G.R. No. L-30440. February 07, 1992
MAPULO MINING ASSOCIATION AND E.V. CHAVEZ & ASSOCIATES, REPRESENTED BY ANTONIO M. CHAVEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. FERNANDO LOPEZ, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF AGRI…
DAVIDE, Jr., J.:
This is a petition under Section 61 of the Mining Act (C.A. No.
137), as amended by R.A. No. 4388, for review of the 24 March 1969 decision of
then Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR),
Hon. Fernando Lopez, in DANR Case No. 3359 entitled Mapulo Mining Association
and E.V. Chavez & Associates versus Projects & Ventures, Inc.,[1]
affirming the 5 July 1968 Order of the Director of the Bureau of Mines, Hon.
Fernando S. Busuego, Jr., which dismissed petitioners’ adverse claim against
private respondent’s Application For Lease of Mining Claims over certain
mineral lands located at Taysan, Batangas, principally on the ground that said
claim was filed one (1) day after the expiration of the period within which to
do so pursuant to Section 72 of the Mining Act.[2]
The records disclose the following factual and procedural
antecedents of this case:
In 1940, Eliseo Chavez and his wife, Lucia B. Mercado, located a
limestone mining claim (then known as the San Jose Placer Claim) over a piece
of registered private land situated at Barrio Mapulo, Taysan, Batangas with an
area of 12.4469 hectares. The said
land, owned by Quiliano Mercado, Lucia B. Mercado’s father, is covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. R0-174(0-510). On 6-12 and 18-27 March 1943, the lease
survey of the placer claim was undertaken by then Assistant Mineral Land
Surveyor of the Bureau of Mines, Mr. Julian Lagman; on 5 July 1943, then
Director of Mines, Hon. Quirico A. Abadilla, approved the survey plan (Pla-163)
prepared by the former. Under a
temporary permit to extract minerals issued to them by the Director of Mines on
3 February 1943, the spouses extracted and mined limestone from the land.[3]
Subsequently, the Mineral Lands and Administrative Division of
the Bureau of Mines declared as abandoned this claim of Mr. Chavez due to his
failure to comply with some requirements.[4]
Thereafter, the Mapulo Mining Association, petitioner herein, relocated the
area through Antonio Chavez on 16-22 December 1963 and registered it as the
Mapulo Placer Mining Area with the Office of the Mining Recorder (Register of
Deeds) of Batangas on 22 January 1964. On 4 February 1964, the Mapulo Mining Association filed an application
for a mining lease, which was docketed as PLA-V-1136.[5]
On 26-30 November 1963 and 1-4 December 1963, petitioner E.V.
Chavez & Associates located mining claims known as “Chavez I” and
“Chavez II” inside private agricultural lands belonging to several
individuals. On 5 December 1963, the
corresponding declarations of location were registered in the Office of the
Mining Recorder of Batangas.[6]
An application for mining lease over the claims was filed on 25 August 1967.
Upon the other hand, on 6-10 June 1966, private respondent
Projects & Ventures, Inc. (PROVEN) located mining claims known as “BAT
40, 41, 60, 22, 23, 38, 37, 44, 57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 39, 42, 58, 59, 43, and
24” over an area embraced by petitioners’ mining claims. Later, PROVEN filed with the Bureau of Mines
Lode Lease Applications Nos. V-9176 Amd., V-9177 Amd., V-9178, V-9226 and
V-9227 Amd.-A. The notice of
application was published in the 7, 14, and 21 August 1967 issues of the Official
Gazette; however, these issues were actually released for
circulation to the public only on 5, 19 and 29 September 1967, respectively,
per certification of the Bureau of Printing.[7]
The notice was also published in the 15, 22 and 29 July 1967 issues of the Philippines
Herald and El Debate, both published in
Manila. It was not, however, published
in a local newspaper in Batangas such as the People’s Courier or The
Batangas Reporter.[8]
Although disputed by petitioners, private respondent alleges that the notice
was also posted at the places required by law.[9]
On 2 August 1967, petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines an
application for an order of lease survey of the “Mapulo Placer
Claim,” “Chavez I” and “Chavez II” mining claims. This application was denied on the ground
that said claims are in conflict with the claims of the private respondent.[10]
In view of this denial, petitioners, on 15 August 1967, requested
the Director of Mines to hold in abeyance any action on private respondent’s
application for mining lease pending submission by the former of a formal
petition. Their letter-request reads:
“With reference to the Lode Lease Applications Nos. 9176 Amd.,
V-9177 Amd., V-9178, V-9226, and V-9227 Amd.-A covering ‘Bat Nos. 21, 40, 41,
60, 22, 23, 38, 37, 44, 57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 39, 42, 59, 58, 43, & 24’ lode
mining claims containing copper, gold, silver, etc., & limestone, etc.,
situated in the barrio of Mapolo (sic), Municipality of Taysan, Province of
Batangas, applied for by the Projects & Ventures, Inc., with post office
address at c/o Mr. C. Castro, Philippine Banking Corp., Port Area, Manila, it
would be highly appreciated if action on the proposed grant or issuance of the
lease contracts be held in abeyance pending resolution of our formal petition
which we will file as soon as possible.
Trusting that this request will merit your usual and prompt
consideration.”[11]
On 29 August 1967, petitioners filed an Adverse Claim and/or
Opposition to the Issuance of Mining Lease dated 28 August 1967.[12]
Private respondent, on 20 October 1967, filed a Motion to Dismiss
petitioners’ adverse claim on the ground that the same was filed one (1) day
late.[13]
On 20 November 1967, petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss
contending that: (1) Section 72 of the
Mining Act, as amended, requiring the publication of the notice of mining lease
application in the provincial newspaper, has not yet been complied with and so,
therefore, there is no publication deadline to speak of; (2) the issues of the Official
Gazette dated 7, 14 and 21 August 1967, where private respondent’s notice
of application was inserted, were actually released to the public only on 5, 19
and 29 September 1967, respectively; (3) private respondent’s mining claims
were located in violation of Sections 28(d) and 60 of the Mining Act as the
same had already been previously located by other parties; and (4) private
respondent’s declarations of location are fraudulent as they are mere table
locations, no actual location having been performed.[14]
On 5 July 1968, the Director of Mines dismissed petitioners’
adverse claim on the ground that: (1)
the publication of private respondent’s notice of filing of applications for
lease in a provincial newspaper is not necessary; (2) with respect to the
publication in the Official Gazette, what is controlling is not the date
of the actual release but rather the date appearing thereon; and (3)
petitioners are guilty of laches in filing their adverse claim only on 29
August 1967.[15]
On 25 July 1968, petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the
Order but the same was later denied.[16]
On 14 October 1968, petitioners appealed to the respondent
Secretary of the DANR who, on 24 March 1969, affirmed the decision of the
Director of Mines and gave due course to private respondent’s application for
mining lease.[17]
Petitioners then filed on 25 April 1969 the instant petition for
review alleging therein that:
a) due course should not have been given to
private respondent’s application for lease because of non-compliance with the
Mining Act, the mining claims covered by said applications having been validly
located by petitioners before the alleged location by private respondent or its assignors and with
reference to one particular area, its location by private respondent’s assignors
having been made without the owner’s
written permission and without a similar permission accompanying the
applications, in violation of Sections
28(d), 60, 27 and 67 of the Mining Act;
b) the publication requirement of the
notice of the application for lease had not been met for: (1) the date of publication with
respect to the Official Gazette should
not be based on the date appearing therein but on the date of release for distribution and sale to the public, and (2) there was no publication
of the application in a provincial newspaper published in the municipality or
province where the mining claim is
located, if such exists or, in its absence, in a newspaper published in the
nearest municipality or province, as
this requirement is mandatory and cannot be dispensed with; and
c) petitioners’ adverse claim was filed on
time and that even assuming it was filed one (1) day late, such a delay could
not be considered as a valid ground to
justify the refusal by the Director of Mines to give due course to the adverse
claim.
In the Resolution of 30 April 1969, this Court gave due course to
the petition[18]
and required the respondents to file their Answer.[19]
Private respondent filed its Answer on 7 June 1969.[20]
On 18 June 1969, Fortune Cement Corporation filed a Motion for Leave
to File an Answer in Intervention alleging that the mining claims involved in
this case had been sold and assigned to it by private respondent Project
Ventures, Inc. under a Deed of Assignment executed on 9 October 1968.[21]
The Answer in Intervention[22]
was filed on the same date.
On 1 July 1969, public respondents Secretary of the DANR and
Director Busuego of the Bureau of Mines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed their Answer to the petition manifesting that they are adopting
the Answer of private respondent.[23]
On 8 July 1969, this Court granted Fortune Cement Corporation’s
motion and noted its Answer in Intervention.[24]
The petitioners were then required to file their Brief, which
they did on 28 August 1969.[25]
The Intervenor filed its Brief on 14 October 1969,[26]
which private respondent adopted per its Manifestation filed on 29 October
1969,[27]
and which this Court merely noted.[28]
Despite several extensions of time granted the public respondents
within which to file their Brief, none was filed. On 20 July 1970, this Court considered the case submitted for
decision without the said Brief.[29]
Petitioners filed a Reply Brief on 24 August 1970.[30]
Subsequently, the Intervenor filed a Request for Oral Argument,[31]
which this Court denied on 18 September 1970; nevertheless, the Intervenor was
allowed to file a Memorandum in lieu of oral arguments.[32]
It filed the Memorandum on 10 October 1970.[33]
On 3 September 1986 and 26 March 1990, the parties were required
to move in the premises;[34]
both petitioners and public respondents informed the Court that they are still
interested in prosecuting this case.
In their Brief, petitioners contend that public respondents
erred:
“1. In not holding that the Projects
& Ventures, Inc. (herein private respondent) is a mere intruder upon the
land covered by petitioners’ mining claims.
2. In not holding that the alleged
locations on June 6 to 10, 1966 of the Projects & Ventures, Inc.’s mining
claims known as BATS 21, 22, 23, 24, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 59, and 60
were done in violation of Section 28(d) of the Mining Law which prohibits
prospecting ‘in lands which have been located for mining leases by other
prospectors under the provisions of this Act’ and Section 60 which provides
that ‘no valid mining claim or part thereof may be located by others until
the original locator or his successor in interest abandons the claim or forfeits his rights on the same under the
provisions of this Act’, because the above-mentioned BATS mining claims were located on land which was
already previously validly located for mining lease by the petitioners.
3. In not holding that the locations
of BATS 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42 mining claims were likewise void on the
further ground that the alleged locators thereof did not get the prior written
permission of Quiliano Mercado to enter his land, as required in Section 27 of
the Mining Law, to locate the aforesaid six (6) BATS claims.
4. In not holding that because the
locations of BATS 21, 22, 23, 24, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 59 and 60 mining
claims were null and void, the applications for lease filed by the Projects
& Ventures, Inc. of its mining claims cannot be entertained under Section
72 of the Mining Law.
5. In not holding that the
applications for lease of BATS 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 mining claims cannot
be entertained on the ‘further ground that Projects & Ventures, Inc., did
not accompany (sic) the applications with the written permission of Quiliano
Mercado nor (sic) with a written
permission granted by a competent court in a proceeding under Section 67 of the
Mining Law.
6. In holding that the requirements
prescribed in Section 72 of the Mining Law, for the publication of the notice
of the application for lease had been substantially complied with and that the
publication of the notice of the application for lease in a newspaper published
in the municipality or province in which the mining claims are situated, if
there is such newspaper, otherwise, in the newspaper published in the nearest
municipality or province, is not mandatory.
7. In not holding in any event that
the period of publication (three weeks) fixed in Section 72 within which an
adverse claim may be filed under Section 72 of the law, had not yet even
commenced to run on August 29, 1967 when petitioners’ adverse claim was filed,
because on that date, i.e., August 29, 1967, the issues of the Official Gazette
dated August 7, 1967, August 14, 1967 and August 21, 1967, where the notice of
the applications for lease of the Projects & Ventures, Inc., was inserted,
had not yet been released for distribution and sale to the public and probably had not yet even been
printed.
8. In holding that the petitioners
were guilty of laches and that the adverse claim and/or opposition filed by
them on August 29, 1967, was filed out of time.
9. In not holding that the earliest
possible deadline for the filing of petitioners’ opposition and adverse claim
was September 5, 1967, which was the three weeks (sic) (the normal period of
publication) from August 15, 1967 when the petitioners requested the Director
of Mines in writing to hold in abeyance action on respondent Projects &
Ventures, Inc.’s application for lease.
10. In not holding that the petitioners
have been in continuous possession of the area covered by the ‘MAPULO’, ‘CHAVEZ
I’, and ‘CHAVEZ II’ mining claims and
kept (sic) them valid and subsisting, and had spent substantial amounts of
money in preparatory work for their
development on a commercial basis.
11. In dismissing the petitioners’ adverse
claim and/or opposition on the basis of the motion to dismiss filed by the
Projects & Ventures, Inc., and
12. In not holding that the Director of
Mines, in issuing the Orders dated July 5, 1968 and October 7, 1969 sanctioned
claim jumping and overlapping locations in violation of the Mining Law.”
Stripped of the non-essentials which adorn the pleadings of the
parties, the main issues in this case are: (a) whether or not there was valid and sufficient publication of
the notice of private respondent’s application for a mining lease over its
claims and, (b) assuming that there was, whether or not petitioners’ Adverse
Claim and/or Opposition to such application was seasonably filed.
These issues must be resolved in the light of the Mining Act
(C.A. No. 137, as amended) which was the governing law at the time of the
filing of application and the subsequent issuance by the public respondents of
the challenged Order and decision. This
Act was superseded by P.D. No. 463, otherwise known as the Mineral Resources
Development Decree of 1974.
Section 72 of the Mining Act provides, inter alia, that:
“Upon receipt of the application, and provided that the
requirements of this Act have been substantially complied with, the Director of
the Bureau of Mines shall publish a notice that such application has been made,
once a week for a period of three consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette
and in two newspapers, one published in Manila either in English or Spanish,
and the other published in the municipality or province in which the mining
claim is located, if there is such newspaper, otherwise, in the newspaper
published in the nearest municipality or province. x x x. The Director of
the Bureau of Mines shall also cause to be posted on the bulletin board of the
Bureau of Mines the same notice for the same period. The applicant shall post for the same period a copy of the plat
of the claim or claims applied for, together with a notice of such application
for lease, in a conspicuous place on the land embraced in such plat, on the
bulletin board, if any, of the municipal building of the municipality, and also
in the office of the mining recorder or district mining officer of the province
or district in which the claim or claims are located; and shall file with the
Director of the Bureau of Mines the affidavit of at least two persons stating
that such notice has been duly posted in the places above specified. At the expiration of the period of
publication the applicant shall file with the Director of the Bureau of Mines
an affidavit showing that the plat and notice have been posted in a conspicuous
place on the claim or claims concerned and in the places above specified during
such period of publication, and thereupon, if no adverse claim shall have been
presented to the Director of the Bureau of Mines, it shall be conclusively
presumed that no such adverse claim exists and thereafter no objection from
third parties of the granting of the lease shall be heard, and the lease shall
within, forty-five days be granted to the applicant, or to his successors or
assigns, by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, provided that
all amounts then due to the Government of the Philippines, or any of its
branches or subdivisions, under the provisions of this Act, shall have been
paid.”
As earlier shown, it is not disputed by the parties that the
notice in this case was published:
a) in
the issues of the Philippines Herald and the EI Debate dated 15,
22 and 29 July 1967, and
b) in the issues of the Official
Gazette dated 7, 14, and 21 of August 1967, which, however, were
respectively released on 5, 19 and 29 September 1967.
There was no publication, however, of the
notice in a newspaper published in the municipality or province in which the
mining claim was located, i.e., in Batangas. It is not denied that at that time, there were two (2) weekly newspapers
in Batangas, namely the People’s Courier and The Batangas Reporter. All that respondent Director of Mines could
say in his challenged Order of 5 July 1968 is that “We are not aware of
the publication in Batangas of such newspapers.”[35]
This non-awareness does not mean that the newspapers do not in fact exist;
besides, the petitioners presented him with certifications issued by the
Circulation Manager of the People’s Courier (Exh. “5”) and the
Editor of The Batangas Reporter (Exh. “4”)[36]
attesting to the existence of said periodicals.
And even granting for the sake of argument that these two (2)
local newspapers do not exist, the fact remains that there was still no
publication of the notice in a newspaper published in the nearest municipality
or province.
Petitioners maintain that publication in a newspaper published in
the municipality or province where the claims are located, if there be such a
newspaper, or in a newspaper published in the nearest municipality or province,
is mandatory. Public respondents
maintain otherwise. Respondent Director
of Mines believes that “considering the proximity of Batangas to Manila
and the speedy means of transportation, x x x the notice in the Philippines
Herald, El Debate, and the Official Gazette, as well as the
posting of the notice in the places abovementioned, specially in the bulletin
board of the Mining Recorder of Batangas, x x x constitute substantial
compliance with the requirements of publication.”[37]
Respondent Secretary believes that “[t]he publication in the Official
Gazette and El Debate, respectively, was
strictly in compliance with law; the publication in the Philippines Herald
could have produced the same effects as if the publication was made in a
newspaper published in Taysan or the nearest town or province. The Philippines Herald
is one of the capital’s dailies which are [sic] extensively distributed and
read throughout the country. There had
been therefore a (sic) substantial compliance of (sic) the law.”[38]
We agree with petitioners that the publication requirements
prescribed in Section 72 of the Mining Act are mandatory and that substantial
compliance therewith is not enough. Such mandatory character is obvious from the Section itself, which
provides that:
“x x x the Director of the Bureau of Mines shall publish
a notice that such application has been made, once a week for a
period of three consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette
and in two newspapers, one published in
Manila either in English or Spanish, and
the other published in the municipality
or province in which the mining claim
is located, if there is such newspaper,
otherwise, in the newspaper published in
the nearest municipality or province. x x x.”
It is evident that the newspaper first mentioned refers to a
periodical published in Manila and circulated in the Philippines while the
second refers to a local newspaper. Publication in one does not mean that the applicant can dispense with
publication in the other. Otherwise, it
would have been absurd, nay ridiculous, for the law to require publication in
both newspapers in addition to publication in the Official Gazette. The legislature certainly abhors
absurdity. Corollarily, courts should
not give a statute a meaning that would lead to absurdity.[39]
Besides, Section 72 imposes upon the Director of Mines the duty, “[u]pon
receipt of the application, and provided that the requirements of this Act have
been complied with,” to publish the notice in the Official Gazette and
in the said two (2) newspapers. The
language of the mandate is undeniably clear and unequivocal. It should be taken to mean exactly what it
says:
“x x x It is the rule in statutory construction that if the
words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous, its meaning and
the intention of the legislature must be determined from the language employed,
and, where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for
construction (Black on Interpretation of Laws, sec. 51). The courts may not speculate as to the
probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Hondoras vs. Soto, 8
Am. St., Rep. 744). The reason for the
rule is that the legislature must be presumed to know the meaning of words, to
have used words advisedly and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute (50 Am. Jur. p. 212).”[40]
Another reason why the publication requirements should be
strictly complied with is that any person who fails to file an adverse claim
against the applicant during the period of publication is forever barred to
file such a claim since the section itself provides that “if no adverse
claim shall have been presented to the Director of the Bureau of Mines, it
shall be conclusively presumed that no such adverse
claim exists and thereafter no objection
from third parties of the granting of
the lease shall be heard.”[41]
In view then of its adverse consequences on the rights of others, nothing short
of strict compliance is demanded. Statutes in derogation of rights must be construed strictly.[42]
Thus, the contention and rationalization of public respondents
that substantial compliance with the publication requirements would suffice, is
wholly unacceptable for the letter and the spirit of the law do not sustain it.
Considering then that there was no publication in a newspaper
published in the municipality or province where the subject claims are located
— Batangas — despite the existence of two (2) weekly newspapers therein, it
is clear that there was non-compliance with Section 72 of the Mining Act and
that public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding that
the publication in the Philippines Herald, El Debate and the Official
Gazette was sufficient.
Respondents, however, maintain that petitioners were well aware
of the publication for on 15 August 1967, the latter filed a letter with the
Director of the Bureau of Mines requesting that action on the proposed grant of
the lease contracts in favor of private respondent be held in abeyance pending
resolution of a “formal petition” which petitioners “will file
as soon as possible.”
Upon the other hand, there is no showing that the filing of the
request was due to petitioners’ knowledge of the publication. In any case, whether or not petitioners knew
of the publication is of no moment since there was in fact non-compliance with
the publication requirements; furthermore, at the time they actually filed
their adverse claim on 29 August 1967, the period of publication was not yet
completed. Granting that petitioners
had such knowledge, the same did not cure a fatal defect or complete and
validate the defective publication. Neither the Director nor the private respondent should be made to profit
from the latter’s non-compliance with the publication requirements.
Of course, the result would be entirely different if there had in
fact been full compliance with the publication requirements for indeed, the
period of publication, taking into account the publication in the Official
Gazette and assuming that publication in a local newspaper was made
earlier, expired on 28 August 1967. The
notice was published in the 7, 14 and 21 August 1967, issues. Although actually released and distributed
on 5, 19 and 29 September 1967, respectively, this Court had already ruled in Barreto
vs. Republic[43]
that:
“x x x With reference to the date of the effectivity of
statutes, it is provided that the Official Gazette ‘is conclusively
presumed to be published on the date indicated therein as the date of issue.’
(Sec. 11, Revised Administrative Code.) This is obviously for the purpose of
avoiding uncertainties likely to arise if the date of publication is to be
determined by the date of the actual release of the Gazette. If the policy regarding so important a
matter as fixing the date of the effectivity of statutes, is to accept the date
of issue indicated in the Official Gazette as conclusive, there is
better reason for adopting said date of issue in respect of publication of
notices in naturalization cases. This
is specially so, because, as we have said in Anti-Chinese League of the
Philippines vs. Felix (44 Off. Gaz., 1480, 1483[44]),
the purpose of the publication in the Official Gazette and in one
newspaper of general circulation, of the posting of notices in a public and
conspicuous place in the office of the clerk of court or in the building where
said office is located, and of the sending of copies of the petition to the
Bureau of Justice, the Department of the Interior, the Provincial Inspector of
the Philippine Constabulary and the Justice of the Peace of the municipality
wherein the petitioner resides, ‘is to inform those officers and the public in
general of the filing of such a petition in order that the public officers and
private citizens supposed to be acquainted with the petitioner may furnish the
Solicitor General or the provincial fiscal with such necessary information and
evidence as there may be against the petitioner.’ x x x.”
There is no reason to depart from this rule.
This Court cannot then accept petitioner’s contention that the
date of release of the Official Gazette is controlling.
Petitioners further argue that it was even premature for the
Director of the Bureau of Mines to cause the publication of the notice of
private respondent’s application since it had not complied with, among others,
Sections 27, 28(d), 60 and 67 of the Mining Act; and, per Section 72, substantial
compliance with the requirements of the Act is a condition precedent that
must be fulfilled before publication of the notice. The first part of said section, to quote it again for emphasis,
reads:
“Upon receipt of the application, and provided that
the requirements of this Act have been
substantially complied with, the Director of the Bureau of
Mines shall publish a notice x x x.”
According to petitioners, private respondent’s claims,
specifically BAT 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42, are located in a parcel of private
agricultural land and are covered by petitioners’ prior mining locations; the
rest of private respondent’s claims are covered by petitioners’ prior mining
locations. Private respondent does not
likewise deny the fact that application for mining lease is not accompanied by
the written permission of the owner of the private agricultural land.
Consequently, petitioners argue in the alternative that either
Sections 27, 28(d), 60 and 67 of the Mining Act were violated, or, in reference
to Section 72, were not complied with. Hence, no notice ought to have been published. The cited sections provide as follows:
“SEC. 27. – Before
entering private lands the prospector shall first apply in writing for written
permission of the private owner, claimant, or holder thereof, and in case of
refusal by such private owner, claimant, or holder to grant such permission, or
in case of disagreement as to the amount of compensation to be paid for such
privilege of prospecting therein, the amount of such compensation shall be
fixed by agreement among the prospector, the Director of the Bureau of Mines
and the surface owner, and in case of their failure to unanimously agree as to
the amount of compensation, all questions at issue shall be determined by the
Court of First Instance of the province in which said lands are situated in an
action instituted for the purpose by the prospector, or his principal: Provided, however, That the
prospector, or his principal, upon depositing with the court the sum considered
jointly by him and the Director of the Bureau of Mines or by court (sic) to be
just compensation for the damages resulting from such prospecting, shall be
permitted to enter upon, and locate the said land without such written
permission pending final adjudication of the amount of such compensation; and
in such case the prospector, or his principal, shall have a prior right as
against the world, from the date of his application. The court in its final judgment, besides determining the
corresponding compensation for the damages which may be caused by the
prospecting, shall make a pronouncement as to the value of the land and the
reasonable rental for the occupation and utilization thereof for mining
purposes in case the prospector decides to locate and exploit the minerals
found therein.
SEC. 28. – No prospecting shall be allowed:
x x x
(d) In lands which have been located for mining leases by other
prospectors under the provisions of this Act.
x x x
The regulations to be promulgated under this Act shall prescribe in
detail the various restrictions under this section.
x x x
SEC. 60. – No valid mining
claim or any part thereof, may be located by others until the original locator
or his successors in interest abandons the claim or forfeits his rights on the
same under the provisions of this Act.
x x x
SEC. 67. – Any person authorized
to locate a mining claim under this Act, having claimed and located a piece of
land for mining purposes who has complied with the terms of this Act, may file
with the Director of the Bureau of Mines an application under oath for a mining
lease thereon, showing such compliance. A plan and a technical description of the mining claim or claims covered
by the application shall be filed therewith or as soon thereafter as the same
may be obtained from the Bureau of Mines under the provisions of this Act. In the case of an application to lease a
mining claim located on private lands, the same shall be accompanied by a
written authority of the owner of the land: Provided, however, That in case of refusal of the
owner of the land to grant such written authority, the same shall be granted by
the court as soon as the applicant deposits the amount fixed as the value of
the land and as compensation for any resulting damage or files a bond to be
approved by the court sufficient to insure the payment of the rental of the
land as determined in accordance with section twenty?seven of this
Act. Should there have been no
proceeding instituted by the applicant, as provided for under section
twenty-seven of this Act, the Court shall determine the value of the land and
the compensation for any resulting damage or its reasonable rental for the
purposes above-mentioned and grant the written authority required
therein.”
The issue thus posed would be best determined during the hearing
of the Adverse Claim. It should,
however, be stressed here that it was held in Standard Mineral Products,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.[45]
that failure to comply with Section 27 is fatal:
“We agree with the declaration of both lower Courts that SMPI
is not entitled to said surface rights
as it failed to comply with the requisite of prior written permission by the
Landowners before entering the private land in question.
Section 27 of the Mining Act explicitly provides:
x x x
The purpose of the law is obvious, which is, to prevent trespass on
private property. The importance of the
written permission of the owner of private land is also apparent from the forms
prescribed by the Bureau of Mines for the declaration of location of a mining
claim which require the locator to state that the landowner has granted written
permission for the prospecting and location of the mining claim if the latter
is located on private property.
The subsequent amendments requiring only mere notification to the
owner of the private land (Section 2, P.D. No. 512) are not discussed for being
inapplicable during the period pertinent to this controversy.
SMPI argues, however, that Section 27 is inapplicable as it never
entered the land for the purpose of ‘prospecting’ but already for ‘locating’ a
mining claim inasmuch as the limestone deposits were prominently exposed and
spread visibly and recognizably on the surface of the land such that
“there was no need of ‘entering’ the land.” In finding the same to be
without merit, suffice it to state that ‘entering’ has to be precede (sic)
‘prospecting’; ‘prospecting’ necessarily precedes ‘discovery’; and a valid
‘discovery’ is essential for the ‘location’ of a mining claim. As expounded by the Court of Appeals:
‘Section 26 of the Mining Act provides that prospecting shall be
carried on “in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” As
appellant’s prospecting was done in violation of the law, it was an illegal act
and the subsequent location of the mining claims was also illegal and null and
void. For the Mining Act regards a
valid discovery as that which gives the prospector the right to locate a mining
claim (Sections 29 and 30), and the validity of a location depends upon
compliance with the law.
‘It is clear, of course, that the validity of a location depends
upon compliance with the statutes. The
law requires that the locator shall act in good faith, and it will not
countenance a trespass as the basis of a mining right’ (36 Am. Jur. Sec.
77).”
In view of the foregoing, it would no longer be necessary to
discuss the second issue as well as the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources of 24 March 1969 in DANR Case No. 3359
affirming the Order of the then Director of the Bureau of Mines of 5 July 1968
in Mines Administrative Case No. V-417 is hereby SET ASIDE and the Adverse
Claim and/or Opposition filed by petitioners is hereby REINSTATED.
Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, 38-42.
[2]
Rollo, 68-71.
[3]
Id., 81-82; 94.
[4]
Id., 82.
[5]
Rollo, 45-46.
[6]
Id., 44.
[7]
Id., 69.
[8]
Rollo, 68-71.
[9]
Id., 39.
[10]
Id., 47.
[11]
Rollo, 4-5.
[12]
Id., 5; 43.
[13]
Id., 5; 53.
[14]
Id., 6-7; 58-67.
[15]
Rollo, 7; 68-71.
[16]
Id., 7; 72-74.
[17]
Id., 38-42.
[18]
Rollo, 101.
[19]
Id., 102.
[20]
Id., 112-146.
[21]
Id., 258, et seq.
[22]
Id., 286, et seq.
[23]
Id., 321-322.
[24]
Id., 324.
[25]
Rollo, 340.
[26]
Id., 356.
[27]
Id., 367.
[28]
Id., 373.
[29]
Id., 396.
[30]
Id., 405.
[31]
Id., 407.
[32]
Id., 411.
[33]
Id., 419.
[34]
Rollo, 438.
[35]
Rollo, 70.
[36]
Id.
[37]
Rollo, 70.
[38]
Id., 41.
[39]
Automotive Parts & Equipment Co. vs.
Lingad, et al., 30 SCRA 248; Director of Lands vs. Abaja, et al. 63
Phil. 559.
[40]
Aparri vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 127 SCRA 231; see also Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees Union vs.
Inciong, 132 SCRA 663 and Baranda vs. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757.
[41]
Underscoring supplied.
[42]
Realty Investments, Inc. vs.
Villanueva, 84 Phil. 842; Philippine National Bank vs. Jacinto, 88 Phil.
376.
[43]
87 Phil. 731.
[44]
Citing 77 Phil., p. 1012.
[45]
184 SCRA 571.