G.R. No. 98111. April 07, 1993
UNION OF FILIPINO WORKERS, (UFW), PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION) AND MAKATI SPORTS CLUB, INC., RESPONDENTS.
NOCON, J.:
This is a petition on certiorari of the Decision of the
NLRC dated February 7, 1991 which dismissed NLRC Case No. NCR-00-08-03998-89 entitled Union of Filipino Workers v. Makati Sports Club,
Inc. and the Resolution dated March 6, 1991 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of said decision.
The case before the labor arbiter was for violation of Rep. Act
No. 6727 and underpayment of separation pay filed by petitioner in behalf of
its members against private respondent.
The labor arbiter’s decision, which was reversed by the NLRC on
appeal, ordered private respondent Makati Sports Club, Inc. to pay the
additional P300.00 monthly wage increase and to compute separation pay
according to the legislated wage increase without crediting the CBA wage
increase.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Union of Filipino Workers (UFW) is the certified
bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of private respondent Makati
Sports Club, Inc.[1]
Private respondent Club is a non-stock, non-Âprofit and non-commercial private
membership club whose primary objective is to provide athletic facilities.[2]
Petitioner and private respondent were negotiating for a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) when two notable events
happened. Private respondent’s
clubhouse burned down on April 1, 1989, resulting in the threat of
retrenchment.[3]
The government also announced the imminent passage of a P25.00 daily wage
increase for the private sector employees.[4]
When negotiations reached a deadlock, petitioner filed a notice
of strike. The National Conciliation
and Mediation Board intervened and conciliation proceedings went underway. An agreement was reached on May 17, 1989 stipulating the
following:
“1. On the CBA
deadlock issues, the parties agreed as follows:
(a) Wage increase: P750.00
1st year – P300.00
2nd year – 250.00
3rd year – 200.00
Legislated wages shall be credited to the
said wage increases.
(b) Effectivity : January 1,
1989
(c) financial assistance: P1,300
(d) signing bonus: P1,300
(e) no other CBA deadlock issue remains unresolved
“2. On the retrenchment issue the parties agreed
as follows:
(a) between 90 to 100 employees shall be retrenched
(b) separation pay shall be one month for every year of service
(c) implementation of retrenchment program shall be as follows:
1st phase (voluntary
basis) – not later than May 26, 1989
2nd phase (involuntary basis) ? ‘last in first out’ on a per
job classification basis.
“3. Both parties shall
finalize the CBA and present the same to the Board of directors for final
approval after which the signing ceremony will take place.” (Minutes, May 17, 1989; Underscoring
supplied)[5]
On June 19, 1989, the
proposed CBA based on the foregoing agreement was approved by private
respondent’s Board of Directors and signed by the parties on June 22, 1989. It provides, among others:
“ARTICLE
VIII
“WAGE
INCREASE
“Section 1. ACROSS THE
BOARD SALARY INCREASE: The Club shall grant to all regular employees within the
appropriate bargaining unit a general wage increase across the board in
accordance with the schedule below.
a) Effective January 1, 1989 –
P300.00 a month per employee
b) Effective January 1, 1990 –
P250.00 a month per employee
c) Effective January 1, 1991 –
P200.00 a month per
employee
“Provided however, that only the increase in basic wages and
service charges shall retroact
to January 1, 1989 and there shall be no back computation on back payment of
any other benefits accruing or arising from such retroactivity, including but
not limited to, overtime premium, night differential, leave and/ or other
payments.
“The employees backwages of P300.00 per month per employee
from January 1, 1989 to May 31, 1989, or a total of P1,500.00
per employee shall be paid not later July 5, 1989.
“The legislated increases above stipulated shall be credited
to and shall form part of any salary increases that may be mandated by the
Philippine government during each year in which case such increases shall take
effect.”[6]
(Italics supplied)
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6727 took effect. It provided for a P25.00 daily wage increase
across-the-board to those receiving P100.00 or less daily wages. Section 4 (d) of the law provides:
“Section 4. x x x
(d) If expressly provided for and agreed upon the collective bargaining
agreements, all increases in the daily wage rates granted by the employers
three (3) months before the effectivity of this Act shall be credited as
compliance with the increase in the wage rates prescribed herein x x x.”
(Italics supplied).
The Rules and Regulations implementing Rep. Act No. 6727,[7]
specifically Section 8, provides:
“Section, 8. Creditable
Wage Increase
a. No wage increase shall
be credited as compliance with the increase prescribed under the Act unless
expressly provided under collective bargaining agreements and such wage
increase shall be granted not earlier than April 1, 1989 but not later than
July 1, 1989. Where the wage
increase granted is less than the prescribed increase under the Act, the
employer shall pay the difference.” (Italics supplied).
Private respondent applied the aforequoted rule in crediting the
P300.00 monthly wage increase per employee provided in their CBA to the wage
increase provided for by Rep. Act No. 6727. The separation pay of the retrenched employees was computed on the basis
of their basic pay, which included the P300.00 CBA wage increase, but did not
include the wage increase granted under Rep. Act No. 6727.
Petitioner protested the crediting of the CBA increases to the
legislated increases. It filed a
complaint for violation of Rep. Act No. 6727 and underpayment of separation
pay.[8]
Petitioner claims that under section 4 (d) of Rep. Act No. 6727 and Section 8
(a) of the Rules and Regulations implementing said law, crediting of CBA wage
increases to the compliance of Rep. Act No. 6727 is allowed where the following
conditions are met, namely: a) the CBA expressly provides for crediting; and b)
the wage increases must have been granted within three (3) months prior to the
effectivity of the Act or within the period from April 1, 1989 to July 1, 1989.[9]
Petitioner agrees that the CBA provides, in Article VIII thereof,
the crediting of CBA increases to future legislated wages. However, petitioner maintains that the wage
increase of P300.00 monthly for the first year of the CBA, though signed only
on June 22, 1989, is retroactive to January 1, 1989. Having been made effective on January 1, 1989, the CBA wage
increase is thus, outside of the time frame provided for in Rep. Act No. 6727
and its Implementing Rules of three (3) months prior to the effectivity of said
Act or the period from April 1, 1989 to July 1, 1989.[10]
Hence, petitioner claims that the CBA wage increase of P300.00 for the year
1989 cannot be validly credited as in compliance with the increase prescribed
under Rep. Act No. 6727. The crediting
made by private respondent was therefore illegal, and resulted in an erroneous
computation of the separation pay for the retrenched employees.[11]
On the other hand, private respondent contends that the CBA
expressly provided for the crediting of the CBA wage increases to the wage
increases mandated by the government and that this was the real intention of
the parties. That the CBA wage
increases, having been granted on June 19, 1989, when the same was approved by
private respondent’s Board of Directors, although made retroactive to January
1, 1989, still falls within the period of crediting under Republic Act No.
6727. Therefore, its act of crediting
the CBA increase to the legislated increase is legal and the computation of
separation pay valid and correct.[12]
On March 12, 1990, Labor Arbiter Arthur L. Amansec rendered a
Decision[13]
in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which, reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering respondent Club to:
1. Pay the present
employees the additional P300.00 monthly each retroactive as of July 1, 1989
with two percent (2%) monthly interest until compliance is made;
2. To pay the differentials
of separation pay to all retrenched employees in the amount of P652.00
multiplied by their length of service; and
3. To pay the amount
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award as attorney’s fees
in favor of complainant’s counsel.
The Corporation (Sic) Auditing Examiner of this Office is hereby directed to compute
immediately the total award of this case, and to submit the same to the
undersigned for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.”
On appeal to the NLRC by private respondent the decision of the
Labor Arbiter was reversed and set aside for lack of cause of action.[14]
In reversing the labor arbiter’s ruling, the NLRC held, and We quote:
“We find respondent’s appeal meritorious.
“The proximity of the signing of the herein parties’ CBA
providing for the respondent’s employees’ wage increases on 22 June 1989 and
the date of the passage of Rep. Act No. 6727 on June 19, 1989, albeit the same
was made effective only on 1 July 1989, after fifteen days from its
publication, stresses the fact that the impending passage of the latter was
foremost in the minds of the herein parties when they inked the following
stipulation:
‘Legislated wages shall be credited to said wage increases’
(Agreement dated 17 May 1989)
and again the following:
The increases above stipulated shall be credited to and shall form part of any salary increase
that may be mandated during each year in
which case such increase shall take effect.’ (CBA dated 22 June 1989)
“From the aforequoted covenants, the intendment of the herein
parties appertaining the crediting of their wage increases under the CBA to
government issuances had been clear and admit of no other interpretation other
than what said stipulations purport to be. As aptly stated by the
Supreme Court in the case of Filipinas Golf and Country Club Inc. vs. NLRC,
PTGWO and Local Chapter 424, G.R. No. 62918, August 23, 1989. The intention of the parties whether or not
to equate benefits under a Collective Bargaining Agreement with those granted
by law must prevail and be given effect.’
“Moreover, complainant capitalizing on the period of coverage
for the crediting of said CBA wage increases to Rep. Act No. 6727 argues that
said CBA wage increases were given on 1 January 1989 beyond the period of
coverage, in question.
“We disagree. Records
clearly show that it was only sometime on 17 May 1989, when conciliation was
conducted on this very issue of wage increase, resulting in a deadlock in CBA
negotiations that an agreement was reached to give complainant’s members this
added benefit then still made subject to the approval of respondent’s Board of
Directors.
“It can be gainsaid therefore, that prior to the approval of
said wage increase by respondent’s Board of Directors on 19 June 1989, there
was no wage increase to speak of Ergo, as of 18 June 1989, prior to the approval
in point, there was nothing that can be credited to any wage increase mandated
by law, not even Rep. Act No. 6727. Complainant’s assertion to the effect that a wage increase was already
granted on 1 January 1989 is absolutely misleading and untenable.
“In point of fact, the provision contained in the CBA
particularly the following:
The employees backwages of
P300.00 per month per employee from January 1, 1989 to May 31, 1989, or a total
of P1,500.00 per employee shall be
paid not later than July 5, 1989.
equivocably show that the benefit was given
not later than July 5, 1989, as granted on approval of the same by respondent’s
Board of Directors on 19 June 1989.
“The retroactivity of said grant on 1 January 1989 is of no
moment and does not to our mind alter the intendment of the parties when they
entered into the agreement on ‘crediting’ in
question. Besides, suffice it
for us to point out, that regardless of the provision of Rep. Act No. 6727, the
CBA of the parties have effectively become the law between themselves.
“All told, we find and so hold that there was a valid
crediting by respondent of the
wage increase under the CBA to the mandated wage increase provided for under
Rep. Act No. 6727. xxx.”[15]
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a
resolution dated March 6, 1991.[16]
Hence this petition. Petitioner seeks relief from private respondent’s “violations of
law and public respondent’s arbitrary, nay, capricious exercise of
judgment/discretion.”[17]
In order to resolve
whether the public respondent acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, We
must dispose of the three issues raised by petitioner.
First, whether or not the CBA wage increase can be credited to
the wage increase mandated by Rep.
Act No. 6727; second, whether or not there was underpayment of separation pay; and third, whether
or not public respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion by exercising jurisdiction over the
appeal of private respondent.
As to the first issue,
may private respondent validly credit the P300.00 monthly wage increase given
under the CBA to the P25.00 daily wage increase mandated by Rep. Act 6727?
According to the law,
crediting is allowed: a) “if expressly provided for and agreed upon in the
collective bargaining agreements; and b) such increases were granted by the
employers three months before the effectivity of this Act xxx;”[18]
It is undisputed that the
CBA expressly provided for the crediting of wage increase under Art.
VIII, Section 1, last paragraph, which We quote:
“The increases above stipulated shall be credited to and shall
form part of any salary increases that may be mandated by the Philippine government during each year in which case such
increases shall take effect.”[19]
The intention of the parties is clear and unmistakable. There is no doubt the first condition for
valid crediting was met with the inclusion of the provision quoted above.
The second condition to be met refers to the time in which the CBA
wage increase was given. It must have
been granted between April 1 and July 1, 1989 in order for the wage increase to
be validly credited to the increase granted by RA 6727.
Petitioner tenuously argues that even though the CBA was signed
on June 22, 1989, the wage increase was not granted on the same day. The wage increase was granted on January 1,
1989, the date to which the increase was made effective or made
retroactive. Having been ‘granted’ on
January 1, 1989 and not June 22, 1989, the wage increase fell outside of the
period allowed by law for valid crediting citing in support thereof the case of
Filipinas Golf and Country Club v.
NLRC,[20]
wherein it was held “that in making the wage increases retroactive, the
parties to all intents and purposes dated the existence of the CBA back to the
effective date of the increase.”
We are not persuaded.
While said case involved a similar question of creditability of
wage increases, the above quoted statement was made not as a dogmatic rule, but
only to support the conclusion of the case in favor of creditability of
legislative wage increases to CBA wage increases because such was expressed in
their CBA. The court in said case also
held:
“A survey of relevant decision of this Court fails to support the proposition implicit in the Labor
Arbiter’s decision that benefits granted by law may be claimed separately from
and in addition to those granted by collective bargaining agreements under any
and all circumstances. What seems, on
the contrary, to be the common thrust of applicable rulings is that the
intention of the parties whether or not to equate benefits under a collective
bargaining agreement with those granted by law must prevail and be given
effect.[21]
“x x x The manifest will and intent of the parties to treat
the legislated increases as equivalent pro tanto to those stipulated in
their collective bargaining agreement must be respected and given effect.”[22]
The fact that the CBA wage increase was made effective on January 1, 1989 does not necessarily
mean that the wage increase was granted on that date and not on the date of its signing. We have seen that the statement from Filipinas
Golf v. NLRC which
petitioner used, has failed to sustain its stand because it has no
applicability to the case at bar. Before the CBA was signed, there was no wage increase to speak of. Hence it is only logical that the grant of
the wage increase by the CBA, is considered to have been made at the time the
CBA was signed on June 22, 1989.
We agree with public respondent’s findings regarding the
intention of the parties as regards crediting and the retroactivity of the wage increase benefits. The proximity of the signing of the CBA on
June 22, 1989 to the passage of Rep. Act No. 6727, on June 19, 1989 coupled
with the CBA stipulation favoring creditability, bolster the conclusion that
the parties did not intend the duplication of wage increase benefits, but
rather crediting the CBA wage increase as part of the legislated increase.
Public respondent NLRC also held that “(t)he retroactivity
of said grant on January 1989 is of no moment
and does not to Our mind alter the intendment of the parties when they entered
into the agreement on ‘crediting’ in question. Besides, regardless of the provision of Rep. Act No. 6727, the CBA of
the parties have effectively become the law between themselves.”
The CBA wage increase having been granted on June 22, 1989, or
within the period for ‘crediting’ as expressly provided in said CBA, We find
that private respondent correctly credited the CBA wage increase to comply with
the mandate of Rep. Act No. 6727 for a P25.00 daily wage increase.
We now proceed to the issue of underpayment of separation
pay. Petitioner claims that the
sixty-one retrenched employees were all entitled to the P25.00 daily wage increase
because the effectivity of the retrenchment was after the effectivity of Rep.
Act No. 6727 on July 1, 1989. Hence,
the same must be made part of the computation of their separation pay.
Private respondent on the other hand, contends that the wage increment
under Republic Act No. 6727 was not included in the computation of separation
pay because the effective date of the
retrenchment was June 30, 1989 and before the effectivity of Rep. Act 6727, and
because the retrenched employees already executed affidavits of quit claim.[23]
There is no dispute that the retrenchment could be validly
done. Petitioner raises the issue of
the amount of separation pay that the retrenched employees are supposed to
receive. To resolve this matter, it is
necessary to determine the effectivity date of the retrenchment undertaken by
private respondent. If it took place
before July 1, 1989, then the wage increase mandated by Rep. Act No. 6727
should not be included in the computation of separation pay. If it took place on or after July 1, 1989,
then the increase should form part of said separation pay.
Public respondent NLRC ruled that there was valid crediting of
the CBA wage increase of P300.00 to the legislated wage increase of P25.00
daily or P652.00 monthly, and
concluded that:
“x x x. We find no
flaw whatsoever in the computation of the retrenched employees’ separation pay
contrary to complainant’s averments to that effect.” (p. 12, Decision,
February 7, 1991)[24]
We agree with the decision[25] of
the labor arbiter on the matter of separation pay.
Article 283 of the Labor Code, on retrenchment reads:
“xxx. The employer may
also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of
labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing
or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this title, by serving a written notice on
the workers and the Ministry of Labor
and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. xxx. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses xxx, the separation pay shall
be one month or at least one-half pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. A fraction of at least six (6)
months shall be considered one (1) whole year.” (Italics supplied)
According to the labor arbiter, retrenchment is valid only when
the following requisites have been met: a) it is to prevent losses; b) written
notices were served on the workers and DOLE at least one month before the
effective date of the retrenchment; and c)
separation pay is paid to the affected workers.[26]
He continues:
“Applying this yardstick to the case at bar, there is no
dispute that the cause of the retrenchment is to prevent losses. While the claims of the parties on the
matter of the actual date of service of notice to the workers are
conflicting. The uncontroverted fact is
that the written notice of retrenchment was filed with DOLE only on June 22,
1989. Undisputed likewise is the fact
that the payment of separation pay was partially made on July 5, 1989, and
completed in the first week of August 1989.
On the basis of the foregoing, it is the considered view of this
Office that the retrenchment could not have validly taken effect on June 30,
1989. At the very least, its
effectivity could be July 22, 1989, one month after respondent filed its
retrenchment notice with DOLE. To
consider June 30, 1989 as its effective date would be circumventing the law. This we cannot sustain.
Correspondingly, the basis, of computation of separation pay is the
basic pay of the retrenched workers as of
July 21, 1989. As such, it must include
the wage incrememts of P25.00 daily or P652.00 monthly as mandated under Rep, Act No. 6727.
The acceptance by the retrenched workers of the separation pay as
computed by respondent, and the subsequent execution and signing of quit claims
do not extinguish respondent’s obligation, and the retrenched workers’
entitlement to the back differentials in separation pay. It is clear from the letter of complainant
that the acceptance of the separation pay is under protest, thus:
We are therefore placing under protest the separation pay
computation with the advice that the retrenched workers are ready and willing
to accept whatever are your computations subject to this protest. (Annex “5”, Complainant’s Position
Paper). xxx.”[27]
The findings of fact by the labor arbiter should be respected and
left undisturbed there being substantial evidence to support them. Furthermore, private respondents allegations
that the workers were notified one month before June 30, 1989[28]
are not supported by the evidence on record. Its claim that the DOLE was “officially notified” of the
retrenchment by its presence during the conciliation proceedings, as per
Conciliation Minutes dated May 17, 1989[29]
cannot be sustained. The law requires
that a written notice of retrenchment be filed with the DOLE one month before
the intended date of retrenchment. The
requirement of the law is very clear. It cannot be substituted by the Conciliation Minutes as claimed by private respondent. While the Conciliation Minutes form part of
the files of the conciliator, its submission cannot constitute substantial
compliance with the requirement of a written notice of retrenchment. Moreover, the said “Minutes” do
not contain the details necessary to effect the retrenchment program, such as
the names of the employees to be retrenched.
The effective date of the retrenchment, as found by the labor
arbiter, could not have been June 30, 1989. At the very least, it could have been July 22, 1989 or one month after the retrenchment
notice was filed with the DOLE. Hence,
the basis for the computation of separation pay should be the basic pay of the
retrenched workers as of July 22, 1989. It must therefore include the wage increments of P25.00 daily or P652.00
monthly as mandated by Rep. Act No. 6727, subject to crediting of the CBA wage
increase of P300.00 monthly.
Public respondent NLRC clearly erred in disposing of the issue of underpayment of
separation pay.
As to the third issue, petitioner claims that “public
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over
the appeal of private respondent
despite clear showing that the same was not perfected within the time frame
allowed by law amounting to an
exercise of judgment in excess of jurisdiction.”[30]
Section 1 (a) of Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the NLRC
provides that:
“Decisions or orders of
a Labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of notice thereof.”
Article 223 of the Labor Code (P.D. No. 442), as amended by Rep. Act No. 6727 provides that:
“In case of a judgment involving a
monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon posting
of a cash or surety bond issued
by a reputable bonding company
duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed.” (Italics supplied)
Petitioner contends that private respondent’s appeal from the
decision of the Labor Arbiter was not perfected because private respondent
failed to fulfill the requirement of posting a cash or surety bond in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award within the ten day period from receipt of notice of the decision.[31]
Private respondent filed the necessary
bond only on October 12, 1990.
Under the facts of the case, petitioner’ s contentions cannot be
sustained.
It is true that the posting of a surety or
cash bond is a necessary step for the perfection of an appeal by an employer
from a monetary judgment. The reason
behind the requirement was stated in the case of Viron Garments v. NLRC:[32]
“The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for
the perfection of an appeal by an
employer, is clearly lined in the provision that an appeal by the employer may be perfected ‘only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond.’ The word ‘only’ makes it perfectly clear, that the lawmakers intended
the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive means
by which an employer’s appeal may be perfected.
“The word ‘may’ refers to the perfection of an appeal as
optional on the part of the defeated party, but not to the posting of an appeal
bond, if he desires to appeal.
“The requirement that the employer post a cash or surety bond
to perfect its/ his appeal is apparently intended to assure the workers that if
they prevail in this case, they will receive the money judgment in their favors
upon the dismissal of the employer’s appeal. It was intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay,
or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their employees’ just and lawful
claims.”
However, despite the late
filing of the bond by private respondent We rule that public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want of jurisdiction in
giving due course to the appeal of
private respondent for the following reasons:
Note that the decision
appealed from by private respondent did not state the exact amount of monetary
award. Rather, the labor arbiter
ordered the NLRC’s “Corporation Auditing Examiner” to immediately
make the computation of the award. As
pointed out by private respondent in its memorandum, “(u)p to this late
date, no computations of any kind ha(ve) been submitted by the ‘Corporation
Auditing Examiner’ in this case x x x. It was the Commission’s own appeal section, which finally (evaluated and) came up with a
tentative computation which served as a basis for the respondent club to
file the bond.”[33]
On October 23, 1990,
private respondent received an Order from the NLRC to submit its bond in
the amount of P529,056.00 within ten calendar days from receipt.[34]
Private respondent had actually filed the
requisite bond on October 12, 1990, even before receipt of the said Order.[35] The situation in which private respondent found
itself was therefore not clear-cut. The
amount on which the bond would be based had not been computed until very much
later. As We ruled in NAFLU v. Ladrido:[36] “Private respondent cannot be expected
to post such appeal bond equivalent to
the amount of the monetary award when the amount thereof was not included in
the decision of the labor
arbiter.” Said the court:
“In the order of public respondent NLRC dated August 10, 1990,
it is stated that ‘(T)he policy of the Commission in situations like this (and
the labor arbiter should have been aware of this) is for the labor arbiter to forward records to the Commission [and
that] thereafter, the Commission will cause the computation of the awards and
issue an order directing the appellant to file the required bond.’ This appears
to be a practice of the NLRC to allow a belated filing of the required appeal
bond, in the instance when the decision of the labor arbiter involves a
monetary award that has not yet been computed; considering that the computation
will still have to be made by that office. It is understood of course, that appellant has filed the appeal on time,
as in this case.”
Moreover, there is no showing that private respondent abused the
leniency of the NLRC, which would merit the dismissal of its appeal as in the
case of Italian Village v. NLRC.[37] Private respondent immediately filed
the bond upon the determination of the amount of the award.
In the case of Rada v.
NLRC[38] where the court allowed the late
payment of the supersedeas bond, it held:
“Besides, it was within the inherent power of the NLRC to have
allowed late payment of the bond, considering that the aforesaid decision of
the labor arbiter was received by private respondent on Oct. 3, 1989 and its
appeal was duly filed on Oct. 13, 1989. However, said decision did not state the amount awarded as backwages and
overtime pay, hence the amount of the supersedeas bond could not be
determined. It was only in the order of
NLRC of Feb. 16, 1990 that the amount of the supersedeas bond was specified and
which bond, after an extension granted by the NLRC, was timely filed by private
respondent.”
We hold that giving due course to the appeal would better serve
the ends of justice and the desired objective of resolving controversies on the
merits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED in so far as the
issue of underpayment of separation pay is concerned, and the DECISION of the NLRC is hereby MODIFIED as outlined above. Private respondent is ordered to re-compute the separation
pay of the retrenched employees using the basic pay as of July 22, 1989 as basis, subject to the
crediting of the CBA monthly wage increase
of P300.00. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1]
Petitioner’s Position Paper, p.1; Rollo, p. 44.
[2]
Private Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 2; Rollo,
p. 234.
[3]
Supra, note 1.
[4]
Private Respondent’s Comment, p. 2; Rollo,
p. 126.
[5]
Id., Annex “A”; Rollo, p. 113.
[6]
Records, pp. 23-24.
[7]
July 7, 1989; Annex “D,” Private Respondent’s Comment; Rollo, p.
116.
[8]
NLRC Case No. NCR-00-08-03998-89, Union of Filipino Workers v. Makati
Sports Club, Inc.; Complaint; Rollo, p. 22.
[9]
Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 47.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Public Respondent’s Comment, p. 6; Rollo, p. 130.
[12]
Id., p. 7; Rollo, p.
131.
[13]
Decision of the Labor Arbiter, p. 9; Rollo,
p. 61.
[14]
Decision of the NLRC; Rollo, p. 24.
[15]
Id., pp. 9-12; Rollo, pp. 32-35.
[16]
Records, p. 134.
[17]
Petition, p. 6; Rollo, p. 7.
[18]
Sec. 4(d), Rep. Act No. 6727.
[19]
Records, p. 24.
[20]
176 SCRA 625 (1989).
[21]
Id., p. 632.
[22]
Id., p. 633.
[23]
Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 15; Rollo,
p. 211.
[24]
Id., p. 17; Rollo, p. 212.
[25]
Rollo, p. 54.
[26]
Decision of the Labor Arbiter, p. 7; Rollo,
p. 60.
[27]
Id., pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp.
60-61.
[28]
Private Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 16; Rollo, p. 248.
[29]
Id., p, 17; Rollo, p.
249.
[30]
Petition, p. 8; Rollo, p.
9.
[31]
Art. 223, Pres. Dec. No. 442; Sec. 1(a), Rule VIII, Revised Rules of
the NLRC.
[32]
207 SCRA 339 (1992).
[33]
Private Respondent’s Memorandum, pp. 20-21; Rollo, pp. 252-253.
[34]
Id., p. 22; Rollo, p. 254.
[35]
Id.
[36]
196 SCRA 833 (1991).
[37]
207 SCRA 204 (1992).
[38]
205 SCRA 69 (1992).