FROILAN A. MENDEZ, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify and
set aside the decision of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which reversed the decision of the Mayor of
Quezon City, dismissing the charges filed against the petitioner Froilan A.
Mendez for Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty.

The facts of the case are briefly as follows:

On June 7, 1984, then Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City
Vicente N. Coloyan filed an administrative complaint against the petitioner, a
legal research assistant in the Quezon City Office of the City Attorney, for
Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty, allegedly for having torn off a portion of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 209287 from the registry book of Quezon City and for having pocketed
it.

After three months of investigation or on October 14, 1985, then
Quezon City Mayor Adelina Rodriguez dismissed the said complaint against the
petitioner for insufficiency of evidence.

Coloyan appealed to the MSPB which rendered judgment on March 16,
1989, the dispositive portion of which reads –

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is
hereby reversed.  Respondent Froilan A.
Mendez is hereby found guilty as charged and dismissed from the service.”
(p. 4, Rollo)

Said decision was affirmed by the CSC on appeal.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, assailing the
reversal of the city mayor’s decision by the MSPB and the CSC on the ground
that Coloyan is not an aggrieved party or “party adversely affected by the
decision” allowed by law to file an appeal.  Moreover, the petitioner claimed that his
exoneration by the city mayor is unappealable pursuant to Section 37, paragraph
(b) of P.D. 807.

The CSC, however, denied said motion for reconsideration ruling
that there is nothing in the said law which
precludes an appeal from the decision of the disciplining authorities to
determine, among others, whether the decision rendered is supported by the
facts on record and the law.

Hence, the present petition.

We find merit in the petition.

It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provision of law.  (Victorias Milling
Co., Inc. vs. Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, 153 SCRA
318).

A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as “The
Philippine Civil Service Law” shows that said law does not contemplate a
review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative
charges.

Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides:

“The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty
of suspension for more than thirty days,
or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary
or transfer, removal or dismissal from
office.  x x x” (underscoring supplied)
(p. 7, Rollo)

Said provision must be read together with Section 39 paragraph
(a) of P.D. 805 which contemplates:

“Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the
party adversely affected by the decision x x x.” (underscoring supplied)
(p. 104, Rollo)

The phrase “party adversely affected by the decision”
refers to the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed
for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension,
demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office.  In the instant case, Coloyan who filed the
appeal cannot be considered an aggrieved party because he is not the respondent
in the administrative case below.

Finally, pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, the
city mayor, as head of the city government, is empowered to enforce judgment
with finality on lesser penalties like suspension from work for one month and
forfeiture of salary equivalent to one month against erring employees.

By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed
of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges filed
against him.  But when the respondent is
exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no occasion for appeal.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the CSC is hereby ANNULLED or
SET ASIDE and the decision of the Quezon City Mayor is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla,
Bidin, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, J., in the result.

Nocon, J., no part.