THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROSALINO NECERIO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The accused-appellant, Rosalino Necerio, was charged with the
crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 5141 before the Regional Trial Court, 5th
Judicial Region, Branch 2, Legazpi City. The information filed in said case reads, as follows (p. 7, Rollo):

“That on (or) about the 15th day of June, 1990 at about 9:30
o’clock in the evening, at Bgy. Palanog, Municipality of Camalig, Province of
Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above-named accused with intent to kill, enter(ed) the dwelling of Salvador
Orogo y Nantes, and with treachery and evident (premeditation), did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and stab said
Salvador Orogo y Nantes, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wound which
directly caused his death.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.”

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision
on February 25, 1991, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows (p.
28, Rollo):

“PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court finds the accused ROSALINO
NECERIO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of having killed SALVADOR OROGO, with
the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery. Then likewise were present the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and having been committed in the duelling of the victim. Accused is therefore sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
victim, the amounts of P30,000.00 for the fact of death of Salvador Orogo;
P30,000.00 as moral damages and P15,000.00, as exemplary damages.

“COSTS AGAINST THE ACCUSED.

“SO ORDERED.”

Hence, the present appeal.

The facts of this case, as found by the trial court are, as
follows (pp. 20-23, Rollo):

“Salvador Orogo is a family man. He has a wife, with four children. As is the usual way in barangays away from the center of the town,
people retire to rest for the night quite early. Herein family of Salvador Orogo was no exception. At about 8:00 o’clock that evening of June
15, 1990, the couple together with the children were already laying down for
the night rest. Considering that the
alleged incident happened at about 9:30 o’clock in the evening, there was only
one eye-witness to the occurrence. And
this was the wife Ludita Orogo.

“She testified that in the evening of June 15, 1990, she was
already laying down in the sala of their house, together with her husband and
three (3) children. Their house
measures about 2 1/2 meters by 4 meters. It has no room, so they just sleep in the sala which is the main house
itself. It has a door but has no
lock. It is being (sic) closed by just
sliding it. While she was then laying
down on her side, nursing her youngest child (who was) four months old, her
eyelids heavy and tired with the (dullness) of the day’s household chores,
sub-conscious and half asleep and nearly to succumb to the invitation of sleep,
she was awakened to consciousness by a sound created by the opening of the
door. She just didn’t mind, thinking it
was one of her children wanting to answer the call of nature. Somebody however suddenly barged into the
house. She recognized that somebody to
be the accused herein ROSALINO NECERIO whom she identified in open court. She was able to recognize the accused, although
it was 9:30 o’clock in the evening because they had a kerosene lamp lighted for
the night specially due to the fact that she was nursing a four-month old
child. This kerosene lamp was placed on
top of a biscuit can, located in one corner of the house as shown on the
picture marked as Exhibit ‘B-2’. This
kerosene lamp has a wick the size of the small finger, so that it was bright
enough to (illuminate) the whole house. She (knows) the accused because he usually goes to their house. He is a compadre of her husband and in fact
her husband acted as father for the accused when the latter asked for the hand
of Magdalena Neo in marriage.

“(Ludita) Orogo alleged that the accused once inside, went near her
husband and immediately stabbed the latter on the left side of the body. After having stabbed her husband, accused
pulled the knife and poked the same on witness and warned her not to inform
anybody or else he will come back and kill her. After warning her, the accused left. It was only after the accused left that she was able to shout for
help.

“Accused Rosalino Necerio interposed the (defense) of alibi. He stated that in the evening of June 15,
1990, he was in the house of Tito Neo, the father of his fiancee Magdalena Neo. With him in the house were Tito Neo,
Magdalena Neo, and (sic) Amador Neo and Gilbert Navera.

“It was about 9:30 o’clock in the evening of June 15, 1990, while
he and Amador Neo were already sleeping; when they heard shouts outside. Amador then asked him that they will (sic)
verify. The shouts were coming from the
house of Salvador Orogo and they were asking for help. So accused together with Amador Neo, went to
the house of Salvador Orogo. He took a
look at the cadaver but did not go up to the house. He did not approach the widow. He did not visit the family of the deceased the morning after the
incident. He did not accompany the
cadaver to the Municipal Building. He
did not attend the wake nor attend the funeral. He was arrested on June 21,1990, in the house of Tito Neo. From June 15, 1990 when the incident
happened up to the time of his arrest he stayed in the house of Tito Neo, which
was about 200 meters away from the house of Salvador Orogo.

“This testimony of the accused was corroborated by Magdalena Neo
and Amador Neo.”

In this appeal, the accused-appellant assigns the following
errors committed by the trial court (p. 34, Rollo):

“FIRST ERROR: The court a
quo gravely erred in holding that the guilt of the accused-appellant was proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

“SECOND ERROR: The court a
quo gravely erred in disregarding accused-appellant’s defense of alibi.

“THIRD ERROR: The court a quo gravely erred in failing to
take into account the absence of Motive on the part of the accused-appellant to
kill his close friend and future cousin-in-law.”

To substantiate the aforementioned assignment of errors, the
accused-appellant asseverates that the testimonies of Ludita Orogo, far from
being credible, are replete with inaccuracies and inconsistencies. During the preliminary investigation, she
testified that the accused-appellant poked at her the knife dripping with
blood. However, during the
cross-examination, she contradicted herself when she testified that no blood
came out from the wound. Also, in her
sworn statement, she stated that on June 20, 1990 (should be June 10, 1990),
there was a heated argument between her husband and the accused-appellant right
inside their residence. She did not
know what the argument was about because she was outside nursing their
baby. These statements are inconsistent
with her testimony during the trial that while she was inside the house, her
husband told the accused-appellant that he is so boastful, it is better for him
not to proceed with the marriage. Furthermore, it has been established that from the time of the stabbing
incident up to the time the accused-appellant was arrested, he did not leave
the place.

The appeal utterly lacks merit.

We are in conformity with the contention of the Office of the
Solicitor General that (pp. 64-65, Rollo):

“These alleged inconsistencies are too insignificant to affect
Ludita (Orogo’s) credibility as a witness. Inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness which are merely de
minimis would not impair the credibility of said witness (People v.
Almenario, 172 SCRA 268 [1989]; People v. Muñoz, 170 SCRA 107 [1989]). Such minor lapses did not impair the
essential truthfulness of Ludita Orogo’s narration (People v. Centeno, 172 SCRA
607 [1989]).”

The fact that the accused-appellant, from the time the crime was committed
up to the time he was arrested, stayed in the house of Tito Neo, does not work
to his advantage. He must have felt
safe in the thought that by threatening Ludita Orogo (supra), he had
succeeded in instilling fear in her heart, that is why he did not bother to
escape (People v. Jimenez, G.R. Nos. 92457­-58, August 12, 1991, 200 SCRA 539).

We quote with favor the ratiocination of the trial court, the
guilt of the accused-appellant having been established beyond reasonable doubt
(pp. 23-27, Rollo):

“We are all aware of the rulings of our Supreme Court that alibi is
a weak defense in the sense that it is so easy to concoct and fabricate. But then even if it is weak, it does not
relieve the prosecution of its prime responsibility of proving the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. It
does not set the prosecution free from introducing proof that requires moral
certainty, ‘a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience
of those who are to act on it’ (People vs. Lavarias, 23 SCRA 1301). So that if after investigation of the whole
proof, there is inability of the mind to rest easy upon the certainty of the
guilt of the accused, then there is reasonable doubt (People vs. Lasada, 18
Phil. 90; People vs. Alipis, 14 SCRA 297), and the accused is entitled to an
acquittal. ‘Mas vale que queden sin
castigar diez reos presuntos, que se catigue uno inocente’ (People vs. Cunanan,
19 SCRA 769).

“We are likewise aware of rulings of our highest Court to the
effect that alibi cannot be effective against the positive identification of
the accused and it is not impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

“For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused
was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but it must likewise be
demonstrated that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time of the commission.

“The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by credible witnesses as the authors of the Crime
(People vs. Mercado, et al., G.R. No. L-39511, Apr. 28/80; People vs. De Jesus,
L-38309, 23 Oct. ‘78; People vs. Matitim, L-56261, 21 Jan. ‘83; People vs.
Reana, L-32106, 14 Feb. ‘83).

“In the case at bar, is the reason and conscience of the court
convinced and satisfied with moral certainty regarding the guilt of the
accused? Can the mind of the court rest
easy after a careful examination of the proofs, upon the certainty of guilt?

“There was only one eyewitness to the incident herein. This was the wife of the victim. She positively identified the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime. She was able
to recognize the accused because there was that lighted kerosene lamp in one
corner of their house. The house was
only about 2 1/2 by 4 meters. There
were no partitions or rooms, so that there was nothing that could in any manner
detract or obstruct the light from the kerosene lamp. As testified to by Ludita Orogo, wife of the victim, which
testimony was never impugn(ed) by the defense, the wick of that kerosene lamp
was the size of her small finger. With
such a size of a wick, the court could readily see that it could give off a
steady and even light enough to brighten a room of two and one half meters by four
meters. The more it would assume prominence
in brightness being the only glow in the dark. She could not have been mistaken with the identity of the accused, the
latter being familiar as he had been frequenting their residence. There was shown no sinister motive for the
widow to falsely impute such a dastardly act to the herein accused.

“The court carefully observed the demeanor of the widow when she
testified. Her testimony was
clear. It is straightforward. The court found no signs whatsoever of any
basis to doubt her narration. There was
even a point in time when (she) shed in (sic) tears while testifying.

“The testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible is
sufficient to support a conviction (People vs. V. Aldeguer, G.R. No. L-47991,
Apr. 3/90). The testimony of only one witness,
if credible and positive and if it satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt,
is sufficient to convict (People vs. Cutura, 4 SCRA 663).

“Accused testified that he was at the house of Tito Neo, his
future-in-law at the time of the incident, which was only about 200 meters away
from the scene of the crime. It was
therefore not impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the incident at
the time of commission.

“The court was not quite impressed with the testimony of the
corroborating witnesses for the defense. Magdalena Neo is a (fiancee) of the accused. Amador Neo is a future brother-in-law. Accused has already been helping in the household chores of his
fiancee. He has been doing menial jobs
therein. He even was already allowed to
stay in his fiancee’s house. True,
relationship is not a ground for disqualification of a witness, but (in
connection with the) defense of alibi this mould not substantially contribute
to the cause of the defense.

“In cases of positive identification of the accused by reliable
witnesses, it has been held that the defense of alibi must be established by
full, clear and satisfactory evidence (U.S. vs. Pascua, 1 Phil. 631; U.S. vs.
Oxiles, 29 Phil. 587; People vs. Pili, 51 Phil. 965; People vs. De la Cruz, 76
Phil. 601).

“Oral evidence of alibi is so easily concocted and fabricated and
usually so unreliable that it can rarely be given credence (People vs. Layos,
60 Phil. 224; People vs. Moradas, 70 Phil. 558). Hence if oral proof is sought to establish alibi, it must not be
loose, vague and doubtful, but firm, consistent and trustworthy to the extent
that when hurled against the evidence for the prosecution, the impact must
perforce overwhelm the latter (People vs. Masilungan, L-9733, Sept. 30, 1958).

“The Court honestly believes that the accused was positively
identified by the widow. It was not
quite impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime when it was
committed. The alibi advance(d) by the
accused and his witnesses was not satisfactory to the court. The corroborating witnesses (have) some
reasons for being biased and partial.

“The actuations of the accused after the incident also (did not)
help any in his cause. It was quite
unnatural. The victim was a compadre of
the accused. The victim served as
father to the accused when the latter presented himself and asked for the hand
of Magdalena Neo in marriage. Yet from
the time of the incident on June 15, to the time of his arrest on June 21,
accused never did visit or attend the wake for the victim. He just stayed in the house of Tito Neo
which was only about 200 meters away from the house of the victim. x x x.”

The trial court took into account the aggravating circumstances
of nighttime, dwelling and treachery (pp. 27-28, Rollo):

“The incident happened at about 9:30 o’clock in the evening. The accused must have purposely sought the
cover of darkness to conceal his crime. As testified by him, he and the victim were together during the day of
June 15, helping in the processing of copra. But he still waited for darkness to envelope the barangay before
committing the felony. The crime was
likewise committed inside the house of the victim.

“The court likewise finds that there was treachery in the
commission of the crime by the accused. The victim was sleeping. The
attack was sudden. The victim thus had
no opportunity to properly defend himself, from the onslaught of the accused.”

It correctly appreciated treachery and dwelling. However, nighttime should not have been
considered a separate aggravating circumstance as this was absorbed by alevosia
(People v. Espiritu, G.R. No. 80406,
November 20, 1990, 191 SCRA 503; People v. Bueza, G.R. No. 79619, August 20,
1990, 188 SCRA 683; People v. Tasarra, et al., G.R. No. 85531, December 10,
1990, 192 SCRA 266).

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that the indemnity for the death of
Salvador Orogo is increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.