THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF, VS. ALFREDO MACLID Y OCAMPO AND DIONISIO PONCIANO, JR. Y PILI, ACCUSED.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, convicting the herein accused-appellant Alfredo
Maclid y Ocampo of the crime of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No.
7735-V-86.

The information dated September 2, 1986, charging the herein
accused-appellant and co-accused Dionisio Ponciano y Pili of the crime alleged:

“That on or about the 7th day of August, 1986, in the
municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, with intent of gain, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and violence destroyed (sic) the
window of the toilet of the dwelling of Ingomar Moosmann y Graf, enter thereat
and took (sic) and carted (sic) away with them the following items, to wit:

a)    Sixteen (16) pieces of imported
caserole………………….     P13,600.00

b)    One (1) set of plumbing tools………………….………………        600.00

c)    One (1) ice bucket ………………….………………….………        155.00

d)    Ten (10) pieces of white
blankets………………….…………      1,000.00

e)    Four
(4) sets of serving spoons, spoons and forks,

bread knife and
cheese designer ………………….……………… 200.00

f) Assorted clothes………………….………………….……………    1,000.00

g) One (1) Bosch electric
drill………………….……………………     2,500.00

h) One (1) pair of
Adidas rubber shoes ……………………             600.00

i) One (1) piggy bank (alkansyang buddha)
containing …….               500.00

j) One (1) BELLS Wall Clock ……………………                               1,000.00

k) One (1) Polaroid Camera ……………………                                 2,280.00

l) One (1) rivet instrument ……………………                                      700.00

m) Two (2) sets of
silver spoon and fork……………………               1,000.00

n) One (1)
travelling bag …….…………….                                            500.00

P 25,835.00

belonging to one Ingomar Moosman y Graf to the damage and prejudice of
the latter in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty Five
Pesos (P25,835.00) Philippine Currency, and by reason of and during the
occasion of the said robbery, the said above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, with evident premeditation and
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault by piece of adobe stone,
stab by means of screw driver and
kitchen knife and strangulate by means of a noose of electric cord the said Ingomar
Moosmann y Graf which directly
caused the death of said Ingomar Moosmann y
Graf.

“That the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and abuse of
superior strength are present during the commission of this crime.

“Contrary to law.” (p. 14, Rollo)

On November 21, 1986, the accused, assisted by their counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty.

During the pendency of the case, co-accused Dionisio Ponciano,
Jr. died and the case against him was dismissed. Thus, trial ensued only against the herein accused-appellant,
Alfredo Maclid.

From the evidence of the prosecution, the following facts were
gathered:

A German national named Ingomar Moosmann V. Graf, who was married
to a Filipina, Marieta Marcelo Moosmann, was robbed and killed inside the
bedroom of their house at Mabolo, Valenzuela, Metro Manila on the night of
August 7, 1986. At the time of the incident, the victim was
alone in the house. His wife slept in
the house of her children some four (4) houses away from their residence on
that same night. When she went home at
about 9:00 A.M. the following morning, August 8, 1986, she found her husband in
their bedroom sprawled on the floor, bloodied and lifeless. She cried for help and her neighbors rushed
towards the house. The things inside
the house were in disarray and some personal properties described in the
information and said to be worth twenty-five thousand pesos were missing.

Patrolman Isagani Salonga of the Valenzuela Police conducted an
investigation on the incident. He
testified at the trial that when he proceeded to the scene of the crime, he
found the victim lying dead in his bedroom. An electric cord was tied around the
victim’s neck and he sustained several stab wounds in his body. Salonga also found a bloodied kitchen knife
and an adobe stone on the floor of the bedroom. The house was in disarray and the window in the comfort room was
broken which might have been used by the perpetrators in going in and out of
the house. A bended knife was also
found some six feet away from the body of the victim.

Dr. Rodolfo Lezondra, an NBI medico-legal officer conducted an
autopsy on the body of the victim. He
found 6 stab wounds. The wounds were
inflicted by a single bladed knife. The
wounds on the upper right chest and the lower left chest were fatal. Dr. Lezondra testified further that the
cause of death was hemorrhage secondary to stab wounds and that the mark caused
by electric cord looped around the victim’s neck was not enough to cause death.

Another witness for the prosecution, Loreto Rodriguez, also a
member of the Valenzuela Police force testified that he conducted a follow-up
of the case. Through the information
allegedly given by the accused-appellant, the police were able to recover some
of the stolen goods from Natividad Maclid, the accused-appellant’s mother. The rest of the stolen goods were recovered
from different persons who claimed that they were either sold or pawned to them
by the accused or his relatives.

Patrolman Salonga further testified that Maclid was arrested in Kalookan
on September 1, 1986 while his co-accused was apprehended in Tarlac also
sometime in September, 1986. He claimed
that Maclid orally confessed to the commission of the crime because he was
already bothered by his conscience. Salonga also claimed that before Maclid was investigated, the police
apprised him of his constitutional right to counsel but the former insisted to
give his confession without the presence of any counsel.

The defense presented the accused-appellant and his mother, Mrs.
Natividad Maclid.

The accused testified that he was a tricycle driver who plied his
route from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. On
August 7, 1986, he started driving his tricycle at around noon, after doing
some errands for his mother. At about
9:00 or 10:00 in the evening, he went home and watched a television program
with his brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces. Home to him was his mother’s house at 238 Mabolo Street,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, not far from the house of the victim. At about 11:00 p.m., he already went to
sleep. He woke up at about 5:00 a.m.
the next day, August 8, 1986. After he
brought his mother to Caloong, Valenzuela, he proceeded to ply his usual route. When he was already home that evening, a
former classmate in high school, co-accused Dionisio Ponciano, Jr., visited him
together with two (2) other companions. Ponciano invited him to his (Ponciano’s) house. They boarded his tricycle and on their way
to Ponciano’s house, Ponciano told him to look for a buyer of some goods. Ponciano showed him the goods and offered to
sell them to him for P700.00 only explaining that he needed the money very
badly. Maclid went home and borrowed
P700.00 from his mother which he used in paying Ponciano, Jr. He then brought the goods home. Accused-appellant sold some of the goods and
pawned the others to his friends and relatives and some were retained by his
mother.

Maclid also testified that on September 1, 1986, Patrolman
Aguinaldo invited him to Malanday and brought him to the municipal
building. He was detained inside a
conference room for about an hour. Then, three (3) policemen entered the room and showed him pictures of
the victim. He admitted that he knew
the victim because his mother’s house was about six houses away from the house
of the victim. He was asked if he had
anything to do with the killing of the victim, but he answered that he knew
nothing. He was battered and tortured
by the policemen. He also admitted to the
policemen that Ponciano gave him certain articles some of which he sold to his
friends. During the investigation, he
was not assisted by counsel.

Mrs. Natividad Ocampo, accused-appellant’s mother, corroborated
the statements of the accused-appellant. She testified that on that night of August 7, 1986, the
accused-appellant came home at about 9:00 o’clock in the evening; that he
watched a television program up to 11:00 o’clock and that he slept
afterwards. She also testified that the
accused-appellant never left the house that evening. She confirmed the testimony of the accused-appellant that he
borrowed P700.00 from her to pay for some household wares he intended to buy
and resell for profit. She learned that
her son was arrested on September 1, 1986 but when she proceeded to the
municipal building, she was not allowed to see her son. She only saw him at about 10:00 o’clock on that evening when he went home escorted by
some policemen and they took the goods his son brought home the night following
the killing of Moosmann.

As already mentioned, after trial, judgment was rendered convicting
the herein accused-appellant. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:

“ACCORDINGLY, finding accused Alfred Maclid y Ocampo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

“The accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
the sum of P18,255.00, the value of unrecovered stolen items and death
indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment and the
costs of suit.

“SO ORDERED.” (p. 33, Rollo)

From the decision of the trial court, this appeal was filed
before Us. The following assignment of
errors were raised:

“I.  THE HONORABLE COURT
BELOW ERRED, WE RESPECTFULLY SUBMIT, WHEN IT HELD THAT THE DEFENSE OF THE
ACCUSED THAT HE WAS NOT AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME ON AUGUST 7, 1986, WAS AN
ALIBI, HENCE, FOR THIS DEFENSE TO PROSPER, IT IS NOT ENOUGH THAT HE WAS
SOMEWHERE ELSE WHEN THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED, BUT HE MUST SHOW THAT IT IS
PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO HAVE BEEN AT THE PLACE OF ITS COMMISSION,
CONSIDERING THAT HIS RESIDENCE WAS ONLY ABOUT SIX (6) HOUSES AWAY FROM THE
VICTIM’S HOUSE –

“II. THE HONORABLE COURT A
QUO ERRED, WE HUMBLY SUBMIT, WHEN IT HELD THAT SIGNIFICANT WAS ACCUSED’S
FAILURE AND OMISSION TO GIVE HIS STATEMENT TO THE POLICE TO EXPLAIN HIS
INNOCENCE WHICH IS THE NATURAL TENDENCY OF AN INNOCENT PERSON, AS A MATTER OF
SELF-PRESERVATION AND A PRECAUTION AGAINST PREJUDICING HIMSELF, AND FAILURE AND
OMISSION OF MOTHER WHO CLAIMED THAT HER SON WAS IN THE HOUSE ON THE NIGHT OF THE
INCIDENT TO TAKE THE CUDGELS FOR HIM –

“III. THE HONORABLE COURT BELOW ERRED, WITH DUE RESPECT, WHEN
IT RULED THAT OF CONSIDERABLE IMPACT WAS THE ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED THAT WHEN
CO-ACCUSED DIONISIO PONCIANO, JR., NOW DECEASED, SHOWED HIM THE MERCHANDISE,
THE LATTER WAS UNEASY, RESTLESS AND IN A HURRY AND HE SUSPECTED THAT THE ITEMS
CAME FROM ILLEGAL SOURCE, COUPLED BY THE FACT THAT ACCUSED’S RESIDENCE WAS JUST
SIX (6) HOUSES AWAY FROM THE VICTIM’S RESIDENCE AND NEWS OF THE KILLING AND
ROBBERY THAT TOOK PLACE THE NIGHT BEFORE WAS ALREADY SPREAD, AND HE STILL
BOUGHT THE ITEMS, AND NO SENSIBLE AND PRUDENT PERSONS WOULD BUY/ACCEPT THE
GOODS NO MATTER HOW CHEAP THE COST MAY BE –

“IV. THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED, IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, WHEN IT FOUND
THAT THE DEFENSE ADVANCED BY THE ACCUSED WAS AN AFTERTHOUGHT TAKEN ONLY DURING
THE TRIAL AS A DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO ESCAPE PENAL LIABILITY, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF
THE DEMISE OF HIS CO-ACCUSED DIONISIO PONCIANO, JR., WHO CAN BLUNT AND REFUTE
HIS VERSION –

“V. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO ERRED, IT IS HUMBLY SUBMITTED,
WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH BROUGHT TOGETHER A
DEFINITE CONCLUSION THAT ACCUSED WAS ONE OF THE CULPRITS.” (pp. 67-69,
Rollo)

It is the main contention of the accused-appellant that the trial
court improperly convicted him on the ground that his defense of alibi is
unavailing.

The trial court held:

“From an evaluation and assessment of the evidence for the
prosecution, nowhere can be found any direct evidence showing that the accused
was seen doing the robbery and the killing. However, there are several circumstances which, brought together, could
form a definite conclusion that the accused was one of the culprits.

“Denial or alibi is the thrust of the defense of the accused. Considering the conflicting testimonies of
the principal opposing witnesses, the Court has to determine whether or not the
accused was present at or during the commission of the offense. Alibi, the weakest of all defenses because
it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove must be received with utmost
caution (People v. Dorico 54 SCRA 172). For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused
was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must show that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the place at the time of its
commission (People v. Lingao, 75 SCRA 131; People v. Balbas, 122 SCRA 859).

“With the above guidelines, the defense of alibi put up by the
accused’ miserably failed. It is
admitted that the victim’s residence is only about six (6) houses away from the
house of the mother of the
accused where the latter was when the crime was committed. The victim’s house can be negotiated by one
or two minutes walk from the place where the accused was. The accused was within the periphery of
barangay Mabolo, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. It was physically possible for the accused to be at the crime
scene.” (pp. 7-8, Rollo)

It should be noted that even the trial court admitted in its
decision that from its evaluation and assessment of the evidence for the
prosecution “nowhere can be found any direct evidence showing that the
accused was seen doing the robbery and the killing.” Accused-appellant’s conviction was based merely on circumstantial
evidence. The trial court relied mainly
on the fact that part of the
stolen goods were recovered from persons pinpointed by the accused-which fact
carries with it the admission that he was once in possession of the part of
recently stolen property and the presumption that he is the thief relying on
U.S. v. Ungal, 37 Phil. 835. The trial
court also considered the accused’s admission that when co-accused Ponciano,
Jr. showed him the merchandise, the latter was uneasy and restless and he
suspected that the goods were stolen. The trial court commented that no sensible and prudent person
would buy/accept the goods no matter how cheap the cost may be with the
knowledge that someone in the vicinity was robbed and killed. For the trial court, the accused-appellant’s
claim that he was merely a buyer of those stolen goods was an absurd
explanation to escape responsibility for the robbery and killing. The trial court noted the accused’s failure
and omission to give his statement to the police showing his innocence which is
allegedly the natural tendency of an innocent person as a matter of
self-preservation and a precaution against prejudicing himself. And lastly, the trial court put considerable
weight on accused’s failure to convince the court of his defense of alibi.

There is no question that circumstantial evidence is sufficient
to convict where the circumstances point to the accused as the culprit. The following requisites however, must be
satisfied: (1) there must be more than
one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven;
and (3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt (People v. Santito, G. R. No. 91628, August 22, 1991,
201 SCRA 87).

The circumstances presented by the prosecution during trial in an
attempt to pin the accused did not in any way point to him as the perpetrator
of the robbery and the killing. It is
true that his possession of the stolen goods results in a strong suspicion that
he had something to do with the crime. However, this is only one circumstance and the presumption brought about
by this fact had been overcome by his reasonable explanation that he bought the
goods from his co-accused. Accused-appellant’s admission that he already suspected that the goods
sold to him were probably stolen and his failure to give any statement to prove
his innocence do not indicate his commission of the crime charged. This fact does not make him the thief or the
robber. At most, accused-appellant
could be guilty of violating the anti-fencing law. Neither should one’s silence be equated with guilt. Suspicion of guilt, no matter how strong
should not be permitted to sway judgment (People v. Fontanilla, 199 SCRA
897). A defendant in a criminal case
must always be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven. When his culpability is not satisfactorily
shown, or in case of a reasonable doubt, he shall have the right to be
acquitted, though his innocence be doubted (People v. dela Cruz, G.R. Nos.
90907-12, August 7, 1991, 200 SCRA 379).

So far, the prosecution’s evidence only showed that after an
investigation on the incident was conducted by the police force in Valenzuela,
they apprehended two suspects, namely, Donisio Ponciano, Jr. and the herein
accused-appellant, Alfredo Maclid. There
was no showing how the latter became a suspect. He was invited for questioning and he confessed that Ponciano,
Jr. sold to him certain articles which turned out to be those which were stolen
from the victim’s house. These
admissions, given without the aid of a counsel are not admissible in court but
even if these admissions were admissible, they do not prove accused-appellant’s
participation in the robbery with homicide. Moreover, his co-accused, Ponciano, Jr., before his death never admitted
that the accused-appelant played a role in the robbery and killing of the
victim nor did he give any testimony incriminating Maclid. Finally, none of the witnesses of the
prosecution positively identified Maclid as one of the perpetrators of the
crime.

In sum, the evidence of the prosecution does not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant committed the crime. As it now stands, the weakness of
appellant’s defense of alibi can
not be held against him in view of the absence of his clear and positive
identification as one of the culprits. And while alibi may not have been proven so satisfactorily as to leave
no room for doubt, such an infirmity can not strengthen the weakness of the
prosecution’s evidence, the reason being that in a criminal prosecution, the
state must not rely on the weakness of the defense. Alibi need not be inquired into if the prosecution’s evidence
fails to satisfy the test of moral certainty (People v. Lazarte, G.R. No.
89762, August 7, 1991, 200 SCRA 378).

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of robbery with homicide on reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Grino-Aquino, and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.