RTC JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 23, MOLAVE, ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF DUMINGAG, ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, REPRESENTED BY MAYOR …

The present petition seeks to annul and set aside the decision
and resolution dated January 21, 1991 and February 20, 1991, respectively of
the Court of Appeals which declared as null and void the October 10, 1991 order
of the petitioner Judge in a civil case “for ejectment with preliminary
injunction and damages” filed by petitioner municipality against the
private respondents granting the petitioner municipality’s motion for a writ of
possession and the writ issued pursuant to it.

On September 24, 1990, petitioner municipality represented by its
mayor Domiciano E. Real filed with the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del
Sur, Branch 23, Molave, presided by the petitioner Judge, a complaint
denominated as “Ejectment with Preliminary Injunction and Damages”
against respondents Vicente Medina and Fortunata Rosellon.

The complaint alleged that the plaintiff (petitioner municipality
herein) is the owner of a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion,
Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur with an area of 5,894 square meters more or less;
that the parcel of land was reserved for public plaza under Presidential
Proclamation No. 365 dated March 15, 1968; that during the incumbency of the
late Mayor Isidoro E. Real, Sr. or in 1958, the municipality leased an area of
1,350 square meters to the defendants (respondents herein) subject to the
condition that they should vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes;
that the defendants religiously paid the rentals until 1967; that thereafter,
the defendants refused to pay the rentals; that the incumbent mayor discovered
that the defendants filed a “Cadastral Answer” over said lot; that
the defendants refused to vacate the place despite efforts of the municipality;
that the national government had alloted an appropriation for the construction
of a municipal gymnasium within the public plaza but the said construction
which was already started could not continue because of the presence of the
buildings constructed by the defendants; that the appropriation for the
construction of the gymnasium might be reverted back to the national government
which would result to “irreparable damage, injury and prejudice” to
the municipality and its people who are expected to derive benefit from the
accomplishment of the project.

The complaint prayed:

“1.   That a restraining order shall be issued
immediately after the filing of this case;

2.  That
after due notice and hearing, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction shall
be issued against the herein defendants for them (sic) from further occupying
the leased portion to them (sic), and/or that a Writ of Possession be
immediately issued to preserve the rights of the herein plaintiff;

3.  That
judgment should be entered against the herein defendants to vacate the premises
of the leased portion given to them.” (CA Rollo, pp. 11-12)

On the same day, September 24, 1990, the petitioner Judge issued
an order setting the preliminary hearing for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of possession on October 10, 1990.

Instead of filing an answer, the respondents filed a motion to
dismiss alleging the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court, since the
complaint is for illegal detainer which is within the original jurisdiction of
the municipal court and the pendency of a cadastral case (Cadastral Case No.
N-10, LRC Cad. Rec. No. N-108, Lot 9481 [Pls-61] TS-218) between the parties
over the ownership of the same parcel of land.

On October 10, 1990, the petitioner Judge issued two (2)
orders. The first order denied the
motion to dismiss. The second order
granted the petitioner municipality’s motion for a writ of possession “with the
ancillary writ of demolition to place in possession the plaintiff on the land
subject of this case, to the end that the public construction thereon will not
be jeopardized.” (CA Rollo, p. 22)

In denying the motion to dismiss, the petitioner Judge said:

xxx                xxx                   xxx

“2.  In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that
the defendant is claiming ownership over the land which was previously rented
to defendant by the plaintiff municipality. This action is, therefore, clearly an accion de reivindicacion,
a real action within the jurisdiction of this court.

3.   As
the complaint is for recovery of ownership of the land not to enforce the
contract, the Statute of Fraud does not apply.

4. The land subject of this case is covered by P. D. No. 365, withdrawing
this land from sale of settlement and reserving the same for school site
purposes under the administration of the Director of Public School and public
plaza under the administration of the Municipality of Dumingag, therefore the
cadastral court has no jurisdiction over the land involved in this case.”
(CA Rollo, p. 20)

The petitioner Judge justified his granting the motion for a writ
of possession with the ancillary writ of demolition by applying the rule on
eminent domain (Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court, erroneously referred to
as Rule 68) in analogy in that under this Rule the complainant is given the
right to the writ of possession in order that public construction and projects
will not be delayed. According to the
petitioner Judge, the necessity of a writ of possession is greater in the instant
case considering that the parcel of land is covered by a Presidential
Proclamation and the on-going construction thereon is being endangered to be
left unfinished on account of the buildings standing on the parcel of land
because the appropriation for the construction might be reverted back to the
national treasury.

The private respondents filed an omnibus motion for
reconsideration with motion to set aside order and to quash writ of possession
and demolition but this was denied in an order dated October 19, 1990.

On October 19, 1990, the petitioner municipality implemented the
writ of possession and ancillary writ of demolition issued by the petitioner
Judge resulting in the dispossession of the private respondents from the parcel
of land and the demolition of structures and buildings thereon owned by the
respondents.

On October 23, 1990, the private respondents filed their answer
to the complaint alleging therein that the subject parcel of land has been
owned, occupied and possessed by respondent Vicente Medina since 1947 when he
bought the subject parcel from a Subanan native; that the other respondent
Fortunata Rosellon leased from Medina a portion of the parcel of land; that the
respondents were never lessees of the petitioner municipality; that Proclamation
No. 365 issued on March 15, 1968 recognized “private rights”; and,
that a case is pending before the cadastral court between respondent Medina and
petitioner municipality as regards the ownership of the subject parcel of land.

Before the petitioner Judge could further act on the case, the
private respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals questioning the October 10 and October 19, 1990 orders of the
petitioner Judge.

In a resolution dated November 14, 1990, the petition was given
due course and a temporary restraining order was issued enjoining the
petitioner Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the case and from
enforcing the October 10, and 19, 1990 orders.

On January 21, 1990, the appellate court rendered the questioned
decision. A motion for reconsideration
was denied in a resolution dated February 20, 1991.

Hence, this petition.

In a resolution dated November 26, 1991, we gave due course to
the petition.

The appellate court rightfully upheld the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court over the case based on the allegations in the
complaint. The allegations and not the
title control the cause of action of the complaint. (Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 195 [1990]).

The Court said:

“First, Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction over
the case brought by the Municipality of Dimangag? As already noted, the gist of the complaint below is that the
land in question is part of the public domain which the President of the
Philippines, under Proclamation No. 365, dated March 25, (should be 15) 1968,
reserved for school site and public plaza in the Municipality of Dumingag and
that the petitioners, to whom the former town mayor had leased a part of the
land, refused to vacate and to pay rents. If this is the theory on which the complaint is based, then the action
may really be considered one for recovery of possession. For though a lease is alleged, the lease
would be void and the municipality could recover the possession of the
land. This is the teaching of the
leading case of Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602 [1915] in which
it was held that the lease by a municipal corporation of a public plaza is null
and void because land for public use is outside the commerce of man and,
therefore, the lessee must restore possession of the land by vacating it. As in this case, in the Rojas case the
action was for recovery of possession instituted in the Court of First
Instance, the counterpart of which at present is the Regional Trial Court. We, therefore, hold that the respondent
judge has jurisdiction of the case brought against petitioners for recovery of
possession of what is alleged to be land for public use of the respondent
municipality.” (CA Rollo, pp. 53­-54)

Prescinding from the finding that the complaint is for recovery
of possession the appellate court concluded that the trial court
did not have authority to issue a writ of possession and a writ of demolition
citing the case of Mabale v. Apalisok (88 SCRA
234 [1979]), to wit:

“In that connection, it should be borne in mind that the law
specifies when a writ of possession may be issued. That writ is available (1) in a land registration proceeding,
which is a proceeding in rem (Sec. 17, Act No. 496; Estipona v.
Navarro, 69 SCRA 285, 291); (2) in an extra-judicial foreclosure of a realty
mortgage (Sec. 7, Act No. 3135); (3) in a judicial foreclosure of mortgage, a quasi
in rem proceeding, provided that the mortgagor is in possession
of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure
suit, had intervened (Rivera v. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and
Rupac, 61 Phil. 201; Ramos v. Mañalac and Lopez, 89 Phil. 270, 275) and (4) in
execution sales (last par. of sec. 35, Rule 39, Rules of Court).”

The appellate court also ruled that the trial court committed an
error when it applied by analogy the rule on eminent domain (Rule 67, Revised Rules of Court) to
justify the issuance of the writ of possession and writ of demolition. The
appellate court pointed out that under this rule:

xxx    xxx xxx

“x x x (i) There is clear statutory authority for the taking of
possession by the government and (ii) The authority is premised on the
government depositing the value of the land to be taken. For unless the taking of the land is done
under these conditions, the taking would constitute deprivation of property
without due process of law which the Constitution prohibits. (See Manila Railroad Co. v. Paredes, 31
Phil. 118 [1915])” (CA Rollo, p. 55)

The appellate court then stated:

In the case at bar,
there is neither statutory authority for the trial court’s action nor bond
given to compensate the petitioners for the deprivation of their possession and
the destruction of their houses if it turns out that the land belongs to
them. For this reason, we think the
trial court’s order is arbitrary and void. For the fact is that petitioners claim ownership of the land in question
and until that question is resolved either in the case pending before the
respondent judge or in the cadastral proceeding, it would be unjust to deprive
petitioners of its possession. (CA
Rollo, pp. 55-56)

The petitioners now contend that
the allegations in the
complaint constitute a cause of action for abatement of public nuisance under
Article 694 of the Civil Code. On the
basis of this proposition, the petitioners assert that petitioner municipality
is entitled to the writ of possession and writ of demolition.

Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as follows:

“ART. 694. A nuisance
is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property or
anything else which:

xxx    xxx xxx

(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

while Article 695 provides:

ART. 695. Nuisance is
either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community
or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of
the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. x x x.”

Applying  these criteria, we
agree with the petitioners that the complaint alleges factual circumstances of
a complaint for abatement of public nuisance. Thus, the complaint states: that
petitioner municipality is the owner of a parcel of land covered by
Presidential Proclamation No. 365 which is reserved for a public plaza; that
the private respondents by virtue of a contract of lease entered into by the
former mayor occupied a portion of the parcel of land constructing buildings
thereon; that the private respondents refused to vacate the premises despite
demands; that the municipality is constructing a municipal gymnasium in the
area financed by appropriations provided by the national government; and that
the appropriations are in danger of being reverted to the national treasury
because the construction had to be stopped in view of the refusal of the
private respondents to vacate the area.

The issue, however, is not the nature of the cause of action
alleged in the complaint. The more
important question is whether or not the petitioner municipality is entitled to
a writ of possession and a writ
of demolition even before the trial of the case starts.

Article 699 of the Civil Code provides for the following remedies
against a public nuisance:

“(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local
ordinance; or

(2) A civil action; or

(3) Abatement, without
judicial proceed­ings.”

The petitioner municipality had three remedies from which to
select its course of action. It chose to
file a civil action for the recovery of possession of the parcel of land
occupied by the private respondents. Obviously, petitioner municipality was aware that under the then Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) the Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass an
ordinance before the municipality may summarily abate a public nuisance. (Sec. 149(z) (ee).

On the premise that the parcel of land forms part of a public
plaza, the petitioners now contend that the Judge was justified in issuing the
writ of possession and writ of demolition.

A public plaza is outside the commerce of man and constructions
thereon can be abated summarily by the municipality. We ruled in the case of Villanueva v. Castañeda,
Jr. (154 SCRA 142 [1987]):

“Exactly in point is Espiritu v. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, (102 Phil. (869-870) where the Supreme Court declared:

‘There is absolutely no question that the town plaza cannot be used
for the construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and that such
structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. Town plazas are properties of public
dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in
general. They are outside the commerce
of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private
parties.’

Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that petitioners had
no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist
in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. They should have realized and accepted this
earlier, considering that even before Civil Case No. 2040 was decided, the
municipal council of San Fernando had already adopted Resolution No. 29, series
of 1964, declaring the area as the parking place and public plaza of the
municipality.

It is the decision in Civil Case No. 2040 and the said resolution
of the municipal council of San Fernando that respondent Macalino was seeking
to enforce when he ordered the demolition of the stalls constructed in the
disputed area. As officer-in-charge of
the office of the mayor, he had the duty to clear the area and restore it to
its intended use as a parking place and public plaza of the municipality of San
Fernando, conformably to the aforementioned orders from the court and the
council. It is, therefore, not correct
to say that he had acted without authority or taken the law into his hands in
issuing his order.

xxx    xxx xxx

The Court observes that even without such investigation and
recommendation, the respondent mayor was justified in ordering the area cleared
on the strength alone of its status as a public plaza as declared by the
judicial and legislative authorities. x
x x .”

If, therefore, the allegations in the complaint are true and that
the parcel of land being occupied by the private respondents is indeed a public
plaza, then the writ of possession and writ of demolition would have been
justified. In fact, under such
circumstances, there would have been no need for a writ of possession in favor
of the petitioner municipality since the private respondents’ occupation over
the subject parcel of land can not be recognized by any law. A writ of demolition would have been
sufficient to eject the private respondents.

However, not only did the municipality avoid the use of abatement
without judicial proceedings, but the status of the subject parcel of land has
yet to be decided.

We have to consider the fact that Proclamation No. 365 dated
March 15, 1968 recognizes private rights which may have been vested on other
persons, to wit:

“BY THE PRESIDENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES

PROCLAMATION NO. 365

RESERVING FOR SCHOOL SITE, PUBLIC PLAZA AND
PLAYGROUND PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN
THE MUNICIPALITY OF DUMINGAG, PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR, ISLAND OF
MINDANAO.

Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, do hereby withdraw from sale or
settlement and under the administration of the Director of Public Schools
administration of the Municipal Government of Dumingag, subject to
private rights, if any there be,
certain parcels of land of the public domain situated in the Municipality of
Dumingag, Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Island of Mindanao, xxx”. (CA Rollo, pp. 41-A – 42) Emphasis
supplied).

It is to be noted that even before the Proclamation, the parcel
of land was the subject of cadastral proceedings before another branch of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur. At the time of the filing of the instant case, the cadastral proceedings
intended to settle the ownership over the questioned portion of the parcel of
land under Proclamation No. 365 were still pending. One of the claimants in the cadastral proceedings is private
respondent Vicente Medina who traced his ownership over the subject parcel of
land as far back as 1947 when he allegedly bought the same from a Subanan
native.

Under the cadastral system, the government through the Director
of Lands initiates the proceedings by filing a petition in court after which
all owners or claimants are compelled to act and present their answers
otherwise they lose their right to their own property. The purpose is to serve the public interests
by requiring that the titles to any lands “be settled and
adjudicated.” (Section 1 Cadastral Act [No. 2259] Government of the
Philippine Islands v. Abural, 39 Phil. 996 [1919]. It is a proceeding in rem somewhat akin to a
judicial inquiry and investigation leading to a judicial decree. (Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of
Manila, 41 Phil. 120 [1920])

Considering therefore, the nature and purpose of the cadastral
proceedings, the outcome of said proceedings becomes a prejudicial question
which must be addressed in the resolution of the instant case. We apply by analogy the ruling in the case
of Quiambao v. Osorio (158 SCRA 674 [1988]), to wit:

“The instant controversy boils down to the sole question of
whether or not the administrative case between the private parties involving
the lot subject matter of the ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question
which would operate as a bar to said ejectment case.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises
in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. (Zapanta v. Montesa, 4 SCRA 510 [1962];
People v. Aragon, 50 O. G. No. 10, 4863) The doctrine of prejudicial question
comes in to play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are
pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely-related
that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the
criminal action can proceed. Thus, the
existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the criminal
case to cause the suspension of the latter pending final determination of the
former.

The essential elements of a
prejudicial question as provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules
of Court are: [a] the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal
action; and [b] the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil
and administrative in character, it is obvious that technically, there is no
prejudicial question to speak of. Equally apparent, however, is the intimate correlation between said two
[2] proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of private respondents
to eject petitioner from the disputed portion depends primarily on the
resolution of the pending administrative case. For while it may be true that private respondents had prior possession
of the lot in question, at the time of the institution of the ejectment case,
such right of possession had been terminated, or at the very least, suspended
by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed in
their favor. Whether or not private
respondents can continue to exercise their right of possession is but
necessary, logical consequence of the issue involved in the pending
administrative case assailing the validity of the cancellation of the Agreement
to Sell and the subsequent award of the disputed portion to petitioner. If the cancellation of the agreement to Sell
and the subsequent award to petitioner are voided, then private respondent’s
right of possession is lost and so would their right to eject petitioner from
said portion.

Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course
for the trial court to have taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in
abeyance until after a determination of the administrative case. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not
jurisprudence, dictate such move. To
allow the parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the possibility of
petitioner’s right of possession being upheld in the pending administrative
case is to needlessly require not only the parties but the court as well to
expend time, effort in what may turn out to be a sheer exercise in
futility. Thus, 1 Am Jr 2d tells us:

`The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a
sound discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the
action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in another court,
especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power
inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes on its dockets
with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
litigants. Where the rights of parties
to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised
in the first action are settled the second action should be stayed.’

While this rule is properly applicable to
instances involving two [2] court actions, the existence in the instant case of
the same considerations of identity of parties and issues, economy of time and
effort for the court, the counsels and the parties as well as the need to
resolve the parties’ right of possession before the ejectment case may be
properly determined, justifies the rule’s analogous application to the case at
bar.”

Technically, a prejudicial question shall not rise in the instant
case since the two actions involved are both civil in nature. However, we have to consider the fact that
the cadastral proceedings will ultimately settle the real owner/s of the
disputed parcel of land. In case
respondent Vicente Medina is adjudged the real owner of the parcel of land,
then the writ of possession and writ of demolition would necessarily be null
and void. Not only that. The demolition of the constructions in the
parcel of land would prove truly unjust to the private respondents.

Parenthetically, the issuance of the writ of possession and writ
of demolition by the petitioner Judge in
the ejectment proceedings was premature. What the petitioner should have done was to stop the proceedings
in the instant case and wait for the final outcome of the cadastral
proceedings.

At any rate, affirmative relief based on the above discussions is
no longer possible. The demolition of the buildings owned by the
private respondents is now a fait accompli.

In the case of Estate of Gregoria Francisco
v. Court of Appeals (199 SCRA 595 [1991] we awarded
just compensation the amount of which was for the trial court to determine in
favor of the petitioner whose building was demolished by the municipality even
before a proper tribunal could decide whether or not the building constituted a
nuisance in law. Our ruling was premised
on the ground that the owner of the building was in lawful possession of the
lot and the building by virtue of the permit from the authorized government
agency when the demolition was effected.

We cannot, however, apply this ruling to the present case. The legality of the occupation by the
private respondents of the subject parcel of land is still to be resolved in
the cadastral proceedings. In the event
that respondent Vicente Medina is declared owner of the subject parcel of land
necessarily, the private respondents would be entitled to just compensation for
the precipitate demolition of their buildings. On the other hand, if private respondent Medina is declared to have no
rights over the subject parcel of land then, the private respondents would not
be entitled to any compensation for the demolition of their buildings. In such a case the private respondents are
considered squatters and therefore, the demolition of their buildings would
turn out to have been justified.

Faced with these alternative possibilities, and in the interest
of justice, we rule that the petitioner municipality must put up a bond to be
determined by the trial court to answer for just compensation to
which the private respondents may be entitled in case the demolition of their
buildings is adjudged to be illegal.

Moreover, the appellate court correctly ruled that Rule 67 of the
Revised Rules of Court on eminent domain can not be made a subterfuge to
justify the petitioner Judge’s issuance of a writ of possession in favor of petitioner
municipality. In the recent case of National Power Corporation
v. Hon. Enrique T. Jocson, et al.
(G.R. No. 94193-99, February 25, 1992) we said:

“In Municipality of Biñan v. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia et al. (180
SCRA 576 [1989]) this Court ruled that there are two (2) stages in every action
of expropriation:

‘The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of
the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. (Citing Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court.) It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, ‘of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint.’ (Citing Section 4, Rule 67; Nieto v.
Isip, 97 Phil. 31; Benguet Consolidated v. Republic, 143 SCRA 466.) An order of
dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it
finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court
on the merits. (Citing Investments,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 147 SCRA 334) So, too, would an order of
condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the rules expressly state, in
the proceedings before the Trial Court, ‘no objection to the exercise of the
right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.’

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the
determination by the Court of ‘the just compensation for the property sought to
be taken.’ This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three
(3) commissioners. (Citing Sections 5
to 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court) The order fixing the just compensation on
the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be
final, too. It would finally dispose of
the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court
regarding the issue. x x x.’

However, upon the filing of the complaint or at any time
thereafter, the petitioner has the right to take or enter upon the possession
of the property involved upon compliance with P.D. No. 42 which requires the
petitioner, after due notice to the defendant, to deposit with the Philippine
National Bank in its main office or any of its branches or agencies, ‘an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation.’
This assessed value is that indicated in the tax declaration.”

Hence, even if we concede that Rule 67 is applicable to the
instant case and that petitioner municipality had the lawful right to eject the
private respondents from the subject parcel of land the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of petitioner municipality would still not be legal if the
petitioner municipality really owns the land. The Judge did not require petitioner municipality to deposit an amount
equivalent to the just compensation due the private respondents as provided for
under Presidential Decree 42. It is
only after the deposit of the just compensation that petitioner municipality
would be entitled to a writ of possession.

Another point raised by the petitioners questions the alleged
ruling of the appellate court “that the petitioners are personally liable
for damages to the private respondents for the abatement of public
nuisance.” (Rollo, p. 50)

The petitioners misread the appellate court’s decision. The records show that the private respondents
prayed for, in their petition for certiorari filed with the appellate
court, among others:

“It is likewise prayed that respondents be ordered to pay
jointly and severally the value of the house illegally demolished in the amount
of P1,000,000.00, attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in
the amount of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, to
pay the costs. x x x.”

xxx    xxx xxx

(CA Rollo, p. 6)

In response to this prayer, however, the appellate court stated:

“We do not, however, have jurisdiction over petitioners’ claim
for damages. This must be pursued in an
appropriate action instituted in the Regional Trial Court.” (Rollo, p. 26).

Moreover, the dispositive portion of the
decision does not mention any personal liability for damages against the
petitioners. The apprehension of the
petitioners lacks factual basis.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
DISMISSED. The questioned decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The trial court is ordered to require the petitioner municipality
to put up a bond to be determined by the court after hearing to answer, for
just compensation due the private respondents in case the demolition of their
buildings is adjudged to be illegal. The “Motion to Declare in Contempt” filed by petitioner Judge
is referred to the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, Branch 18 in Civil
Case No. 3156 for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., on leave.