UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE, INC. (NOW UNCIANO COLLEGES & GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC.); MIRANDO C. UNCIANO, SR.; DOMINADOR SANTOS AND EDITHA MORA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEA…

This is a petition for
review on certiorari seeking reversal of the decision^[1] of public respondent Court of Appeals dated
February 7, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 21020; and its resolution dated June 3,
1991.

The antecedent facts are, as follows:

On April 16, 1990, private respondents Elena Villegas and Ted
Magallanes, thru their mothers, Victoria Villegas and Jacinta Magallanes,
respectively, filed before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch 21, a petition for injunction and damages with prayer for a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioners Unciano Paramedical
College, Inc. (now Unciano Colleges and General Hospital, Inc.), Mirando C.
Unciano Sr., Dominador Santos, Editha Mora, Dr. Evelyn Moral and Laureana Vitug,
docketed as Civil Case No. 90-52745. Among other things, they alleged therein that:

“6.01. Around the
latter part of July 1989, the above-named students initiated a petition
proposing to the school authorities the organization of a student council in
the school. They solicited support of
their petition from the studentry by asking the students to endorse the same
with their signatures. They were able
to get at least 180 signatures.

“6.02. On August 18,
1989, Elena Villegas and a certain student named Solomon Barroa were summoned
to the Office of Dr. Moral and were admonished not to proceed with the proposal
because, according to her, the school
does not allow and had never allowed such an organization.

“6.03. On September
12, 1989, when news leaked out that the above-named students would be barred
from enrollment, they sought confirmation with respondent Dr. Moral, Dean of
Discipline, who told them ‘it’s not true unless you violate the rules and
regulations of the school and if you still insist with your student council.’

“6.04. On October 28,
1989, in compliance with an announcement to see the Dean of Nursing, the
above-named students met with Dean Vitug and Dr. Moral who informed them that
they would be barred from enrollment for the second semester because they
supposedly harassed a female student, invited an outsider to the school to
speak before the students, and also because the school has an arrangement with
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports not to allow their students to
put up a student council. Dr. Moral
advised them to get their Honorable Dismissal, and warned them that if she
herself were to give it, it would be marked ‘expelled.’

“6.05. On November 6,
1989, the students again approached Dr. Moral who informed them that they were
no longer allowed to enroll because they are allegedly members of the National
Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP) and the League of Filipino Students
(LFS), officers of the student organization they organized, and, moreover ‘drug
addicts.’ The students asked for proof of these accusations but were not given
any, and were told by Dr. Moral that the school has people investigating for
(sic) them but she did not disclose their identities nor provide any proof to
support her allegations.

“6.06. On November 13,
1989, a few days after petitioners retained the services of counsel FREE LEGAL
ASSISTANCE GROUP (FLAG), counsel sent a letter to Mr. Mirando Unciano,
President of the College, demanding that the constitutional requirements of due
process be complied with prior to unilaterally dismissing the students, and
requesting that a conference be held prior to 17 November 1989, as the
enrollment deadline was fast approaching. x x x.

“6.07. On 17 November
1989, acceding to the demand, a meeting was held, attended by Dr. Moral, Dean
Vitug, Mr. Rustico Lopez, the students, and their counsel. Due, however, to the inability of Dr. Moral
to resolve the problem in the absence of the College President and their legal
counsel, the meeting was reset to November 22,1989 upon Dr. Moral’s
request. However, notice was sent to
the students’ counsel from Unciano Paramedical College resetting the meeting to
November 27, 1989 stating that the President will attend personally therein. x x x.

“6.08. On 27 November
1989, due to the absence of the school’s legal counsel and the President who
allegedly just arrived from the United States, Dr. Moral again requested that
the meeting be reset. A verbal
altercation occurred between the parties due to the delaying tactics of the
school officials and the failure to resolve the problem by their continuous
refusal to discuss the merits of the accusations against the students. The meeting, attended by Dr. Moral, Dean
Vitug and Dean Dominador Santos, ended with the school officials’ request that
it be reset for 29 November 1989 and that the students’ bring their parents or
guardian with them at said meeting. The
students agreed to this request and their counsel prepared a written summary of
the matters discussed and agreed during
the meeting. The school officials
refused to sign it, however, x x x.

“6.09. On 29 November
1989, the students were informed that the President had unilaterally refused to
allow them to enroll and it was up to their parents to request or appeal to the
school officials to change their decision. Mrs. Victoria Villegas and Mrs. Jacinta Magallanes wrote to the school
officials to request that their children be allowed to enroll. x x x. Dr. Moral informed them that the Board of Trustees will have to decide
on these requests.

“6.10. On 11 December
1989, the students were informed that the Board of Trustees had refused to
grant the parents’ request.”^[2]

On May 16, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary restraining
order effective May 17, 1990, enjoining petitioner school from not enrolling
private respondents in its College of Nursing and setting the hearing for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on June 4, 1990.^[3]

Petitioners filed an opposition to the prayer for a preliminary
mandatory injunction on the ground that private respondents are not entitled
thereto and have no clear legal right to the relief demanded. On the same date, the trial court issued an
order, the pertinent parts of which, read:

“x x x.

“It is the opinion of the Court that there will be irreparable
injury to the petitioners if they are not allowed to enroll. At least they will miss another semester.

“On the other hand, the injuries mentioned by Dr. Unciano, in
particular the withdrawal of the other students and the school will lose money
if the petitioners are allowed to enroll is still a speculation, and may not
take place.

“In view thereof, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for
issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, ordering the respondents to
allow petitioners to enroll for the first semester of school year 1990-1991,
upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of P2,000.00 each.

“x x x.

“SO ORDERED.”^[4]

On June 11, 1990, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
was issued.^[5]

On June 13, 1990, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the
Order of June 4, 1990 was denied.^[6]

Elevating the matter to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the same was dismissed on February
7, 1991 for lack of merit.^[7] Said the
court:

“The arguments advanced in support of the petition are mainly
anchored on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ALCUAZ, et al. vs.
Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), et
al., L-76353, May 2, 1988; 161 SCRA 7 where
it was held that —

‘It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is
considered enrolled for one semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137 (of the) Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools, that when a college student registers in a school, it is
understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that
the ‘written contracts’ required for college teachers are for ‘one semester.’
It is thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no
longer has any existing contract
either with the students or with the intervening teachers. x x x.

“However, in the more recent case of Ariel Non, et al. vs.
Hon. Sancho Dames II, et al., G.R. No. 89317, May 20, 1990 (185 SCRA 523),
the Supreme Court, abandoned and overruled
its decision in Alcuaz and
declared thus:

‘The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the
‘termination of contract’ theory. But
it must be repeatedly emphasized that
the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary
contract. It is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State
supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions [See Art.
XIV, Secs. 1-2, 4(1).]

‘Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on
Paragraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations for Private School which provides
that ‘(w)hen a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling…
for the entire semester for collegiate courses,’ which the Court in Alcuaz
construed as authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on the
ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has already
expired.

‘The ‘termination of contract’ theory does not even find support in
the Manual. Paragraph 137 merely
clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools wherein tuition
fees are collected and paid on an installment basis, i.e. collection and
payment of the downpayment upon enrollment and the balance before
examinations. Thus, even if a student
does not complete the semester for which he was enrolled, but has stayed on for
more than two weeks, he may be required to pay his tuition fees for the whole
semester before he is given his credentials for transfer. This is the import of Paragraph 137,
subsumed under Section VII on Tuition and Other Fees, which in its totality
provides:

‘137. When a student
registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire
school year for elementary and secondary courses, and for the entire semester for collegiate
courses. A student who transfers or
otherwise withdraws, in writing, within two weeks after the beginning of classes
and who has already paid the pertinent tuition and other school fees in full or
for any length of time longer
than one month may be charged ten per cent of the total amount due for the term
if he withdraws within the first week of classes, or twenty per cent if within
the second week of classes, regardless of whether or not he has actually
attended classes. The student may be
charged all the school fees in full if he withdraws anytime after the second
week of classes. However, if the transfer or withdrawal is due to a justifiable reason, the student
shall be charged the ‘pertinent fees only
up to and including the last month of attendance.’

‘Clearly, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean that the
student shall be enrolled for only one semester, and that after the semester is
over his re-enrollment is dependent solely on the sound discretion of the
school. On the contrary, the Manual
recognizes the right of the student to be enrolled in his course for the entire
period he is expected to complete it. Thus, Paragraph 107 states:

‘Every student has the right to enroll in any school, college or
university upon meeting its specific requirement and reasonable
regulation: Provided, that except in
the case of academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulation, the
student is presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the entire period he is
expected to his (sic) complete his course without prejudice to his right to
transfer.’

‘This ‘presumption’ has been translated into a right in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 232, the ‘Education Act of 1982.’ Section 9 of this act provides:

‘SEC. 9. Rights of
Students in School. -? In addition to other rights, and subject to
the limitations prescribed by law
and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the following
rights:

* * *

‘2. The right to
freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to
continue their course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic
deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.’”^[8]

On
June 3, 1991, the motion for reconsideration was denied, again, for lack of
merit.^[9] Hence, the present petition.

Petitioners raise this lone issue:

“WHETHER OR NOT THE NON DOCTRINE SHOULD BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY TO GOVERN AND INVALIDATE, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF INCIDENTS THAT
TOOK PLACE PRIOR TO ITS ADOPTION AND WHICH INCIDENTS WERE PROPER AND VALID
UNDER THE ALCUAZ DOCTRINE PREVAILING AT THE TIME SAID INCIDENTS TOOK
PLACE.”^[10]

Petitioners argue that under the then prevailing Alcuaz doctrine
which was promulgated on May 2, 1988, the contract between them and private
respondents was validly terminated upon the end of the first semester of school
year 1989-1990. Although said doctrine
was later abandoned in Non, et al. v.
Dames II, et al., supra, this case was promulgated much
later, or on May 20, 1990, when the termination of the contract between them
had long become fait accompli. Settled
is the rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different
view is adopted, the new doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not
apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof,
conformably with the case of People v. Jabinal, G.R. No. L-30061, 55 SCRA 607
(1974). Thus, the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction was issued by the trial court with grave abuse of
discretion.

We agree with the arguments of petitioners.

The ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive effect to cases that
arose before its promulgation on May 20, 1990, as in this case, which was filed
on April 16, 1990. If it were
otherwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners and other schools
similarly situated who relied on the ruling in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on
May 2, 1988, which recognized the termination of contract theory. We had an opportunity to resolve a similar
issue in National Service Corporation, et al. v. NLRC.^[11]
In this case, petitioner claimed that as
a government corporation (by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the
National Investment and Development Corporation, a subsidiary wholly owned by the Philippine National Bank, which
in turn is a government owned corporation), the terms and conditions of
employment of its employees are governed by
the civil service law, rules and regulations. In support thereof, petitioner cited the ruling in National
Housing Corporation v. Juco,^[12] that
employees of government owned or controlled corporations are governed by the
civil service law, rules and regulations. We rejected this claim of petitioner and held that:

“It would appear that, in the interest of justice, the holding
in said case should not be given retroactive effect, that is, to cases that
arose before its promulgation on 17
January 1985. To do otherwise would be
oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated, because under the
same 1973 Constitution but prior to the ruling in National Housing Corporation
vs. Juco, this Court had recognized the applicability of the Labor Code
to, and the authority of the
NLRC to exercise jurisdiction over, disputes involving terms and conditions of
employment in government-owned or controlled corporations, among them, the
National Service Corporation (NASECO).”^[13]

In addition, We reiterate Our earlier
pronouncement in the case of People v. Jabinal, supra, that it
is a settled rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively,
and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on
the faith thereof.

Coming now to the
question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, the case of
Capitol Medical Center, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.^[14]
discussed exhaustively the purpose in issuing said writ:

“The sole object of a
preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the
case can be heard. The status quo is the last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the controversy (Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76
Phil. 225). It may only be resorted to
by a litigant for the
preservation or protection of his
rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the
principal action (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445). It should only be granted if
the party asking for it is clearly entitled thereto (Climaco vs.
Macaraeg, 4 SCRA 930; Subido vs. Gopengco, 27 SCRA 455; Police Commission vs.
Bello, 37 SCRA 230).

Inasmuch as a mandatory
injunction tends to do more than to maintain the status quo, it is generally improper to issue such an injunction prior to
the final hearing (Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. vs. Del Rosario, 22
Phil. 433). It may, however, issue ‘in
cases of extreme urgency; where the right is
very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly
in complainant’s favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of
plaintiff’s right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a
continuing one; and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to
reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties,
recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new
relation. Indeed, the writ should not
be denied the complainant when he makes out a clear case, free from doubt and
dispute.’ (Commissioner of Customs vs. Cloribel, et al., 19 SCRA 235.).”^[15]

In the present case, the contract between
the parties was validly terminated upon
the end of the first semester of school year 1989-1990, or in October,
1989. This is the status quo. The trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction which ordered petitioners to allow
private respondents “to enroll for the first semester of school year 1990-1991.”^[16] Guided by the Capitol case,
certainly, this writ will not restore the status quo but will go a step
backward, then restore the condition
preceding the status quo. Private respondents do not possess any clear
legal right to re-enroll, corollarily, petitioners are not obliged legally
to re-admit them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.   The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 7, 1991 and its
resolution dated June 3, 1991 are SET ASIDE. The orders of the trial court dated June 4, 1990 and June 13,
1990 and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction are likewise SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by Justice Arturo B. Buena with the concurrence of Justice Minerva P.
Gonzaga-Reyes and Justice Cancio C. Garcia.

^[2]
Pp. 47-51, Rollo.

^[3]
P. 55, Rollo.

^[4]
Pp. 63-64, Rollo.

^[5]
P. 75, Rollo.

^[6]
Pp. 76-77, Rollo.

^[7]
P. 41, Rollo.

^[8]
Pp. 37-41, Rollo.

^[9]
P. 45, Rollo.

^[10]
P. 238, Rollo.

^[11]
G.R. No. 69870, 168 SCRA 122 (1988).

^[12]
G.R. No. 64313, 134 SCRA 172 (1985).

^[13]
At pp. 132-133.

^[14]
G.R. No. 82499, 178 SCRA 493 (1989).

^[15]
At pp. 503-504.

^[16]
P. 75, Rollo.