RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. LUIS SANTOS, AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND MELVIN VARGAS, AS ACTING GOVERNOR OF CAGAYAN, RESPONDENTS.

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order, petitioner Rodolfo
E. Aguinaldo assails the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government
dated March 19, 1990 in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89 dismissing him as Governor of
Cagayan on the ground that the power of the Secretary of Local Government to
dismiss local government officials under Section 14, Article I, Chapter 3 and
Sections 60 to 67, Chapter 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, was repealed by the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution.

The pertinent facts are as follows: Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of
Cagayan, having been elected to said position during the local elections held
on January 17, 1988, to serve a term of four (4) years therefrom. He took his oath sometime around March 1988.

Shortly after the December 1989 coup d’etat was crushed,
respondent Secretary of Local Government sent a telegram and a letter, both dated
December 4, 1989, to petitioner requiring him to show cause why he should not
be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic, within
forty-eight (48) hours from receipt thereof.

On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for disloyalty to the
Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by Veronico
Agatep, Manuel Mamba and Orlino Agatep, respectively the mayors of the
municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and Lasam, all in Cagayan, against petitioner
for acts the latter committed during the coup. Petitioner was required to file a verified answer to the complaint.

On January 5, 1990, the Department of Local Government received a
letter from petitioner dated December 29, 1989 in reply to respondent
Secretary’s December 4, 1989 letter requiring him to explain why he should not
be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty. In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planning of
the coup or actively participating in its execution, though he admitted that he
was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers.^[1]

Respondent Secretary considered petitioner’s reply letter as his
answer to the complaint of Mayor Veronico Agatep and others.^[2]
On the basis thereof, respondent Secretary suspended petitioner from office for
sixty (60) days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation
into the charges against him.

During the hearing conducted on the charges against petitioner,
complainants presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the
charges. Petitioner neither presented
evidence nor even cross-examined the complainants’ witnesses, choosing instead
to move that respondent Secretary inhibit himself from deciding the case, which
motion was denied.

Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered the questioned decision
finding petitioner guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. Installed as Governor of Cagayan in the process was respondent Melvin
Vargas, who was then the Vice-Governor of Cagayan.

Petitioner relies on three grounds for the allowance of the
petition, namely: (1) that the power of
respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local government officials under
Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987 Constitution;
(2) that since respondent Secretary no longer has power to suspend or remove
petitioner, the former could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor
of Cagayan; and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty committed by petitioner
should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance
of evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised
Penal Code.

While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner filed
his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the
May 11, 1992 elections. Three separate
petitions for his disqualification were then filed against him, all based on
the ground that he had been removed from office by virtue of the March 19, 1990
resolution of respondent Secretary. The
Commission on Elections granted the petitions by way of a resolution dated May
9, 1992. On the same day, acting upon a
“Motion to Clarify” filed by petitioner, the Commission ruled that
inasmuch as the resolutions of the Commission become final and executory only
after five (5) days from promulgation, petitioner may still be voted upon as a
candidate for governor pending the final outcome of the disqualification cases
with this Court.

Consequently, on May 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
with this Court, G.R. Nos. 105128-30, entitled Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo v.
Commission on Elections, et al., seeking to nullify the resolution of the
Commission ordering his disqualification. The Court, in a resolution dated May 14, 1992, issued a temporary
restraining order against the Commission to cease and desist from enforcing its
May 9, 1992 resolution pending the outcome of the disqualification case,
thereby allowing the canvassing of the votes and returns in Cagayan to
proceed. However, the Commission was
ordered not to proclaim a winner until this Court has decided the case.

On June 9, 1992, a resolution was issued in the aforementioned
case granting the petition and annulling the May 9, 1992 resolution of the
Commission on the ground that the decision of respondent Secretary has not yet
attained finality and is still pending review with this Court. As petitioner won by a landslide margin in
the elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as
Governor of Cagayan.

Under the environmental circumstances of the case, We find the
petition meritorious.

Petitioner’s re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan
has rendered the administrative case pending before Us moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of
votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the candidates for
governor of Cagayan province. As held
by this Court in Aguinaldo v. Comelec
et al., supra,:

x x x [T]he certified true xerox copy of
the “CERTIFICATE OF VOTES OF CANDIDATES”, attached to the “VERY
URGENT MOTION FOR THE MODIFICATION OF THE RESOLUTION DATED MAY 14, 1992[“]
filed by petitioner shows that he received 170,382 votes while the other
candidates for the same position received the following total number of votes: (1) Patricio T. Antonio – 54,412; 2)
Paquito F. Castillo – 2,198; and 3) Florencio L. Vargas – 48,129.

x x x

‘Considering the facts narrated, the expiration of petitioner’s
term of office during which the acts charged were allegedly committed, and his
subsequent reelection, the petition must be dismissed for the reason that the
issue has become academic. In Pascual
v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, L-11959, October 31, 1959, this Court has ruled:

‘The weight of authority, however, seems to incline to the rule
denying the right to remove from office because of misconduct during a prior
term to which we fully subscribe.

‘Offenses committed, or acts done, during a previous term are
generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true
where the Constitution provides that the penalty in proceeding for removal
shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from
holding office for a term for which the officer was elected or appointed. (6 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice v. State, 161
S.W. 2nd 4011; Montgomery v. Newell, 40 S.W. 23rd 418; People ex rel Bashaw v. Thompson, 130 P. 2nd 237; Board of
Com’rs Kingfisher County v. Shutler, 281 P. 222; State v. Blake, 280 P. 388; In
re Fedula, 147 A 67; State v. Wald,
43 S.W. 217)

‘The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other
terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the
officer’s misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing
Atty. Gen. v. Kasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 Sec. 599, 50 L.R.A. [NS] 553). As held in Comant v. Bregan [1887] 6 N.Y.S.R.
332, cited in 17 A.L.R. 63 Sec. 559, 50 [NE] 553

‘The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior
to his present term of office. To do
otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their
officers. When the people have elected
a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his
life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct,
if he had been guilty of any. It is not
for the court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule
the will of the people.’ (Lizares v. Hechanova, et al. 17 SCRA 58, 59-60
[1966]) (See also Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 [1974])^[3]

Clearly then, the rule is that a public official can not be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his
re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no
application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may
have committed during the failed coup.

The other grounds raised by petitioner deserve scant
consideration. Petitioner contends that
the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local government
officials as alter ego of the President, and as embodied in B.P. Blg. 337 has
been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and which is now vested in the courts.

We do not agree. The
power of respondent Secretary to remove local government officials is anchored
on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative
branch. The constitutional basis is
provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in
the President the power of control over
all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general
supervision over local governments, and by the doctrine that the acts of the
department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly
rejected by him.^[4]
The statutory grant found in B.P. Blg. 337 itself has constitutional roots,
having been enacted by the then Batasan Pambansa pursuant to Article XI of the
1973 Constitution, Section 2 of which specifically provided as follows —

SEC. 2. The National Assembly shall enact a local
government code which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority vote
of all its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government
structure with an effective system of recall, allocating among the different
local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
providing for the qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries,
power, functions, and duties of local government officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units. However, any change in the existing form of
local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.^[5]

A similar provision is found in Section 3, Article X of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:

SEC. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government
code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different
local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
provide for the qualifications, election, appointment, and
removal, term and salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.^[6]

Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact a
local government code, which provides for the manner of removal of local
government officials, is found in the 1973 Constitution as well as in the 1987
Constitution, then it can not be said that B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the
effectivity of the present Constitution.

Moreover, in Bagabuyo
et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al.,^[7] this Court had the occasion to state
that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the present
Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is
approved.

The power of respondent Secretary of the Department of Local
Government to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60
and 61 of B.P. Blg. 337.^[8]

As to petitioner’s argument of the want of authority of
respondent Secretary to appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor of
Cagayan, We need but point to Section 48 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337 to show the
fallacy of the same, to wit -?

In case a permanent vacancy arises when a
governor . . . refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies or is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office, the
vice-governor . . . shall assume the office for the unexpired term of the
former.^[9]

Equally without merit is petitioner’s claim that before he could
be suspended or removed from office, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is required inasmuch as he is charged with a penal offense of disloyalty
to the Republic which is defined and penalized under Article 137 of the Revised
Penal Code. Petitioner is not being
prosecuted criminally under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, but
administratively with the end in view of removing petitioner as the duly
elected Governor of Cagayan Province for acts of disloyalty to the Republic
where the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence.^[10]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision
of public respondent Secretary of Local Government dated March 19, 1990 in Adm.
Case No. P-10437-89, dismissing petitioner as Governor of Cagayan, is hereby
REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Melo, J., no part.

^[1]
See the text of the letter as quoted in the Decision of respondent Secretary,
pp. 4-6

^[2]
The validity of respondent Secretary’s action was upheld by this Court in Santos
vs. Villacete, G.R. No. 91522, January 25, 1990.

^[3]
G.R. Nos. 105128-30, Rodolfo E.
Aguinaldo vs. Comelec, Florencio Vargas, Luzviminda Villaflor and
Alfonso Purugganan, prom. June 9, 1992, pp. 3, 4-5.

^[4]
Citizen J. Antonio Carpio vs.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 96409, February 14, 1992; Federation of Free
Workers vs. Inciong, 161 SCRA 295 (1988); Villena vs. Secretary
of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1951).

^[5]
Emphasis supplied.

^[6]
Emphasis supplied.

^[7]
G.R. No. 87233, September 21, 1989.

^[8]
Sec. 60. Suspension and Removal; Grounds. — An elective local official
may be suspended or removed from office on any of the following grounds
committed while in office:

(1) Disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines;

(2) Culpable violation of the Constitution;

(3) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office and neglect of duty;

(4) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude;

(5) Abuse of authority;

(6) Unauthorized absence for three consecutive months.

^[9]
Emphasis supplied.

^[10]
Ang Tibay vs. CIT, 69 Phil. 635;
Air Manila, Inc. vs. Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489.