BPI CREDIT CORPORATION (FORMERLY FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION), PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND DOMINADOR CABACUNGAN, RESPONDENTS.

From the judgment of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
15036^[1]
promulgated on 7 January 1991 affirming in toto the
decision in Civil Case No. XX-29 of Branch 20 (Cauayan, Isabela) of the
Regional Trial Court, Second Judicial Region, dated 28 April 1987, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

x x x

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Filinvest Credit
Corporation, ordering said defendant: (1) to pay or return to the plaintiff
Dominador Cabacungan P44,914.00 representing the amount  said plaintiff paid to defendant plus legal
interest from September 12, 1983,  up to
and until the full amount is fully paid; (2) to pay to the plaintiff Dominador
Cabacungan P15,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages and
P10,000.00 attorney’s fees.

All the other defendants are absolved of any liability for the
reason that they acted for and in behalf of their employer, Filinvest Credit
Corporation.”

x x x

petitioner Filinvest Credit Corporation
(now BPI Credit Corporation, but hereinafter referred to as Filinvest) filed on
25 February 1991 this petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.

The factual and procedural antecedents are summarized in the
challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals, to wit:

x x x

“In March, 1982, plaintiff-appellee Dominador Cabacungan
(Cabacungan, hereafter) purchased on installment basis from B.M. Domingo Motor
Sales, Inc. (BMD, Inc.) a brand new Isuzu KBD 26 pick-up vehicle with Plate
Number BAH 401 with the purpose in mind to use it in his furniture
business.  The price of the sale was One
Hundred Twenty Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Five Pesos P128,765.00 (Exh.
“E”) of which an initial downpayment of P24,797.00 was paid to BMD, Inc.
and the balance of P103,968.00 was to be paid in 36 consecutive monthly
installments of P2,888.00 beginning April 19, 1982 to end by March 19,
1985.  A P75.00 discount is allowed the
buyer for every installment paid on or before its due date but a 2% penalty
charge per month shall be added on each unpaid installment from the date of its
maturity.

Aside from the promissory note (Exh. “I”), the buyer
executed a Deed of Chattel Mortgage with the purchased vehicle as security
(Exh. “2”).  In a Deed of Assignment,
BMD, Inc. assigned to defendant?appellant Filinvest Credit Corporation
(Filinvest, for brevity) its rights, title and interest in the aforesaid
Chattel Mortgage and Promissory Note.

As the trial court found, from April 19, 1982 to August 19, 1983, Cabacungan
made installment payments as follows:

NOTE:          Table based on
Exh. A, A-1 to A-18

Surcharge computed as follows:

P2,888.00 x 02 = 57.76

Amount due for late payments: P2,945.76

Payments of the installments were made in Land Bank checks except
for one instance when the amount of P20.00 was paid in cash and Filinvest
issued the corresponding receipts per Exhibits A-1 to A-14.  The payments for the months of April 19 and
May 19, 1982 (Exh. A-17 and A-18) were remitted by BMD, Inc. to Filinvest on
April 26, 1982 and May 20, 1982, respectively.

But Cabacungan failed to pay the installments for June, 1982 and
February, 1983 and he had explained that he purposely withheld the payments for
those months because he wanted a recomputation of the interests being collected
from him considering that he had made a number of payments in excess of the
stipulated installment.  Cabacungan
appeared to have been required by Filinvest to make payments in excess of the
stipulated amount to cover the instances when the amortizations have not been
paid.  As the trial court round,
Cabacungan had made excess payments totalling P2,208.48.

On September 13, 1983, after they delivered a piece of furniture to
a customer in San Isidro, Isabela, Dominador Roduta and Ruben Cabacungan, the
driver and helper, respectively, of Cabacungan were apprehended by the
employees of Filinvest who also seized the pick-up vehicle.  In the office of Filinvest at Santiago,
Isabela, Cabacungan’s driver and helper were issued a receipt by defendant
Teddy Gaba (Exh. G) showing that the subject pick-up vehicle was surrendered to
Filinvest purportedly pursuant to the Deed of Chattel Mortgage for Cabacungan’s
failure to pay overdue amortizations in the amount of P7,555.84.

When informed of the seizure of the vehicle, Cabacungan issued a
check for P7,555,00 drawn on the Land Bank which he tendered to defendant Gaba
but the latter refused to accept the same. 
Cabacungan then deposited the check in the Pilipinas Saving Bank and
brought the receipt of the deposit (Exh. A-16) to defendant Gaba who also
refused to accept the receipt and demanded that the entire balance of the
promissory note be made.

On September 14, 1983, Cabacungan filed a complaint for replevin
before the court a quo alleging that appellant Filinvest took
possession of the pick-up vehicle through force and intimidation without either
a seizure order from the court or a petition for foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage; that the return of the value of the said motor vehicle he (sic) made
and that he be awarded moral damages and attorney’s fees.

Cabacungan later amended his complaint to include his wife Teodora
Cabacungan as party plaintiff and some personnel of Filinvest as defendants and
increased the amounts pertaining to his claim for moral, exemplary and nominal
damages and attorney’s fees.

Filinvest in its Answer denied having seized the pick-up vehicle
through force and intimidation and claimed having taken possession when it was
voluntarily surrendered by Dominador Roduta and Ruben Cabacungan.  Filinvest further alleged that Cabacungan
violated the terms of the chattel mortgage deed and the promissory note he
executed.

As affirmative defense, Filinvest contended that the venue is
improperly laid since the Chattel Mortgage provides that venue of action shall
be in the City of Manila or in Santiago, Isabela and not in Cauayan, Isabela
where the complaint was filed; that Cabacungan has no cause of action having
defaulted in the payment of two (2) monthly installments and the chattel
mortgage provides that upon (sic) default of one installment will make the
entire remaining amount due and demandable.

Plaintiff Teodora Cabacungan died in the course of the proceedings
and in an amended complaint, her children were substituted in lieu of her.

In the pre-trial conference held on March 13, 1985, both parties
agreed to litigate on the following issues: 
(1) Whether or not taking of the truck by defendant Filinvest was
lawfully made; (2) Whether or not Cabacungan was in arrears in the payment of
his obligations to the appellant; and (3) Whether or not damages were due from
one to the other.”^[2]

On 28 April 1987, the trial court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which was quoted earlier.

Filinvest appealed from the decision to the respondent Court of
Appeals, which docketed the case as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15036, and urged it to
reverse the decision because the trial court erred in:  (a) granting the reliefs prayed for in the
complaint but remaining silent on the counter-claim, (b) awarding unwarranted
damages to plaintiff, which are not supported by the evidence and applicable
laws and jurisprudence, (c) making conclusions not substantiated by facts as established
by evidence, and (d) rendering a judgment which is not in accord with the law
and applicable decisions of this Court.

In the instant case, Filinvest urges Us to overturn the Court of
Appeals’ decision because it is grounded on speculation, surmises and
conjectures:

— as when it held that the account on the NOTE was not delinquent
even as an admission of delinquency is extant in the Answer and amply proven by
the evidence.

— as when the Honorable Court of Appeals awarded enormous actual
damages not established by evidence. 

— as when it ignored the contractual stipulations voluntarily
entered into per the promissory note made out by Cabacungan.”

it made mistaken inferences from the
documents presented by Cabacungan and misapprehended the facts.  In support thereof, Filinvest argues that
Cabacungan’s account was in arrears; written and verbal demands were made upon
Cabacungan; there was no unlawful taking of the mortgaged property; a contract
of adhesion is valid; Cabacungan did not pay the additional docket fees on the
claim for damages in his amended complaint, hence the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case; the premises for the award of damages are
erroneous and Cabacungan is not entitled to the damages; and that the decision
violates Section 9, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.^[3]

In his Comment filed by mail on 4 April 1991^[4]
in compliance with this Court’s resolution of 6 March 1991, private respondent
Cabacungan denies the allegations in the petition.

We gave due course to the petition and required both parties to
submit simultaneously their respective Memoranda^[5]
which Filinvest complied with on 17 June 1991^[6]
and the private respondent on 20 July 1991.^[7]

After a careful scrutiny and analysis of the issues and the
amplified arguments adduced by the parties in their Memoranda, this Court finds
that the principal issues raised are unquestionably directed to the findings of
facts of respondent Court of Appeals.

It must be stressed that, as shown in the foregoing summary of
facts, the parties agreed during the pre-trial conference to litigate on three
(3) issues only:  (1) whether or not the
taking of the truck by Filinvest was lawfully made; (2) whether or not
Cabacungan was in arrears in the payment of his obligations to Filinvest; and,
(3) whether or not damages were due from one to the other.  The parties are bound by, and the issues
presented here must be resolved vis-a-vis, such
agreement.  We cannot allow the parties
to run wild, and confuse the issues for their own benefit.

Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.  The jurisdiction of this Court in cases
brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising
errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive.  It is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited
to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower
court.  Barring, therefore, a showing
that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or
that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion, they must stand.^[8]

There are, however, exceptions to this rule, namely:

(1)  When the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) When the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) When there is a grave abuse
of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) When the findings
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.^[9]

There is no doubt that Filinvest has carefully crafted its
petition in an attempt to bring it within the exceptions.  Unfortunately, We are not persuaded.

The findings of fact of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals on the illegal taking of the vehicle, the non-delinquency of the
account of private respondent, and on damages, are sufficiently supported by
the evidence.  As to the first, the Court
of Appeals stated:

x x x

“As the lower court correctly held, Filinvest did not have the
right to take possession of the subject pick-up vehicle as it did not make any
demand to Cabacungan to surrender the same prior to the said seizure.  The pertinent provision of the Deed of
Chattel Mortgage (Exhs. 2, 2-A) on this point, reads:

`The MORTGAGOR further agrees that in default of payment of any
installment or any part thereof or interest thereon as and when the same shall
become due and payable, the mortgaged property/ies shall
be delivered on demand to the MORTGAGEE in Manila,
or as designated by the MORTGAGEE at any address stated in the demand,
free of all charges and should the MORTGAGOR not deliver
the said property/ies the MORTGAGEE shall
have the right to get the said
property/ies wherever it/they may be found
and have the same brought to the City of Manila, and the expenses of locating and
bringing said mortgaged property/ies to the City of Manila shall be for the
account of the MORTGAGOR and shall form part of the following remedies:  (a) Sale by the MORTGAGOR or his assigns to
himself, (b) Cancellation of the contract of sale with the MORTGAGOR; (c) Extra­judicial
foreclosure; (d) Judicial foreclosure; and (e) Ordinary civil action to exact
fulfillment of the mortgage contract. 
Whichever remedy is elected by the MORTGAGEE, the MORTGAGOR expressly
waives any and all amounts on the principal and interests already paid by him.’

Filinvest should first make a demand on Cabacungan to deliver or
surrender the subject vehicle to its branch office in Santiago, Isabela and
only if he shall have failed to comply with such demand may it seize the vehicle
wherever it may be found.

No demand was made whatsoever by Filinvest to Cabacungan for the
return to it of the pick-up vehicle. 
Instead, employees of Filinvest, upon seeing the vehicle on the highway
at San Isidro, seized it from the driver Dominador Roduta and helper Ruben
Cabacungan.

Appellant’s contention that a verbal demand was made to Ruben
Cabacungan and that the letters Exhs. X and Y were made, did not constitute the
proper demand.  Ruben Cabacungan is a
mere employee of the appellee and his having signed the surrender paper
purportedly in behalf of the appellee, without the latter’s authority or
consent cannot bind the appellee.  The
Chattel Mortgage deed very clearly provides that demand for the surrender of
the vehicle should be made to the mortgagor himself, in this case, appellee
Cabacungan.  That Ruben Cabacungan is a
nephew of the appellee cannot by that relationship prove any agency or
authority to represent him.

Exhs. X and Y are mere demands to pay overdue installments for
October and November, 1982 (Exh. X) and for May and June, 1983 (Exh. Y).  A written demand to deliver the mortgaged
property is required and not a written demand to pay certain overdue
amortizations.  Furthermore, what were
supposed to be overdue accounts have been paid for by the appellee as evidenced
by Exhs. A-11, A-10 and A-4, A-3.”

x x x

It is not disputed that upon the default by a mortgagor in his
obligations, the mortgagee has the right to the possession of the property
mortgaged preparatory to its selling in a public auction.  Section 14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law^[10]
provides, inter alia, that the “mortgagee, his
executor, administrator, or assign, may, after thirty days from the time of
condition broken, cause the mortgaged property, or any part thereof, to be sold
at public auction …” In the early case of Bachrach Motor Co.
vs. Summers,^[11]
this Court held this right to be unquestionable; however, if “the debtor
refuses to yield up the property, the creditor must institute an action, either
to effect a judicial foreclosure directly, or to secure possession as a
preliminary to the sale contemplated.  x
x x He cannot lawfully take the property by force against the will of the
debtor.  x x x In the article on Chattel
Mortgages, in Corpus Juris, the following statement of the
law on the same point is made: `The only restriction on the mode by which the
mortgagee shall secure possession of the mortgaged property after breach of
condition is that he must act in an orderly manner and without creating a
breach of the peace, subjecting himself to an action for trespass’.”^[12]

The law does not allow the creditor himself to possess the
mortgaged property through violence and against the will of the debtor because
the creditor’s right of possession is conditioned upon the fact of default, and
the existence of this fact may naturally be the subject of controversy.  The debtor, for instance, may claim in good
faith, and rightly or wrongly, that the debt is paid, or that for some other
reason the alleged default is nonexistent.^[13]

Besides, the Deed of Chattel Mortgage in this case, which has the
force of law between the contracting parties and which they must comply with in
good faith,^[14]
clearly provides that the mortgaged property shall be delivered only upon
demand from the mortgagor.  Filinvest was
bound to comply with it and cannot substitute demand and voluntary delivery
with unilateral illegal seizure. 
Cabacungan was not even given the opportunity to contest the taking as
the vehicle was seized from his nephew. 
That the former did not agree to the taking is borne out by the fact
that he presented a check in the amount of P7,555.00 the day after the seizure,
as payment for missed installments.  In
short, it is obvious that Filinvest took the law into its own hands in
obtaining possession of the vehicle and made a mockery of the judicial process
when it kept the vehicle away from the reach of the writ of replevin.  We note in the decision of the trial court
that the writ of replevin was not implemented because the vehicle disappeared
from Filinvest’s stockyard.^[15]

As to the non-payment of the installments for June 1982 and
February 1983, the trial court found that Cabacungan had an excuse
therefor.  He requested Filinvest to
recompute the interests.  If Filinvest
deemed the excuse unfounded, its conduct in accepting payments for succeeding
installments and the absence of a formal written demand therefor could hardly
be reconciled with the former.  Besides,
such delinquency is immaterial to the issue of the legality of the taking of the
vehicle.  While Filinvest may have all
the right in the world to foreclose the mortgage, that right did not grant it
untrammeled license to intercept the property subject of the mortgage and seize
it wherever it may be found, in a manner contrary to the stipulations set forth
in the Chattel Mortgage contract.

Anent the damages granted, We find the award to be supported by
the evidence.

Three (3) remaining issues involve questions of law:  (a) the validity or propriety of the order
directing Filinvest to return to Cabacungan the sum of P44,194.00, which
represents the installment payments made before the seizure of the vehicle,
which Filinvest claims to be a violation of Section 9, Rule 60 of the Rules of
Court, (b) the non-payment of docket fees on the increased amount of damages
claimed in the amended complaint, and (c) the issue of whether the chattel
mortgage is a contract of adhesion.

There is merit in the first.

The complaint before the trial court is for replevin with a
prayer for damages.  A writ of replevin
was in fact issued, but unfortunately the vehicle disappeared from the
stockyard of petitioner.  The records do
not disclose that:  (a) the vehicle was
subsequently recovered and its possession restored to Cabacungan because of the
writ, and (b) Filinvest subsequently foreclosed the chattel mortgage.  It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that
the writ of replevin was never implemented, Filinvest did not foreclose the
mortgage, and that the latter has the vehicle in its possession and control.

In a replevin case, the Rules of Court expressly provides that:

“After a trial of the issues the court shall find in whom is
the right of possession and the value of the property and shall render judgment
in the alternative for the delivery thereof to the party entitled to the same,
or for the value in case delivery cannot be made, and also for such damages as
either party may prove, and for costs.”^[16]

There can be no question that although he had not yet fully paid
its purchase price, Cabacungan became the owner of the vehicle, otherwise the
seller would not have accepted it in mortgage. 
He was entitled to its possession and use until appropriate lawful
proceedings would have been taken by Filinvest to obtain possession of the
vehicle preliminary to foreclosure of the mortgage.  Absent such proceedings, as in this case,
Cabacungan was entitled to recover its possession.  But the writ of replevin could not be and was
not in fact implemented for the reason already adverted to.  The conclusion is thus inescapable that
return of the vehicle was rendered impossible by Filinvest.  So, from 12 September 1983 up to at least 28
April 1987, when the trial court rendered its decision, and even up to the
present — or for at most a little over eight (8) years — Cabacungan was
effectively deprived of the possession and use of the vehicle.  Undoubtedly, whether it is being used or just
kept idle somewhere by Filinvest, its value has significantly been reduced.  It is obvious that Cabacungan had abandoned
any claim for its recovery and for the restoration of its possession to
him.  He did not appeal from the decision
which was silent on that point. 
Considering the lapse of more than eight (8) years since the illegal
seizure of the vehicle, its possible deterioration and diminution in value as a
result thereof, equity demands that Cabacungan should be paid its value, which
is the second alternative provided for in Section 9, Rule 60 of the Rules of
Court, and that he should not be held liable for the remaining unpaid
installments on the promissory note.

Cabacungan explicitly admits in paragraph 8 of his Complaint:^[17]

“8.  That the value of the said motor vehicle as
of September 12, 1983 is P62,255.55.”

which Filinvest admits in paragraph 8 of
its Answer.^[18]
The parties are bound by this valuation:

Accordingly, Filinvest must be ordered to pay this amount of
P62,255.55 instead of the sum of P44,914.00.

And now to the issue concerning the docket fees.

Filinvest claims that Cabacungan should not be allowed to recover
damages because he failed to pay the corresponding docket fees based on the
P960,000.00 damages prayed for in the amended complaint.  Respondent court, however, citing Magaspi
vs. Ramolete,^[19]
maintains that the trial court had jurisdiction over the claim despite the
insufficiency of the docket fees paid.

The respondent court is correct. 
The decision in Magaspi was promulgated on 20 July 1982 and was
the controlling law at the time the original and amended complaints were filed
by Cabacungan; the case was decided by the trial court on 28 April 1987.

Magaspi involved a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land, with claims for P500,000.00 as moral damages,
P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and P250,000.00 as attorney’s fees.  The docket fee paid was based on the assessed
value of the property alone.  On motion
of two (2) of the defendants to compel the plaintiffs to pay the correct docket
fees on the basis of the sum total of the value of the property, the rentals claimed
and the damages and the attorney’s fees asked, the court, through then Judge
Canonoy, directed the plaintiffs to pay the additional docket fee of
P3,104.00.  The complaint was in the
meanwhile amended; however, in their prayer, plaintiffs did not specify anymore
the amounts of the said damages but left it to the determination of the court
and reduced the claim for attorney’s fees to P100,000.00.  Judge Canonoy admitted the amended
complaint.  Plaintiffs, nevertheless, did
not comply with the order for the payment of the additional docket fee, forcing
defendants to file a motion to require the former to pay it within seven (7)
days which plaintiffs in turn opposed in view of the amended complaint.  Acting on this motion, the court, through a
new judge, Judge Ramolete, ruled that in view of the insufficient docket fee
paid, the original complaint was not deemed registered or docketed; it follows
then that there being nothing to amend, the amended complaint cannot be deemed
to have been filed and admitted. 
Plaintiffs assailed this order and on a petition for certiorari
filed with this Court, We held that, considering the honest difference of
opinion as to the correct amount to be paid, the case below was properly
docketed upon the payment of P60.00 although said amount is insufficient.  The trial court had acquired jurisdiction
over the case and the proceedings thereafter were proper and regular.  However, the plaintiffs were required to pay
the additional docket fee based on the amended complaint.

The instant case is for replevin and for purposes of determining
the jurisdiction of the court, the value of the personal property involved is
controlling; the damages and attorney’s fees claimed are merely
incidental.  Accordingly, following the
rule in Magaspi, the court had validly acquired jurisdiction on the
basis of the original complaint; the increase in the amount of the damages
claimed did not affect it, although Cabacungan still has to pay the deficiency
in docket fees based on the amended complaint.

It must, however, be stressed here that the subsequent ruling of
this Court in Manchester Development Corp. vs. Court
of Appeals,^[20]
promulgated barely nine (9) days after the court below decided the instant
case, partly modified the Magaspi ruling.  Nevertheless, justice and equity would not
warrant the application of Manchester in this case.  Besides, Manchester was later modified
in Sun Insurance Office. Ltd. vs. Asuncion,^[21]
wherein We made the following clarificatory rules:

“1.    It is not simply the filing of the complaint
or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket
fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action.  Where the filing
of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2.     The same rule applies to permissive
counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be
considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is
paid.  The court may also allow payment
of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.

3.     Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination
by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment.  It shall be the responsibility
of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and
assess and collect the additional fee.”

Then in Tacay, et al. vs. Regional
Trial Court of Tagum, et al.,^[22]
We made further clarifications on the matter of the payment of the docket fee.

Finally, on the question of whether the Deed of Chattel Mortgage
is a contract of adhesion, We uphold the respondent court’s conclusion that it
is such.  In Angeles vs. Calasanz,^[23]
We said, quoting Sweet Lines vs. Teves,^[24]
that while generally, stipulations in a contract come about after deliberate
drafting by the parties thereto, there are certain contracts almost all the
provisions of which have been drafted only by one party, usually a
corporation.  Such contracts are called
contracts of adhesion, because the only participation of the party is the
affixing of his signature or his “adhesion” thereto.  The deed of Chattel Mortgage entered into by
the parties easily falls into this category as it is evident that its
preparation was done solely by Filinvest. 
This being the case, the terms of such contract are to be construed
strictly against the latter, the party which prepared it.^[25]

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
modifying the challenged Decision and that of the trial court’s.  As modified the award of P44,914.00 to
plaintiff Cabacungan is hereby SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, Filinvest is
hereby ORDERED to pay the sum of P62,255.55 representing the value of the motor
vehicle.  In all other respects the
Decision is AFFIRMED.

The Clerk of Court of the trial court is hereby ordered to
reassess and determine the additional docket fees that should be paid by private
respondent Cabacungan in Civil Case No. XX-29, taking into account the total
amount sought in the original complaint and the amended complaint as determined
from the allegations and the prayer thereof, and to require Cabacungan to pay
the deficiency, if any, within ten (10) days following receipt of notice to
that effect:  provided; however, that
should the latter fail to do so, the deficiency shall be considered a lien on
the judgment in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and
Romero, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., on leave.

^[1]
Per Associate Justice Cezar D. Francisco, concurred in by Associate Justices
Serafin E. Camilon and Venancio D. Aldecoa, Jr.; Rollo, 82.

^[2] Rollo,
83-85.

^[3] Rollo,
25, et seq.

^[4] Rollo,
96.

^[5]
Resolution of 29 April 1991.

^[6] Id.,
103.

^[7] Id.,
142.

^[8]
Remalante vs. Tibe, et al., 158 SCRA 138, citing Chan vs. Court
of Appeals, 33 SCRA 737; Tiongco vs. De la Merced, 58 SCRA 89; Corona vs.
CA, 121 SCRA 865; Baniqued vs. CA, 127 SCRA 596; Sta. Ana, Jr. vs.
Hernandez, 18 SCRA 973.

^[9]
Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 191 SCRA 218. 
See also Joaquin vs. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257; Cruz vs.
Sosing, G.R. No. 4875, 27 November 1953; Buyco vs. People, 95 Phil. 453;
Evangelista vs. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401; Casica vs.
Villaseca, G.R. No. 9590, 30 April 1957 (unreported); Salazar vs.
Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242; Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622; Sacay vs.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593.

^[10]
Act No. 1508, as amended.

^[11]
42 Phil. 3.  See also Papa vs.
Banaag, 31 Aug. 1966, 17 SCRA 1083.

^[12]
Citing 11 C.J. 560; 5 R.C.L. 462.

^[13]
Bachrach case at p. 6.

^[14]
Article 1159, New Civil Code.

^[15] Rollo,
73.

^[16]
Section 9, Rule 60.

^[17] Rollo,
56; emphasis supplied.

^[18] Id.,
62.

^[19]
G.R. No. L-34840, 20 July 1982, 115 SCRA 193.

^[20]
149 SCRA 562, 7 May 1987.

^[21]
170 SCRA 274, 13 February 1989.

^[22]
180 SCRA 433, 20 December 1989.

^[23]
135 SCRA 323.

^[24]
83 SCRA 361.

^[25]
Western Guaranty Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 652.