AUTOBUS WORKERS’ UNION (AWU) AND RICARDO ESCANLAR, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND MR. ROBERT ONG, RESPONDENTS.

This petition for certiorari and prohibition assails the Resolution
dated July 12, 1994 of the respondent National Labor Relations
Commission which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
finding complainant’s dismissal valid and in accordance with procedural
due process.

As financial assistance, however, respondents are hereby ordered to give complainant the sum of P5,000.00.

SO ORDERED.”^[1]

and the Resolution dated October 3, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner.

Petitioner Ricardo E. Escanlar worked with Autobus Industries, Inc.
(Autobus for brevity) as a Cutting Machine Operator since January 8,
1981 with a salary of P162.16 per day. He was the recipient of two (2)
Plaques of Appreciation as Model Employee in 1987 and as Valuable
Employee in 1988. He was later elected President of the Autobus Workers’
Union (AWU), the union for the rank and file employees.

On January 29, 1993, Engr. Zosimo Prospero Chavez, Production Manager of Autobus, received a handwritten report^[2] from one Reynaldo T. Andres, a supervisor, pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:

“1. That in the morning of January 29, 1993, Mr. Andres told the
herein complainant, together with another employee of the company their
reassignment to the other section of the company as these latter
sections lack manpower; that herein complainant shall be reassigned to
the `Washer Section’ while the other to the `Painting Section’;

“2. That despite being told of the reason for his transfer, Mr. Escanlar questioned his transfer to the `Washer Section’;

“3. That on the way to his assigned section, herein complainant
asked for an eye goggle to be used in his work; that a certain Mr.
Andres told complainant that there was one goggle in the section where
he is assigned;

“4. That herein complainant refused to use the goggles saying
that it might have some `ketong’ in it; that no new goggles were issued
to the complainant; that the latter was given instructions by Mr.
Andres; that Mr. Andres proceeded to the `Painting Section’;

“5. That at around 6:55 a.m. while on his way back to the `Washer
Section,’ Mr. Andres saw herein complainant talking to a certain Odelon
Gamora; that the two talked for about two (2) minutes; that after their
conversation, Mr. Andres approached the complainant; that at this
instance Mr. Escanlar told Mr. Andres that he (complainant) did not like
the way Mr. Andres chose personnel to go on overtime; that complainant
went on further saying that Mr. Andres chose only persons who are close
to him and from those who treat him for a drink; that Mr. Andres told
complainant to ask a certain Mr. Tomas Marahit who was near if the
complainant’s allegations were true;

“6. That thereafter, herein complainant answered back by saying
`Gago Ka’ to Mr. Andres; that the latter told the former that they
should talk later at his (Mr. Andres) office but the complainant again
called him (Mr. Andres) `Gago Ka’;

“7. That at this juncture, Mr. Andres deemed it proper to leave
complainant; that while Mr. Andres was already in the Seam Weld Section
of the company, complainant continued to stare at him without doing his
job; that Mr. Andres decided to ask complainant what his problem was;
that herein complainant retorted by saying: `BAKIT ANONG GUSTO MO, TANG
INA MO’; Mr. Andres just left him (complainant);

“8. That at about 8:30 a.m. of the same day, while Mr. Andres was
on his way to the canteen, herein complainant approached him (Mr.
Andres) asking what he told the office regarding the incident between
them; that Mr. Andres told the complainant to just ask the management
about the matter; that complainant said `Panapanahon lang yan, panahon
mo ngayon’;

“9. That at 3:08 p.m. of the same day, complainant approached Mr.
Andres in the canteen and said `Patunayan mong minura kita at kung
hindi, tandaan mo yan’.”

On February 5, 1993, Engr. Chavez issued a memorandum^[3]
to petitioner Escanlar requiring the latter to explain in writing
within 48 hours from receipt thereof why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him pursuant to the company’s Code of Discipline, for
addressing Reynaldo T. Andres, his supervisor, in profane or obscene
language and for threatening him.

On February 6, 1993, Reynaldo Andres wrote a memorandum^[4]
to Engr. Chavez that petitioner Escanlar had again threatened him the
previous day at the basketball court of the company premises.

On February 8, 1993, petitioner Escanlar submitted a written explanation^[5] to Engr. Chavez. On the same day, Engr. Chavez through a memorandum^[6]
informed petitioner Escanlar of the scheduled hearing of the January 29
incident on February 17, 1993. The hearing was continued on March 12,
1993.

After the administrative investigation, petitioner Escanlar was served a Notice of Termination^[7]
dated April 19, 1993, for gross misconduct, i.e., uttering unsavory
remarks and threatening his supervisor with physical harm.

On April 21, 1993, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against Autobus. After the submission by the parties of their
respective position papers, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution. On October 29, 1993, Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol D. Del
Rosario rendered a decision finding the dismissal of petitioner valid,
pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:

“Subjecting the evidence on record to a close scrutiny, this
Arbitration Branch notes that the immediate cause of the row was the
order of transfer given by the Supervisor, Mr. Andres to complainant and
Julieto Anober from the Cutting Section to the Washer and Painting
Sections, respectively. Complainant felt that being a machine operator
and union president at that, his transfer to the washer section is
without legal and justifiable basis and this constituted harassment. The
records discloses, however, that the very Collective Bargaining
Agreement, signed by the union headed by complainant and respondent
provides for such transfer as management prerogative of respondent.
Article VI of the C.B.A. (Annex ‘1,’ Respondent’s Rejoinder to Reply to
Position Paper), reads:

‘The union hereby recognizes the company’s right x x x to
transfer employees from one job to another; and to make changes in the
duties of employees as the company may consider fit and proper to the
conduct of its business and to exercise the inherent and customary
prerogative and functions of management.’

With this blanket grant of management prerogative, complainant
who headed the union panel that concluded the C.B.A. with respondent
company is now estopped to question his transfer of work. Further, the
reason given for the transfer is the lack of manpower to the two (2)
sections and there is no showing that the transfer is permanent. There
is no evidence on record that showed complainant’s transfer as
permanent. If at all it was done by respondent to meet the exigencies of
the situation on account of a dearth in manpower. Finally,
complainant’s transfer and subsequent dismissal can not be termed unfair
labor practice on account of union busting because complainant failed
to show by concrete proof that all the other officers of the union have
been removed or are on the verge of being so. As it appears on records,
the union has been in existence prior to complainant’s ascendancy as
president of the union and even with complainant at the helm of the
union as president, respondent company readily concluded a Collective
Bargaining Agreement with the union. If union busting has been the
agenda of respondent, complainant would not find himself all alone in
his present predicament but his co-union officers likewise; but this is
not the picture obtaining.

In fine, this Arbitration Branch does not find any unfair labor
practice committed by respondents as an aftermath of complainant’s
dismissal.

With regard to the issue of illegal dismissal, there is evidence
on record that complainant violated Sec. 6 of Rule No. 28 of the Code of
Discipline of respondent company, which provides:

‘Seksiyon 6- ASAL AT KILOS – pag-insulto o panghihiya, pagbanta
ng pananakit o pagpakita ng anumang sinasadyang di paggalang sa isang
superbisor o sino mang opisyal ng kumpanya.’

The transfer of complainant from the cutting section to the
washer section has undoubtedly bruised complainant’s ego, and created a
rancor in his heart not only because he has been assigned for quite
sometime to operate a machine but also because he is the president of
the worker’s union in the company. He had therefore a reason to commit
the acts complained of by respondents. This Arbitration Branch therefore
gives more weight and credence to the supervisor’s complaint that on
four (4) occasions on January 29, 1993, complainant committed acts that
violated said rule. These acts are:

That at around 6:55 a.m. when complainant uttered against his
supervisor ‘gago ka’ (twice) when the latter was accused with playing
favorites in the choosing of employees for overtime work, when the
supervisor pointed to one Tomas Marahit who can deny the charge of
favoritism; that the complainant uttered the words ‘bakit, anong gusto
mo, tang ina mo’ upon being approached by the supervisor to ask what the
problem is because complainant was not doing his work but merely
staring at him; that at 8:30 a.m., when the supervisor on his way to the
canteen was threatened by complainant when he said, ‘panapanahon lang
iyan, panahon mo ngayon’ when not told about the contents of the
supervisor’s report to management concerning the incident that
transpired between the two (2) of them; and that at 3:08 of the same
day, again at the canteen when complainant approached his supervisor and
uttered the following words: ‘Patunayan mong minura kita at kung hindi,
tandaan mo iyan.’

To these claims of the supervisor, complainant could only give a
general denial. As between a positive averment and a mere denial the
former should be accorded more weight and belief. Moreover, in
complainant’s attempt to twist facts, he claims that it was the
supervisor who uttered profane language but during the investigation of
February 17, 1993, he admitted that he did not hear the supervisor
uttered any bad word. Rather it was his co-worker Julieto Anober who
told him about it not at the time the statement was uttered but in the
afternoon when said co-worker was about to go home. This would
constitute an after thought not worthy of credence. Furthermore, the
contents of Julieto Anober’s affidavit did not mention during the
investigation by the fact finding committee on March 12, 1993 said bad
words but only the word ‘gago’ as having been uttered by the supervisor
and relayed to complainant in the afternoon when he was about to go home
(Annex ‘G-5,’ Respondent’s Rejoinder to Reply to Position Paper). He
simply said, ‘iyan lang ang sinabi ko kay Ric’ (Complainant) nuong
kinahapunan x x x pauwi na ako (Annex ‘G-6,’ Supra).

The utterance of complainant are four-square with the violated
rule aforecited. As there is legal cause and procedural due process
accorded to complainant, this Arbitration Branch so holds and declares
complainant’s dismissal to be valid.”^[8]

On appeal, the decision was affirmed by respondent National Labor Relations Commission in its Resolution^[9] dated July 12, 1994.

Dissatisfied with the NLRC decision, petitioner has come to this
Court via this petition for certiorari and prohibition, contending that
respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
decision of the labor arbiter.

Petitioner asserts that there are questions of fact which have been
overlooked and misconstrued by the labor arbiter and the NLRC.

It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that factual findings of
the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the Labor
Arbiter, are accorded respect, even finality, and will not be disturbed
for as long as such findings are supported by substantial evidence.^[10]
In the instant case, we have no reason to deviate from this policy as
petitioner failed to convince us that the findings of the labor arbiter
as affirmed by the NLRC are devoid of basis or are otherwise capricious
or arbitrary.^[11]

Petitioner was dismissed by respondent Autobus for violation of Section 6 (B) of the company’s Code of Discipline, to wit:

“B. SEKSIYON 6. ASAL AT KILOS

24. Pag-insulto o panghihiya, pagbabanta ng pananakit o
pagpapakita ng anumang sinasadyang di-paggalang sa isang superbisor o
sino mang opisyal ng kumpanya.

Takdang Parusa: Suspensiyon hanggang sa pagtitiwalag, ayon sa bigat ng pagkakasala.”^[12]

which is considered as an act of gross misconduct and is a valid
ground for terminating an employee pursuant to Article 282 of the Labor
Code.

Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent
and not mere error in judgment. The misconduct must be of such a grave
and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant.^[13]
The charge of serious misconduct finds ample support in the record.
Petitioner failed to satisfactorily rebut this accusation, his only
defense being self-serving denials.

The repeated utterances by petitioner of obscene, insulting or
offensive words against a superior were not only destructive of the
morale of his co-employees and a violation of the company rules and
regulations, but also constitute gross misconduct which is one of the
grounds provided for by law to terminate the services of an employee.^[14]
His attitude toward his supervisor, Reynaldo T. Andres, amounted to
insubordination and conduct unbecoming of an employee which merited the
penalty of dismissal.^[15]

Suffice it to state that an employee may be validly dismissed for
violation of a reasonable company rule or regulation adopted for the
conduct of the company’s business.^[16]
It is the recognized prerogative of the employer to transfer and
reassign employees according to the requirements of its business. For
indeed, regulation of manpower by the company clearly falls within the
ambit of management prerogative. A valid exercise of management
prerogative is one which, among others, covers: work assignment, working
methods, time, supervision of workers, transfer of employees, work
supervision, and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. Except
as provided for, or limited by special laws, an employer is free to
regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of
employment.^[17]

Then petitioner makes the farfetched claim that his dismissal is by
reason of his being the union president, thus Autobus is allegedly
guilty of unfair labor practice. This contention is devoid of any legal
foundation. We agree with the observation of the respondent NLRC that:

“x x x. The records are devoid of any substantial evidence that
would establish the theory that the dismissal of herein complainant was
entirely and exclusively motivated by the employees’ union activities or
affiliations nor brought about by a clear discriminatory motive.”^[18]

Finally, petitioner assails the proceedings during the
administrative investigation claiming violation of due process. We are
not convinced.

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the
essential elements of due process. Due process of law simply means
giving opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. In fact,
there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted,
where the party was given a chance to explain his side of the
controversy. What is frowned upon is the denial of the opportunity to be
heard.^[19]

A perusal of the record reveals that petitioner was duly notified
of the charges against him and given the opportunity to defend himself
via a written explanation and thereafter, to adduce evidence on his
behalf during a formal hearing where he was represented by a counsel of
his own choice.

A formal trial-type hearing is not even essential to due process.
It is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to
present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based.^[20] This type of hearing is not even mandatory in cases of complaints lodged before the Labor Arbiter.^[21]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The
resolution of respondent NLRC affirming the decision of the Labor
Arbiter is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Melo, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] Rollo, p. 38.

^[2] Annex “F” of Petition, NLRC Resolution, pp.4-5; Rollo, pp.44-45.

^[3] Rollo, p. 213.

^[4] Rollo, p. 14.

^[5] Rollo, p.16.

^[6] Rollo, p. 15.

^[7] Rollo, pp. 28-29.

^[8] Decision of Labor Arbiter; Annex “E” of Petition; Rollo, pp. 34-38.

^[9] Penned by
Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo, and concurred in by Presiding
Commissioner Bartolome S. Carale and Commissioner Vicente S.E. Veloso,
First Division.

^[10] Belaunzaran vs.
NLRC, G.R. No. 120038, December 23, 1996, 265 SCRA 800, 806 citing PCI
Automation Center, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 115920, 29 January 1996;
Zanotte Shoes, Inc. vs. LRC, 241 SCRA 261 (1995); Morales vs. NLRC, 241
SCRA 103 (1995).

^[11] San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 117055, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 580, 588.

^[12] Rollo, p. 28.

^[13] Dept. of Labor
Manual, Sec. 4343.01, cited in C.A. Azucena, The Labor Code with
Comments and Cases, Volume II, Revised Edition, 1996, p.662.

^[14] Asian Design and Manufacturing Corporation vs. Deputy Minister of Labor, 142 SCRA 79 (1986).

^[15] De la Cruz vs. NLRC, 177 SCRA 626 (1989).

^[16] Tanala vs. NLRC,
G.R. No. 116588, January 24, 1996, 252 SCRA 314, 320, citing Soco vs.
Mercantile Corporation of Davao, et. al., G.R. Nos. 53364-65, March 16,
1987, 148 SCRA 526.

^[17] Manila Electric
Company vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 114129, October 24, 1996, 263 SCRA 531, 538,
citing San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union vs. Ople, 170 SCRA 25
(1989).

^[18] NLRC Resolution, Rollo, p. 48.

^[19] China City
Restaurant Corporation vs. NLRC, 217 SCRA 443, 449 (1993), citing
Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC, 198 SCRA 748 (1991).

^[20] Abiera vs. NLRC, 215 SCRA 476, 481-482.

^[21] Ibid., p. 482, citing Llora Motors, Inc. vs. Drilon, 179 SCRA 175 (1989).