F.C. AREY ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. ADOLPH WISLIZENUS ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This is an original action in certiorari seeking to set aside the appointment
of a receiver for the plaintiffs’ business.

It appears from the pleadings that the defendant company is carrying the
herein plaintiffs on its books for a considerable amount. But that the latter
assumed the indebtedness due the defendant company from the S. L. Joseph Lumber
Yard, and have also incurred additional indebtedness by the purchase of large
quantities of the defendant company’s products, for which they have not yet
paid, does not entitle the defendant company to ask for the appointment of a
receiver.

In Bonaplata vs. Ambler (2 Phil. Rep., 392), this court, in
referring to section 174 of the Code of Civil Procedure, said: “That section
authorizes the appointment of a receiver (1) in certain corporation cases; (2)
where the plaintiff has an interest in”the property or fund
which is the subject of the action, etc.; (3) in an action to foreclose a
mortgage; (4) and, finally, whenever in other cases it shall appear to the court
that the appointment of a receiver is the most feasible means of preserving and
administering the property which is the subject of the litigation during the
pendency of the action”

A later case of the same tenor is Rocha & Co. vs. Cross field (6
Phil. Rep., 355), in which the court said: “The case at bar does not fall within
any of the provisions of this section. There is no allegation in the complaint,
as has been before stated, that the plaintiff is the owner of any of the
property of Rocha & Co., nor is there any allegation that he has any lien
thereon, nor are there any facts alleged in the complaint from which it could be
inferred that he was the owner of such property or had any lien thereon.”

While the defendant company, in its complaint before the Court of First
Instance, alleged that lumber delivered to the plaintiffs under the contract of
June 1, 1913, was for sale on consignment only, we cannot overlook the fact that
the eighth paragraph of that contract states that “The company (The Insular
Lumber Company) agrees to sell to Arey & Laing, such lumber as may
be necessary for their business, at the following prices, * * *.”

Again, in Strong vs. Van Buskirk-Crook Co. (10 Phil. Rep., 190),
this court said: “In Bonaplata vs. Ambler (2 Phil. Rep., 392), it was
held that * * * in an action for debt, not in aid of a lien upon specific
property, the plaintiff, before the return of his execution unsatisfied, has no
such interest in the defendant’s property as to authorize the appointment of a
receiver under section 174 of the same code.”

A receiver cannot be appointed merely for the purpose of assisting in the
collection of debts.

For these reasons it is adjudged that the court below exceeded its
jurisdiction in appointing a receiver for the plaintiffs’ business, and all the
proceedings taken therein are hereby annulled. Let judgment be entered
accordingly, with the costs of this action against the defendant, The Insular
Lumber Company.

Arellano, C. J., Moreland and Araullo, JJ., concur.