PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALEJANDRINO C. CABEBE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF ILOCOS SUR, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. EFREN O. RAMOS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING A…

These cases have been consolidated because they both involve the
interpretation of Section 5 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
reading as follows:

SEC. 5 – Who must prosecute criminal actions. – All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. However, in the Municipal Trial Courts or
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when there is no fiscal available, the offended
party, any peace officer or public officer charged with the enforcement of the
law violated may prosecute the case. This authority ceases upon actual intervention of the fiscal or upon
elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court.

In G.R. No. 95370, the petitioners question the order of Judge
Efren C. Ramos of the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur,^[1]
dismissing the petition against two orders of Judge Francisco R. Ranches of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caoayan-Sta. Catalina, Ilocos Sur, requiring
Alejandrino C. Cabebe as Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos Sur to personally
attend the trial of seven criminal cases pending before the latter court.^[2]

The petitioners claim that all these cases were commenced on
complaint by the offended parties or the corresponding peace officers and
without the intervention of the Provincial Prosecutor. Assistant Fiscal Ramon D. Verzosa
participated in only one of these cases but no public prosecutor was assigned
to replace him when he died because Cabebe’s office was understaffed. Cabebe informed Judge Ranches of this
problem and requested him to allow the offended parties or peace officers to
handle the prosecution of the cases. However, Judge Ranches rejected this request and issued the questioned orders,
which on appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, were
substantially sustained by Judge Ramos.

Required to submit a Comment, Judge Ranches pointed out that,
contrary to the allegations in the petition, not all the seven cases were
commenced by complaint, one of them having been instituted through an
information filed by State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano. Annexed to the Comment were certified true
copies of the minutes of the proceedings in the said cases to show that Fiscal
Verzosa had actually participated in the prosecution of six of these cases
until his death, while Fiscal Panem attended the seventh.^[3] The
respondent judge also challenged the petitioners’ claim that there were not
enough prosecutors to handle the said cases and implied that the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos Sur was in fact not overworked. For his final argument, he stressed the
exception in Section 5, as affirmed in People v. Beriales,^[4] that
the authority given to offended parties and peace officers to handle the
prosecution of cases under certain conditions shall cease upon actual
intervention of the fiscal or upon elevation of the case to the Regional Trial
Court. Judge Ramos raised virtually the
same justifications in his own Comment.

In G.R. No. 101227,
the petitioners also seek certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction, this time
against Judge Pacito B. Vizcarra of the Municipal Trial Court of Bantay, Ilocos
Sur, for requiring the attendance of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Ilocos Sur in a criminal case pending before that court.^[5] Also
faulted is his order directing Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jaime P.
Filler to explain why he should not be punished for contempt for refusing to
prosecute the said case.^[6]

The petitioners claim that a private practitioner was handling
the prosecution of that case under the authority and direction of the
Provincial Prosecutor. Cabebe had
earlier informed the court that no prosecutor could be assigned to the case
because nine of his ten prosecutors were assigned to the Regional Trial Court
of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, and one to the Municipal Trial Court of Vigan pursuant to
a directive of the Department of Justice.^[7]
Nevertheless, acting on the objection of defense counsel to the absence of a
public prosecutor, Judge Vizcarra deferred the trial of the case and in four
separate orders required Cabebe or any of his assistants to enter his
appearance and prosecute the case.^[8]

In the Comment he filed as required by this Court, Judge Vizcarra
said that the criminal case was commenced by the filing of an information for
theft by Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ulpiano Campos and not by mere
complaint. After the arraignment of the
accused and the postponement of the trial for various reasons, Filler appeared
before the court and moved for time to study the case. The motion was granted and the hearing
re-set but about two weeks later Filler asked to be excused, arguing that the
filing of the information by his office did not signify its actual intervention
in the case. It was for this reason
that Filler was required to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt. Like Judge Ranches and Judge
Ramos in the other case, Judge Viscarra also invoked the last sentence of
Section 5 to justify his questioned orders.

The issues having been joined, the Court now proceeds to resolve
them.

A study of Section 5 will show that a criminal case falling under
the jurisdiction of a municipal trial court or a municipal circuit trial court
may be prosecuted by the offended party, any peace officer or any officer
charged with the enforcement of the law violated only: 1) when there is no fiscal (or prosecutor)
available; and 2) as long as the fiscal has not intervened or the case has not
been elevated to the regional trial court.

In the cases at bar, it is claimed by the petitioners that there
are no prosecutors available because the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Ilocos Sur is understaffed and its distribution by the Department of Justice
among the several courts in the province precluded its handling of the seven
cases in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in Caoayan-Sta. Catalina, and the
lone case before the Municipal Trial Court of Bantay.

We have examined the said directive and find that this allegation
is inaccurate, to say the least. Annex
F clearly shows that Fiscal Roman Mario V. Panem has been assigned to the
Municipal Trial Court of Vigan and the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Caoayan-Sta. Catalina, Ilocos Sur, and Fiscal Primo T. Cabotaje, Jr. to the
Municipal Trial Court of Bantay, Ilocos Sur. It is true that, according to the directive, assignments to the
municipal trial courts and the municipal circuit trial courts are made
“only upon call for assistance by police officers, offended parties, law
enforcement officers and the proper courts in the interest of justice.”
Such call has been made, however, by the respondent judges.

The argument of the petitioners that the respondent judges should
not be allowed to interfere with the administration of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor is not acceptable. In
requiring that office to prosecute the cases before them, the said respondent
judges were merely enforcing the basic rule in Section 5 that “all
criminal actions either commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the fiscal.” The questioned orders were
in fact based, albeit unwittingly, on the directive of the Department of
Justice.

We also note the following allegations of Judge Vizcarra in his
Comment, which have not been refuted by the petitioners:

The petitioners stated that Provincial Prosecutor Alejandrino
Cabebe and/or his assistant prosecutors should not be required to prosecute
criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court of Ilocos Sur considering the
insufficient number of prosecutors to serve all courts in the province. They have never alleged much less shown to
the Municipal Trial Court of Bantay, Ilocos Sur and to the Honorable Supreme
Court why they claim that there are insufficient prosecutors to serve the
courts in the province. Before
September 4, 1991, Prosecutor Filler was not assigned to any Regional Trial
Court or any Municipal Trial Court of Ilocos Sur. It was only on September 4, 1991, after these incidents which
gave rise to the petition, that Prosecutor Cabebe assigned Prosecutor Filler as
an alternate or corroborating prosecutor of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. Nevertheless, since September 4, 1991 to the present, Prosecutor Filler
has never appeared to prosecute any criminal case before Branch 24 of the
Regional Trial Court of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. Similarly, Prosecutor Cabebe is not assigned to any Regional Trial Court
or Municipal Trial Court of Ilocos Sur although in very few and minor cases in
which Prosecutor Cabebe is presumably personally interested he appears in the
prosecution of cases before the Municipal Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos
Sur. The Regional Trial Court of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur has three branches, Branch 20 presided by Honorable Florencio Ruis
who holds session only on Tuesdays and Thursdays in the morning as Judge Ruiz
is regularly assigned to Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabugao,
Ilocos Sur, Branch 21 presided by Honorable Efren Ramos who holds session
mainly in the morning and Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur presided by Honorable Herminia Pascua who holds session at Vigan,
Ilocos Sur for fifteen (15) days in one month, as she also holds session on the
other fifteen (15) days in the Regional Trial Court of Tagudin, Ilocos
Sur. Prosecutor Primo Cabotaje, Jr. the
assigned prosecutor in Branch 20 therefore prosecutes cases only in the
mornings of Tuesdays and Thursdays. Prosecutor Redentor Cardenas, the prosecutor assigned in Branch 21
usually prosecutes cases before Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court only in
the mornings and rarely in the afternoons. Prosecutor Jessica Viloria who is assigned to prosecute criminal cases
in Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur prosecutes
criminal cases only in fifteen (15) days for one month and usually only in the
mornings as the Court seldom holds session in the afternoon. Aside from these, Provincial Prosecutor
Cabebe, Prosecutor Filler and Prosecutor Nonnatus Caezar Rojas could also
appear in the very few cases (about one or two times a month) of the Municipal
Trial Courts of Ilocos Sur wherein the public prosecutors have actually
intervened.

Judge Ranches commented on the same matter thus, also without
refutation:

The reason of petitioner Cabebe that there is a shortage of
assistant fiscals that is why he is not assigning an assistant prosecutor to
handle the prosecution of criminal cases in the sala of the undersigned
respondent is not true. There is no
shortage. In the municipality of Vigan
alone, which is only three (3) kilometers distance to Caoayan, there are five
(5) assistant fiscals, namely: Assistant Provincial Prosecutors Primo T. Cabotaje, Jr., Jessica G.
Viloria, Jaime P. Filler, Roman Mario Panem and Redentor Cardenas. There are only three (3) RTC branches
conducting hearings in Vigan. Branch XX
presided by then Hon. Ariston L. Rubio and the prosecuting fiscal is Primo T.
Cabotaje, Jr., Branch XXV presided by Hon. Herminia Pascua who conducts
hearings only on the first fifteen (15) days of every month, her official
station being Tagudin, Ilocos Sur. The
prosecuting fiscal is Jessica G. Viloria, Branch XXI now presided by Hon. Efren
O. Ramos, one of the respondents herein and the prosecuting fiscal is Redentor
Cardenas. Said Judges conduct trials
only in the morning that is the reason why the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Caoayan usually sets case for hearings in the afternoon.

The argument that there are no prosecutors to handle the said
cases must therefore be rejected.

Coming now to the second limitation, we find that in G.R. No.
95370, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Verzosa participated in the hearings of
Criminal Cases Nos. 1798, 1804, 1805, 1761, 1876, and 1871, and Prosecutor
Roman Mario Panem in the hearing of Criminal Case No. 1841, as shown by the
minutes attached to the Comment of Judge Ranches. Verzosa and Panem were not only available but actually intervened
in these seven cases, thus placing them under the general rule rather than the
exception in Section 5. No contrary
evidence has been submitted by the petitioners to belie the entries in the
minutes.

In G.R. No. 101227, the record shows that Filler’s appearance
before Judge Vizcarra was limited to his asking for time to study the case and
his subsequent request to be excused from prosecuting it. It is necessary therefore to determine
whether the mere filing of the information by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, as was done in the prosecution for estafa before that court, should
be considered an actual intervention by the prosecutor that would disauthorize
the exception in Section 5.

In his Reply to the respondents’ Comments in both petitions, the
Solicitor General argues that:

The mere filing of the Information can not be the “actual
intervention” contemplated by the Rules. If respondent Vizcarra’s interpretation were followed, there would be no
instance when a private prosecutor could intervene in a criminal case, except
in private crimes where the offended party filed the case. This is so because all Informations, except
in private crimes, are filed by the prosecutor.

Section 5 does not say it is only the private crime that may be
prosecuted on complaint of the offended party. All offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial
courts and the municipal circuit trial courts are allowed to be commenced by
complaint by the parties named in Section 5 and without the participation of
the public prosecutor’s office. Indeed,
the petitioners admitted as much when they stressed and argued in G.R. No. 95370
that “the aforementioned cases were filed by the offended parties
themselves, peace officers or public officers charged with the enforcement of
the law violated… The Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor had no hand or intervention in their filing.”

It is noteworthy that none of the crimes involved in these
petitions is a private offense coming under Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code. Criminal Case Nos. 1761 and 1876
are complaints for estafa, Criminal Case Nos. 1798, 1804 and 1805 are for grave
oral defamation and Criminal Case No. 1841 is for slight physical
injuries. The petitioners have not
questioned the jurisdiction of the respondent judges over these cases and in
fact have requested that the trial thereof proceed without their participation.

The Court feels that in those cases where the prosecutors
themselves have filed the criminal charges, there is all the more reason for
them to actively intervene in their prosecution. Having presumably made the necessary investigation of these cases
before filing the corresponding informations, they are in the best position to
handle their prosecution on the basis of their initial findings. If the prosecutor had not determined the prima
facie guilt of the accused, he should not have filed the information in the
first place. At any rate, there is
something not quite correct in the prosecutor filing the information himself
and then leaving the offended party in the lurch, as it were, by asking him to
fend for himself in prosecuting the case.

The exception provided in Section 5 must be strictly applied as
the prosecution of crime is the responsibility of officers appointed and
trained for that purpose. The violation
of the criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole
and not merely the person directly prejudiced, who is merely the complaining
witness. This being so, it is necessary
that the prosecution be handled by persons skilled in this function instead of
being entrusted to private persons or public officers with little or no
preparation for this responsibility. The exception should be allowed only when the conditions therefor as set
forth in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure have been
clearly established.

We find that the respondent judges were correct in requiring the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos Sur to participate in the
prosecution of the criminal cases pending before their respective courts. However, it is not necessary for the
Provincial Prosecutor himself to personally handle the prosecution of the
criminal cases, and in requiring him to do so, Judge Ranches committed grave
abuse of discretion. The Court notes
that although Judge Ramos sustained Judge Ranches’s order for the participation
of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in the trial of the criminal cases,
he nevertheless did not require petitioner Cabebe to personally prosecute
this. Judge Ramos was correct in
allowing Cabebe to merely assign any of his assistants to attend the said
hearings.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 95370 and G.R. No.
101227 are both DENIED except that Provincial Prosecutor Alejandrino Cabebe
shall not be required to personally undertake the prosecution of the cases
involved in G.R. No. 95370. Subject to
this modification, the challenged orders of the respondent judges are
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino, and
Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo (G.R. No. 95370), p. 18.

^[2]
Ibid., pp. 23-25.

^[3]
Id., pp. 39-43.

^[4]
70 SCRA 361, 76 SCRA 42.

^[5]
Rollo (G.R. No. 101227), p. 1.

^[6]
Ibid., p. 24.

^[7]
Id., p. 28.

^[8]
id., pp. 20-25.