PASCUALA DENZON ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. CORAZON CH. VELOSO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

It appears that Bartolome Ch. Veloso, on or about the month of January, 1909,
was convicted of the crime of seduction in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
and sentenced to four months of arresto mayor and to recognize and maintain the
child born of the relations between him and the girl seduced, Pascuala Denzon.
After having served a part of his sentence, Bartolome Ch. Veloso petitioned the
Governor-General for a pardon. This was granted upon the condition that he give
a bond to the girl seduced and to the child born of such seduction, Lourdes
Denzon, in a sum to be fixed and approved by the court, conditioned that the
sureties would undertake to assure that said Bartolome Ch. Veloso would furnish
to the child, Lourdes Denzon, support and maintainance until it arrived at its
majority. In pursuance of this requirement the defendant Corazon Ch. Veloso,
jointly and severally with Pedro Rodriguez, executed a bond in favor of the
plaintiffs, of which the following is a copy:

“Know all men by these presents, that we, Corazon Ch. Veloso and Pedro
Rodriguez, as sureties for Bartolome Ch. Veloso, are hereby bound jointly and
severally to Pascuala Denzon in the sum of seven thousand five hundred pesos
(P7,500) to be paid by us and our heirs and administrators, to which payment we
bind ourselves by these presents.

“The condition of this obligation is the following:

“Whereas Bartolome
Ch. Veloso was pardoned by the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of the
sentence imposed on him by the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cebu
in the above-entitled cause;

“Whereas one of the conditions imposed by the Governor General being that the
said Bartolome Ch. Veloso should give a bond, approved by the court, for the
maintenance and education of the child, Lourdes Denzon, daughter of the said
Pascuala Denzon, during her minority:

“Therefore, we, Corazon Ch. Veloso and Pedro Rodriguez, as sureties of the
said Bartolome Ch. Veloso, bind ourselves jointly and severally, and promise
that the latter will pay the sums which the court may fix for the maintenance of
the said Lourdes Denzon during her minority; and we promise, moreover that the
sum so named as the support and maintenance of the said child shall be delivered
to the person who has the care and the legal custody of the said child in
accordance with the terms and conditions which the court will hereafter fix with
reference to said support and maintenance.”

A stipulation of facts was made in the court below which formed the basis of
the decision. The only defense made to the action is based upon the following
paragraphs in the stipulation of facts:

“That since the month of November, 1910, to the present, Bartolome Ch.
Veloso, the principal in the bond providing for the support and maintenance of
the minor Lourdes Denzon, has been without property or funds to such an extent
that he has been unable to satisfy his own necessities and is completely unable
to pay for the support and maintenance of the said minor Lourdes Denzon, he
having been since said month of November, 1910, without property or money and
without employment of any kind from which he could obtain a
recompense.

“That said Bartolome Ch. Veloso, from the time that he
entered into the obligation to maintain the said minor Lourdes Denzon, fulfilled
his obligation by paying thirty pesos every month in accordance with the order
of the court mentioned in the eighth paragraph of the complaint until the 1st of
November, 1910, from which date he has failed to maintain said minor for the
reasons alleged in the previous paragraph.”

This action is to recover the sum of P900, being P30 a month from November,
1910, to the filing of the complaint in this action.

The defense based upon the two paragraphs quoted is founded in article 152 of
the Civil Code which reads, so far as material, as follows:

“The obligation to give support shall cease:

“1. By the death of the recipient.

“2. If the means of the person obliged to pay it are reduced to such a point
that he or she cannot pay it without neglecting his or her own requirements and
those of his or her family.”

It is the contention of the appellant that the stipulation of facts, so far
as quoted, brings the case squarely within the provisions of the article
referred to. The learned trial court did not agree with the appellant in this
regard and found that the sureties were bound in accordance with the express
wording of their undertaking and that the impoverishment of the principal did
not relieve them. He accordingly decided in favor of the plaintiffs and gave
judgment for the sum of P900 and costs.

This appeal is from that judgment.

We are of the opinion that the judgment appealed from is correct. The
obligation sought to be enforced here is not, strictly speaking, the legal
obligation of the principal to maintain and educate his offspring as set out in
the Civil Code. Nor is the court seeking to enforce against him the general
provisions of the Civil Code (articles 142 to 154) relative to the obligation to
support. If it were, the contention of the appellant would have considerable, if
not complete, foundation. The bond was given to fulfill a condition named by the
Governor-General as a prerequisite to the pardon which he proposed to issue to
Bartolome Ch. Veloso. In making his conditions to the pardon the
Governor-General was not limited to the obligation which the law placed upon
Veloso to support and maintain his off spring. He had the power to make any
condition which he deemed advisable and proper for the welfare of the convict
and his offspring as well as for the protection of the public interests. From
the whole instrument and from the facts and circumstances surrounding its
execution, we cannot say that the learned trial court was in error in
determining that it was the intention of the Governor-General to assure beyond
peradventure that Veloso’s offspring should be taken care of by him during its
minority and that, consequently, it was the intention of the sureties to bind
themselves in that sense and to that extent. It is true that we held in the case
of Bandoy vs. Judge of La Laguna (14 Phil. Rep., 620), that “where the form of
the bond, for the purpose of admitting a defendant in a criminal case to liberty
during the pendency of the action, is prescribed by law, such form must be
followed in substance,” and that “the authorities can not vary its terms so as
to impose greater obligations upon the defendant and his bondsmen;” and that we
have also held in the case of Herrera vs. Neis (18 Phil. Rep., 366),
that “where a bond is given for the dissolution of an attachment, in the form
prescribed by section 440 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but contains an
additional clause, not prescribed by statute, under which the sureties agree to
assume a further obligation, no recovery can be had under such additional clause
which is not required by law and for which there is no consideration.”

In the latter case we laid down the proposition that in general it will not
be presumed that a bond given in accordance with the requirements of law was
intended to have greater reach or broader effect than the conditions which the
law itself imposed. This rule was laid down in aid of the interpretation of a
bond given in pursuance of law. It was not intended to hold in that case, or
either of the cases referred to, that parties may not make provisions in bonds
in civil actions in addition to those required by law, provided the intention is
clear and the consideration present.

The Civil Code does not require a bond to be given for the maintenance of
relations. It simply states the liability of parties to support and maintain
their relations and prescribes how that obligation shall be enforced. The bond
in the present case was not given in pursuance of law or of any provisions of
the Civil Code. We do not have, therefore, the question of whether or not its
provisions are broader than the requirements of the law. It was given in
pursuance of a requirement of the Governor-General, precedent to a pardon which
had been solicited, and its binding force must be determined by the intention of
the parties as gathered from the instrument itself. The words used therein are
clearly sufficient to require the sureties to furnish the support and
maintenance mentioned therein, no matter what the financial condition of the
principal may be; and the bond having been given for the purposes mentioned, we
do not see how we would be justified in limiting the scope of the provisions of
the obligation beyond that which the wording clearly implies.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Arellano, C. J., Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Trent, J., dissents.