MELECIO MACASIRAY, VIRGILIO GONZALES, AND BENEDICTOGONZALES, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AND ROSALINA RIVERA VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioners seek a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 16106,^[1]
reversing the ruling of the Regional Trial Court and ordering the
admission in evidence of petitioner Benedicto Gonzales’ extrajudicial
confession and the transcript of the proceedings of the preliminary
investigation of the case, during which Benedicto allegedly made
statements affirming the contents of his extrajudicial confession.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioners Melecio Macasiray, Virgilio Gonzales, and Benedicto
Gonzales are the accused in Criminal Case No. 33(86) of the Regional
Trial Court of San Jose City, presided over by Judge Pedro C. Ladignon.
The case is for the murder of Johnny Villanueva, husband of private
respondent Rosalina Rivera Villanueva, on February 9, 1986.

It appears that in the course of the trial of the case, the
prosecution introduced in evidence, as Exhibit B, an extrajudicial
confession executed by petitioner Benedicto Gonzales on March 27, 1986,
in which he admitted participation in the crime and implicated
petitioners Melecio Macasiray and Virgilio Gonzales, his co-accused.
Also presented in evidence, as Exhibit D, was the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation of the
case on April 8, 1986 before the fiscal’s office. This transcript
contained statements allegedly given by Benedicto in answer to questions
of the fiscal, in which he affirmed the contents of his extrajudicial
confession.

When the extrajudicial confession was offered at the conclusion
of the presentation of evidence for the prosecution, petitioners
objected to its admissibility on the ground that it was given without
the assistance of counsel. The transcript of the preliminary
investigation proceeding was similarly objected to on the same ground.
In its order dated April 14, 1988, the trial court sustained the
objections and declared the two documents to be inadmissible.

It appears that when it was the turn of the defense to present
evidence, Gonzales was asked about his extrajudicial confession (Exh.
B). On cross-examination, he was questioned not only about his
extrajudicial confession but also about answers allegedly given by him
during the preliminary investigation and recorded in the transcript of
the proceeding. As he denied the contents of both documents, the
prosecution presented them as rebuttal evidence, allegedly to impeach
the credibility of Gonzales. Petitioners once more objected and the
trial court again denied admission to the documents. (Order, dated Oct.
17, 1988)

Private respondent then sought the nullification of the trial
court’s orders and succeeded. The Court of Appeals declared the two
documents admissible in evidence and ordered the trial court to admit
them. Hence, this petition for review of the appellate court’s decision.

There is no dispute that the extrajudicial confession and the
statements recorded in the transcript in question were taken without the
assistance of counsel. Petitioner Benedicto Gonzales was informed of
his constitutional rights in a very perfunctory manner. No effort was
made to drive home to him the seriousness of the situation he was
facing.^[2] He waived the assistance of counsel, but did so without counsel’s advice and assistance.^[3]
Both his confession and his statement before the fiscal were thus
inadmissible under Art. IV, §20 of the 1973 Constitution. The question
is whether petitioners waived objection to the admissibility of the
documents, either by failing to object to their introduction during the
trial or by using them in evidence. In declaring them to be admissible,
the Court of Appeals said:

The documents in question (Annexes A and B to Petition), which were
denied admission by respondent Judge, were marked for identification as
“Exh. B” with sub-markings and “Exh. D” with sub-markings on “10-11-86”
(or October 22, 1986) as appear on their face. Those markings show that
the documents were introduced during the prosecution’s
evidence-in-chief; and, necessarily, they were testified on by a
prosecution witness (not clear from the record who). The fact that the
prosecution proposed to formally offer them in evidence at the close of
trial implies that when the documents were first introduced through the
prosecution witness at the trial, the defense did not object to their
introduction. To prevent the introduction of such kind of evidence,
the practice is for the defense to move for its exclusion at any time
before commencement of trial. Such failure of the defense may therefore
be taken as a waiver of their objection — and the waiver was made at
the trial by said accused who was in fact assisted by counsel.

Thus, because of such failure to object, the prosecution succeeded
to introduce the subject documents and cause them to be marked for
identification as Exhibits B and D. . .

. . . During the defense turn to present their evidence-in-chief,
they called said accused to the witness stand, then through him
introduced the question-and-answer statement (Exh. B) that had
previously been denied admission by respondent Judge, and on direct
examination asked him to testify on said statement; of course, accused
denied the contents in that statement. In other words, not only did
the defense waive their objection to the introduction of this statement
when first introduced during the prosecution’s evidence-in-chief as well
as when introduced through the testimony of Cpl. Renato Bautista given
during the prosecution evidence-in-rebuttal, the defense themselves —
including the counsel for accused — introduced such statement as part
of their evidence-in-chief. Hence, respondent Judge committed a
grave abuse of discretion in denying admission of this statement (Exh.
B) when the prosecution again proposed to formally offer it as their
evidence after the defense had rested.

With respect to the transcript (Exh. D), however, the defense did
not introduce it as part of their evidence-in-chief. Although the
prosecution introduced this exhibit during the cross-examination on
which said accused was confronted during the latter’s cross-examination,
the same cannot serve as an independent evidence for the prosecution.
The exhibit may be admitted as prosecution evidence only for the purpose
of impeachment, i.e. as a means to test the credibility of said accused
and/or his testimony. Therefore, respondent Judge should not have
rejected such transcript (Exh. D) when formally offered by the
prosecution for that limited purpose of impeachment. In denying this
exhibit admission, respondent Judge also committed a grave abuse of
discretion.

In fine, the introduction and admission of the two documents in question per se
was not violative of Sec. 20 Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution nor of
Sec. 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution. As stated above, with
respect to the sworn statement (Exh. B), this was introduced by the
defense themselves at the trial as their evidence-in-chief; hence, in
effect this became part of their evidence. As regards the transcript
taken during the preliminary investigation of the complaint against said
accused and his co-accused (Exh. D), this too was deemed admitted, not
by a positive act of the defense but by their default for failure to
object to its introduction at the trial during the cross-examination of
said accused who was assisted by counsel. (Emphasis added)

We think the Court of Appeals erred.

First. Objection to evidence must be made after the evidence is formally offered.^[4] In the case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified,^[5] specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being offered.^[6] It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be made.

In this case, petitioners objected to the admissibility of the
documents when they were formally offered. Contrary to the ruling of the
appellate court, petitioners did not waive objection to admissibility
of the said documents by their failure to object when these were marked,
identified, and then introduced during the trial. That was not the
proper time to make the objection. “Objection to the documentary
evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier.”^[7]
Thus, it has been held that the identification of the document before
it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the
document as evidence for the party presenting it. Objection to the
identification and marking of the document is not equivalent to
objection to the document when it is formally offered in evidence. What
really matters is the objection to the document at the time it is
formally offered as an exhibit.^[8]

It may be mentioned in this connection that in one case,^[9]
objection to the admissibility of a confession on the ground that no
meaningful warning of his constitutional rights was given to the accused
was raised as soon as the prosecution began introducing the confession,
and the trial judge sustained the objection and right away excluded the
confession. This Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, upheld the
action of the trial court over the dissent of Justice Aquino, who argued
that the trial court’s ruling was premature, considering that the
confession was merely being identified. It was not yet being formally
offered in evidence.^[10] On
the other hand, Justice Barredo, concurring, while agreeing that
objection to documentary evidence should be made at the time of formal
offer, nonetheless thought that to faithfully carry out the
constitutional mandate, objections based on the Miranda right
to counsel at the stage of police interrogation should be raised as
early as possible and the ruling on such objections made just as soon in
order not to create prejudice in the judge, in the event the confession
is found inadmissible.^[11]

But the ruling in that case does not detract from the fact that
objections should be made at the stage of formal offer. Objections to
the admissibility of documents may be raised during trial and the court
may rule on them then, but, if this is not done, the party should make
the objections when the documentary evidence is formally offered at the
conclusion of the presentation of evidence for the other party.

Indeed, before it was offered in evidence, the confession in this
case cannot even be considered as evidence to which the accused should
object.

Second. Nor is it correct to say that the confession was
introduced in evidence by Benedicto Gonzales himself when it was his
turn to present evidence for the defense. What happened is that despite
the fact that in its order of April 14, 1988 the court sustained the
objection to the admissibility of the confession and the statements
given by Benedicto Gonzales at the preliminary investigation, the
defense nonetheless asked him questions regarding his confession in
reference to his denial of liability. It was thus not for the purpose of
using as evidence the confession and the alleged statements in the
preliminary investigation but precisely for the purpose of denying their
contents that Gonzales was asked questions. Gonzales denied he ever
gave the answers attributed to him in the TSN allegedly taken during the
preliminary investigation.

The defense did not really have to ask Gonzales questions
regarding his confession inasmuch as the court had already declared both
the confession and the transcript of stenographic notes to be
inadmissible in evidence, but certainly the defense should not be
penalized for exercising an abundance of caution. In fact, the defense
did not mark the confession as one of its exhibits, which is proof of
the fact that it did not adopt it as evidence. There is, therefore, no
basis for the appellate court’s ruling that because the defense adopted
the confession by introducing it in evidence, the defense waived any
objection to the admission of the same in evidence.

Third. Private respondent justifies the use of the
confession and TSN on the ground that they are necessary for the purpose
of impeaching the credibility of Benedicto Gonzales and not for the
purpose of presenting them as evidence in chief. But as already stated,
there was really no need for Gonzales to deny the contents both of the
confession and the TSN since they had already been excluded in evidence.
There was therefore no use for impeaching his credibility.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the orders dated April 14, 1988 and
October 17, 1988 of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City are
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado (Chairman), Melo, Puno, and Martinez, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Per Justice Jesus M. Elbinias and concurred in by Justice Pedro A. Ramirez and Justice Regina G. Ordoñez Benitez.

^[2] People v. Caguioa,
95 SCRA 2 (1980); People v. Ochavido, 132 SCRA 304 (1986); People v.
Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289 (1986); People v. Duhan, 142 SCRA 100 (1986).

^[3] People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 (1985); People v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219 (1986).

^[4] Rules of Court, Rule 132, §36.

^[5]Id., Rule 132, §35.

^[6] Id., Rule 132, §34.

^[7] Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385, 389 (1990). Reiterated in Quebral v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353 (1996).

^[8] Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, ibid.

^[9] People v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2 (1980).

^[10] Id., at 21.

^[11] Id., at 16.