PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MANUEL DUSOHAN Y BORJA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
156, Pasig, Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. 83994, finding “the accused
Manuel Dusoman y Borja guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape by
force and intimidation with the aggravating circumstance of relationship under
Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code” and sentencing him “to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the victim Mariel
Dusohan Gresola, in the amount of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) in
compliance with the mandate in Articles 100, 104 (3), 107 and 345 of the
Revised Penal Code and to pay the costs” (Decision, p. 8; Rollo, pp.
17-18).

In the criminal complaint filed with the trial court, appellant
was charged with rape committed as follows:

“That in or about the month of July, 1990 up to August 8,
1990, in the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, taking advantage
of his moral ascendency over the undersigned complainant Mariel Dusohan y Gresola, his own daughter, and by means
of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie with and have carnal knowledge over (sic) Mariel Dusohan y
Gresola against the latter’s will” (Rollo, p. 4).

In the title of the complaint prepared by the Office of the
Public Prosecutor of Rizal, the name of the accused was erroneously spelled as
“Dusoman.” The error was repeated by the trial court in its decision.

Appellant, when arraigned, pleaded “not guilty.”

The trial court found that sometime in October 1989, appellant,
after quarreling with his wife, left the conjugal house at Barangay Parang,
Marikina, Metro Manila, to live in Barangay Concepcion of the same town. His daughter, Mariel, followed and lived
with him.

Sometime between October 23 and 30, 1989, at about 9:00 P.M.,
appellant entered the room of Mariel. He started to undress her and kiss the exposed part of her body. He ordered her to lie down. Once Mariel was prostrate, he tightly
embraced her and pinned her with his body. She pleaded in vain with appellant to desist from his lewd designs.

Realizing that any resistance on her part was inutile, all that
Mariel could do was cry. Against the
protestations of his daughter, he proceeded to satisfy his bestiality. Thereafter and before going to sleep, he
threatened to kill her if she disclosed the incident to anyone.

Appellant repeated the sexual aggressions on his daughter every
week thereafter until January 1990, when Mariel went to her mother to complain
that her father was treating her like a house maid. She did not mention the sexual abuses out of fear of her
father. Her mother enrolled her at the
Sienna College Convent in Taytay, Rizal.

Sometime in July 1990 Mariel saw appellant at the poblacion. Appellant pleaded with her to return home,
and promised that he would not abuse her again. With this in mind, Mariel returned to appellant’s house. However, appellant broke his promise and
resumed the sexual assaults on Mariel about 20 times within that month.

On August 8, 1990, Mariel fell ill. At about 2 P.M. of that day, appellant entered her room. He asked her to undress and proceeded to
touch her private parts. She tried to
resist and told her father “Papa, why are you doing this to me. You could do this with other woman (sic) I
am your daughter.” Despite her pleas, appellant again succeeded in
satisfying his lust.

When she could no longer bear his abuses, Mariel reported her
father to her mother. As Mariel could
not count on her mother to initiate an action against her father, she went to
the police station to complain against appellant.

In this appeal, appellant assigns the following errors which he
claims to have been committed by the trial court in convicting him of the
offense charged:

1.   He was convicted despite
the lack of resistance on the part of the complainant;

2. To commit the crime of
rape under paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the carnal knowledge of the
woman must have been consummated with the use of force or intimidation upon the
victim;

3.   The complainant
consented in having sexual intercourse with him;

4.   Complainant was coerced
by her mother in filing the rape case in order to effect a separation between
them.

Appellant’s contentions deserve scant consideration.

As to the first and second assigned errors, the law does not
impose on the rape victim the burden of proving resistance. What needs only to be proven by the
prosecution is that the will of the victim to resist the sexual aggression has
been overpowered by the accused (People vs. Dinola, 183 SCRA 493 [1990]). It is not necessary that actual force and
intimidation be employed. It is
sufficient that the accused exercised a pervasive influence and control over
the victim (People vs. Robles, 170 SCRA 557 [1989]). Appellant exercised such a strong moral ascendency and parental
control over his daughter (People v. Lucas, 181 SCRA 319 [1990]). The force and violence, threat or
intimidation upon her need not be of such nature and degree as would be
required in rape cases committed by the accused having no filial relations with
the victim (People vs. Caballes, 199 SCRA 152 [1991]).

Anent the third assigned error, appellant in his desperate
attempt to rid himself of the consequences of his act, alleges that his own
daughter consented to his lechery. In
the appellant’s brief, he contends that his daughter “surrendered to the
call of the flesh and could not resist the temptation of the highest form of
physical pleasure” (Rollo, p. 35).

This is the first case wherein the defendant, accused of
incestuous rape, has claimed that his daughter willingly surrendered her body
to satisfy her own lust. In all the
cases involving incestuous rape decided by this Court, invariably the
appellants denied the accusations (People v. Clarin, 108 SCRA 680 [1981];
People v. Alvis, Jr., 117 SCRA 362 [1982]; People v. Domen, 120 SCRA 486
[1983]; People v. Egot, 129 SCRA 96 [1984]; People v. Erardo, 127 SCRA 250
[1984]; People v. Quintal, 125 SCRA 734 [1983]; People v. Ramos, 165 SCRA 400
[1988]; People v. Corina, 167 SCRA 285 [1988]; People v. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316
[1990]; People v. Rosell, 181 SCRA 679 [1990]; and People v. Telio, 210 SCRA
169 [1991]). We grope for words to
describe our disgust with this claim of appellant; so we have to borrow the words
“Sick, sick, sick” used in People v. Domen, 120 SCRA 487 (1983).

The surrender to superior force is not the same as giving consent
to the violation of the victim’s virtue. Mariel did not consent to the lascivious acts of appellant. She even begged her father to desist from
his bestial designs. In her young mind,
she could not understand why her own father
was having sexual intercourse with her.

As to the fourth assigned error, appellant claims that he caught
his wife and his store helper, named Alvin, in bed on August 5, 1990. Not
wanting any trouble he just requested his wife to ask her paramour to
leave. This allegedly angered his wife
and so she coerced Mariel to file this case in order to effect a separation
between them.

As correctly held by the trial court:

“It is hard to believe that a mother would sacrifice her own
daughter to tell a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private
parts, and thereafter present her to be the subject of a public trial, if they
(mother and daughter) were not motivated by an honest desire to have the
culprit who is Mariel’s own father, punished (People vs. Erardo, 127 SCRA 250
[1984])” (Decision, p. 8; Rollo p. 17).

A daughter, especially one of tender age, would not accuse her
own father of this heinous crime had she really not have been aggrieved. On the other hand, a mother would not
sacrifice her daughter’s virtue in order to punish her husband, especially
when, as claimed by appellant,
she was the one at fault.

In a last ditch effort to elude the clutches of law, appellant
interposes the defense of
alibi. He contends that he was not in
Marikina, Metro Manila but in Cebu City when the criminal acts were committed.

After admitting that he had carnal knowledge with his own
daughter, appellant could no longer claim that he was elsewhere during the
times he was said to have committed the offense. Furthermore, appellant asked for Mariel’s forgiveness after his
arrest.

Relationship, in this case, as correctly held by the trial court,
is aggravating (People vs. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316 [1990]).

A violation of a woman’s chastity becomes doubly repulsive where
the outrage is perpetrated on one’s own flesh and blood, for the culprit is
reduced to a level lower than a beast. “The latter yields only to biological impulses and is unfettered by
social inhibitions when it mates with its own kin, but a man who rapes his own daughter violates not only her purity and her trust but
also the mores of his society which he has scornfully defied. By inflicting his animal lust on her, he
forfeits all respect as a human being and is justly spurned by all, not least
of all by the fruit of his own loins whose progeny he has forever stained with
his shameful and shameless lechery” (People vs. Ramos, 165 SCRA 400
[1988]).

The circumstances that are present in this particular case render
the offense charged and proven heinous and highly offensive to the moral sense
of the community (People vs. Aquino, Resolution dated July 24, 1991). The indemnity should therefore be increased
to P50,000.00 (People v. Magaluna, 205 SCRA 266 [1992]).

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED,
with the MODIFICATION that the indemnity is increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Griño-Aquino, J., on leave.