RAUL H. SESBREÑO, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND BENJAMIN RALLON, RESPONDENTS.

This petition for review on certiorari is an offshoot of
Sp. Proc. No. 916-R of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Cebu City, an
intestate proceeding which has dragged on for the past forty (40) years.

Petitioner Raul H. Sesbreño acted as counsel for Crispin and
Carlos Borromeo, both deceased, who were among the many heirs of the late Vito
Boromeo. Private respondent Benjamin
Rallon, meanwhile, was counsel of the Estate of Salud Borromeo and of the heirs
of Marcial, Canuto and Asuncion,
all surnamed Borromeo (Annex “A”, Petition, p. 1).

On 17 February 1989, petitioner filed a motion to fix his
attorney’s fees before the trial court alleging that his legal services in the
estate proceedings benefitted not only his clients but also private respondent
and the other lawyers in this case. Thus, he demanded attorney’s fees
from the other heirs who were not his clients.

On 29 August 1989, the trial court granted the motion and
assessed the other heirs “1/2 of 1% of whatever is due to them from the
distribution of the residue of the Estate of Vito Borromeo” (Rollo, p. 49). Private respondent, along with Atty. Gabriel
J. Canete, moved for its reconsideration.

On 30 January 1990, the trial court modified its earlier order by
revoking the award of attorney’s fees against the other heirs, said court
noting that its award was not in consonance with law and jurisprudence as the
other heirs had not contracted the services of petitioner. Besides, they were represented in the
intestate proceedings by their respective counsel. Hence, petitioner’s recourse to the Court of Appeals.

On 7 May 1991, the appellate court affirmed the questioned order
of the trial court. It took note of the
doctrine in Borromeo-Herrera v. Borromeo, G. R. No. L-41171, G.R. No.
55000, G.R. No. 62895, G.R. No. 63818 and G.R. No. 65995, all prom. 23 July
1987, 152 SCRA 171, a consolidated decision of five (5) incidents which all
stemmed from Sp. Proc. No. 916-R. Particularly in G. R. No. 65995, We held that the lawyers in this case
“should collect from the heirs-distributees who individually hired
them.” Since the Order of 29 August 1989 was contrary to the aforesaid
ruling, respondent Court of Appeals declared it null and void.

Aggrieved by the decision
of the Court of Appeals,
petitioner instituted the instant petition for review. He now insists that the ruling in Borromeo-Herrera, supra, is not applicable to him because he
was not a party in that claim for attorney’s fees (Reply, p.3). He also contends that the Order Of 29 August
1989 of the trial court may no longer be altered or modified as it has already
attained finality and been in fact partially satisfied. Petitioner further claims that Amelinda
Talam, another heir, entered into an attorney-client relationship with him and,
consequently, should be ordered to pay him attorney’s fees.

Petitioner’s contentions are devoid of merit.

A careful examination of Our decision in Borromeo-Herrera, supra,
discloses that contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the ruling for attorney’s
fees therein applies to all the lawyers appearing in the estate proceedings,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, entitled “Estate of Vito
Borromeo”. This can readily be
gleaned from that portion of the consolidated decision, notably in GR. No.
65995, where We said –

“We agree with the petitioners’ contention that attorney’s
fees are not the obligation of the estate but of the individual heirs who individually hired their respective lawyers. The portion, therefore, of the Order of
August 15, 1969, segregating the exorbitantly excessive amount of 40% of the
market value of the estate from which attorney’s fees shall be taken and paid
should be deleted.” (supra
at p.195; underscoring ours).

Consequently, We ordered that –

“(6) The
portion of the Order of August 15,1969, segregating 40% of the market value of
the estate from which attorney’s fees shall be taken and paid should be, as it
is hereby DELETED. The lawyers
should collect from the heirs-distributees who individually hired them,
attorney’s fees according to the nature of the services rendered but in
amounts which should not exceed 20% of the market value of the property the
latter acquired from the estate as beneficiaries.” (supra at p.
196; underscoring ours).

We note that the aforesaid decision, portions of which are herein
reproduced, is not ambiguous. Instead,
it clearly mandates that all lawyers should only “collect from the
heirs-distributees who individually hired them”. It applies to all the lawyers connected with the settlement of
the Vito Borromeo estate and does not make reference to any lawyer or lawyers
in particular. Such being the case,
petitioner can only charge attorney’s fees from the heirs­-distributees who
individually hired him and not from those heirs-distributees who hired other
lawyers such as private respondent.

The Supreme Court is the final arbiter of all legal questions
properly brought before it. Consequently, its decision in any given case constitutes the law of that
particular case (Festin v. Faderanga, G. R. No. 57351, 16 January 1982,
111 SCRA 1). The only function of a
trial court once it receives the judgment of the Supreme Court, or any higher
court for that matter, is to order the execution of that judgment. It cannot interpret or reverse the judgment
of the higher court (Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97238, 15 July
1991, 199 SCRA 212).

The Order of 29 August 1989 attempted to modify the decision in Borromeo-Herrera,
supra, by assessing 1/2 of 1% of whatever
is due to the heirs-distributees who did not hire petitioner as his attorney’s
fees. This is plainly in contravention
of Our ruling that lawyers in this estate proceeding can only collect
attorney’s fees from the heirs­distributees who hired them. For this reason, the aforesaid Order is null
and void, having been issued in excess of jurisdiction (see Wong v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70082, 19 August 1991, 200 SCRA
792).

A void judgment is non-existent and therefore cannot acquire
finality (Barde v. Posiquit, No. L-29445, 15 August 1988, 164 SCRA 304; Metropolitan
Waterworks & Sewerage System v. Sison, No. L-40309, 31 August 1983, 124
SCRA 394). It is in legal effect no
judgment or order at all (Paredes v. Moya, No. L-38051, 26 December
1974, 61 SCRA 526). Since the Order of 29 August 1989 was void from its
incipience, it never attained finality, although it was partially executed. Hence, the trial court correctly declared
said Order as partly null and void insofar as it assessed attorney’s fees
against the heirs-distributees who were not petitioner’s clients (Rollo, p.
117). As succinctly noted by respondent
Court of Appeals, “it took courage for the trial judge to reconsider”
his erroneous order (Annex “A”, Petition, p. 5).

Lastly, the allegation that Amelinda Talam was a client of
petitioner deserves scant consideration. The alleged contract purporting to show that Talam was petitioner’s
client is nothing but a mere ex parte manifestation on Talam’s
part that she was agreeable to giving petitioner P5,000.00 out of the
P20,000.00 set aside for attorney’s fees (Rollo, p. 46). Such acquiescence, however, was not an
admission that she had in fact hired petitioner but, rather, its purpose was to
facilitate the release of the P100,000.00 due her as petitioner had opposed any
release of the shares due the heirs-distributees without first satisfying his
alleged attorney’s fees.

ACCORDINGLY, for utter lack of merit, the instant petition
for review on certiorari is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, and
Medialdea, JJ., concur.