PINES CITY EDUCATIONAL CENTER AND EUGENIO BALTAO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) AND DANGWA BENTREZ, ROLAND PICART, APOLLO RIBAYA, SR.…

Complainants’ claims for indemnity pay, premium pay for holidays
and rest days, illegal deduction, 13th month pay and underpayment are hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.”^[1]

In support of this decision, the Labor
Arbiter rationalized that the teacher’s contracts^[2] are vague
and do not include the specific description of duties and assignments of
private respondents. They do not categorically state that there will be no
renewal because their appointments automatically terminate at the end of the
semester. Petitioners did not present any written evidence to substantiate
their allegation that the Academic Committee has evaluated private respondents’
performance during their one semester employment. On the contrary, they were
hastily dismissed.

On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission, the
decision was affirmed in toto in its resolution dated November 29, 1990,
with the additional reasoning that “the stipulation in the contract
providing for a definite period in the employment of complainants is obviously
null and void, as such stipulation directly assails the safeguards laid down in
Article 280 (of the Labor Code),^[3] which
explicitly abhors the consideration of written or oral agreements pertaining to
definite period in regular employment.”^[4]
Hence, the present petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order.

As prayed for, this Court issued a temporary restraining order on
March 11, 1991, enjoining respondents from enforcing the questioned resolution.^[5]

Petitioners raise this sole issue: “THAT THERE IS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE LABOR ARBITER BY WANTONLY, CAPRICIOUSLY AND
MALICIOUSLY DISREGARDING PROVISIONS OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE LAID DOWN IN
DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.”^[6]

Petitioners reiterate their previous arguments, relying heavily
in the case of Brent School, Inc.,
et al. v. Zamora, et al.^[7]

It is quite easy to resolve the present controversy because the Brent case, which is a product of
extensive research, already provides the answer. We were categorical therein that:

“Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the
development of legislation culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor
Code clearly appears to have been, as already observed, to prevent circumvention
of the employees right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in said article
indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral agreements
conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined therein should be
construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled
out: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. It
should have no application to instances where a fixed period of employment was
agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties without any force, duress
or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any
other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily appears
that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal
terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the
latter. Unless thus limited in its purview, the law would be made to apply
to purposes other than those explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes
pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and
unintended consequences.”(Underscoring supplied.)

This ruling was reiterated in Pakistan
International Airlines Corporation v. Ople, etc., et al.^[8]
and La Salette of Santiago, Inc. v. NLRC, et al.^[9]

In the present case, however, We have to make a distinction.

Insofar as the private respondents who knowingly and voluntarily
agreed upon fixed periods of employment are concerned, their services were
lawfully terminated by reason of the expiration of the periods of their
respective contracts. These are Dangwa Bentrez, Apollo Ribaya, Sr., Ruperta
Ribaya, Virginia Boado, Cecilia
Emocling, Jose Bentrez, Leila Dominguez and Rose Ann Bermudez. Thus, public
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the
Labor Arbiter ordering their reinstatement and payment of full backwages and
other benefits and privileges.

With respect to private respondents Roland Picart and Lucia Chan,
both of whom did not sign any contract fixing the periods of their employment
nor to have knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon fixed periods of employment,
petitioners had the burden of proving that the termination of their services
was legal. As probationary employees, they are likewise protected by the security
of tenure provision of the Constitution. Consequently, they cannot be removed
from their positions unless for cause.^[10] On
the other hand, petitioners contended that based on the evaluation of the
Academic Committee their performance as teachers was poor. The Labor Arbiter,
however, was not convinced. Thus, he
found as follows:

“Respondents likewise aver that the Academic Committee has
evaluated their performance during their one semester employment (see Annexes “M” to “X” of
complainants’ position paper). However, they did not present any written proofs
or evidence to support their allegation.^[11]

“xxx.

“There is absolutely nothing in the record which will show
that the complainants were afforded even an iota of chance to refute
respondents’ allegations that the complainants did not meet the reasonable
standards and criteria set by the school. x x x.”^[12]

We concur with these factual findings,
there being no showing that they were resolved arbitrarily.^[13]
Thus, the order for their reinstatement and payment of full backwages and other
benefits and privileges from the time they were dismissed up to their actual
reinstatement is proper, conformably with Article 279 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Section 34 of Republic Act No. 6715,^[14]
which took effect on March 21, 1989.^[15] It
should be noted that private respondents Roland Picart and Lucia Chan were
dismissed illegally on March 31, 1989, or after the effectivity of said
amendatory law. However, in ascertaining the total amount of backwages payable
to them, we go back to the rule prior to the Mercury Drug rule^[16]
that the total amount derived from employment elsewhere by the employee from
the date of dismissal up to the date of reinstatement, if any, should be
deducted therefrom.^[17] We
restate the underlying reason that employees should not be permitted to enrich
themselves at the expense of their employer.^[18] In addition, the law abhors double
compensation.^[19]
To this extent, our ruling in Alex
Ferrer, et al. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 100898, promulgated on July
5, 1993, is hereby modified.

Public respondent cannot claim not knowing the ruling in the Brent case because in its
questioned resolution, it stated that one of the cases invoked by petitioners
in their appeal is said case.^[20] This
notwithstanding, it disregarded Our ruling therein without any reason at all
and expressed the erroneous view that:

“The agreement of the parties fixing a definite date for the
termination of the employment relations is contrary to the specific provision
of Article 280. Being contrary to law, the agreement cannot be
legitimized. x x x.”^[21]

Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Once
a case has been decided one way, then another case, involving exactly the same
point at issue, should be decided in the same manner. Public respondent had no
choice on the matter. It could not have ruled in any other way. This Tribunal
having spoken in the Brent case, its duty was to obey.^[22]
Let it be warned that to defy its decisions is to court contempt.^[23]

WHEREFORE, the resolution of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated November 29, 1990 is
hereby MODIFIED. Private respondents Roland Picart and Lucia Chan are ordered
reinstated without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and their
backwages paid in full inclusive of allowances, and to their other benefits or
their monetary equivalent pursuant to Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended
by Section 34 of Republic Act No. 6715, subject to deduction of income earned
elsewhere during the period of dismissal, if any, to be computed from the time
they were dismissed up to the time of their actual reinstatement. The rest of
the Labor Arbiter’s decision dated February 28, 1990, as affirmed by the NLRC
is set aside. The temporary restraining order issued on March 11, 1991 is made
permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, and
Vitug, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., joins J.
Padilla on his separate opinion.

Griño-Aquino, J., retired on
October 22, 1993.

^[1] Rollo, pp.
79-80.

^[2]
Annexes “1,” “3”, to “10” of private respondents’ position paper.

^[3] Rollo, p.
98.

^[4]
ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment — The provisions of written agreement
to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the
parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has
been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in
the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination
of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or
where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the
duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be
casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any
employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is
continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to
the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while
such actually exists.

^[5]
Rollo, pp. 107-108.

^[6]
Rollo, p. 2.

^[7]
G.R. No. L-48494, 181 SCRA 702 (1990).

^[8]
G.R. No. 61594, 190 SCRA 90 (1990).

^[9]
G.R. No. 82918, 195 SCRA 80 (1991).

^[10]
Colegio San Agustin v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 87333, 201 SCRA 398
(1991).

^[11]
Rollo, p. 74.

^[12]
Rollo, p. 78.

^[13]
De Vera, et al. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 93212, 191 SCRA 632 (1990).

^[14]
Section 34 of Republic Act No. 6715 provides: Article 279 of the Labor Code is
hereby amended to read as follows: “ART. 279. Security of Tenure. – In
cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of
an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of his actual reinstatement.”(underscoring supplied)

^[15]
Sealand Service, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 90500, 190 SCRA 347 (1990);
Maranaw Hotels and Resorts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 103215, November 6, 1992; Arms Taxi and/or Dorothea Tanongon v.
NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 104523, March 8, 1993.

^[16]
In the case of Mercury Drug Co., Inc., et al. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
et al., G.R. No. L-23357, 56 SCRA 694 (1974), this Court first found occasion
to rule that an employee whose illegal termination had lasted some years was
entitled to backwages for a fixed period without further qualifications, i.e.,
without need of taking into account whatever he might have earned during such
period and deducting it from the amount to be recovered, in order to relieve
the employee from proving his income during the period he was out of the
service and the employer from submitting counter-proofs, which may delay the
execution of the decision. The base period of three years was later considered
just and reasonable and instituted in the case of Feati University Faculty Club
(PAFLU) v. Feati University, et al., G.R. No. L-31503, 58 SCRA 395
(1974).

^[17]
Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. Sañgilo-Itogon Workers’ Union, et al., G.R
No. L-24189, 24 SCRA 873 (1968).

^[18]
Philippine Air Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Air Lines Employees
Association, 108 Phil. 1129.

^[19]
ltogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. Sañgilo-Itogon Workers’ Union, et al., supra.

^[20]
Rollo, p. 96.

^[21]
Rollo, p. 99.

^[22]
Ang Ping, et al. v. RTC of Manila, et al., G.R. No. 75860, 154 SCRA 77
(1987).

^[23]
The Philippine Veterans Affairs Office v. Segundo, G.R. No. 51570, 164
SCRA 365 (1988).

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