PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. TIRSO GARCIA AND VICENTE TORREJAS, ACCUSED. VICENTE TORREJAS, APPELLANT.

Appellant Vicente Torrejas appeals from the decision, promulgated on 20 April 1990, of Branch 4 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol in Criminal Case No. 5696 the
dispositive portion of which
provides:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds that accused Vicente Torrejas is
GUILTY beyond doubt (sic) of the crime charged for which he is hereby sentenced
to life imprisonment and to pay the costs. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Flaviano Gonzales legal indemnity
of P30,000.00 as well as reimbursement of (sic) the stolen articles in the sum of P5,600.00.

SO ORDERED.”^[1]

Together with Tirso Garcia, appellant was charged with the crime
of robbery with homicide in an information which reads:

“The undersigned, Third Assistant Provincial Fiscal, hereby
accuses Tirso Garcia alias Mamerto, Meming, Ranny and Vicente Torrejas both of
Kinan-oan, Trinidad, province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, (sic) conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with each other,
with intent to gain and by the use of violence or intimidation upon persons did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the inhabited house
of Flaviano Gonzales and once inside the said house, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away therefrom
against the consent of the owner thereof, money in cash in the amount of Five
Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P5,600.00) Philippine Currency, and assorted family
documents on real properties belonging to and owned by the said Flaviano Gonzales,
and by reason or on occasion of
the said robbery the accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
with each other, with intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault attack and hit the
victim Flaviano Gonzales with the use of blunt instruments thereby inflicting
physical injuries or mortal wounds on the said victim which resulted to his
immediate death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased in an
amount to be proved during the trial of the case.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 293 and 294 of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 48 of the same Code, with the
aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strenght (sic) and disregard of
the respect due the offended party on
account of his age, the latter being already 78 years old at the time of the
incident.”^[2]

Accused Tirso Garcia
disappeared after the incident and remains at large.

Only appellant was
arraigned; because of his plea of not guilty, trial on the merits ensued. The version of the prosecution, as
testified to by witnesses Socorro Gonzales, Eusebio Nagulada and Dr. Dalmacio
Javellana, is summarized by the People in its Appellee’s Brief as follows:^[3]

“In the early morning of June 30, 1988, Socorro Gonzales left
her house at Kinan-oan, Trinidad, Bohol and proceeded to the market of Trinidad
to sell tobacco, as it was her town’s market day (pp. 2-3, tsn, June 14,
1989). Her 79-year-old husband Flaviano
Gonzales, also known as ‘Falab,’ who was then not suffering from any serious
illness, just stayed at their home (ibid).

Later that same morning, Eusebio Nagulada called at Flaviano’s
house at Kinan-oan, Trinidad, Bohol to ask him the amount of P40.00 as payment
for services he rendered as errand boy and all-around helper of Flaviano and
his wife, which amount he intended to spend on the market (pp. 2-5, tsn, June
13, 1989). Flaviano, however, handed to
him the amount of P100.00 (ibid.). Subsequently, Nagulada left Flaviano
and proceeded to the market at Trinidad, Bohol. After he had purchased what he needed, he gave the P60.00 change
of Flaviano to the latter’s wife, Socorro, who was also at the market. Socorro, instead, returned to him the amount
of P26.00 and requested Nagulada to buy rice, battery (sic), fish and sugar for
delivery to her husband (pp. 6-8, tsn, June 13, 1989). Nagulada complied and upon completing his
errand proceeded to the house of Flaviano to deliver the articles purchased
(pp. 7-8, tsn, June 13, 1989). When he
arrived there at past 2:00 o’clock P.M., he saw Tirso Garcia and appellant
Vicente Torrejas standing near the banana plants outside Flaviano’s house (pp.
8­-9, tsn, June 13, 1992). Consequently, he greeted them. As neither of the two answered him, he proceeded to call at the main
door of Flaviano’s house but nobody answered so he just entered through the
door, which was not locked. Afterwards,
he went to the kitchen and placed the articles he purchased on top of an
aparador (pp. 10-11, tsn, June 13, 1989). As he turned to go out, he saw the dead body of Flaviano with his head
partly hidden under the stove where the fuel was placed (pp. 10-12, tsn, June
13, 1989). Shocked at this discovery,
he rushed outside but Tirso Garcia and appellant, who were still standing near
the banana plants, saw him (pp. 11-12, tsn, June 13, 1989). Subsequently, Tirso Garcia summoned him and
told him not to tell anybody about Flaviano’s death or else, he would be the
next victim. At that time, appellant
just stood looking at Nagulada and Garcia as they were conversing about three
(3) fathoms away (pp. 12-14, 15-16, tsn, June 13, 1989).

Consequently, Nagulada, who felt scared of Garcia’s threat,
retraced his steps, left the premises and proceeded to his house about 200
meters away (pp. 14-15, tsn, June 13, 1989). He did not tell anyone, except his wife Basilia, that Flaviano is (was)
already dead (ibid).

Meanwhile, Socorro Gonzales left her stall at the market in
Trinidad, Bohol and just walked towards her home at about 3:30 P.M. (pp. 4-5,
tsn, June 14, 1989). At about 4:00
o’clock P.M., she called at the main door of her house, but no one answered her
(ibid). Consequently, she went through the
kitchen door and thereupon found her husband, Flaviano, lying under the stove
with his head covered by a coconut husk. Forthwith, she set down the things she brought with her and knelt down
to massage her husband’s chest and stomach. Afterwards, she removed the coconut husk from his face and there and
then discovered that his ears had been smashed (pp. 4-13, tsn, June 14,
1989). Consequently, she rushed outside
shouting for help from her neighbors. Subsequently, she saw Tibo Apao, a nine-year old boy, and requested him
to go to the store to inquire if persons there may have witnessed what had
happened to her husband. (ibid).

Immediately thereafter, she returned to her husbands’s side and, in
the process, discovered that he had many wounds (pp. 5-6, tsn, June 14, 1989;
Exhs. “B”, “B-1”). Near her husband’s dead body lay a pestle, his cane which was already
broken, a ‘buri’ hat and a ‘chako’ (Exhs. “B”, “D”,
“E”, “F” and “G”). Close examination thereof disclosed that the lower end of the
pestle, as well as of the chako, showed fresh blood stains. Socorro recognized the ‘buri’ hat as the one
used by Tirso Garcia when he passed by their house two (2) days before the
incident, while the ‘chako’ was the same one owned by Tirso Garcia’s younger
brother, Edilberto Garcia, which she had previously seen Edilberto use before
the incident (pp. 7-8, tsn, June 14, 1989). Socorro likewise discovered that their ceiling had been opened. She did not see any revolver therein
although her husband had previously informed her that he kept there the .38
caliber revolver pledged to him by Tirso Garcia as collateral for the P300.00
he (Flaviano) loaned to him (pp. 9-10, tsn, June 14, 1989). Furthermore, she saw that their two (2)
wooden trunks appeared to have been forcibly opened and land titles and cash of
about P5,000.00 out of their recent sales of coconuts, ‘palay,’ and cassavas
(sic) kept therein were already missing (pp. 9-13, tsn, June 14, 1989).

Subsequently, Dr. Dalmacio Javellana, Municipal Health Officer of
Trinidad, Bohol, upon request of the INP Station Commander of Trinidad, Bohol,
who was notified of the killing, conducted post-mortem (sic) examination on
Flaviano’s body at about 7:30 o’clock in the evening of June 30, 1988 (pp. 2-3,
tsn, May 26, 1989; Exh. “A”; p. 5, rec.). Dr. Javellana placed the time of the victim’s death between 2:00
to 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, or five hours before the post?mortem
examination. His findings indicated
(sic) as follows:

‘A male individual in cadaveric spasm showing severe contusion of
the right ear with concomittant (sic) fracture of the parietal bone with blood
coming out from the ears (,) nose and mouth, hands raised and flexed with
semi-clinched (sic) fist (,) with
laceration of the skin at the postero-distal part of the right arm
“2” x 4, contusion of the left and right supra orbital regions.’

(Exh. A, p. 5, rec.)

Thereafter, Dr. Javellana issued a Medico-Legal Post-Mortem Report
which stated the cause of the victim’s death as follows:

‘Cause of death:  Cerebro-Vascular Accident Secondary to Cerebro Hemorrhage; Skull
Fracture; Cerebral Concussion.’

(Ibid); pp. 2-6, tsn, May 26, 1989; Exhs. “B”,
“B”).

As a result of Flaviano’s death, Socorro incurred expenses for his
funeral.

On July 11, 1988, Nagulada gave his statement before the police
station at Trinidad, Bohol regarding the incident which, among others, declared
that he saw Tirso Garcia and appellant outside the house of the deceased
Flaviano at about 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of June 30, 1988 and that
Garcia warned him that if he would tell anybody about the death of Flaviano, he
will be the next person to be killed, while appellant merely looked at them
some three (3) fathoms away (Exh. “C”; pp. 8-14, 15-16, 21-22, June
13, 1989).”

The appellant’s version, on the other hand, as summarized by the
People in its Brief, is based on the testimonies of the appellant himself and
his witnesses, namely Roberto Infuesto, Pedro Daclan and Francisco Gonzales:^[4]

“Appellant is a resident of Tugas, Jetafe, Bohol. On June 11, 1988, he brought his sick father
to the house of his brother-in-law Pedro Daclan at Kinan-oan, Trinidad,
Bohol. On the same occasion, he met
Roberto Infuesto, his former co-worker at the logging company of one Quirino
Gonzales (pp. 2-4, tsn, June 19, 1989; pp. 2-3, tsn, June 15, 1989). In the early morning of June 30, 1988, he
(appellant) and Allan Daclan went to select good cassavas (sic) of Pedro Daclan
at Sitio Katipunan, Trinidad, Bohol, one kilometer away from Pedro Daclan’s
house, which were (sic) intended for delivery to Philstarch. They finished the task at past 1:00 o’clock
in the afternoon. Afterwards, he and
Allan went to Daclan’s house. His
brother-in-law later commanded him to get a sack of corn grits and a sack of
fertilizer from the store of Nena Daclan and load it on the cart. Accordingly, he went to the store and did as
he was told. Upon reaching the store,
appellant took the sacks of corn grits and fertilizer and loaded them on the
cart. On his way to Daclan’s house, he
saw Infuesto plowing his field. He
arrived at Daclan’s house at past 2:00 o’clock and saw Daclan talking to Francisco Gonzales, who has (sic)
just arrived. When Gonzales saw
appellant, he attempted to borrow money from the latter but he told him that he
has mortgaged his property. Francisco
Gonzales chatted with them until past 3:00 o’clock when he returned to the
poblacion (pp. 2-4, tsn, June 15, 1988; pp. 2-4, tsn, June 19, 1989). At
around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, appellant, his wife, and Daclan heard
shouts apparently coming from the house of Flaviano Gonzales, which prompted
Daclan to investigate. Daclan came back
at past six in the afternoon and informed appellant and his companions that
Flaviano had died in his house (p. 5, tsn, June 15, 1989; pp. 2-4, tsn, June
19, 1989).

During the trial, appellant testified that he has (sic) never met
Nagulada prior to his (appellant’s) imprisonment at the municipal jail of
Trinidad, Bohol, (pp. 6-8, 13, tsn, June 15, 1989).”

We
find the foregoing summary to be amply supported by the evidence adduced by the
parties.

The conviction of the
appellant is based solely on the trial court’s observations that (a) there
existed no previous misunderstanding between him and the prosecution witness
Eusebio Nagulada; it is the latter who
testified having seen the appellant
and Tirso Garcia together a few meters from the house of the victim at past
2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the day of the incident; (b) the appellant
left for Jetafe, Bohol on the day after the incident; (c) the appellant lied
when he claimed that he did not know the victim; and (d) at the time the victim
was killed, the appellant was, as
he had testified, in the house of his
brother-in-law, Pedro Daclan, a mere 100 meters from the house of the victim;
it was, therefore, not physically impossible for the appellant to be at the
crime scene when the crime was committed.

In his Brief,^[5]
appellant submits the following assignment of errors:

“I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT VICENTE
TORREJAS BASED SOLELY ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING VICENTE TORREJAS GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.”

Appellant contends that he was convicted on the basis of a single
circumstance which does not even clearly implicate him, namely his having been
seen, by witness Nagulada, with co-accused Tirso Garcia at past 2:00 o’clock in
the afternoon of the day of the killing near the house of the victim, Flaviano
Gonzales. There was no eyewitness to the
crime. Otherwise stated, appellant avers
that the circumstantial evidence presented did not prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

In a gesture of utmost objectivity and fairness, which is but
proper and to be expected of it under all circumstances, the Office of the
Solicitor General, in the Brief for the Appellee,^[6]
concurs with the appellant and recommends the reversal of the appealed decision
and acquittal of the appellant.^[7] In
support thereof, it contends that the only circumstance that can be appreciated
against appellant is the statement of prosecution witness Eusebio Nagulada that
he saw Tirso Garcia and the appellant
standing near the banana plants about five (5) and fifteen (15) meters away,
respectively, from the house of Flaviano minutes before he (Nagulada)
discovered that the latter had been killed; the appellant remained in the same
place and watched as Garcia warned him (Nagulada) not to tell anyone that
Flaviano was dead or else he would be the next victim.

The Solicitor General opines that appellant should be convicted
only if it could be proven that he had conspired with his co-accused Tirso
Garcia. In view of the rule obtaining
in this jurisdiction that conspiracy must be established by positive and
conclusive evidence, appellant’s mere presence at the place of the incident, absent
any other corroborating circumstance, cannot be considered as sufficient to
establish his having conspired with Tirso Garcia to kill and rob Flaviano.^[8]

We find merit in the appeal and do not hesitate to acquit the accused
for the sheer failure of the prosecution to present evidence that would
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. We note at the same time, to Our
dismay, the failure of the trial court to accord with profound reverence the
solemn mandate of the Constitution that an accused is presumed innocent until
the contrary is proven and to remain faithful to the firmly settled doctrine
that in order to overcome said presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable
doubt must be established by the prosecution. Save in certain circumstances, as where the accused admits the
commission of the imputed criminal act but interposes justifying circumstances,
that burden is never shifted to the accused or diminished by the weakness of
the defense. For indeed, unless the
prosecution discharges that burden, the accused need not even offer evidence in
his behalf. He would be entitled to an
acquittal. As We stated in People vs. Dramayo:^[9]

“Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent
on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to
offer evidence on their behalf. Their
freedom is forfeit (sic) only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for
conviction be in existence. Their guilt
must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary,
independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate
tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed
precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the
sentence be one of conviction. It is
thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into
account. The proof against him
must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted
to sway judgment. The conscience must
be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the
offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted
to a crime. What is required then is
moral certainty.”

We have this dictum not
only because the accused “faces the full panoply of state authority with
all ‘The People of the Philippines’ arrayed against him,” hence the need
“to equalize the positions of the prosecution and the defense by presuming
the innocence of the accused until the state is able to refute the presumption
by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt,“^[10]
but also for the cogent reasons that
“[t]he accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of
immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his
liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be
stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every
individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is
reasonable doubt about his guilt. x x x
Moreover, use of the reasonable doubt standard is indispensable to command the
respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal
law. It is critical that the moral
force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that
leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society
that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt
with utmost certainty.”^[11]

This reasonable doubt
standard has constitutional stature for the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.^[12]

Absolute certainty as to the guilt of the accused is, of course,
not required.^[13]
Only moral certainty, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind, is needed.^[14]

In the instant case, nobody witnessed the taking of the property
subject of the robbery and the killing of the victim. There is no evidence to show that either or both deeds took place inside the house, specifically in the
kitchen where the victim’s dead body was discovered. The only circumstance that could possibly link the appellant to
the incident is his alleged presence near the victim’s house at the time of the
commission of the crime. Conceding, ex
gratia, such presence to have been adequately proven — although such
averment was vigorously denied by appellant — thereby effectively according
full faith and credit to the testimony of prosecution witness Eusebio Nagulada,
such testimony provides a single circumstance only. In order that circumstantial evidence may sustain a conviction,
there must exist, inter alia, more than one circumstance. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
provides:

“SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when
sufficient. — Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”

The lone allegation that
appellant was standing near the victim’s house minutes after the offense was
committed, unsupported by any other credible or competent evidence, can not
even engender a belief that he committed a crime. At most, one would merely suspect. Suspicion is not proof. Of course, as correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
it would have been entirely different if conspiracy between the appellant and
Tirso Garcia was established. The rule
is well settled that the same degree of proof is required to support a finding of
the presence of conspiracy, that is, it must be shown to exist as clearly and as convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.^[15] Direct proof, however, is not essential; it
may be shown by acts and circumstances from which may logically be inferred the
existence of a common design among the accused to commit the offense charged.^[16] In the instant case, the prosecution
miserably failed to show other facts and circumstances, except the appellant’s
supposed presence near the house of the victim, from which it may be reasonably
and logically inferred that both appellant and Tirso Garcia had agreed to rob
and kill the victim and actually decided to commit it. Mere passive presence at the scene of the
crime does not make a person liable therefor.^[17]

We note the trial court’s
attempt to supply the missing piece, so to speak, to the prosecution’s evidence
by taking into account the appellant’s departure on the day after the incident
and the weakness of his defense of alibi. As to the first, the court relied on the rule that flight is indicative
of guilt. Indeed, as written in the literature of the Old Testament, “the wicked man flees
though no one pursues, but the righteous is as bold as the lion.”^[18] Unfortunately, however, no such flight could
be ascribed to the appellant. The trial
court lost sight of the fact that the appellant was then a resident of Tugas,
Jetafe, Bohol and that he happened to be in Kinan-oan, Trinidad, Bohol on 11
June 1988 because he brought his sick father to the house of his brother-in-law,
Pedro Daclan. Flight, in order to be
considered as an indication of guilt, presupposes that a person escapes from
the authorities to evade prosecution. It does not contemplate a situation where the accused, like the
appellant in the case at bar, returns to his home where at any time, he may be
picked up for questioning in connection with or arrested for having committed a
crime. If there is anyone upon whom
flight can be appreciated against, it is Tirso Garcia who remains at large.

As to alibi, the trial
court should have disregarded the same altogether because reliance on it is entirely unnecessary. The
prosecution having miserably failed to prove appellant’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the weakness of his defense should not have been even made to
come into the picture. The weakness of
his alibi could not strengthen the prosecution’s case, for settled is the rule
that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the
weakness of the defense.

No court, when confronted with issues that affect the life and
liberty of citizens in a free society, should treat flippantly the latter’s
constitutional guarantees and supply deficiencies in the evidence for the
prosecution with its own bias, suspicion or speculation.

All told, Our minds cannot rest easy upon the certainty of guilt
on the part of the appellant on the basis of the scant and unreliable evidence
presented by the prosecution.

One final word. The trial
court imposed the penalty of life imprisonment on the
appellant. Under the first paragraph of
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the first
paragraph of Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, only reclusion perpetua may be imposed. This penalty is not
the same as life imprisonment. We
have reiterated this time and again^[19] and admonished judges to employ the proper
legal terminology in the imposition of imprisonment penalties because of their different
accompanying legal accessories and effects. Failure to heed this pronouncement can no longer be excused.

WHEREFORE, for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, the
appealed decision of Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol in Criminal
Case No. 5696 is REVERSED and
appellant VICENTE TORREJAS is hereby ACQUITTED. His immediate release from detention is hereby ordered, unless he
is being held for another lawful cause.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Bidin, Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, 20-24. Per Judge Fernando S. Ruiz.

^[2]
Rollo, 7-8.

^[3]
Rollo, 93-99.

^[4]
Rollo, 100.

^[5]
Rollo, 54, et. seq.

^[6]
Id., 90-110.

^[7]
Id., 110.

^[8]
Rollo, 104-106.

^[9]
42 SCRA 59, 64 [1971]; see also People vs. Zamora, 54 SCRA 47 [1973].

^[10]
People vs. Tempongko, 144 SCRA 583 [1986].

^[11]
In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct.
1068, 25 L.E. 2d 368, excerpted
from LEWIS and PEOPLES, The Supreme Court and the Criminal Process, 1978 ed.,
712.

^[12]
Id.

^[13]
U.S. vs. Reyes, 3 Phil. 3
[1903]; U.S. vs. Lasada, 18 Phil. 90 [1910]; People vs. Lavarias,
23 SCRA 1301 [1968]; People vs. Malilay, 63 SCRA 420 [1975].

^[14]
Section 2, Rule 133, Rules of
Court.

^[15]
People vs. Custodio, 47 SCRA 289 [1972]; People vs. Llamera, 51
SCRA 48 [1973]; People vs. Tumalip, 60 SCRA, 303 [1974].

^[16]
People vs. Tingson, 47 SCRA 243 [1972].

^[17]
People vs. Regal, 5 SCRA 703 [1962]; People vs.
Custodio, supra.

^[18]
Proverbs, 28:1; U.S. vs.
Alegado, 25 Phil. 510 [1913]; U.S. vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil. 486 [1918];
People vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 69581, 21 May 1992.

^[19]
See for instance, People vs.
Mobe, 81 Phil. 58 [1948]; People vs. Abletes, 58 SCRA 241 [1974]; People vs. Gonzales,
58 SCRA 266 [1974]; People vs. Pilones, 84 SCRA 167 [1978]; People vs.
Baguio, 196 SCRA 459 [1991]; People vs. Penilllos, 205 SCRA 546 [1992].