THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 93, AND SPOUSES DANILO A. ALCANTARA AND ISA…

Is the crime of
“fencing” a continuing offense that could allow the filing of an
information therefor in the place where the robbery or theft is committed and
not necessarily where the property unlawfully taken is found to have later been
acquired?

The above query is the
sole issue in this petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by
the People of the Philippines, praying for the reversal, annulment and setting
aside of the Order of 28 February 1986^[1] of the respondent Judge, who has ruled in
the negative, as well as his Order, dated 21 March 1986,^[2]
denying the motion for
reconsideration. The petitioner prays
that the respondent Judge be directed to assume jurisdiction over, and to
proceed with the trial of, the criminal case.

On 09 September 1985, robbery was committed in Quezon City in the
house of Jose L. Obillos, Sr., where various pieces of precious jewelry alleged
to be worth millions of pesos were taken. An information, dated 30 September 1985, was instituted against the
perpetrators in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, docketed
thereat as Criminal Case No. G.R. No. 42078.^[3]

Subsequently, an information, dated 22 October 1985, for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the
“Anti-Fencing Law,” was also filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 93, docketed as Criminal Case No. 42433, against herein
respondent spouses Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita Esguerra-Alcantara, from
whose possession the jewelries stolen
were recovered in Antipolo, Rizal.^[4]

The trial court, acting
on the motion to quash filed by the accused [now private respondents], issued
the now questioned order of 28 February 1986, viz:

“Before the Court is a Motion to Quash, filed by the accused
thru counsel, praying that the information filed against both accused be
quashed, on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the offense
charged. Among others, the motion
alleges, that as per police investigation, the crime took place in Antipolo,
Rizal. For this reason, Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1612 is an independent crime, separate and distinct
from that of Robbery. The accused
claims, likewise, that jurisdiction to try the same is with the Court within
which territorial jurisdiction, the alleged fencing took place.

The Prosecution filed an Opposition thereto, alleging among others,
that there is nothing in the law which prohibits the filing of a case of
fencing in the court under whose jurisdiction the principal offense of robbery
was committed. The prosecution claims
further, that the consideration in the enactment of PD 1612 was to impose a
heavier penalty on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery
or theft.

On this point, we should not lose sight of the fact, that in all
criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the Municipality or Province wherein the offense was committed, or anyone of
the essential ingredients thereof took place.^[5]

Since the alleged act of fencing took place in Antipolo, Rizal,
outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, and considering that all
criminal prosecutions must be instituted and tried in the Municipality or
Province where the offense took place, this Court, necessarily, does not have
jurisdiction over the instant case.

Wherefore, the above-entitled case is hereby QUASHED, without
prejudice to the filing of the corresponding action against the accused in the
Court having proper jurisdiction.”

The
private prosecutor’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the court’s order
of 21 March 1986.

Hence, the instant
petition.

The Solicitor General
argues that since an essential element of the crime of fencing is the
commission of robbery, in this case committed in Quezon City, the information
therefor filed in said City accords with the provisions of Rule 110 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, and the refusal of the Court a quo to
assume and exercise jurisdiction thereover constitutes a serious error of law
and a grave abuse of discretion. He
theorizes that fencing is a “continuing offense.” He explains that
the Anti-Fencing Law has been enacted for the purpose of imposing a heavier
penalty on persons who profit from the effects of the crime of robbery or
theft, no longer merely as accessories under Article 19, paragraph 1, of the
Revised Penal Code, but as equally guilty with the perpetrators of the robbery
or theft itself.

In People vs. Ledesma,^[6]
we said:

“x x x. A ‘continuous
crime’ is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single
criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division. According to Cuello Calon, when the actor,
there being unity of purpose and of right violated, commits diverse acts each
of which, although of a delictual character merely constitutes a partial
execution of a single particular delict, such concurrence of delictual acts is
called a ‘delito continuado.’ For it to exist there should be plurality of acts performed separately
during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated;
unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are
united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same
criminal purpose or aim.

Robbery
is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain,
by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything.^[7]
“Fencing”, upon the other hand, is the
act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall
buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy
and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything
of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.^[8]

The
crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then two distinct offenses. The law on fencing does not require the
accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been
in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft. Neither is the crime of robbery or theft made to depend on an act of fencing in order
that it can be consummated. True, the object
property in fencing must have been previously taken by means of either robbery
or theft but the place where the robbery or theft occurs is
inconsequential. It may not be
suggested, for instance, that, in the crime of bigamy which presupposes a prior subsisting marriage of an
accused, the case should thereby be triable likewise at the place where the
prior marriage has been contracted.^[9]

We are not unaware of a number of instances^[10]
when the Court would allow a change of venue in criminal cases “whenever
the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty
reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction
over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a
miscarriage of justice.”^[11]
Here, however, we do not see the attendance of such compelling circumstances,
nor are we prepared to state that the lower court gravely abused its discretion
in its questioned orders.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus
is DISMISSED, and the orders appealed from are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, (Chairman), Bidin, Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
G.R. No. 77368, Annex “F,” Petition, 32-33.

^[2]
Ibid., Annex “H,” Ibid., 39.

^[3]
G.R. No. 74344, Annex “A,” Petition, 19-21.

^[4]
Ibid., Annex “B,” Petition, 22-23.

^[5]
Section 14, Rule 110, Rules of Court.

^[6]
73 SCRA 77/1976/.

^[7]
Article 293, Revised Penal Code.

^[8]
Presidential Decree No. 1612, Anti-Fencing Law of 1979.

^[9]
See Ganchero vs. Bellosillo, 28 SCRA 673/1969/.

^[10]
People v. Gutierrez, 36 SCRA 172/1970/; People v. Pilotin, 65
SCRA 635/1975/; Mondiguing v. Abad, 68 SCRA 14/1975/.

^[11]
People v. Gutierrez, Ibid.; see also Article VIII, Section 5 [4],
1987 Constitution.