THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALIAS CRYSLER BABAC, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City Branch 23 in Criminal Case No. 33079 entitled People of the
Philippines v. alias Crysler Babac (sic), the dispositive portion of which
reads:

“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused CRYSLER BABAC GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation
of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous
Drugs Act as amended and hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment; to pay a fine of P20,000.00 without imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.

In the service of sentence, the accused shall be credited with his
preventive imprisonment under the terms and conditions prescribed in Article 29
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The confiscated Marijuana (Exh. “D”), together with its
plastic container are hereby declared forfeited in favor of the government, and
upon the finality of this Decision, the Branch Clerk of Court, this Branch, is
directed to turn over the same to the NBI through the Chief, PC Crime
Laboratory, Region VI, Camp Delgado, Iloilo City, for disposition in accordance
with law.”

SO ORDERED.”

The prosecutions evidence as summarized by the lower court in its
decision is as follows:

“At about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon on April 6, 1989,
Staff Sergeant Francisco Allaga of the 6th NRU Narcotics Unit was at Brgy.
Luna, La Paz, Iloilo City together with Sgts. Roberto Felecio, Gabasa and
Cartel upon instruction of Lt. Suyo for them to conduct a buy-bust operation in
view of reports received by the latter that selling of marijuana is rampant in
said area.  Sgt. Allaga who acted as
poseur-buyer proceeded to a store inside the interior part of Luna Street, La
Paz, Iloilo City per the sketch showed to him by Lt. Suyo.  ­Upon arriving thereat, he asked a boy where
alias Babac is.  The boy left and for
about 2 minutes returned with Alias Babac. 
Sgt. Allaga then asked if he is Babac to which the latter replied in the
affirmative asking if he (Allaga) wants to get (sic).  Sgt. Allaga answered ‘yes worth P60.00’ as he
handed to herein accused Babac the corresponding money bills which he caused to
be xeroxed (Exh. “E”, p. 35, rec.) before they proceeded to the
area.  Crysler Babac left and returned
five (5) minutes later with another boy coming from the interior.  Sgt. Allaga then sitting in the store saw
Crysler Babac and the boy from a distance of about 15 meters.  Already feeling suspicious, Babac gave the
pack of marijuana (Exh. “D”) to the boy who in turn gave it to him
(Allaga).  Sgt. Allaga walked towards
Babac to apprehend him but the latter ran towards the interior part of the
place and failed to arrest him.  They
were not also able to recover the amount of P60.00 from the accused.

S/Sgt. Fradejas of the PC Crime Laboratory at Camp Delgado, Iloilo
City received the letter-request for Laboratory Examination  (Exh. “B”, p. 35, rec.) duly signed
by the Commanding Officer of the Narcotics Command (Exh. “B-1”)
together with the specimen from Sgt. Bayate at 10:10 in the morning on April
10, 1989.  Lt. Zenaida Sinfuego, Forensic
Chemist of the PCCL subjected the specimen thus submitted (Exh. “D”)
to physical examination (microscope), chemical test and thin layer
chromatography (TLC) test to determine the presence of marijuana.  As reflected in her Chemistry Report (Exh.
“C”, p. 36, rec.) ‘Qualitative examination conducted on the
above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test for marijuana’ (Exh.
“C-4″).” (At pp. 2-3, Decision)

The defense, on the other hand, claims that on April 6, 1989, the
accused worked at the BMY Rice Mill the whole day.  He reported for work in the morning until
6:00 o’clock in the evening as there were about 700 sacks of rice to be shipped
for Cebu that day.  He continued
reporting for work until he was arrested on May 31, 1989 for allegedly
violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.

The lower court gave full
faith and credit to prosecution’s version and rendered the aforequoted
questioned decision.

The accused-appellant
raises the following assignment of errors:

I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONY OF SGT. ALLAGA;

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED, THE
PROSECUTION NOT HAVING ESTABLISHED AN UNBROKEN CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF EXHIBIT
“D”;

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING FOR
THE ACCUSED.  (Rollo, p. 2)

and stresses the following points in his
brief in the hope of creating doubt about his guilt in his favor:

“1)    It is hardly believable that appellant will
readily sell marijuana to a person he does not know;

 2)    Sgt.
Allaga’s uncorroborated testimony has been satisfactorily contradicted and
discredited;

 3)    Failure
of the prosecution to arrest or to file charges against the child who delivered
the alleged marijuana to Sgt. Allaga is fatal to the cause of the prosecution;

 4)    Failure
of the prosecution to present the said child as witness amounts to a willful
suppression of evidence and creates a presumption that the same is adverse if
produced; and

 5)    The
prosecution has failed to establish an unbroken chain of possession or custody
of the alleged prohibited drug such that it failed to prove that the very same
object allegedly taken from the appellant was the very same thing examined.

After a thorough examination of the evidence on record, this
court has no other recourse but to affirm the conviction of the
accused-appellant.  The issues raised on
appeal are factual.  The appellant has
failed to present convincing reasons why the usual respect which appellate
courts give to factual findings of trial courts should not be maintained in
this case.

It must be noted that the accused-appellant, testifying on his
own behalf, hinges his defense on alibi with Rodolfo Gonzales, an alleged
co-worker in the rice mill and Florencia Babac, accused-appellant’s mother,
corroborating his testimony.  However,
the testimonies of the defense witnesses do not in any manner strengthen the
appellant’s case.  They all testified to
the fact that the accused went to work in the morning of April 6, 1989 and went
home at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening. 
They failed to establish, however, that it was impossible for the
accused to have gone to the scene of the crime at the time of the alleged
buy-bust operations.  The possibility of
the accused having accomplished the transaction is further made evident by the
fact that the rice mill is very near the place where the buy-bust operation was
conducted.  As the lower court has
correctly pointed out “xxx considering the proximity of the place where
the buy?bust operation was conducted to the BMY Rice Mill where he
allegedly worked, it could not have been physically impossible for the accused
to be at the scene of the incident.” It has, time and again, been held
that for the defense of alibi to prosper, it should be shown that it is
physically impossible for the accused to have been present at the scene of the
crime or its vicinity at the time of its commission (People v. Ruedas, 194 SCRA
553 [1991]; People v. Solis 182 SCRA 182 [1990]; People v. Alcantara 33 SCRA
812 [1970]).  Moreover, the accused has
been positively identified by prosecution witness as the perpetrator of the
crime charged.  Such positive identification
prevails over the simple denials of the accused.  (People v. Camarao 188 SCRA 671  [1990] citing People v. Khan, 161 SCRA 406
[1988]; People v. Delavin, 148 SCRA 257 [1987]; People v. Tuscano, 137 SCRA 203
[1985]; People v. Estrada, 22 SCRA 112 [1968]).

The appellant also attacks the credibility of the prosecution’s theory
by asserting that the accused is not foolhardy to sell marijuana to a person he
does not know.  In People v. Rumeral (G.
R. No. 86320, August 5, 1991) citing People v. Sanchez (173 SCRA 305 [1989]),
the doubts as to the possibility of persons selling marijuana to strangers has
already been put to rest with the following pronouncement of the court:

“xxx Drug pushers, especially small
quantity or retail pushers sell their prohibited wares to anyone who has the
price of the drug, be they strangers or not. 
What matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the
seller but their agreement and acts constituting the sale and delivery of
marijuana leaves.  xxx.”

The appellant next points to the insufficiency of Sgt. Allaga’s
lone testimony as to the alleged incident. 
As stated earlier, accused-appellant impresses upon this Court that the
prosecution should have presented other witnesses to corroborate Sgt. Allaga’s
story such as his companions during the buy-bust operations and the child who
allegedly handed the pack to Sgt. Allaga.

It is the prosecuting fiscal’s prerogative to determine whom to
present as witness (People v. Alerta, G.R. No. 85250, July 1, 1991; People v.
Bati, 189 SCRA 97 [1990]; People v. Solomon 166 SCRA 767 [1988]; People v.
Andiza, 164 SCRA 643 [1988]).  The
prosecution may have deemed Sgt. Allaga’s testimony as sufficient to establish
its case.  The lower court likewise found
it to be so.  Courts are not precluded
from rendering a judgment of conviction based on the testimony of a single
witness as long as such is found to be credible and positive and it satisfies
the court that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt (People v.
Rumeral, supra; People v. Javier, 182 SCRA 830 [1990]).

It must also be considered that no motive is imputed against Sgt.
Allaga which would impel him to falsely testify against the accused.  The accused-appellant even testified that he
does not know Sgt. Allaga nor does he have any quarrel or misunderstanding with
him (p. 12 TSN, October 3, 1989).  Under
the circumstances obtaining herein, Sgt. Allaga’s testimony may be received as
true (People v. Rumeral, supra).  Law
enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of
proof to the contrary (People v. Alerta, supra; People v. Castiller, 188 SCRA
376 [1990]; People v. Khan, 161 SCRA 406 [1988]).

The guilt of the accused is further established by his actions
after the alleged buy-bust operations. 
He evidently went into hiding as he could not be contacted during the
preliminary investigation as shown in the proof of service of the subpoena
issued against him.  The defense offered
no other explanation except for bare denials that he never received a subpoena
(p. 17, TSN, October 3, 1989).  In fact,
the authorities were only able to effect his arrest on May 31, 1989 – more than
a month after the buy–bust operations. 
It is a well?settled rule that flight is indicative of guilt of
the accused (People v. Eduarte, 187 SCRA 291 [1990]; People v. Mercado, 190
SCRA 452 [1990]; People v. Guevarra, 94 SCRA 642 [1979]).

As to the appellant’s contention that the prosecution has failed
to establish an unbroken chain of possession or custody of the prohibited drug,
the same must also fail.  Sgt. Allaga has
positively identified the pack (Exhibit “D”) offered in evidence by
the prosecution as that which was handed to him during the buy-bust
operations.  (p. 14 TSN, September 19,
1989) The defense had the opportunity to cross-examine Sgt. Allaga on that
particular subject and establish the irregularities, if there be any.  Add to this, the proffered explanation of the
Solicitor General in the People’s brief as follows:

“xxx Such slight delay was obviously brought about by the fact
that the 6th Narcotics Regional Unit at Iloilo City was evidently undermanned
and its staff had to attend to other tasks also requiring immediate attention
and implementation at the time.  This is
not to mention the fact that the intervening days between the time of the perpetration
of the crime and the time Exhibit “D” was actually taken for
examinations to the PC Crime Laboratory happened to fall on a weekend.”
(Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee, pp. 13-14)

In the absence of proof to the contrary,
the principle earlier enunciated as to the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties is equally applicable.

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the
appeal is hereby DISMISSED.  The decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr., and
Romero, JJ., concur.