investigation Service and alleging, among others, illegal transactions
committed in the Continental Bank;

(c) on 17 June 1974 and several days thereafter,
a composite team of PC-CIS-­NISA agents under orders from General Fabian Ver
raided the Continental Bank offices in Binondo, Manila, seized books,
securities records and other vital credit documents and sealed the bank’s
security vault, the office of the bank’s Vice President and the room of the
Chief Accountant;

(d) the series of raids conducted by the
military agents triggered a bank “run” on Continental Bank causing
chaos and confusion on its banking operations;

(e) defendant CB issued an order forbidding the
Continental Bank from doing business effective at the beginning of office hours
on 24 June 1974, and designating the Director of the Department of Commercial
and Savings Banks as statutory receiver; thereafter, it ordered a special
examination of Continental Bank’s financial condition as of 24 June 1974;

(f) in a final report, dated 12 August 1974, on
the special examination conducted, the Supervising Bank Examiner of the CB
reported that the “Continental Bank is in an insolvent position in view of
which, its continuance in business under the present conditions, may no longer
be safe to its creditors and depositing public” but added that “the
Bank may be allowed to reorganize under an entirely new management provided
there is an infusion of fresh funds to the Bank as well as the conversion
and/or restructuring of certain liabilities into equity and/or long-term
liabilitises (sic)”;

(g) while still
under military custody and detention, Vicente T. Tan, on his own behalf and on
behalf of his affiliate companies, was pressured into signing three (3)
agreements dated 2 February 1977, 12 May 1977 and 5 July 1977 under which he
transferred and conveyed by way of assignment their aforesaid 359,615 shares of
stock, including other assets, interests and properties in Continental Bank, to
three (3) corporations, alleged fronts for Herminio Disini, namely Executive
Consultants, Inc., Orobel Property Management, Inc., and Antolum International
Trading Corporation, in consideration of the latter’s assumption of certain
specified liabilities and obligations of Tan and his group of companies;

(h) unknown to Vicente T. Tan, whose facilities
of verification were severely restricted by his detention, the combined paid-up
capital of the three (3) aforementioned assignee-corporations at the time of
the assignment was only P2.5 Million, which made them inherently incapable of
performing the obligations they had assumed;

(i) by reason of the fraudulent acquisition by
the Disini corporation of the 359,615 shares, a constructive trust has been
constituted on said shares in favor of plaintiffs;

(j) the execution of the aforementioned
agreements paved the way for the re?opening of the Continental Bank on 19
September 1977 under a new name, the International Corporate Bank (Interbank),
and under the management of the Herdis Group, which became the owner of the
bank’s controlling stock; this also paved the way for the release from military
custody, on 27 December 1977, of Vicente T. Tan and other officers of the
Continental Bank and the subsequent dismissal of the criminal cases filed
against them;

(k) Interbank’s new management totally ignored
the existing rules and regulations of the CB by milking the deposits with said
Interbank dry through huge borrowings by the Disini Group of companies, thereby
pushing said Bank to the brink of total collapse; had it not been for the huge
infusion of funds by the CB in the form of emergency loans and advances,
Interbank would have completely collapsed;

(l) since the CB is prohibited from acquiring
shares of any kind and participating in the ownership or management of any
enterprise, either directly or indirectly, it assigned the emergency loans and
advances extended to the Interbank to the National Development Company (NDC) as
a result of which the latter executed the corresponding promissory note payable
in 25 years, without interest, in favor of said CB; the said loans and advances
were then converted into equity thereby enabling the NDC to acquire 99% of
Interbank’s outstanding shares of stock from the Disini Group, including the
359,615 shares earlier mentioned, and the corresponding stock/cash dividends
earned;

(m) defendant
American Express Bank, Ltd. (AMEX) acquired from defendant NDC 40% of the
outstanding shares of stock of Interbank, but before the acquisition by AMEX of
the said interest, “it was placed on notice of the infirmities of the
transfer of the shares of plaintiffs in Continental Bank to the former owners
of Interbank” and despite said notice AMEX proceeded to convert, with the
CB’s approval, its exposures to the Philippine Government into equity in
Interbank;

(n) defendants CB, NDC and AMEX, having actual
or constructive notice of the fraudulent acquisition by the aforesaid Disini
corporations of the 359,615 shares of stock of plaintiffs, are obligated under
the principle of constructive trust to reconvey to plaintiffs the latter’s
original controlling shareholdings in the Continental Bank including the
stock/cash dividends earned;

(o) in view of the CB’s arbitrariness, Tan had
been subjected to physical suffering, mental anguish, besmirched reputation and
social humiliation and said bank is therefore liable for moral damages;
plaintiffs were likewise compelled to engage the services of counsel for a
stipulated fee.

The amounts of moral damages and attorney’s fees sought were not
specified; however, in their prayer, they asked the Court that the CB be
ordered to pay them moral damages and attorney’s fees in such amount as may be
proved during the trial.

On 19 January 1987, the trial court, per Judge Ignacio Capulong,
issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting petitioners AMEX and NDC from
disposing of or transferring their shares of stock in Interbank.^[5]

On 26 January 1987, NDC and AMEX moved to dismiss the complaint
alleging that: (a) the trial court has
no jurisdiction over the subject or nature of the action which is
intra-corporate in nature; (b) the complaint states no cause of action against
them; (c) there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause; and (d) the cause of action, if any, is barred by prescription. They likewise opposed the private
respondents’ application for preliminary injunction.^[6] Judge
Capulong denied the motion in an order dated 6 February 1987.^[7]

On 27 February 1987, petitioners’ co-defendant in Civil Case No.
15707, the CB, filed its separate motion to dismiss, but Judge Capulong
likewise denied it in his Order dated 15 May 1987.^[8] Its
motion for reconsideration having been denied, the CB filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari which was docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP.
No. 12706.^[9]

On 14 April 1989, the NDC and AMEX filed a supplemental motion to
dismiss on the ground that Tan, et al. had not paid the correct amount of
filing fees. The said motion was also denied by Judge Capulong in the Order
dated 8 August 1989.^[10]

On 29 September 1989, NDC and AMEX filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 challenging
the adverse orders of the trial court; they prayed for the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 15707 and for the issuance of a restraining order to enjoin further
proceedings therein. The case was docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 18865.^[11]
As grounds therefore, they alleged that:

“a)   A complaint for recovery of property on the
ground of duress in the transaction by which such property had been sold or
assigned cannot be maintained against its present holder for value, where the
original assignments remain valid, no action for the annulment thereof having
been filed against the original assignees.

b) An action to recover corporate shares of
stock by one claiming to be a stockholder against another stockholder of the
same corporation is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

c) Where the action to annul a contract of
assignment based on duress has prescribed, no further suit to recover the
property assigned may be maintained by the alleged assignor based on the same
ground.

d) The doctrine of constructive trust on which
the complaint is based is not applicable to the case at bar.

x x x

g)    Private respondents purposely omitted in the
prayer of their complaint below the value of the Interbank shares of stock
sought to be recovered to evade payment of the correct filing fees, hence the
complaint cannot be deemed filed, and the lower court died not acquire
jurisdiction over the suit.”

The then former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals gave the
petition due course and issued a restraining order.

Earlier however, more specifically on 5 April 1989, the
respondent Court (First Division) promulgated its decision in the petition
filed by the CB, C.A.-G.R. SP No. 12706, granting the petition and ordering the
dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 15707 insofar as the CB is
concerned.^[12]
Herein private respondents then filed with this Court a petition for review to
set aside the said decision, which was docketed as G.R. No. 90365^[13].

On 30 April 1990, the Sixth Division of the respondent Court
promulgated its Decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 18865 granting the petition and
ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 15707.^[14] It
ruled that: (a) NDC and AMEX are not
the original assignees, but subsequent transferees, of the questioned shares of
stock; Tan, et al. should have filed the complaint for annulment of the
assignments, which they claimed to have been made under duress against the
original assignees. Assuming that duress
did exist, it merely made the assignments voidable; without a judgment for
annulment on that ground, the assignments remain valid and binding and may even
be ratified under Article 1390 of the Civil Code. There being no annulment
declared by a competent court, NDC’s and AMEX’s title of ownership over the
shares cannot be collaterally attacked. Besides, Civil Case No. 15707 is for
reconveyance, not annulment; the complaint does not allege any act or omission
by NDC and AMEX in derogation of any legal right belonging to Tan, et al. Hence, the complaint fails to state a cause
of action. (b) The requisites of
implied trust, an argument invoked in the complaint, are not present. The original assignees were not fiduciaries
with respect to the questioned shares of stocks. The shares involved were assigned to them for value; said
assignees did not acquire, misapply or misappropriate the same by mistake or
fraud. The complaint makes no
allegation that the shares were obtained by fraud or mistake. (c) The cause of action, if any, is clearly
barred by prescription. If indeed the
consent of Tan to the deeds of assignment was obtained through force or duress
at a time when he was under military detention and custody, such duress ceased
when he was eventually released by the military on 27 December 1977. Pursuant to Article 1391 of the Civil Code,
he should have filed the complaint for annulment within four (4) years from
such release. (d) Finally, Civil Case
No. 15707 is an action involving corporate shares of stock between parties who
both claim to be stockholders of the same corporation. Pursuant to Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A, it
is the Securities and Exchange Commission which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction thereon.

Private respondents herein moved to reconsider said
decision. An undated resolution penned
by Justice Nicolas Lapeña, Jr.,^[15]
denied the motion; however, Associate Justice Emeterio Cui indicated his
dissent and submitted a dissenting opinion.^[16]
Pursuant to Section 11 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and Section
6, Rule I of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, two (2)
Members of the Court, Associate Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and Alicia V.
Sempio Diy, were designated to sit temporarily in a Division of Five. The two concurred with the dissenting
opinion of Justice Cui. Thereafter, the
Division of Five promulgated on 11 April 1991 the challenged resolution which
granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed the petition.^[17]
This Division of Five of respondent Court held that Civil Case No. 15707 states
a sufficient cause of action based on a constructive or implied trust;
prescription is a matter of defense that is best resolved by a resort to the
parties’ evidence; and, finally, no intra-corporate matters are involved in the
case since private respondents are neither claiming nor enforcing the rights
incident to corporate stock ownership, such as the right to vote at
stockholders meetings, elect and remove directors, adopt and repeal by-laws and
other rights under the Corporation Code.

Unable to accept the Resolution, NDC and AMEX filed the herein
petition on 14 June 1991. They aver
that the respondent Court erred: 

x x x

“4.1 x x x in holding, or holding in effect,
that a seller claiming to have sold or assigned property to another ‘under duress,’
may bring suit to recover it from a subsequent purchaser with whom he has no
privity, and even the original sale or assignment remains valid.

4.2. x x x in holding that prescription as
ground (sic) for dismissal should be resolved at the trial, even though the
determinative facts appear on the face of the complaint.

4.3. x x x in holding that an action for
reconveyance of corporate shares, between parties claiming to be stockholders
of the same corporation, is not a case within the SEC’s jurisdiction.

4.4. x x x in not holding that the trial court
in any case acquired no jurisdiction over the complaint for reconveyance, where
plaintiffs failed and refused to pay the required filing fees therefor.

4.5. x x x in not holding that the trial court
has issued an injunction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.”^[18]

After private respondents filed their Comment^[19]
to the petition on 22 August 1991 in compliance with the Resolution of 3 July
1991,^[20]
this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file
their respective Memoranda. Private
respondents filed their Memorandum on 24 October 1991.^[21]
Petitioners AMEX and NDC filed their separate Memoranda on 30 October 1991 and
12 November 1991, respectively. ^[22]

On 22 November 1991, private respondents filed a Reply to
petitioners’ Memorandum^[23] to
which they attached as Annex “A”^[24]
thereof a certification by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati to the effect that on 7 May 1990, private respondent Tan paid the
additional amount of P183,967.55 for the docketing and other fees.

The petition is impressed with merit.

As to the lack of cause of action and prescription, the fate of
the private respondents had long been sealed.

In the 18 March 1991 decision of this Court entitled
“Vicente T. Tan, et al. versus The Honorable Court of Appeals, et
al.,”^[25]
docketed as G.R. No. 90365 and resulting from the private respondents’ petition
for review of the respondent Court’s decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 12706
granting the CB’s petition for certiorari and ordering the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 15707, this Court ruled that: (a) a cause of action for reconveyance of the shares in question can
only exist against the original assignees and (b) private respondents’ cause of
action, if any, had already prescribed. As to the first, it states:

“On the question of cause of action, the Court notes that as
the complaint itself avers, the petitioners’ shares in the Continental Bank
were assigned to the firms already above specified (which Herminio Disini
allegedly controlled), and not to the Central Bank. It is therefore fairly obvious that if any claim for reconveyance
may be prosecuted, it should be prosecuted against the Disini companies.”^[26]

This observation becomes even more appropriate
in the case of the petitioners because they did not have any transaction with
either the private respondents or the Disini companies. NDC and AMEX derived their rights from the
CB and the NDC, respectively. Except
for the allegation in paragraph 22 of private respondents’ complaint in Civil
Case No. 15707 that petitioners herein, having actual or constructive notice of
the fraudulent acquisition of the shares by the Disini corporations, are
obligated under the principle of constructive trust to reconvey to them such
shares including the corresponding stock/cash dividends earned, there is
nothing therein that even remotely intimates that petitioners had violated any
of the private respondents’ right. This
is an essential element of a cause of action.^[27]

This Court cannot divine the reason or cause why private
respondents did not implead the original assignees in Civil Case No.
15707. For purposes of reconveyance of
the questioned shares of stock, they are the indispensable parties. No final determination of the case between
the private respondents and the impleaded agents (CB, NDC and AMEX) can be had
without the said original assignees because the reliefs prayed for against said
impleaded defendants are precisely anchored on the voidability or nullity of
the deeds of assignments flowing from contracts to which these impleaded
defendants are not parties.

Joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and a complaint may
be dismissed if an indispensable party is not impleaded in the complaint. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
provides:

“SECTION 7. Compulsory
joinder of indispensable parties. — Parties in interest without whom no
final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants.”

When an indispensable party is not before
the court, the action should be dismissed.^[28]
Ordinarily, however, a reasonable opportunity to amend the pleading must be
given, and the action should not be dismissed, except when the plaintiff fails
or refuses to include said party, or the latter cannot be sued.^[29]

As to prescription, this Court, in said
G.R. No. 90365 ruled:

“The next question is whether or not any action for
reconveyance has nevertheless prescribed, on the bases of provisions governing
reconveyance.

The rule anent prescription on recovery of movables (shares of
stock in this case) is expressed in Article 1140 of the Civil Code, which we
quote:

Art. 1140. Actions to recover movables shall prescribe
eight years from the time the possession thereof is lost, unless the possessor
had acquired the ownership by prescription for a less period, according to
Article 1132, and without prejudice the provisions of articles 559, 1505, and
1133.

As it provides, Article 1140 is subject to the provisions of
Articles 1132 and 1133 of the Code, governing acquisitive prescription, in
relation to Articles 559 and 1505 thereof. Under Article 1132:

Art. 1132. The ownership of
movables prescribes through uninterrupted possession for four years in good
faith.

The ownership of personal property also prescribes through
uninterrupted possession for eight years without need of any other condition.

With regard to the right of the owner to recover personal property
lost or of which he has been illegally deprived, as well as with respect to
movables acquired in a public sale, fair, or market or from a merchant’s store
the provisions of articles 559 and 1505 of this Code shall be observed.

acquisitive prescription sets in after
uninterrupted possession of four years provided there is good faith and upon
the lapse of eight years, if bad faith is present. Where, however, the thing was acquired through a crime, the
offender can not acquire ownership by prescription under Article 1133 which we
quote:

Art. 1133. Movables
possessed through a crime can never be acquired through prescription by the
offender.

Please note that under the above Article, the benefits of
prescription are denied to the offender; nonetheless, if the thing has
meanwhile passed to a subsequent holder, prescription begins to run (four or
eight years depending on the existence of good faith).^[30]

For purposes of extinctive prescription vis-a-vis movables,
we therefore understand the periods to be:

1. Four years, if the possessor is in good faith;

2. Eight years in
all other cases, except where the loss was due to a crime in which case, the
offender can not acquire the movable by prescription, and an action to recover
it from him is imprescriptible.

It is evident, for purposes of the complaint in question, that the
petitioners had at most eight years within which to pursue a reconveyance,
reckoned from the loss of the shares in 1977, when the petitioner Vicente Tan
executed the various agreements in which he conveyed the same in favor of the
Executive Consultants, Inc., Orobel Property Management, Inc., and Antolum
Trading Corporation.

We are hard put to say, in this regard, that the petitioners’
action is after all, imprescriptible pursuant to the provisions of Article 1133
of the Civil Code, governing actions to recover loss by means of a crime. For one thing, the complaint was not brought
upon this theory. For another, there is
nothing there that suggests that the loss of the shares was indeed made
possible by a criminal act, other than simple bad faith and probably abuse of
right:

x x x

Since the complaint was filed on January 13, 1987, ten years more
or less after the petitioners transferred the shares in question, it is clear
that the petitioners have come to court too late.

We can not accepts the petitioners’ contention that the period
during which authoritarian rule was in force had interrupted prescription and
that the same began to run only on February 25, 1986, when the Aquino
government took power. It is true that
under Article 1154:

Art. 1154. The period
during which the obligee was prevented by a fortuitous event from enforcing his
right is not reckoned against him.

fortuitous events have the effect of
tolling the period of prescription. However, we can not say, as a universal rule, that the period from September
21, 1972 through February 25, 1986 involves a force majeure. Plainly, we can not box in the ‘dictatorial’
period within the term without distinction, and without, by necessity,
suspending all liabilities, however demandable, incurred during that period,
including perhaps those ordered by this Court to be paid. While this Court is cognizant of acts of the
last regime, especially political acts, that might have indeed precluded the
enforcement of liability against that regime and/or its minions, the Court is
not inclined to make quite a sweeping pronouncement, considering especially the
unsettling effects such a pronouncement is likely to bring about. It is our opinion that claims should be
taken on a case-to-case basis. This
selective rule is compelled, among others, by the fact that not all those
imprisoned or detained by the past dictatorship were true political
oppositionists, or, for that matter, innocent of any crime or wrongdoing. Indeed, not a few of them were manipulators
and scoundrels.

The petitioner Vicente Tan claims that from June, 1974 through
December, 1977, he was under detention; that sometime in August, 1977, the
Central Bank lodged six criminal cases against him, along with several others,
with Military Commission No. 5 in connection with alleged violation of the
Central Bank Act, falsification of documents, and estafa, that while in
detention, he was made to execute various agreements in which he conveyed the
shares of stock in question; and that ‘[u]nder the foregoing factual setting
… it would be foolhardy on the part of petitioners to institute … [any]
action for reconveyance . . .’

The records show, however, that although under detention, Vicente
Tan:

1. Commenced in July
1976, Civil Case No. 103359 of (sic) the defunct Court of First Instance of
Manila, ‘to mandatorily enjoin the Central Bank as receiver of Continental
Bank, to takeover from ‘NISA’ the control and management and assets of Vicente
Tan and his affiliate corporations’;

2. Was ably
represented by competent counsel, Atty. Norberto Quisumbing, throughout;

3. Filed with this
Court a petition to stop the trial of the criminal cases pending against him
with the Military Commission No. 5 and succeeded in obtaining a temporary
restraining order.

On top of those facts abovementioned, he:

1. Asked the Court of
First Instance to order the Central Bank ‘to proceed to rehabilitate
Continental Bank by extending to it such emergency loans and advances as may be
needed for its rehabilitation. . .’

2. Wrote on July 15,
1977, the Central Bank expressing his approval in the reopening and
rehabilitation of Continental Bank.

We are, therefore, convinced from Vicente Tan’s very behavior, that
detention was not an impediment to a judicial challenge, and the fact of the
matter was that he was successful in obtaining judicial assistance. Under these circumstances, we can not
declare detention, or authoritarian rule for that matter, as a fortuitous event
insofar as he was concerned, that interrupted prescription.

To be sure, there is nothing in the petition which would remotely
suggest, assuming that Vicente Tan could not have freely and intelligently
acted during the period of martial rule, that his co-petitioners Victan &
Company, Inc., Transworld Investment Corporation, First International
Investment Company, Inc., Far East Petroleum & Minerals Corporation, and
Philcontrust International Corporation, could not have similarly acted during
the martial law regime and shortly thereafter. As far as they are therefore concerned, the Court has even better reason
to invoke prescription because none of them acted and none now claims that it
could not have acted.”^[31]

Private respondents’ motion to reconsider the above decision,
especially insofar as it dismissed Civil Case No. 15707, was denied with FINALITY
in the resolution of this Court of 3 May 1991.^[32]

The foregoing disquisitions render unnecessary further action on
the remaining assigned errors in this petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of respondent Court in
C.A.G.R. SP No. 18865 promulgated on 11 April 1991 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE while its Decision therein, promulgated on 30 April 1990, is REINSTATED.

Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., (Chairman), see
dissenting opinion.

Feliciano, J., no part.

---

^[1]
Per Associate Justice Emeterio C. Cui, concurred in by Associate Justices
Ricardo J. Francisco and Alicia V. Sempio Diy with Associate Justices Jose C.
Campos, Jr. and Nicolas Lepeña, Jr., dissenting; Rollo, 46-51.

^[2]
Per Associate Justice Nicolas P. Lapeña, Jr., concurred in by Associate
Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Emeterio C. Cui.

^[3]
Entitled “National Development Company and American Express Bank, Ltd, vs.
Hon. Ignacio Capulong, et al.”

^[4]
Rollo, 68-83.

^[5]
Per Judge Ignacio Capulong, CA decision of 30 April 1990, 3; Rollo, 62.

^[6]
Rollo, 62.

^[7]
Id., 14.

^[8]
CA’s Decision dated 30 April 1990, 3; Id., 62.

^[9]
Id.

^[10]
Id.

^[11]
Id., 15.

^[12]
Rollo, 62.

^[13]
AMEX’s Manifestation filed on 5 May 1992.

^[14]
Rollo, 60-67.

^[15]
Rollo, 52.

^[16]
Id., 53-58.

^[17]
Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo, 45-51.

^[18]
Petition, 13-14.

^[19]
Rollo, 88-101.

^[20]
Id., 85.

^[21]
Id., 117, et seq.

^[22]
Id., 131, et seq.; 168, et seq.

^[23]
Id., 198, et seq.

^[24]
Id., 201.

^[25]
195 SCRA 355 [1991].

^[26]
At pages 369-370.

^[27]
Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947].

^[28]
People vs. Hon. Rodriguez, 106 Phil. 325 [1959].

^[29]
Cortez vs. Avila, 101 Phil. 205 [1957].

^[30]
Citing IV PARAS, Civil Code of the Philippines
Annotated, 1985 ed., 30.

^[31]
At pages 364-369.

^[32]
Rollo of G.R. No. 90365, 474.

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