IN RE: PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF OWNER’S DUPLICATE COPY OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NOS. (T-117716) 16649 AND (T-117717) 16647 ROGELIO PASAMONTE, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. R…
BRUSELAS, JR. J.:
In the challenged resolution, the RTC held:
“WHEREFORE, finding that evidence is insufficient to substantiate the petition, the herein petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.”[4]
Involved in the controversy are two parcels of land covered by TCT No. (T-117716) 16649, with an area of 247 square meters, and TCT No. (T-117717) 16647, with an area of 221 square meters, both registered in the name of Ricardo D. De Guzman (Ricardo). On 16 May 1989, Ricardo declared that his owner’s duplicate copies were missing and his Affidavit of Loss was annotated at the back of the TCTs.
These properties were allegedly sold to the appellant as evidenced by a photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 March 1992.
An Affidavit of Loss executed by Carina Apelo, the appellant’s wife, was also annotated at the back of the TCTs on 09 November 2001.
Claiming to be the owner of the subject properties, the petitioner filed a petition for issuance of owner’s duplicate copies of TCT Nos. (T-117716) 16649 and (T-117717) 16647. He alleged that he purchased the properties despite the loss of the owner’s duplicate copies because Ricardo showed him a certified copy of the TCTs under his name. Furthermore, he claimed that he has been occupying the properties and has been paying the real estate taxes thereof.
On 21 August 2009, the RTC denied the appellant’s petition. It was not convinced that the appellant was a person in interest of the subject properties because the alleged sale transaction was not duly substantiated by the appellant. On the contrary, it concluded that the following observations tend to cast doubt on the purported sale, to wit: the appellant’s failure to present the original deed of absolute sale; the signatures of the appellant and his wife, although mentioned as vendees in the document, were nowhere to be seen in the document; no proof of payment was offered; the receipt of real estate tax payment was still under the name of Ricardo; and the second entry of Carina’s Affidavit of Loss was made even prior to the purported sale.
The appellant moved for a reconsideration. He explained that the original Deed of Absolute Sale was presented to the RTC in another case and so, he secured a certified true copy of the same from the concerned Branch Clerk of Court. With respect to the other observations of the RTC, he contended that those were not grounds for the denial of his petition.
At the hearing of the motion for reconsideration, the appellant was allowed to present additional evidence ex-parte to support his petition.
In his Formal Offer of Additional Evidence, the appellant presented the following: (1) Photocopy of receipt dated 30 December 1989 to prove the partial payment of the purchase price; (2) Barangay Clearance dated 19 August 2010 to prove his possession of the subject properties; (3) Certification from Punong Barangay that he was the legal owner of the subject properties and that a deed of sale was entered into between him and Ricardo; and (4) Supplemental Affidavit.
The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. It noted that since the receipt was made in the presence of two witnesses, the appellant could have requested them to corroborate his testimony as to the fact of the sale, but this he failed to do. It added that it could not give weight to the certification issued by the Punong Barangay because the latter could not validly certify as to the execution of the deed of sale between Ricardo and the appellant for he was neither present at the time of the execution nor a party to the said contract. Thus, it concluded:
“In light of the foregoing, and inasmuch as this Court finds no cogent reason to depart from its earlier ruling, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.”[5]
The appellant came to us on appeal based on seven assigned errors which can be summarized into two; that the court a quo erred in denying the petition because he is not a person in interest and in doubting the validity of the deed of absolute sale and the receipt of the partial payment.
Essentially, the petitioner simply reiterates his arguments in his motion for reconsideration. He contends that the noted irregularities like the lack of his and his wife’s signatures in the deed of absolute sale, failure to register the disputed document in the Registry of Deeds, failure to present the vendors or their heirs, that the receipt of real estate taxes payments was still under the names of the vendors, and that the second annotation of affidavit of loss executed by his wife, are not valid grounds for the denial of the petition. As to the proof of payment of the consideration, he insists that the Deed of Absolute Sale itself indicated that Ricardo received the amount of P80,000 from him. He further explains that while he is the one paying the real estate taxes, the receipt was still under the name of Ricardo because the subject properties are still registered in the latter’s name. Moreover, he asserts that his continuous and actual possession of the subject properties coupled with his payment of the real estate taxes supported his claim of ownership.
The Solicitor General, however, share the view of the RTC that the appellant failed to present substantial evidence to prove that he is a person in interest to petition for the issuance of new owner’s duplicate copies of title. He posits that the photocopied Deed of Absolute Sale is in violation of the best evidence rule and therefore inadmissible in evidence.
We find no merit in the appeal.
The law applicable in petitions for issuance of new owner’s duplicate certificates of title which are lost, stolen or destroyed, is Section 109 of Presidential Decree 1529 (P.D. 1529) which provides:
“Sec. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. – In case of loss or theft of an owner’s duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.”
In a petition for the issuance of a second owner’s duplicate copy of a certificate of title in replacement of a lost one, the only questions to be resolved are: whether or not the original owner’s duplicate copy has indeed been lost and whether the petitioner seeking the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate title is the registered owner or other person in interest.[6]
There is no dispute insofar as the first question is concerned. The fact of the loss of the owner’s duplicate copy was duly annotated at the back of the certificates of title. The petitioner also presented a copy of the Affidavit of Loss executed by the registered owner dated 16 May 1989.
The controversy lies only on the issue of whether or not the appellant is considered as “other person in interest.” It is the contention of the appellant that he has interest in the subject properties because he acquired the same by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 10 March 1992. To support this allegation, he presented a photocopy of a certified true copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale, a photocopy of a receipt of his partial payment to Ricardo, and a Certification from Punong Barangay that a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed between the appellant and spouses De Guzman.
Inasmuch as the subject of inquiry is the Deed of Absolute Sale, it was incumbent on the appellant to adduce in evidence the original of the deed consistent with Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the content of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself.[7] This rule, however, admits certain exceptions where the presentation of secondary evidence would be allowed, to wit:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice.
(c ) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.[8]
Here, the appellant alleged that the original Deed of Absolute of Sale was submitted to the RTC of Valenzuela City as evidence in another case. Thus, he secured a certified true copy of said document from the Clerk of Court of the said court.
Based on the copy of the Deed of Absolute of Sale, it appears that it was notarized and so, it may be considered as a public document pursuant to Section 19[9] of Rule 132. Nevertheless, it may not be admissible under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. While evidence is admissible when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer, as in this case, there is a need to present a certified copy of it issued by the public officer having custody of the document to prove its contents. Furthermore, the attestation must state that the copy is a correct copy of the original or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.[10] In this case, what was presented by the appellant was only a photocopy of the alleged original certified true copy, not the certified true copy itself. While the appellant averred in his Motion for Reconsideration[11] that the certified true copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale would be presented during the hearing of his motion, there is nothing about this matter that can be found in the records. In fact, at the hearing of the appellant’s motion for reconsideration, there was no mention about the presentation of the supposed original certified true copy.[12] Even in his Formal Offer of Additional Evidence,[13] the appellant failed to attach said document. There is therefore no way for the Court to compare the photocopy with the original certified true copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale. Moreover, being a mere photocopy, it cannot be said that such copy was under the seal of the Court to which the attesting Clerk of Court belonged. The Court is therefore left with no choice but to uphold the inadmissibility of the Deed of Absolute Sale to prove the contents of the alleged document.
Even if we consider Section 5 of Rule 130, still the Deed of Absolute Sale may not be admissible. The admission of secondary evidence in case of the loss or unavailability of the original document is warranted upon satisfactory proof of the following: (1) execution or existence of the original; (2) loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3) unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence.[14]
Here, we find no sufficient evidence, even testimonial, to prove the execution and existence of the original document. We cannot give credence to the certification issued by the Punong Bayan because the latter is neither a party nor a witness to the document in question. There was likewise no showing that the Punong Bayan was present when the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed.
Furthermore, the unavailability of the original document was not seasonably established. A perusal of the appellant’s sworn statements reveals that he did not even bother to explain the reason for the non-production of the original document in court and that the unavailability thereof was not due to his bad faith. It was only in his motion for reconsideration where he alleged that the original document was presented to the RTC in another case and so, he secured a certified true copy of the same from the Branch Clerk of Court.
Since the appellant had not sufficiently laid down the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence, the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale upon which he anchored his claim of ownership may not therefore be admitted. Besides, the rule on the admission of secondary evidence provides that the contents of the original document may be proved (1) by a copy; (2) by a recital of its contents in some authentic document; or (3) by the recollection of the witnesses, in the order stated.[15] As earlier emphasized, what was presented by the appellant was not a certified copy of the original document but only a photocopy of an alleged certified true copy.
The alleged proof of partial payment is also of no help. First, it is a mere photocopy. Second, it does not clearly state if the supposed payment was for the same properties covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale. Third, it does not coincide with the statement in the Deed of Absolute Sale that the consideration of the subject properties was only P80,000.00. If it were true that the purchase price of the subject properties was P280,000.00 as indicated in the said receipt, such amount should have been reflected in the Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the same manner, neither does payment of taxes conclusively prove ownership; it is, at best, an indicium of possession in the concept of ownership.[16]
We do not, however, share the observation of the RTC that the second entry of an Affidavit of Loss executed by the appellant’s wife was annotated prior to the purported sale transaction because as alleged in the Petition and indicated in the supposed Deed of Absolute Sale, the conveyance took place on 10 March 1992 while the Affidavit of Loss was inscripted at the back of the TCTs only on 9 November 2001. It is quite a puzzlement why the appellant’s wife managed to submit the Affidavit of Loss of Carina to the Registry of Deeds but the appellant failed to register the supposed Deed of Absolute Sale.
Finally, while it may be true that the irregularities observed by the RTC were not valid grounds for the denial of the appellant’s petition, these discrepancies, nevertheless, render the appellant’s claim of ownership doubtful. There being no competent proof of ownership by the appellant over the subject properties, he could not be considered as “other person in interest” and the RTC did not therefore err in denying the petition below.
WHEREFORE, we resolve to DENY the appeal. The assailed Resolution and Order of the RTC are AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Salazar-Fernando, Chairperson and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.
[1] Written by Presiding Judge Maria Nena J. Santos of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 171 on 21 August 2009, Records, pp. 36-38.
[1] Also issued by Presiding Judge Maria Nena J. Santos of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 171 2n 03 December 2010, Records, pp. 63-65.
[3] Records, pp. 39-44.
[4] Records, p. 38.
[5] Records, pp. 64-65.
[6] Dizon v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 165938, 25 November 2009, 605 SCRA 441.
[7] Rule 130, Section 3, Rules of Court.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Section 19. Classes of document. -For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
| xxxx |
xxxx
|
xxxx
|
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments;
| xxxx |
xxxx
|
xxxx
|
[10] Rule 132, Section 32, Rules of Court.
[11] Records, pp. 39-44.
[12] Order dated 04 August 2010, Records, p. 49.
[13] Records, pp. 56-61.
[14] Bangis v. Heirs of Serafin and Salud Adolfo, G.R. No. 190875, 13 June 2012.
[15] Rule 130, Section 5, Rules of Court.
[16] Arangote v. Spouses Martin Maglunob, G.R. 178906, 18 February 2009, 579 SCRA 620.