PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO CRUZ Y DELA ROSA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal interposed by the accused­-appellant who was sentenced
to Life Imprisonment by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71,
for violation of Section 4, Article 11, of the Republic Act No. 6425.

The accused-appellant was charged in the Information, as follows:

“That on or about the 3rd day of October, 1985, in the
Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having
been duly authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver and give away to another twelve (12) grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation of the above?cited
law.” (Rollo, p. 66)

Details of the crime charged show that on October 3, 1985, an
alleged buy-bust operation was conducted by Sgt. Edison Balatucan and two (2)
unnamed informers who were not even presented as witnesses for the prosecution.

Accordingly, the team was dispatched to conduct the supposed
buy-bust operation at Barangay Sta. Ana (Exhibit “B”). However, from the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, accused Cruz accompanied the team to Barangay San Isidro
and it is unclear whether Cruz was arrested at the original destination of the
operation or at the latter barangay, when the alleged place turned out
“negative”, meaning that there was no marijuana that was found in the
house of the supposed pusher. (TSN,
December 9, 1987, p. 7)

After the two military men testified, the defense thru its
Citizen’s Legal Assistance Office counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss by Way of
Demurrer to Evidence, on the ground that “the guilt of the accused was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt.” (RTC Records, p. 72)

On May 10, 1988, the trial court inadvertently allowed the
accused to present its evidence (Rollo, p. 90), however, on May 30, 1988, the
court rectified the earlier Order and submitted the case for resolution. (Ibid., p. 93) Thus, the Decision subject of
this review was promulgated on July 26, 1988, declaring:

“WHEREFORE, applying the provisions of Sec. 4, of the Dangerous
Drug Act, as Amended by P.D. 1675, the Court sentences ANTONIO CRUZ y DELA CRUZ
to suffer an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua. Likewise, to pay a fine of P20,000.00.” (Ibid., p. 85)

The Court notes that the trial Judge sentenced the accused-appellant
to reclusion perpetua. The correct
penalty under the law is life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
P20,000.00 to P30,000.00.

The lone assigned error cited by the appellant is that: “The lower court erred in convicting
accused-appellant considering that his guilt was not established beyond
reasonable doubt.” To prove its argument, appellant cited testimonial
inconsistencies and contradictions of the prosecution witnesses. In the course of this review, it is
established that the trial court noted the inconsistencies and
contradictions. But then it justified
and ventured on reconciling, and explaining the alarming defects in the
declarations of the witnesses in apparent contravention of what is expected of
an impartial and judicious application of the law based on the personal
knowledge of the witnesses with respect to the facts and circumstances subject
of the charge. Portions of the Decision
heretofore referred, are:

“A cursory study of the testimonial physical and documentary
evidences presented by the prosecution during the trial of the instant case
reveal significant points which the Court finds it compelling to discuss to
serve as a guide for the Court in properly appreciating the merits of the case.

“Among this, that Court could
not help but notice that there were
certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of
the witnesses for the prosecution as correctly
pointed out by the defense in its
motion to dismiss by way of demurrer
to evidence.

“The testimony of Lt. Jose on
direct examination stating that the marijuana
leaves were found in the pocket of
the accused directly conflicts with Sgt.
Balatucan’s handed to him by the accused. This conflict, through
(sic) apparently clear can be explained.

“A witness who admittedly is present while a fact is taking
place may not coincide in relating all the details of the occurrence because
one amy (sic) mention details which the other may not have observed or may not
remember. The paarent (sic) conflict
may be due to differences in observation or memory which does not necessarily
imply falsehood on their part. (People
vs. Tuazon, 47 O.G. 6177). Besides,
Lt. Jose on cross-examination rectified its
(sic) previous testimony when it later
on categorically stated that (sic) said
marijuana leaves were in fact with Sgt.
Balatucan sicne (sic) it was he who
bought the same from the accused. (p. 2, t.s.n. 1/13/86)

“Furthermore, to the mind of
the Court, said inconsistencies only pertain
to minor and inconsequential points and
do not detract from the truthfulness and
sincerity in their testimonies. Also, well settled is
the rule the discrepancies and improbabilities
of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses
in matters of detail heighteness (sic)
the credibility rather that (sic) otherwise
and show that the testimony was neither
coached nor rehearsed. (People vs Pas, L-17320, May 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 137)

“Another salient point worth nothing
(sic) is the testimony of Sgt. Balatucan
on direct examination alleging that it
was he who personally approached the accused
and bought the marijuana from him.
(p. 5, t.s.n. 2/19/86) in his cross-examination, he
testified to the effect that he never
approached the accused but it was the
informant who talked to him and opened
up the conversation. (p. 8, tsn., 2/19/86)
This conflict in the testimony of Sgt.
Balatucan can be reconciled.

“Sgt. Balatucan did never approached
(sic) the accused in the first place
since he is not known and not acquainted
with the accused. It
was in fact the informer who approached
the accused and opened up the conversation. Although, it was the
informant who did so, it does not
necessarily imply that Sgt. Balatucan could
not have talked to the accused and
agreed with him about the sale of
the marijuana leaves since he was with
the informant when they approached the
accused (p. 7, tsn, 2/19/86). Besides, there is here
a misconception on the part of Sgt.
Balatucan on the meaning of the word
“approached” as used during his cross-examination
when propounded to him to the effect
that it was obvious on is (sic)
part that what he meant and understood
it to be is to open up the
conversation which in fact he never did.”
(Ibid., pp. 83 – 84; Emphasis supplied)

It is intriguing how the trial court could note the conflicting testimonies
of the two witnesses for the prosecution, yet come up with a conclusion
different from the plain reading of the testimonies. It was the court which supplied the justification or
reconciliation of inherently irreconcilable and divergent testimonies of the
witnesses who composed the buy-bust team that carried out the operation. The explanations did not come from the
witnesses. The act of the court is more
properly the function of the prosecutor. It supplied the prosecution what the latter failed to adduce as evidence
to prove the alleged acts constituting the offense charged. The justifications are not based on evidence
found in the records.

Furthermore, the trial court even failed to take into account
that its Order of October 10, 1988 was superseded by a subsequent Order on
October 30, 1988, citing Section 15, Rule 119 of the New Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The order precluded the
accused from introducing his evidence after he had filed a Motion to Dismiss by
Way of Demurrer to Evidence. The court
stated in its Decision, that:

“Be that as it may, the defense failed to
prove any improper motive on the part
of the prosecution witnesses to testify
falsely against the accused and therefore
there would be reason to doubt their credibility. (People vs. Beltran, G.R. 38049, July 15,
1985) It is also well settled that when there is no credible evidence showing
that the witness is prejudiced against the accused, the witness would not have
imputed to the accused the commission of such a grave offense if it were not
true that he was really guilty thereof.” (People v. Ali, L-18519, Oct. 30,
1969, 29 SCRA 756)

The defense could not have proved improper motive as the court
ruled that it waived its right to present evidence when it filed the demurrer.

Again, contrary to the already conflicting testimo­nies of Lt.
Jose and Sgt. Balatucan, the trial court insisted that it was entrapment and
not instigation that took place in bagging the accused, as follows:

1.  The military operation
conducted on October 3, 1985 was carried out in Barangay Sta. Ana, Taytay,
Rizal according to Lt. Jose. Other
members of the team were C2C Errol Era and two civilian informers. (TSN, Dec. 9, 1985, p. 3) Lt. Jose was about
ten (10) meters from where the alleged buying was taking place between Sgt.
Balatucan and the accused who were talking to each other. (Ibid., p. 4)

When the Court asked Lt. Jose about the quantity of the marijuana
allegedly bought from the accused by Sgt. Balatucan, Lt. Jose replied
that: “I don’t know
the quantity, it was furnished only to
us by PCCL (Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory).” (Ibid., p. 6) Upon further questioning by
the Court, whether accused accompanied the team to his house, the same witness testified that: “He accompanied us sir, in a house he
was referring to as a pusher in Barangay San Isidro.” There was no arrest
made, “xxx because it was negative, meaning, there’s no marijuana.”
(Ibid.,7)

Aside from the conflicting testimony of Lt. Jose, there were also
tell-tale declarations he made, as follows:

Asked on cross-examination if Lt. Jose affirms the truth that the
alleged dried marijuana leaves were recovered inside the pocket of the accused,
the answer was “yes”. (Ibid.,
p. 9)

When pressed whether he was the one who recovered the dried
marijuana leaves from the pocket of the accused, the answer was “No” it
was Sgt. Balatucan. However, when
further asked if Sgt. Balatucan was the one who searched the pocket of the
accused, the same witness answered that: “No, the marijuana was with Sgt. Balatucan when he was arrested
because Sgt. Balatucan bought from him the marijuana leaves.” (Ibid., p.
10)

Witness was reminded by the counsel for the accused that during
his direct testimony he claimed that the marijuana was recovered inside the
pocket of Antonio Cruz, the accused, but, the answer of Lt. Jose was, “No,
it was done during the buy bust operation.” And when asked about the name
of the civilian informer who was a member of their team and was the one who
approached the accused, Lt. Jose replied that “I do not know.” and
when pressed further, he declared: “That’s all I know,” and insisted that: “x x x it was Sgt. Balatucan who knows
about that.” That, “It was Sgt. Balatucan who cause (sic) as buyer
and he was the one who pay (sic) P20.00 bill and the one who received marijuana
leaves from the accused Antonio Cruz.” (Ibid., pp. 10 -11)

2. Sgt. Edison Balatucan was transferred to the 221st P.C. Company on
October 1, 1985 and on October 3, 1985, went into the buy-bust operation at
Sta. Ana, Tanay, Rizal, and not San Isidro, Tanay, Rizal, as testified to by
Lt. Jose. (TSN, February 19, 1986, p.
3) Conflicting testimonies from that of Lt. Jose, are the following:

This witness claimed that he pretended to buy marijuana and
alleged that he was able to buy marijua­na, but according to Lt. Jose, the
informer was the one who approached the accused. He stated that he paid P20.00 for the marijuana which P20.00 bill
was accordingly recovered from him by Lt. Jose. (Ibid., p. 4)

Sgt. Balatucan when asked by the court what the agreement was all
about, stated that he told the accused: “Because I need it badly.” This contradicted his assertion
that he did not approach the accused, since he was two (2) feet away from the
informant and the accused when the transaction was going on. (Ibid., p. 7) As a matter of fact, when
asked by the court whether he (Sgt. Balatucan) heard the conversation he said
“No, sir.” (Ibid., p. 9)

Sgt. Balatucan nevertheless asserted, when asked by the court
what the response of the accused was when the former said he wanted to buy
marijuana, that: “He has marijuana
leaves in his pocket and he gave to me the stuff which turn I gave the
money.” (Ibid., p. 5) He also declared that he did not know the name of the
informer who approached the accused and that this was the first operation he
participated in. (Ibid., p. 8) He even
denied that he executed a sworn affidavit, which was introduced in evidence and
the signatures were identified by Lt. Jose, (Exhibit “B”) including
the signature of Sgt. Balatucan designated as Exhibit
“B-2”. (Ibid., p. 3)

From the above, it is apparent that the trial court erred in
convicting the accused, based not only on the conflicting and contradictory
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, but the impossibility based
on the positions of the witnesses for the prosecution and accused during the
alleged buy-bust operation, of their active participation.

The counsel for the public respondent tried to explain the
disconcerting arguments by maintaining that:

“Whether or not Sgt. Balatucan executed an affidavit attesting
to the buy-bust operation and the subsequent arrest of accused-appellant is of
no moment since the execution of an affidavit is not material in the present
case. In fact, even if Sgt. Balatu­can
had executed an affidavit, the same is useless since he himself testified in
court and was extensively cross-examined by appellant’s counsel. This question will only become material if
the witness was confronted with his affidavit and such affidavit contains
matters which are completely irreconcilable with affiant’s testimony. As it turned out, Sgt. Balatucan was not
confronted with his affidavit and there is no showing that said affidavit
contains matters that are contradictory with his testimony.” (Brief for
the Appellee, Rollo, p. 95)

The position taken by the appellee illustrated above is erroneous
considering that Sgt. Balatucan, one of the affiants in the Affidavit marked by
the prosecution as Exhibit “B” was asked point-blank on direct
examination whether he executed an affidavit. He denied having done so. On
further questioning with respect to the accused counsel’s open court manifestation
that the witness was looking at a note whenever he would answer questions of
the trial fiscal, who asserted that the note referred to was the Affidavit that
was already marked Exhibit “B” during the testimony of Lt. Jose, the
witness again denied this assertion by saying, “None, sir.” (TSN,
February 19, 1986, p. 6)

Another instance why the testimony of this witness should not be
given much probative value is his assertion that when the accused admitted that
he had marijuana and that this witness told him that “bibili ako sa iyo ng
halagang P20.00”, Sgt. Balatucan gave said amount and the accused handed
him the marijuana. Subsequently, four
questions after the preceding answer, when asked by the counsel for the
accused, if it is not a fact that the witness never approached the person of
the accused and that it was only the informant who approached and talked to
Antonio Cruz, Sgt. Balatucan’s emphatic reply was: “Yes, sir, the informant only.” (Ibid., p. 8)

These points illustrate the lack of credibility of the main
witness who aside from contradicting the testimony of Lt. Jose, came out with
conflicting testimonies of his own. It
was grave error for the court to make generous explanations and justifications
of what it considered inconsistent but then dismissed as minor matters.

It is clear from the records that the prosecution utterly failed
to prove the crime charged, and taking note of the prosecution’s failure, the
trial court compounded the contradictory and conflicting testimonies of the
witnesses by supplying explanations not apparent from the records.

In the case of People vs. Guinto (184 SCRA
287, [1990]) this Court took time to reiterate the following:

“The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and
the bar that in this jurisdiction, accusation is not synonymous
with guilt. The accused
is protected by the constitutional presumption
of innocence which the prosecution must
overcome with contrary proof beyond reasonable
doubt. This Court has
repeatedly declared that even if the defense
is weak, the case against the accused
must fail if the prosecution is even
weaker, for the conviction of the accused
must rest not on the weakness of the
defense, but on the strength of the
prosecution. Indeed, if
the prosecution has not sufficiently established
the guilt of the accused, he has
a right to be acquitted and
released even if he presents naught a
shred of evidence. x x x The accused-appellants have been condemned x x x based on
uncertain evidence clearly insufficient to sustain their conviction. It is their guilt and not their innocence
that has been presumed. It is their
innocence and not their guilt that should have been pro­nounced. In these circumstances, only one thing has
to be done if the Constitution is to be observed and justice is to be
served.”

Then in People vs. Sadie (149 SCRA 240, 244
[1987]) and Perez v. Sandiganbayan and People
of the Philippines (180 SCRA 9 [1989]), this Court
reiterated the ancient principle that “no one shall be found guilty of
crime except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt.”

Trial courts are admonished to always require precise and
convincing testimony in cases involving buy-bust operations. Competent and effective handling of a case
by the prosecution is particularly urgent in drug-related offenses.

We sustain the rule that police officers in buy-bust operations
are entitled to the presumption of having acted pursuant to official duty. Their testimony is entitled to great
respect. Theirs is a most difficult
and, in the light of an ever increasing drug menace, a seemingly hopeless
assignment. Anti?narcotics agents
deserve utmost support and consideration.

Nonetheless, we are also cognizant of the ease with which
prohibited drugs may be “planted” on innocent individuals. Except for influential persons or those who
can afford the best lawyers, it is well nigh impossible to refute a charge that
drugs were “planted” and not “possessed” or
“pushed.” The complaints of mulcting activities by unscrupulous
policemen, especially by those who are assigned to traffic duties or some other
chores but who somehow stumble on possession of prohibited drugs by teenagers
or provincianos, are legion. It is for
this reason that trial courts should be more wary and careful in assessing
conflicting, ambiguous, or non-relevant testimony. More important than apprehending and convicting criminals is
faithful adherence to due process, the need to accord to every accused the
protections guaranteed to him or her by the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated July 26, 1988 sentencing the
accused to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and a
fine of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) is REVERSED. The accused-appelant is ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero, and
Melo, JJ., concur.