FELICIANO MORCOSO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPS. TOMAS MAQUIRANG AND ROSA TIROL-MAQUIRANG, RESPONDENTS.

In 1984, private respondent Rosa Tirol (now Rosa Tirol-Maquirang)
filed a complaint against the
petitioner Feliciano Morcoso for the recovery of possession and declaration of
ownership of a fishpond situated in Barangay Aslum, Ibajay, Aklan.

In her complaint, she alleged that the said fishpond is a part of
the 4.5 hectare of land she inherited from her father Eriberto Tirol in 1930; that in December 28,
1979, she entered into a lease agreement with Morcoso, allowing the latter
without paying rental and for a period of six
years, to develop into a fishpond a 5,880 sq.m. portion of the land she
inherited, with usufructuary rights (Exhibit “A”); that while working
on the fishpond, Morcoso was informed by the personnel of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR, for brevity) that said portion of the
land of Tirol leased to him is
within the area of alienable and disposable public land; that in 1973, Morcoso
applied for a fishpond permit with the BFAR; that the latter subsequently
refused to surrender the possession of the fishpond to Tirol in 1976 when the
term of the lease expired; and that Tirol filed an unlawful detainer case
against Morcoso but the same was dismissed for not having been timely filed.

As his defense, Morcoso claimed that the fishpond in dispute from
which he is being evicted is not the fishpond subject of the contract of lease;
that he developed two fishponds: (a)
the fishpond subject of the lease, from which he was forcibly ejected by Tirol in
1971 as a result of a disagreement with her;
and (b) the fishpond in dispute, which adjoins the first fishpond and
which he developed after the BFAR personnel assured him that the area he had
moved to is a forested area, suitable for fishpond development; that he applied
for a fishpond permit in 1973; and that he declared said fishpond in his name
for taxation purposes. Morcoso also
assailed the jurisdiction of the trial court because of a pending
administrative case before the BFAR regarding their conflicting claims. (pp.
13-14, Rollo)

After trial, the trial court ruled that the fishpond in dispute
belongs to Tirol. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads thus –

“WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs – and against the
defendant –

“a) Declaring the plaintiffs the
owners and entitled to the possession of the fishpond in question;

“b) Ordering the
defendant to deliver to the plaintiffs the possession of said fishpond in
question;

“c) Ordering the
defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the amount of One Thousand five Hundred
(P1,500.00) pesos per annum from December 28, 1976 to 1980 and Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) pesos per annum from 1980 up to time the possession of the fishpond
in question is delivered to the
plaintiffs, as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation thereof;

“d) Ordering the
defendant to pay to the plaintiffs Three Thousand (P3,000.00) as attorney’s
fee, and to pay the costs of this suit.” (pp. 14-15, Rollo)

The Court of Appeals affirmed said decision on appeal.

In this petition, the petitioner asserts that the trial court
erred:

“IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF A CONFLICT OF CLAIMS INVOLVING A
PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL OF
ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY;

“IN DECLARING TIROL AS THE OWNER OF SAID PARCEL OF LAND OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN” (pp. 4-5, Rollo)

We find no merit in the petition.

The doctrine requiring prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies before recourse to courts is inapplicable to the instant case because
the fishpond in dispute is private and not public land. (Obanana v. Boncaros, 128 SCRA 457)

What the Court of Appeals found in this regard need not be
further elaborated upon. The appellate
Court ruled:

“In the sketch of the 4.5 hectare land (Exh. B ) of
plaintiff-appellee Rosa T. Maquirang, are two lots, identified as Lot 1 (Exh.
B-1) and Lot 2 (Exh. B-2). During the
pre-trial, the parties agreed as to the identity of the land in dispute, which
is Lot 1. It is claimed by
defendant-appellant that the subject of the lease contract (Exh. A) is Lot 2
and that he transferred to Lot 1, and developed the same into a fishfond, upon being informed that it was a public land by BFAR personnel. However, appellee insists that Lot 1 is the
same fishpond which was the subject of the lease contract (Exh. A). We find merit to appellee’s contention. In the lease contract, the land subject of
the lease is bounded as follows: North,
Luciano Tirol Sitjar; East, Ciriaco, Rosa all Tirol; South, Ipil Creek; and
West, Adiango Creek. In the sketch
(Exh. B), Lot 1 (Exh. B-1) which admittedly is the land in dispute, has the
same boundaries in the north, east and south, except in the West side, which is
Aslum River. The discrepancy, however,
is more apparent than real. As
explained by Gil Maquirang, the son of Appellee, Adiango Creek became Aslum
River ‘due to the change of
course of Aslum River flowing through the way of the former Adiango Creek it
became a dominant river and therefore it is now called Aslum River.’ (p. 6 tsn; May 31, 1988) Thus, the former
Adiangco Creek is now known as Aslum River.

“Moreover, even the sketch plan of the Bureau of Fisheries,
which is appellant’s Exhibit 5 shows the same area with the same adjoining
owners as Lot 1 of appellee’s sketch (Exh. B). Without doubt, Lot 1 (Exh. B-1) was the subject of the lease contract
between appellee Rosa Tirol, as lessor and appellant Feliciano Morcoso, as
lessee.

“Contrary to the claim of appellant, Lot 2 was not the subject
of the lease contract, for the simple reason that the boundaries thereof are different
from that of Lot 1. In the lease
contract; the adjoin­ing owner on the North is Luciana Tirol. In the sketch (Exh. B), the adjoining owner
of Lot 2 is Rosa Tirol. The other
adjoining owners of Lot 2, as depicted in the sketch (Exh. 2), are clearly
different from those appearing in the lease contract (Exh. A). It is not true, therefore, that appellant
developed Lot 2 in 1968 for the appellees and it was the subject of the lease
contract. Neither is it true that Lot 1
was never leased to him and he developed it into a fishpond only in 1972 when
he allegedly learned that it was a public land. x x x

“The fishpond is not part of the public domain, as claimed by
appellant. We agree with the trial
court’s reasoning that –

‘The plaintiffs have sufficiently established that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land in question under
claim of ownership for a very long period of time. Eriberto Tirol, father of Rosa Tirol, purchased the land in
question which was then included in a bigger parcel on June 28, 1918 by means
of a public instrument, Exhibit 1 (Exh. I-1-English translation), and had it
declared for taxation purposes as early as 1921, Exhibit J. He paid the corresponding land taxes thereon
as shown by his tax receipts, mentioned above. Upon his death in 1930, Rosa Tirol succeeded to its possession, had it
declared for taxation purposes and paid continuously the real estate taxes
thereon. Nobody had disturbed them in
their possession and usufruct of the land up to the time the defendant made an
unwarranted claim over it. The
defendant, emboldened and taking advantage of the information he got from the
personnel of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources that the fishpond
under lease was a public land, applied for a fishpond permit and thereby
refused to recognize the existing and legitimate claim of ownership over the
land by the plaintiffs.’ ” (pp. 15-17, Rollo)

We find the foregoing conclusions drawn by the trial court from the
documentary evidence submitted by the parties to be in order. The technical descriptions of the fishpond
stated in the lease contract and in the sketch plan of the BFAR personnel who
conducted an ocular inspection of the fishpond area applied for by Morcoso
explicitly show that the latter was the subject of the lease contract between
Tirol and Morcoso. The fishpond not
having been part of the public domain, the trial court correctly adjudged Tirol
as the rightful owner thereof.

Well settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial
court are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal especially when
established by unrebutted testimonial and documentary evidence, as in this
case.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the appellate court is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

* Penned by Associate Justice
Antonio M. Martinez and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose A.R. Melo (now
acting Presiding Justice) and Nicolas P. Lapena, Jr.