HERNANDO C. LAYNO, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision*
of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 12955, dated 15 June 1990, finding
the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of
public document defined in Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

Briefly, the facts as found by the Sandiganbayan are as follows:

The petitioner was the incumbent municipal mayor of Lianga,
Surigao del Sur, on 16 March 1980, having been elected to that position in the
elections held in that year. As chief
executive of the municipality, he had the authority to appoint employees in the
municipal government of Lianga.

On 16 March 1980, the petitioner appointed Fernando Y. Layno, his
legitimate son, meat inspector in the office of the municipal treasurer of Lianga. He signed the appointment document — Civil Service Form No. 35
— twice, first as the appointing authority and second, as the personnel
officer, certifying “(t)hat all the required supporting papers pursuant to
MC 5, s. 1974, as amended, have been complied with, reviewed and found to be in
order.”

Among the supporting papers
required for the appointment is the Certification (Exh. “B”)
signed by the petitioner, reading as follows:

“In connection with the appointment of MR. FERNANDO Y. LAYNO, Lianga, Surigao del
Sur, in the Office of Municipal Treasurer, Lianga, Surigao del Sur at the rate
of FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY TWO PESOS ONLY per annum (P4,632.00),
effective March 16, 1980. I HEREBY
CERTIFY THAT:

“1. He is not related to me to (sic) any person
exercising immediate supervision over him within the third degree of either
consanguinity or affinity.”

On the same day, i.e., 16 March 1980, Fernando Y. Layno took his
oath of office with the
petitioner as the adminis­tering officer.

Thereafter, the appointment paper, together with the required
supporting documents, was forwarded to the Davao Regional Office of the Civil
Service Commission and was received by the said office on 17 May 1980. On 20 May 1980, the OIC, Jorge Mindanao,
acting by authority of the Commission, approved the appointment of Fernando Y.
Layno. Three (3) days later, the
approved appointment was returned to the office of the petitioner.

The appointee, however, neither assumed the position to which he
was appointed nor collected the salary corresponding to it.^[1]

On 28 September 1988, petitioner was charged before the
Sandiganbayan with the crime of falsification of public document defined in
Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, in an Information reading
as follows:

“That on or about March 16, 1980, in the Municipality of
Lianga, Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then
the incumbent Municipal Mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, taking advantage of
his official position and committing the offense in relation to his duties, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare and falsify a document or
certification, wherein said accused is legally
bound to disclose the truth, by stating that a certain Fernando Y. Layno of
Lianga, Surigao del Sur is not related to him within the third
degree of either consanguinity or affinity, when in truth and in fact, as
the said accused well knew, said
Fernando Y. Layno is his son, thus, making untruthful statements in a narration
of facts, to the damage of the public interests.

“Contrary to law.”^[2]

When arraigned, petitioner assisted by counsel de parte
pleaded not guilty.^[3]

At the pre-trial held on 9 February 1989, the peti­tioner
admitted that: (1) he was the duly
elected mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, on the date alleged in the
information; (2) that, as mayor, he had the authority to appoint employees in
the municipal government of Lianga; (3) that on 16 March 1980, he appointed
Fernando Y. Layno meat inspector in the office of the municipal treasurer of
Lianga; Surigao del Sur; and (4) that the appointee is his legitimate son. Upon motion of the petitioner, his admission
that he appointed Fernando Y. Layno was made subject to the qualifi­cation that
he later on revoked the appointment upon being advised that it was against the
law on nepotism.^[4]

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued, and the prosecution as
well as the defense adduced their respective evidence.

After the trial, on 15
June 1990, the Sandiganbayan as aforestated promulgated its decision^[5]
finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
falsification of public document defined and penalized in Article 171,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, We find the accused, HERNANDO LAYNO y DE CASTRO,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document
defined in Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance and applying in his favor the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, We impose upon him the indeterminate
imprisonment ranging from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor, as maximum, and a fine of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P2,500.00), Philippine currency, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. No costs.”^[6]

The petitioner has interposed
the present appeal, contending that:

“I. THE SANDIGANBAYAN UTTERLY FAILED TO
CONSIDER THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL
DEFENSES OF PETITIONER.

“II. THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE IS GROSSLY
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A VERDICT OF CONVICTION.

“III. THE SANDIGANBAYAN
FAILED TO YIELD OBEDIENCE TO THE
CONSTITUITONAL MANDATE OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.”^[7]

The appeal is devoid of merit.

Petitioner assails the Sandiganbayan in not giving weight nor
credence to his defense that he did not sign nor issue the certification (Exh.
B) in question. He claims that the lone
witness for the prosecution, Amando R. Pandi, Jr., who identified his signature
on the said certification is incompetent to testify on the matter because he
admitted during the trial that he never saw him (petitioner) actually signing
(affixing) his signature on the questioned certification. Petitioner further claims that the said
witness is biased and prejudiced and that his testimony is incredible,
unreliable and undeserving of belief. He argues that Pandi did
not testify voluntarily but was actually instructed by the incumbent mayor who
was his (petitioner’s) political opponent for the mayorship of the Municipality
of Lianga in the last local election and that he (Pandi) is a relative of the
incumbent vice-mayor against whom he (petitioner) has a long-standing political
feud.

The petitioner’s aforesaid contentions are without merit. Under Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
“has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness acted or
been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.” Otherwise stated,
any witness may be called who has, by sufficient means, acquired knowledge of
the general character of the handwriting of the party whose signature is in
question.^[8]

Prosecution witness Amando R. Pandi, Jr. was competent to testify
on the signature of petitioner on the certifica­tion, Exhibit “B”
because in the course of his employment as municipal secretary and designated
personnel officer in the municipal government of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, he
had seen records under his charge bearing the long and short signa­tures of the
petitioner, and, as such, he had acquired knowledge of the general character of
the handwriting of the petitioner. As
aptly observed by the Sandiganbayan:

“x x x. Pandi has seen
in the course of his employment in the Municipal Government of Lianga as
Municipal Secretary since July 15, 1988, and as designated Personnel Officer
from February 1, 1989, appointment records of municipal employees and old
resolutions of the Municipal Council bearing the full and abbreviated
signatures of the accused as Municipal Mayor. For this reason, he became familiar with those signatures. He could therefore identify and did identify
the full signature on the Certification, Exhibit “B”, to be that of
the accused.”^[9]

Moreover, the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that the signature on
the certification in question is the
signature of the petitioner was not
only based on the testimony of Amando R. Pandi, Jr. Section 22, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence further provides that “(e)vidence res­pecting
the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the
court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom
the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the
judge.” Pursuant thereto, the Sandiganbayan compared the signature on the
certification with the signatures of the petitioner on documents filed with the
court, and which were proved to be genuine. Thus, the Sandiganbayan held:

“The record of this
case contains documents bearing signatures of the accused which have been
proved to be genuine or treated by him to be so. We refer, among many others, to two full signa­tures undisputably
affixed by the accused on the appointment paper, Exhibit A, on March 16, 1980,
the day when the questioned signature was made. There is no doubt that these two signatures strikingly resemble
that on Exhibit B not only in general appearance but also in the manner the illegible letters were formed. Even the accused himself reluctantly
admitted that the challenged signature ‘really looks like my signature and is
almost the same’.”^[10]

After making the comparison, the Sandiganbayan was satisfied and
convinced that the signature on the certifi­cation Exhibit B is truly the
signature of the petitioner. The Court
finds no ground or reason for disturbing such finding or conclusion.

On the question of credibility of the witness for the prosecution
Amando R. Pandi, Jr., it would suffice to state that “the rule
consistently adhered to by this Court is to give due respect to the finding of
the trial court on the matter, the latter tribunal having had the opportunity
to observe the demeanor and conduct of witnesses while testify­ing and,
therefore, is in a better position to properly gauge their credibility. Thus, appellate tribunals will not disturb
the findings of fact of the trial court unless there is proof that said court, in making the findings, had failed to
appreciate some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have
altered the results of the case.”^[11] Upon
review of the records, the Court finds no reason to reject the findings and
conclusions of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner also assails the Sandiganbayan in disregarding his
defense that he had no obligation to disclose the truth about his relationship
with the appointee — his son Fernando Y. Layno. He argues that there is nothing in Section 49 (a) of P.D. No. 807^[12]
which makes it a legal obligation of the appointing public official to disclose
his true relationship with the appointee in the form of a certification. He further argues that the law contemplated
under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is not a prohibitory but a mandatory law,
that is, a law which requires the
revelation of any relationship, either by blood or affinity, between the
appointing public official and the appointee.

Again, the petitioner’s aforesaid contention is devoid of merit.

In one case,^[13] the
defendant-appellee therein was charged with falsification of a public document
by misrepresenting to the representative of the City Treasurer of Cebu that his
name was Antonio Perez, that his place of birth was Jaro, Leyte and that his
citizenship was Filipino, and by means of such misrepresentation, said
representative of the City Treasurer of Cebu was made to issue and write, and in fact did isssue and write on the
corresponding lines of residence certificate No. A-1618529 the name of Antonio
Perez, as the name of the taxpayer, Jaro, Leyte, as his place of
birth, and Filipino as his citizenship, thus causing it to appear
that said residence certificate No. A-1618529 dated 7 January
1952, was issued to one Antonio
Perez with place of birth at Jaro, Leyte, and his citizenship as Filipino, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, his true name was Po Giok To, his place birth was Amoy, China, and his citizenship was Chinese. The accused moved to quash the information on the ground that it did not
allege that he (the accused) had the obligation to disclose the truth in
the document allegedly falsified. The trial court quashed the information. The prosecution appealed to this Court. In resolving the appeal and reversing the trial court’s judgment, this
Court held:

“x x x, the obligation on the part of the accused to disclose
the truth as to the facts that should appear in a residence certificate, is
inherent in the very nature and purpose of said document. Section 3 of Commonwealth, Act 465
(otherwise known as the Residence Tax Law) provides ‘that the residence
certificate for persons shall contain the full name, place and date of birth,
citizenship, civil status, length of residence in the Philippines, length of
residence in the city or municipality where the certificate is issued,
occupation or calling’, all of which facts are required to appear therein for
the purpose of establishing the true and correct identity of the person to whom
the certificate is issued. Needless to say, this provision implies that the
person to whom the certificate is issued must state to the officer who issues
the same, the true facts, required to appear therein, the latter having merely the ministerial function
of recording thereon the facts supplied by this person. And to guarantee that the facts given
correctly and truly identify the holder of the certificate, he is also required
by Sec. 3, supra, to sign the document and affix his right hand
thumbmark thereon. There is, therefore, no question that the
accused had the duty to disclose the true facts about his name, place of
birth, and citizenship to the officer or employee who issued his residence
certificate No. A-1618529; and such duty being inherent in the transaction,
there was no need for the
criminal charge to allege that the accused had such duty.”

In another case,^[14] the
defendant-appellant who was born a citizen
of the Philippines married one Kho Cheng, a Chinese citizen, on 6 January
1936. As a consequence of said
marriage, she acquired the citizenship of her husband, for which reason, she
was registered as an alien in the Bureau of Immigration. Sometime in 1951, she purchased a parcel of
residential land from the San Francisco del Monte, Inc., as evidenced by a deed
of sale which appeared to have been acknowledged by appellant and Cipriano B.
Castro, Vice-President of the San Francisco del Monte, Inc. in the City of
Manila before a notary public. The deed
of sale stated inter alia that appellant was a widow and a
Filipino citizen, she having represented to the clerk who typed the deed that
she was a widow. The truth however was
that her husband was then alive and that, at the time the deed of sale was
executed, she was a registered alien. The deed of sale was subsequently registered with the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City, after which appellant was issued Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 15975 covering the lot subject of the sale.

After an investigation conducted by an agent of the Anti-Dummy
Board, an information was filed with the court a quo charging the appellant with the offense of falsification of
public document. The trial court found
the appellant guilty as charged. Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. In sustaining her conviction, the appellate court held:

“x x x. In this
connection, it is to be noted that alienage modifies or limits a person’s
capacity to act (Art. 39, new Civil Code). For instance, Section 5, Article XIII of the Consti­tution prohibits
aliens from acquiring agricultural land. There is, therefore, no merit in the argument that appellant did not
have a legal obligation to disclose her true citizenship, for, had she revealed
the truth in the deed of sale, the same would have been a patent nullity, being
in violation of the constitutional mandate referred to above, and it would have
never have been registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. That the integrity of the document Exhibit C
was thus affected by appellant’s false statement regarding her citizenship
cannot be doubted.”

“Furthermore, Section
54 of Act No. 496 explicitly requires that ‘Every deed or voluntary instrument
presented for registration shall contain or have indorsed upon it the full
name, nationality, place of residence, and post-office
address of the grantee or other persons acquiring or claiming such interest
under such instrument, and every such instrument shall also state whether the
grantee is married or unmarried, and, if married, give the name in
full of the husband or wife.’ Now, it being undeniable that deed of sale,
Exhibit C, was intended to be — as it was a fact — registered with the
corresponding Register of Deeds, and considering that in transactions affecting
registered land, such as the one in question, the registration of the deed of
conveyance is the operative act by which title is fully conveyed to the grantee
as against all parties, which was paramount in her mind to precisely achieve
her ultimate purpose, appellant could not validly claim that she was not
legally obliged to reveal her civil status and citizenship in the deed Exhibit
C. Otherwise, the deed could not have been registered and a new title would
not have been issued in her favor.”

The law on nepotism, as provided in Section 49(a) of PD No. 807,
prohibits the appointing or recommending authority from making any appointment
in the national, provincial, city or municipal governments or in any branch or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
in favor of his (appointing or recommending authority’s) relative within the
third degree of consanguinity or affinity.^[15]
Thus, in order to guarantee that the law is duly observed, it is required,
among others, that the appointment paper should be accompanied by a
certification of the appointing or recommending authority stating therein that
he is not related to the appointee within the third degree of consanguinity or
affinity. Although Section 49(a) of PD
No. 807 does not explicitly provide that the appointing or recommending
authority shall disclose his true relationship with the appointee in the form
of a certification, nonetheless, in the light of the rulings in the aforecited
cases, the legal obligation of the appointing or recommending authority to
state the true facts required to be stated in the certification is inherent in
the law on prohibition against nepotism and the nature and purpose of such
certification.

In the case at bar, since the petitioner was the appointing
authority when he made the appointment in favor of his son, Fernando T. Layno,
as meat inspector in the office of the municipal treasurer of Lianga, Surigao
del Sur, he had the legal obligation to disclose in the certification his true
relationship with the appointee. As
aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his Memorandum —

“The general purpose
of PD No. 807 is to ‘insure and
promote the constitutional mandate that appointments in the Civil
Service shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to provide within
the public service a progressive system of personnel administration, and to
adopt measures to promote moral and the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, efficiency, and
professionalism in the Civil Service.” (Section 2, PD No. 807)

“The civil service laws are designed to eradicate the system
of appointment to public office based on political considerations and to
eliminate as far as practicable the element of partisanship and personal
favoritism in making appointments. These laws intend to establish a merit system of fitness and efficiency
as the basis of the appointment: to
secure more competent employees, and thereby promote better govenment. (Meran vs. Edralin, 154 SCRA 238 [1987])

“Indeed, there are many cases wherein local elective
officials, upon assumption to office, wield their new-found power by appointing
their own proteges, and even relatives, in violation of civil service laws and
regulations. Victory at the polls should not be taken as authority
for the commission of such illegal acts. (Mendoza vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 78053, June 4, 1990, citing Nemenzo
vs. Sabillano, 25 SCRA 1 [1968])

“Clearly, the provision on nepotism under Section 49 of PD No.
807 was incorporated to prevent the nefarious practice of appointing or
recommending relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity. And to insure that the
provision on nepotism is duly observed, the appointing authority issues a
certification that the appointee is not related to him within the third civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity. Otherwise, the very purpose of the prohibition would be put to naught.

“Prosecution witness Pandi testified that the certification is
one of the documents required by the Civil Service Commission to be attached to
the appointment paper and without said certification, the appointment will not
be acted upon. He also testified that
he knows of no appointment which has been approved by the Civil Service Commission without the
certification. (TSN, April 26, 1989,
pp. 7-8)

“Even the petitioner admitted, on cross examination by the
public prosecutor, that in all the years he was the Mayor of Lianga and during
which time he had been issuing appointments, he signed certifications similar
to the certifica­tion (Exhibit “B”) he issued to his son. (TSN, August 21, 1988, pp. 22-23)

“Plainly, petitioner, as the officer authorized to issue the
certification, has the legal obligation to disclose the truth as to the facts
that should appear in the certification, it being inherent in the
purpose of the document and in the very nature of the prohibition.

x x x                             x x x                               x
x x

“Had petitioner, therefore, truthfully declared that the
appointee was his son, the appointment would have been disapproved by the Civil
Service Commission and he would have been prosecuted, as in fact he was in
another case, for violation of the law on nepotism.”^[16]

Petitioner assails the Sandiganbayan in not taking into
consideration his defense of lack of criminal intent to commit the crime, as
evidenced by his withdrawal of the appointment followed by his order to the municipal
treasurer not to honor the appointment of his son and not to allow him to
report for work, and that he made the appointment through oversight and
ignorance of the law on nepotism. In
other words, he contends that he acted in good faith when he made the
appointment in favor of his son.

This Court has indeed ruled that good faith is a valid defense in
a charge of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements
in a narration of facts.^[17] In
the present case, however, the petitioner’s claim of good faith is unavailing
as it is inconsistent with his very defense that he did not sign nor issue the
certification in question. As held by
the Sandiganbayan —

“The plea cannot be accepted. He expressly admitted that Fernando Y. Layno was his legitimate
son. Nevertheless, he deliberately
disregarded that fact, brazenly certifying that he was not related to him
within the third degree of consanguinity. The perversion was designed to conceal his father-son relationship from
the Civil Service Commission and
thereby deceived it, as it was in fact deceived, in approving the appointment
he extended to him. The criminal intent
is not only obvious, but is also presumed, from the untruthful narration of
fact. The crime of falsification
having already been committed; no acts showing subsequent repentance and
abandonment of purpose, even if true, can relieve the accused of his penal liability.”^[18]
(emphasis supplied)

Finally, the petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan failed to yield obedience to the
constitutional mandate that guilt must
be proven by proof beyond reasonable doubt, claiming that the evidence for the
prosecution is grossly insufficient to sustain his conviction.

In Syquian vs. The People of the Philippines,^[19] this Court held that:

“The offense of falsification by a public officer under
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by ‘any public officer,
employee or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall
falsify a document by committing
any of the following acts: x x x
4. Making untruthful statements in a
narration of fact; x x x.’ It is settled that in this fourth kind of
falsification, the following requisites must concur:

(a) That the offender makes
in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

(b) That he has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and

(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are
absolutely false (Cabigas v. People, G.R. No. 67472, July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA
18.)”

After a thorough review of the records,
the Court finds that all the elements of the crime of falsification of public
document under Article 171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code are present in
the case at bar.

The petitioner was a public officer^[20]
being then the incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Lianga, Surigao del Sur,
when he issued on 16 March 1980 the appointment in favor of Fernando Y. Layno
as a meat inspector in the office of the municipal treasurer of Lianga. In connection with the said appointment, the
petitioner taking advantage of his official position,^[21]
issued the certification (Exh. B)^[22] — a public document — stating therein
that he is not related to the appointee within the third degree of
consanguinity or affinity; but, as previously discussed, he had the legal
obligation to disclose his true relationship with the appointee. The facts narrated by the petitioner in the
said certification are absolutely false because the bare fact and naked truth
is that the appointee Fernando Y. Layno is his legitimate son.

Contrary, therefore, to the petitioner’s pretense, the
Sandiganbayan did not commit any reversible error in finding the petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification by a public
officer under Article 171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged
decision of the Sandiganbayan is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, and
Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, and
Feliciano, JJ., on official leave.

Campos, Jr., J., took no part
in the deliberations.

*Penned
by Justice Jose S. Balajadia and concurred in by Justices Romeo M. Escareal and
Cipriano A. Del Rosario.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 31-32

^[2]
Ibid, p. 22

^[3]
Ibid, p. 23

^[4]
Ibid, p. 23

^[5]
Ibid, p. 22

^[6]
Ibid, p. 45

^[7]
Rollo, p. 55

^[8]
Martin, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol, 5. p. 586, citing 3
Jones on Evidence, p. 2358

^[9]
Rollo, p. 35

^[10]
Ibid, p. 36

^[11]
People vs. Yap, L-28664, 22 December
1971, 42 SCRA 567, 574

^[12]
Section 47(a) of PD No. 807 provides as follows:

“All appointments in the national, provincial, city or municipal
governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the
appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office,
or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are prohibited.

“As used in this Section, the word ‘relative’ and members of the
family referred to are those related within the third degree of either consan­guinity
or affinity.”

^[13]
People vs. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913

^[14]
People vs. Kho, CA-G.R. No.
03618-CR, 21 April 1964, 5 C.A. Rep. 661, penned by then Presiding, Justice
Jose P. Bengzon who later became an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court

^[15]
Section 49(a) of PD No. 807 is
mandatory, because it contains words of positive prohibition as it is couched
in negative terms importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise
than designated (Brehm vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-18566, 30 September
1963, 9 SCRA 172, 176

^[16]
Rollo, pp. 106-110

^[17]
Siquian vs. People of the
Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 82897, 13 March 1989, 171 SCRA 223, 233, citing
U.S. v. San Jose, 47 Phil. 48 (1924)

^[18]
Rollo, p. 44

^[19]
Supra

^[20]
A “public officer” according
to Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, is a “person who, by direct
provi­sion of the law, popular election or appointment by competent authority,
shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in
any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate
official, of any rank or class.”

^[21]
Abuse of public office is considered
present when the offender falsifies a document in connection with the duties of
his office which consist of either making or preparing or otherwise intervening
in the preparation of a document (Syquian vs. People of the Philippines,
supra, citing U.S. v. Inosanto, 20 Phil. 376 [1911]; People v.
Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 [1957]).

^[22]
The certification having been issued by
petitioner in the exercise of the function of his office is a public document
(Syquian v. People of the Philippines, supra, citing U.S. v.
Asensi, 34 Phil. 765 [1915]).