ROBERTO AGURA, CESAR ALIB, TOMAS STA. RITA, ALFREDO CORDOVA, VICTOR DE LOS REYES, AND MARINA SERFINO, PETITIONERS, VS. FEDERICO SERFINO, SR., FEDERICO SERFINO, JR., THE HONORABL…

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners
seek to nullify the decision dated 30 April 1979 of the then Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, Branch XXI, in Civil Case No.
113897, which affirmed the decisions of the
Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs and the then Minister of Natural
Resources giving due course to the Miscellaneous Sales Applications filed by
private respondents with the Bureau of Lands.

The relevant factual and procedural antecedents which gave rise
to this petition as gathered from the pleadings are as follows:

On 10 December 1965, private respondent Federico Serfino, Sr., filed with the Bureau of Lands Miscellaneous
Sales Application (MSA) No. (V-3)2 over a 4,172 square meter parcel of land
located at San Patricio, Bacolod City.  On 18 February 1966, his son, respondent Serfino, Jr., filed MSA No. (V-3)1 over an adjoining lot
with an area of 1,358 square meters. 
Subsequently, the Director of Lands approved the survey plans of these
two (2) MSAs.

On 21 February 1966, Land Investigator Rodolfo Magbanua conducted a preliminary investigation of the
parcels of land covered by the above MSAs.  He reported that Serfino,
Sr. had introduced improvements consisting of a residential house, a piggery
house and a bodega all valued at P25,500.00; Serfino, Jr. had
introduced an improvement consisting of a residential house valued at
P15,000.00; and that they have been occupying the parcels applied for since
1947.  Magbanua
recommended that the MSAs be given further due course.

The MSAs were referred to the Director
of Public Works, the Commissioner of Public Highways, the Bacolod
City Engineer and the Bacolod City Collector of
Customs.  These officials did not
interpose any objections.

The Director of Lands approved the surveys of the parcels applied
for on 26 July 1966.

On 28 September 1967, notices
for the sale through public auction of the lots in question were posted
at the required places and published in the 13 and 20 November 1967 issues of
the Official Gazette.  The auction sale
was set for 27 December 1967 at
10:00 o’clock in the morning.  The
Undersecretary of Natural Resources pegged the price of the lots in question at
P5.00 per square meter.

At the auction sale, private respondents were the only qualified
bidders.  Serfino,
Sr.’s bid was P20,860.00 while that of Serfino, Jr.’s was P6,790.00. 
They paid the required 10% of their respective bids.  While the purchase price and the
corresponding annual real estate taxes have already been fully paid, the Bureau
of Lands has yet to issue an
Order awarding the lots in question to them.

On 11 March 1968, District Land Officer Pedro C. Reyes ordered an
investigation of an alleged conflict (docketed as D.L.O. Conflict No. (V-3)220 (N)) between Serfino, Sr.’s MSA No. (V-3)2 and
that of an unnumbered Revocable
Permit Application (RPA) of a certain Primitivo Donozo.  On 2 April 1968, another investigation of an alleged conflict
(docketed as B.L. Conflict No. 217(N)) between Serfino,
Jr.’s MSA No. (V-3)1 and the RPAs of petitioners Agura, Alib, and Sta. Rita and a certain Domingo Natividad was ordered.

Land Investigator Ernesto Siriban
conducted a preliminary investigation of B.L. Conflict No. 217(N).  In his report dated 20 April 1968, he stated:

“That the land subject hereof used to be foreshore but is now dryland and is being used for residential purposes by the
party litigants and their respective tenants and relatives;

That upon verification of the premises, it was found out that the
area applied for and occupied by the Applicants-Contestants are inside the area
applied for and surveyed for the Applicant-Respondent x x
x.”^[1]

In his report, Siriban made no mention
of D.L.O. Conflict No. (V-3)220(N).  He advised the contending parties in B.L.
Conflict No. 217(N) to submit to a
formal investigation so that their respective claims can be threshed out.

A formal investigation was then conducted by Ramon Villamarzo of the Bacolod City
District Land Office.  Three (3) formal
hearings were held in May, June and 19 September 1969.  Unfortunately, however, Villamarzo
failed to submit either the stenographic notes or the report on what transpired
during these hearings, except the
one held on 19 September 1969 wherein he stated that for failure of herein
respondents to appear, he had to reset the hearings to 27, 28, and 29 of
November 1969.

Meanwhile, petitioners Agura, Alib, Sta. Rita and 106 others sent to the President of the
Philippines a petition dated 22 August 1969 requesting that the small parcels
of land located in the areas covered by private respondents’ MSAs which they have been occupying for thirty (30) years
be awarded to them.  In view of this
petition, Regional Land Officer Cipriano Zabala of Region V, Iloilo City was ordered to conduct an
investigation.

On 13 October 1969, Zabala submitted
the following preliminary report:

“The land subject of the present controversy is now a dry land
which has been formed by accretions from the sea (Guimaras
Strait) for many, many years.  It could
not be reached anymore by sea water during ordinary high tide.  The land is between the Bacolod
Cadastre on the east and foreshore area on the west.

About 3/4 of the land in question extending towards the south was
surveyed under approved survey plans msi-(V-3)3-D in
the name of Federico Serfino, Sr. and Serfino, Jr.  The
remaining 1/4 portion of the land in question is not covered by an approved
survey plan and is being claimed by Mr. Serfino, Sr.

The Serfinos have houses on the land in
question.  Likewise, all other portions
of the land in question are covered with houses mostly of nipa
roofing and of light materials belonging to the petitioners.  There is an artesian well now being used by
the people therein.  Several old coconut
trees are found in the area and
the consensus of the people with me (including Atty. Drilon, Jr., Serfino Sr. and Barrio Captain Deoma) is that these coconut trees have been planted by Candido Cordova and/or his predecessors, owners of a
cadastral lot not very far south of the land in question.”^[2]

On 3
December 1969, Zabala submitted a “final” report:

“As stated in my progress report dated October 13, 1969, transit and stadia sketching of the area in question was made by
Supervising Surveyor I Ponciano Bautista of the Bacolod City District Land Office.  Enclosed herewith, marked as Annex ‘J’ is a
sketch tracing plan prepared therefor.  From the herein sketch plan, the first lot on
the south is that covered by M.S.A. No. (V-3)1 of Federico Serfino,
Jr. with an area of 1,358 square meters. 
There are thirty four (34) persons (petitioners) with houses therein
very close to each other occupying the area. 
Some of these houses are indicated on the tracing plan.  The site of the proposed artesian well to be
constructed is also indicated and circled with red ink on the sketch.

The second lot involved in this case with an area of 4,172 square
meters is the one applied for by Federico Serfino,
Sr.  Aside from the residential house of
the Serfinos and the bodega (of) the West Visayan Shipping Co., there are thirty-eight (38) houses
also close to each other of the petitioners. 
Some of these houses are indicated on the sketch.

x x x

The third lot on the north is not covered by any public land
application by the Serfinos as verified from the
records in the District Land Office at Bacolod City.  The area is approximately 3,650 square
meters.  There are fifty-eight (58)
houses of the petitioner(s) within the lot all close to each other.  Some of the houses are indicated on the
sketch.  The site of another artesian
well proposed to be constructed by the petitioners is marked and circled in red
ink.”^[3]

Zabala likewise stated in his report
that three (3) ejectment cases (Civil Cases Nos.
6533, 6534, and 6674) were filed with the City Court of Bacolod
by private respondents against certain individuals including petitioners
herein.  He recommended that, in view of
these pending cases, further action on private respondents’ MSAs
be held in abeyance.

On 7 January 1970,
the City Court of Bacolod rendered a decision in
Civil Case No. 6533 ordering the ejectment of the
defendants therein from the lots in question for “failure to pay rentals.” On
22 August 1970, Civil Cases Nos. 6534 and 6674 were dismissed on the ground
that “the question of who has a better right to the areas claimed by the
parties will be determined by the Bureau of Lands who (sic) has charge of the
disposal of public lands.”^[4]

On 10 February 1971,
Land Investigator Villamarzo submitted a report recommending that the
petitioners herein be given “preferential right” over the portions occupied by
them.  Acting on this recommendation, the
Director of Lands on 6 July 1971
issued an Order, the dispositive part of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, it is ordered that the Miscellaneous Sales Applications
No. (V-3)2 and (V-3)1 of Federico Serfino, Sr. and
Federico Serfino, Jr., respectively, be, as hereby
they are, amended by excluding therefrom the portions
occupied by the petitioners, and as thus amended said applications shall be
given due course for the remaining portions after they are surveyed at the
applicant’s own expense.  The excluded
portions shall be subdivided into home-sized lots in accordance, as much as
possible, with the actual occupation of the petitioners who shall, thereafter,
be required to file appropriate public land applications therefor.”^[5]

On 7 August 1971,
private respondents moved for a reconsideration alleging that they were not
given the opportunity to introduce evidence in their behalf.  On 16
August 1974, the Assistant Director of Lands denied the motion
stating, inter alia, that:

“Records also disclosed that the proceedings in the City Court of Bacolod in the aforesaid civil cases were adopted during
the investigation of the above-noted case conducted by a representative of this
office.  Thus, the records of the
transcript of stenographic notes taken down during the hearing in the two (2)
aforesaid civil cases are attached to the record of this case as part hereto.

Records further show that the petitioners-claimants are in actual
possession of the portions
respectively claimed by them.  The
foregoing facts and circumstances have clearly established that the
petitioners-claimants have preferential right to the portions they actually
occupy.”^[6]

On appeal by herein private respondents, the Secretary of Natural
Resources set aside the foregoing orders in a decision dated 7
October 1976, the dispositive part of
which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Order of the Director of Lands dated July 6, 1971,
is hereby SET ASIDE, and the appellees are hereby
ordered to vacate the two lots in question within thirty (30) days from receipt
of their copies of the decision hereof and leave the appellants in peaceful
possession of the same.  Accordingly, the Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (V-3)1
of appellant Federico Serfino, Jr. and Miscellaneous
Sales Application No (V-3)2 of appellant Federico Serfino,
Sr. shall be given further due course.”^[7]

In support of this disposition, the Secretary made the following
findings of facts and conclusions:

“The principal issue is whether or not the sales of the lots in
question in favor of the appellants (private respondents) should be revoked in
view of the alleged conflicts and adverse claims of the appellees
(petitioners).

We find no basis for an affirmative answer to this issue
considering that the basic facts remain uncontroverted.

The records show that the required notices were posted in
accordance with law on September 28,
1967, at the required places for the sale through public auction of
the lots in question on December 27,
1967.  The notices were
likewise published in the Official Gazette on November 13, 1967, and on November 20, 1967. 
On December 27, 1967,
no other bids having been admitted, except those of the appellants, their bids
were accepted.  Since then, the
appellants have fully paid the amounts respectively bidded
by them:  P20,860.00
for Federico Serfino, Sr., and P6,790.00 for Federico
Serfino, Jr. 
Appellants have also declared the said lots for taxation purposes with
the City Assessor of Bacolod and have been
religiously paying their taxes thereon.

Ordinarily, the Order of award and the corresponding authority to
enter follow.  But no such order of award
in favor of the appellants has yet been issued. 
Were there supervening events that could have prevented the Bureau from
giving the award to the appellants?  If
so, did these supervening events constitute a bar to an award of the contested
lots?

From the records of this case, there were allegedly two supervening
events.  First, there were the alleged
conflicts between the Miscellaneous Sales Applications of the appellants and
Revocable Permit Applications of the five appellees.  The second were the adverse claims of these
five appellees and 105 others filed on August 22, 1969.

Under Land Administrative Order No. 6, a conflict refers to a
protest made by a public land applicant who believes that another applicant or
any other person is encroaching upon the land applied for by him.  In other words, it is essential that the
protestant must be a public land applicant. 
Appellees never filed any regular land
application.  They did, however, file
revocable permit applications, but these were never approved by the Bureau of
Lands as reflected in the questioned Order of the Director of Lands.  x x x The appellees
therefore have not acquired any right whatsoever over the lots in
question.  Beside (sic) such mere filing
did not create an obligation on the part of the Bureau of Lands to grant their
applications.  ‘x x x
It is discretionary on the part of said officials to grant or not to grant such
applicants.’ (Aureus vs. Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 85 Phil. 1, November 11, 1949).

The case took on a different aspect when the five appellees and 105 others sent a letter-protest to the
President of the Philippines
on August 22, 1969,
requesting that the contested areas, which they have allegedly occupied for
more than thirty (30) years, be awarded to them.  This was done even while the formal
investigation before Villamarzo on the alleged
conflicts was still pending.  In fact, no
investigation at all was ever done by Villamarzo.  In effect, the appellees
turned the alleged conflicts into adverse claims.

Again under Lands Administrative Order No. 6, an adverse claim
refers to the verified protest filed whereby a person asserts a right over a
land covered by a public land application, based on his alleged ownership or on
his prior right to apply for the same.

Obviously, appellees cannot base their
adverse claim on the ground of ownership since the contested lots belong to the
public domain.  Well settled is the rule
that no public land can be acquired by private persons without a grant, express
or implied, from the Government (Padilla vs. Reyes, 60 Phil. 967), x x However, a mere allegation by the appellees
that they have been in occupation of certain portions of the public domain for
more than 30 years is not sufficient to confer ownership on (sic) said public
lands.

x x x

Appellees herein failed to protest when
the appellants filed their respective sales applications.  Neither did they protest when the land was surveyed nor did they contest or participate in the
public bidding.  Appellees
took nearly two years after the bidding to file their alleged adverse claims.

x x x

The basic facts remain.  The
Bureau decided to sell the contested lots through public auction.  And the public bidding was indeed held.  Prior possession is immaterial.  In proceedings for the sale of public lands
for residential purposes, adjudication shall be made to the highest
bidder.  x x x.

Appellants herein have substantially complied with the sales
provisions of the Public Land Act, whereas the appellees
failed to exercise their rights when they did not participate in the public
bidding.  They therefore could not invoke
preferential right over the contested lots under Section 95 of the Public Land
Act since the lots were already regularly sold at public auction in favor of
the appellants.”^[8]

On appeal by herein petitioners, the Presidential Assistant for
Legal Affairs on 20 September 1977
affirmed in toto the foregoing decision.

In affirming the Secretary’s decision, the Office of the
President held as without merit the contentions of petitioners that the land in
question is foreshore and cannot therefore be disposed of by sale but only by
lease pursuant to Section 61, in relation to Section 59 of the Public Land Act,
and that if at all it could be disposed of by sale, purchasers are limited to
1,000 square meters pursuant to R.A. No. 730, and that the decision appealed
from renders nugatory the social justice policy of the New Society as it would
result in the eviction and dislocation of more than 100 occupants of the area
who have been there for more than thirty (30) years.  The order of the Director of Lands of 6 July 1971 favoring the petitioners
characterized the land as having been formed by accretion from the sea, hence it is not foreshore land.  The sales in question were perfected by
public auction, held and conducted pursuant to Section 60, in relation to
Section 26 of the Public Land Act, and not through private sales; hence, R.A.
No. 730 has no application.  As to the
third contention, the Office of the
President concluded that from the facts established, the petitioners were able
to enter the land after the Serfinos purchased the
land by public bidding.  The social
justice policy of the New Society does not condone, much less countenance,
entry upon public lands already applied for and purchased at public auction;
otherwise, it would be placing a premium on squatting.^[9]

Petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration of the above decision having been denied, they filed with the
respondent trial court a special civil action for certiorari and asked
for the nullification of the decisions of the Presidential Assistant for Legal
Affairs and the Secretary of Natural Resources. 
On 30 April 1979, the trial court^[10] affirmed the questioned decisions and
dismissed the petition.^[11]

On 20 July
1979, petitioners
filed the petition at bar.^[12]

Petitioners urge Us to
reverse the decision of the trial court because it erred:

“I

X X X IN NOT
DECLARING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE RESPONDENTS PUBLIC OFFICIALS WERE MADE WITH
ARBITRARINESS AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

II

X X X IN
REFUSING TO REVIEW, AND IN BASING ITS DECISION ON, THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE
RESPONDENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS.

III

X X X IN NOT HOLDING THAT SEC 1 OF R.A. NO. 730 HAS
AMENDED THE PROVISIONS OF SECS. 61 AND 67 OF THE PUBLIC
LAND ACT REGARDING THE SALE
OF PUBLIC LANDS FOR RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES TO
BONA FIDE
OCCUPANTS.

IV

X X X IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE SALE TO THE RESPONDENTS
SERFINOS AT PUBLIC AUCTION OF MORE THAN 1,000 SQUARE METERS OF RESIDENTIAL PUBLIC
LAND VIOLATED THE PROVISIONS OF
R.A. NO. 730 AND IS THEREFORE VOID.”

We required the respondents to comment^[13]
on the petition which public respondents complied with on 31 August 1979,^[14]
and private respondents on 12 October
1979.^[15]
A Reply was subsequently filed by the petitioners.  On 13
February 1980, this Court gave due course to the petition^[16]
and the parties consequently filed their Briefs.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Decisive of the first and second assigned errors is the rule We enunciated in Pajo, et al, vs. Ago, et al.,^[17]
thus:

“In the case of Espinosa, et al. vs. Makalintal, et al. [79 Phil. 134; 45 Off. Gaz. 712] we held that the powers granted to the Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce (Natural Resources) by law regarding the
disposition of public lands such as granting of licenses, permits, leases, and
contracts or approving, rejecting, reinstating, or cancel­ling
applications, or deciding conflicting applications, are all executive and
adminis­trative in nature.  It is a
well-recognized principle that purely administrative and discretionary
functions may not be interfered with by the courts.  [Coloso vs. Board
of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938 and cases therein cited].  In general, courts have no supervising power
over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the
government.  This is generally true with
respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings
of fact [54 Am. Jur. 558-559].  Findings of fact by an administrative board
or officials, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be
disturbed except where the board or official has gone beyond his statutory
authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and
without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion.  And we have repeatedly held that there is
grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari
only when there is capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction [Abad Santos vs.
Province of Tarlac, 67 Phil. 480; Tan vs. People, 88
Phil. 609], as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion
of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to
act at all in contemplation of law [Tavera-Luna, Inc. vs. Nable, 67
Phil. 340; Alafriz vs. Nable,
72 Phil. 278; Liwanag vs. Castillo, 106 Phil. 375; 57
Off. Gaz. [11] (1962)].” x x
x

and reiterated
in many cases, among which is Lacuesta vs.
Herrera.^[18]

In Lacuesta vs. Herrera, this Court
categorically declared:

“The petition must therefore be granted on the strength of the
established doctrine that where as in this case at bar there is no showing that
there was fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or mistake on the part of the Office of the
President or a department head, (such as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources in the present case), in rendering their questioned decisions or of a
total lack of substantial evidence to support the same, such administrative
decisions are entitled to great weight and respect and will not be interfered
with by the courts.”

In the instant case, both the Secretary of Natural Resources and
the Office of the President made a thorough and painstaking analysis and
evaluation of the facts and their respective decisions are clearly supported by
substantial evidence.  There is nothing
in their actuations that would bring their findings and decisions within the
above exceptions to the principle of conclusiveness of finding of facts of
administrative bodies.  Accordingly, the
trial court, which nevertheless patiently and carefully summarized the facts,
did not commit the first and second alleged errors.

The third and fourth assigned errors are likewise untenable.

We agree with the ruling of the respondent court that R.A. No.
730 does not repeal or amend Sections 61 and 67 of C.A. No. 141 (The Public
Land Act); it merely establishes an exception to said sections.

Section 61 of the Public Land Act provides:

“The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section
fifty-nine shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise, as soon as the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public
service and are open to disposition under this chapter.  The lands included in class (d) may be disposed
of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act.”

Section 67 provides:

“The lease or sale shall be made through oral bidding, and
adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder.  However, where an applicant has made
improvements on the land by virtue of a permit issued to him by competent
authority, the sale or lease shall be made by sealed bidding as prescribed in
section twenty-six of this Act, the provisions of which shall be applied
wherever applicable.  If all or part of
the lots remain unleased or unsold, the Director of
Lands shall from time to time announce in the Official Gazette or in any other
newspapers of general circulation, the lease or sale of those lots, if
necessary.”

Section 59 reads:

“The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as
follows:

a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by
dredging, filling, or other means;

b) Foreshore;

c) Marshy lands or lands covered with
water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;

d) Lands not included in any of the
foregoing classes.”

The land in question belongs to class (d).

On the other hand, Section 1 of Republic Act No. 730 (“An Act To
Permit The Sale Without Public Auction Of Public Lands Of The Republic Of The
Philippines For Residential Purposes To Qualified Applicants Under Certain
Conditions”) provides that:

“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections sixty-one and sixty
seven of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Forty-one, as amended by
Republic Act Numbered Two Hundred Ninety-three, any Filipino citizen of legal
age who is not the owner of a home lot in the municipality or city in which he
resides and who has in good faith established his residence on a parcel of the
public land of the Republic of the Philippines which is not needed for the
public service, shall be given preference to purchase at a private sale of
which reasonable notice shall be given to him not more than one thousand square
meters at a price to be fixed by the Director of Lands with approval of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources.  It
shall be an essential condition of this sale that the occupant has constructed
his house on the land and actually resided therein.  Ten percent of the purchase price shall be
paid upon the approval of the sale and the balance may be paid in full, or in
ten equal annual installments.”

while Section 3
reads:

“The provisions of the Public Land Act with respect to the sale of
lands for residential purposes which are not inconsistent herewith shall be
applicable.”

From the title alone of R.A. No. 730, it is quite obvious that
indeed, as seen by the respondent court, it merely provides an exception to
Sections 61 and 67 of C.A. No. 141.  We
quote with approval the pertinent portions of the disquisition of the respondent
court, thus:

“The contention of the petitioners that the sale to the Serfinos is void because under Rep. Act No. 730 public
lands for residential purposes must be sold by private sale and for not more
than 1,000 square meters is not meritorious either.  Sec. 59 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 has
classified public lands which can be sold for residential, commercial, or
industrial purposes into:  (a) lands
reclaimed by the government; (b) foreshore; (c) marshy lands; and (d) lands not
included in any of the foregoing classes. 
Under Sec 60 of the Act, these public lands may be leased or sold to any
person qualified to purchase public lands for agricultural purposes, provided
that the area shall not exceed 144 hectares, as may be determined by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. 
Under Sec. 61, the lands under (a), (b) and (c) classifications can be
disposed of by lease only, while those under (d) classification may either be
leased or sold, Sec. 67 provides that the lease or sale shall be made by oral
bidding to the highest bidder.  Secs. 61
and 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 were amended by Rep. Act No. 730 in the
following manner:

x x x

The petitioners contend that after the passage of Rep. Act No. 730,
the sale of public lands for residential purposes has been limited to 1,000
square meters only, and that the sale must be effected
by private sale only.  A close
examination of the law cited by the petitioners, however, shows that it is only
applicable when the conditions specified therein are present, i.e., that
preference shall be given to the applicant if he is not the owner of a home lot
in the municipality or city in which he resides; if he has established his
residence in good faith on a parcel of public land, which is not needed for the
public services; and if the area applied for does not exceed one thousand
square meters.  In other words, Sec. 1 of
Rep. Act No. 730 does not repeal Secs. 61 and 67 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 entirely, but merely establishes an exception.  It does not repeal Sec. 60, either expressly
or by implication.”

x x x

In short, R.A. No. 730 authorizes a sale by private sale,
as an exception to the general rule that it should be by bidding, if the
area applied for does not exceed 1,000 square meters, and that the applicant
has in his favor the conditions specified for in Section 1 thereof.  Hence, if the area applied for is in excess
of 1,000 square meters, as in the instant case, the sale must be done only
through bidding.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the respondent court of 30 April 1979 in Civil Case No.
113897 is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., on leave.

---

^[1]
Rollo, 143.

^[2]
Rollo, 144.

^[3]
Rollo, 144-145.

^[4]
Id., 145-146.

^[5]
Rollo, 146.

^[6]
Rollo, 146-147.

^[7]
Id., 147.

^[8]
Rollo, 59-64.

^[9]
Rollo, 90-92.

^[10]
Per Judge Jose C. Colayco.

^[11]
Rollo, 141-155.

^[12]
Id., 8-35.

^[13]
Rollo, 157.

^[14]
Id., 161.

^[15]
Id., 177.

^[16]
Id., 217.

^[17]
108 Phil. 905 (1960).

^[18]
62 SCRA 115 (1975). 
The others are Ganitano vs. Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, et al., 16 SCRA 543 (1966); Deluao, et al. vs. Casteel, 26 SCRA 475 (1968); Lim vs.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 34 SCRA 751 (1970).