PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PILAR AMPARO PINZON, ENRICO VILLANUEVA AND ORLANDO CABRERA, ACCUSED, ENRICO VILLANUEVA AND ORLANDO CABRERA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

The appellants, Enrico T. Villanueva, Orlando Cabrera and Pilar
Amparo Pinzon, were charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide as
defined and penalized in Articles 293 and 294, paragraph 1, of the Revised
Penal Code committed as follows:

“That on or about the 8th day of February, 1988 in the
Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping and aiding with one another, armed with bladed
instrument, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away the following items to wit:

all in the total amount of P93,000
belonging to one Dolores Lugos to the damage and prejudice of the said owner
thereof in the aforementioned amount of P93,000; and that by reason and on the
occasion of the said robbery, the above named accused, with intent to kill and
with the use of the said bladed instrument, did then and there willfully (sic),
unlawfully and feloniously stab Maria Stella Lugos and Serafia Cruz on the
vital parts of their body, thereby inflicting upon them mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of their
death thereafter.” (pp. 23-24, Rollo.)

Upon arraignment, the
three accused pleaded “Not Guilty” (p. 221, Rollo). Trial on the merits ensued and a decision
was rendered on June 18, 1990 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 152, National
Capital Judicial Region, finding Villanueva and Cabrera guilty as charged but
acquitting Pinzon on the ground that her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt (p. 19, Decision). The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused
Enrico T. Villanueva alias Ricky and Orlando S. Cabrera alias Orlan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide defined and
punished under Article 293 in relation to Article 294 paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code without any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance
attendant thereto and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify Mrs. Dolores Lugos the sum of P93,000.00 value of the stolen
property, and the heirs of the deceased Maria Stella Lugos and Serafia Cruz the
amount of P30,000.00 each as damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency with the accessories of the law and to pay the costs.” (p. 123,
Rollo.)

The facts of the case, as
culled from the decision of the trial court, are the following:

In the morning of February 8, 1988 Mrs. Dolores Lugos left her house
at No. 4-N Jimenez St., Calawaan, Pasig, Metro Manila for the Asian Development
Bank at Makati where she works as internal auditor.

At about noontime she was summoned to go home because of an
emergency. Upon arrival she was shocked
to see that her 24-year old daughter, Maria Estela, and the househelp, Serafia
Cruz, were dead and lying in a pool of blood in different parts of the
house. Mrs. Lugos stayed for the
meantime in the house of a neighbor.

In the afternoon of February 10, 1988 she returned to her house and
noticed that her small jewelry box which she kept in a drawer was missing. The pockets of all the clothes hanging in a
closet had been turned out. She gave a written statement to the police
(Exhs. A and A-1) of the things that were lost worth P93,000.

Pat. Mones who was initially assigned to the case made sketches and
took pictures of the crime scene. The
body of the househelper Serafia Cruz,
was found in the comfort room
while Maria Estela’s body was found on the second floor.

Dr. Desiderio Moraleda of the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, who made an
autopsy of the cadaver of Maria Estela
Lugos on February 8, 1988, found seventeen (17) stab wounds on different parts
of her body. The cause of death was
cardio-­respiratory arrest due to shock as a result of multiple injuries of the
neck and trunk. The wrists had ligature
marks indicating the victim had been tied with a rope or wire.

The cadaver of Serafia Cruz bore fourteen (14) stab wounds in
different parts of the body. Both feet had ligature marks indicating she
had been tied.

Leopoldo Ramos, chief of the barangay tanods of Calawaan, received
raw information that one of the tricycles from San Joaquin could have been used
by the suspects because no motor vehicle was seen parked near the Lugos residence. A tricycle driver, Albino Tero, informed him
that sometime on February 9, 1988 he read in a newspaper about the killing in
Calawaan. Tero believed that three
persons who were his passengers on February 8, 1988 may have something to do with the crime.

According to Tero between 11 and 12 in the morning of February 8,
1988 while his tricycle was parked at Elisco Road, San Joaquin, Pasig, a woman hired him to take her to Purok
3, Calawaan. He later identified the woman as the accused
Pinzon. On the way, they met another
tricycle with two male passengers who called out to his (Tero’s) female
passenger. When Tero stopped his
tricycle, the two male passengers transferred to his tricycle. They told him to turn back to San
Joaquin. He identified one of the male passengers as the
accused Villanueva who sat beside Pinzon.

The male passenger who rode behind him told him to proceed to the
old market. While cruising down San
Joaquin bridge, Tero noticed that the right leg of Villanueva’s pants had blood
stains on it. Villanueva explained that
they had figured in a fight at Calawaan.

On the way to the old market site the two male passengers were
grabbing for possession of some jewelries. The woman passenger told them to stop and they obeyed. At Kapasigan his three passengers alighted
at a small alley.

Tero was endorsed to P/Sgt. Antonio Sityar, head of the follow-up
team. Tero pointed to him the place
where his passengers alighted. Thru the
grapevine, Sgt. Sityar learned about the identities of the possible suspects –
Pinzon and Villanueva.

Sgt. Sityar’s team went to the place of Pinzon and Villanueva (who
are live-in partners). Sityar invited
them for questioning. When he was about
to frisk them for weapons, Villanueva threw his wallet inside the house.

The wallet was recovered
and was found to contain loose birthstones (Exhibit K) a child’s earring
(Exhibit I) and money in the
amount of P5,462.41. The articles,
except the money, were identified by Mrs. Lugos as among the things that were
taken from her house during the robbery.

Pinzon and Villanueva were
brought to the police station where Tero identified them as two of his
passengers on February 8, 1988. Tero
pointed to Villanueva as the passenger whose pants had blood stains. He pointed to Pinzon as the woman who hired
his tricycle from San Joaquin to Calawaan.

During the investigation by the police, both Pinzon and Villanueva
denied involvement in the crime but Villanueva unwittingly mentioned the name
“Orlan” who resides at Palatiw, Pasig. Patrolman Eduardo Martin said he knew a person called
“Orlan” in Palatiw so he joined the follow-up team that went to the
place.

Pat. Cuevas of the Pasig Police informed the policemen on the case that he saw the three suspects in
the morning of February 8, 1988 sitting together on a bench in front of the
barangay tanod outpost. One of them had
rosary around his neck.

The policemen who went to look for Orlan found him in a neighbor’s
house pretending to be asleep. Pat.
Cuevas identified Orlan (Orlando Cabrera) as one of the men he saw at Calawaan
in the morning before the commission of the crime.

Cabrera, assisted by Atty. Oscar Saldivar of the then Citizens
Legal Assistance Office, was investigated by P/Cpl. Bugnot. He gave a written statement (Exh. I) which
he signed and swore to before Fiscal Bargas.

He disclosed in his statement the following:

That at about 7:00 a.m. on February 8, 1988 he went to the house of
Villanueva and Pinzon to get his fighting cock which he wanted to sell because
he needed money to redeem a necklace which he had pawned for P2,000.00. Villanueva did not agree and instead invited
Cabrera to go with him.

Together with Pinson they rode on a tricycle up to the library in
Pasig and then rode on a passenger jeep to San Joaquin. Cabrera asked Villanueva where they were
going. The latter said they would pass
by the house of his aunt.

From the library they rode again on a tricycle to Calawaan where
they alighted at the waiting shed. They
drunk pepsi cola at a store until 9:30 a.m.

Afterwards they walked to the
house of Villanueva’s aunt (actually the house of Dolores Lugos) which was
about 50 meters distant from the store. Villanueva and Pinzon knocked on the gate but someone told them to use
the other gate where they saw the aunt (Serafia Cruz) who ushered Villanueva
and Pinzon to the garden. Villanueva,
Pinzon and Serafia entered the house. Cabrera was left outside the gate.

Later, Villanueva came out and told Cabrera to come inside the
house. Upon entering, Villanueva pulled
out a knife and poked it at Serafia Cruz who asked: “Ricky what is this all about?” Villanueva answered,
“Nothing, just enter there.” When they reached the kitchen Villanueva
and Pinzon tied her up with a straw and covered her mouth. Villanueva ordered Cabrera to watch her.

Villanueva and Pinzon went up to the second floor of the
house. After ten minutes, Pinzon came
down and told Cabrera that Villanueva needed him.

Cabrera went upstairs and saw Villanueva poking a knife at Maria
Estela Lugos. Maria Estela asked
Villanueva, “What does this mean Ricky?” The latter asked: “Where is the money of your
mommy?” Maria Estela answered “I
do not know kuya Ricky.”

Villanueva got an electric cord and tied up Maria Estela. Cabrera ransacked the room upon orders of
Villanueva. When Cabrera could not find
any valuables Villanueva told him to watch Serafia downstairs and continued to
ransack the room. Villanueva found
something in a drawer and placed it inside his pocket.

Villanueva ordered Cabrera to call Pinzon who went upstairs. When Pinzon was already upstairs Villanueva
went down and stabbed Serafia Cruz several
times. Then Villanueva ordered Cabrera
to call for Pinzon.

Villanueva went upstairs again and stabbed Maria Estela several
times. Villanueva and Cabrera went downstairs
together. Villanueva told Pinzon to go
out of the house and get a tricycle. Because it took Pinzon a long
time to find a tricycle, Villanueva
and Cabrera got out of the house. They
were able to board a tricycle. Upon
reaching the vicinity of Elisco Road, they met Pinzon on another tricycle. They transferred to Pinzon’s tricycle and
alighted at the old market. Cabrera
went home. The following morning
Villanueva arrived at Cabrera’s house and gave him P5,000.

On February 10, 1988 another investigator questioned Emilio
Demaano. He informed that at about
10:00 o’clock in the morning of February 8, 1988 he was sitting on a jeep in
front of the Lugos house waiting for his employer who lives across the street
from Mrs. Lugos’ house. He saw a man
and a woman knocking at the gate of the Lugos residence. Nobody answered so he (Demaano) advised them to knock on the other gate. They did
as they were told. After a
while Serafia Cruz came out. After talking for about ten minutes, the man and the woman left the
place. Not long afterwards the woman
returned alone and talked again with Serafia Cruz. She also left and walked toward the “labasan.” A man
later passed in front of him (Demaano) and walked around the Lugos residence
and left. Demaano also left. He learned about the killing in the Lugos residence at about 4:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of the same day.

Demaano identified Cabrera as the third man who passed in front of
him and walked around the Lugos residence in the morning of February 8, 1988
and who at that time wore a
rosary on his neck which attracted Demaano’s attention.

The accused-appellants, in their respective appeal briefs, allege that the trial
court erred:

1. in convicting
them on the basis of circumstantial
evidence (p. 223, Rollo) and

a.     
in admitting the sworn statement of accused Cabrera, which was
given during custodial investigation in violation of his constitutional rights
(p. 138, Rollo);

b.     
in convicting Villanueva on the basis of Cabrera’s
extrajudicial confession (p. 223, Rollo); and

2.  in finding that a conspiracy was established
by the prosecution (p. 23, Appellant’s Brief).

The appeal is devoid of
merit.

The appellants were
convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence. There was no direct evidence proving that they robbed Dolores
Lugos’ house and killed her daughter, Maria Estela Lugos and the maid, Serafia
Cruz. Nevertheless, the rule is that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict if: (1) there are more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from
which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
a reasonable doubt (Section 5, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court; People
vs. Modesto, 25 SCRA 36). Although no
general rule has been formulated regarding the quantity of circumstantial
evidence which will suffice for any case, all that is required is that the
circumstances proven must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with
any other hypothesis except that of guilt (People vs. Constante, 25 SCRA 653;
People vs. Caneda, 12 SCRA 9).

In the case at bar, the
circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution sufficiently satisfies the
quantum of proof necessary for conviction. The following circumstances, proven by the prosecution, point to the
accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime:

First, Demaano testified
that at about 10:00 o’clock in the morning of February 8, 1988, he saw
appellant Villanueva, together with Pinzon and Cabrera, in front of the gate of
the victims’ house. He further
testified that appellant and Pinzon entered the house of the victims while
Cabrera was left outside the house.

Second, Tero testified that between 11:00 to 12:00 o’clock
in the morning of February 8, 1983, Pinzon hired his tricycle and instructed
him to proceed to Purok 3 Calawaan, Pasig. Before reaching Calawaan, they met a tricycle with Villanueva and
Cabrera on board, who called his (Tero’s) passenger (Pinzon). When Tero stopped his tricycle, Villanueva
and Cabrera transferred to his tricycle and told him to go back to San
Joaquin. On their way to San Joaquin,
Tero noticed blood stains on the pants (right leg) of Villanueva.

Third, Tero further testified that while still on board his
tricycle he saw Villanueva and Cabrera grabbing for possession of pieces of
jewelry. The jewels were identified by
Dolores Lugos as hers.

Fourth, when Villanueva was apprehended by the police,
appellant’s wallet yielded loose stones and a child’s earring, which were later
identified by Dolores Lugos (mother of the victim, Maria Estela) as some of the
jewels she owned and which were lost during the robbery.

Since the three accused were
the last persons seen going inside the house of the victims and were later
found in possession of jewels stolen from the victims the inference is that as
they committed the robbery on the occasion of which the victims were killed,
they also committed the killings.

Appellant Cabrera assails
the trial court’s reliance on his extrajudicial confession which is allegedly
inadmissible as evidence because it was extracted from him without complying
with the requirements in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, which
are:

(1) that the
arresting officer inform him of the reason for his arrest; (2) he shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that
any statement he might make could be used against him; (3) the person arrested
shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, or anyone he chooses by
the most expedient means – by telephone, if possible, or by letter, or
messenger. The arresting officer shall
see to it that this is accomplished. (4) No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either by the detainee himself
or by anyone on his behalf.

There is no merit in the above
argument. We agree with the Solicitor General’s view that:

“x x x the
entire process of custodial investigation was conducted in the manner required
by the Constitution. Atty. Saldivar
informed appellant of the latter’s right to remain silent, as anything he says
in said investigation could be used against him. Appellant was likewise informed of his right to counsel and that
if he could not afford to pay [for] the services of one, he could avail of the
free legal services of the CLAO, which offer appellant accepted. By said acceptance, Atty. Saldivar became
appellant’s counsel of choice, and the fact that appellant had no previous
acquaintance with Atty. Saldivar did not render null and void appellant’s otherwise
valid extrajudicial confession. Atty.
Saldivar was present from the time appellant’s statements were taken up to the
time appellant affixed his signature thereon. In fact, Atty. Saldivar’s signature
appears on the statement. Plainly, the admission in evidence of appellant’s sworn statement
does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity.” (p. 157, Rollo.)

Appellant Villanueva’s
contention that the lower court erred in convicting him of the robbery with double homicide on
the basis of Cabrera’s extra-judicial confession is not well taken far his conviction was in fact
based on circumstantial evidence. The
trial court categorically stated thus:

“Cabrera’s extra judicial confession is sufficiently
corroborated by the corpus delicti. He
was also pointed to by Emilio Demaano as
one of the three persons in the vicinity of the Lugos residence before the
discovery of the crime.

“However, the statement is not admissible
against Villanueva and Pinzon for being
‘res inter alios acta.'” (pp. 240-241, Rollo.)

The appellants also assail
the trial court’s finding of a conspiracy among them to commit the crime charged.

A  conspiracy need not be
proven by direct evidence. Proof of previous agreement to commit the
crime is not essential to establish a conspiracy. It may be inferred
from the acts of the accused (People vs. Abueg, 145 SCRA 622). The conduct of the accused-appellants before, during, and after the commission of
the crime may be considered to show the existence of a conspiracy (People vs.
Cabiltes, 25 SCRA 112). It is
sufficient that the accused be shown to have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective (People vs. Abueg, supra). And where a conspiracy is proven, a showing
as to who inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain a conviction
(People vs. Tala, 141 SCRA 240).

The Solicitor General correctly observed that —

“The abovementioned acts of appellant [Cabrera], albeit done upon
instructions of his co-accused Villanueva, clearly show that he and Villanueva
entertained a common resolve to cart away valuables from the house of Maria
Dolores Lugos and to silence anybody who would prevent them from doing so. It is thus clear that appellant, based on
his extrajudicial admission, conspired with co-accused Villanueva in the commission
of the crime charged. Thus, although it
was not shown that appellant asported any of the missing pieces of jewelry, or
inflicted any fatal wound on Maria Estela and Serafia, appellant, as
co-conspirator, was correctly held liable as principal. In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act
of all (People vs. Beltran, 138 SCRA 521 [1985]; Pring vs. Court of Appeals,
138 SCRA 155 [1985]).

“That the overt acts of
appellant [Cabrera] in the
commission of the subject felony were all done upon instructions of [his]
co-accused Villanueva, does not negate conspiracy. For conspiracy to exist, it is enough that the malefactors be
shown to have a common purpose and were united in the execution of the felony
(People vs. Dorico, 54 SCRA 172), although there is no agreement as to the
details on how the felony is to be executed.” (pp. 151-152, Rollo.)

“It should be emphasized that in so far as appellant is
concerned conspiracy is immaterial to prove his guilt. It has been satisfactorily shown through
circumstantial evidence, earlier adverted to, that appellant was one of the
perpetrators of the crime charged.

“Moreover, while it is true that an extra-judicial confession
is admissible only against the person who made the same, it is, however, the
rule that it may be admitted as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend
to establish the guilt of the other defendants (People vs. Simbajon, 15 SCRA 83
[1965]). In the case at bar, the above-referred
circumstantial evidence, clearly corroborated by the contents of the
extra-judicial confession of Cabrera, shows the role played by appellant in the
perpetration of the crime charged.” (pp. 242-243, Rollo.)

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED except the award of civil indemnity for the death of the two
(2) victims, Maria Estela Lugos and Serafia Cruz, which is hereby increased to
P50,000 for the heirs of each victim. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, and
Medialdea, JJ., concur.