JUAN PONCE ENRILE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. OMAR U. AMIN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 135, HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL …

Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion complexed with murder^[1]
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
government prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati.  The second information reads:

“That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, having reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio
“Gringo” Honasan has committed a crime, did
then and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct,
impede, frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio
“Gringo” Honasan by harboring or concealing
him in his house,”

On March 2, 1990,
the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance of
a warrant of arrest pending personal determination by the court of probable
cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge the information from the record.

On March 16, 1990,
respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge
of respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile’s Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that “there (was) probable cause to hold
the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of
PD No. 1829.”

On March 21, 1990,
the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on the grounds that:

(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) The respondent court’s finding of probable cause was devoid
of factual and legal basis; and

(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed
with murder and frustrated murder against Senator Enrile
as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the
basis of their alleged meeting on December
1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or
concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.

On May 10, 1990,
the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for
alleged lack of merit and setting Senator Enrile’s
arraignment to May 30, 1990.

The petitioner comes to this Court on Certiorari imputing grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by
the respondent court in refusing to quash/dismiss the information on the
following grounds, to wit:

I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting
on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the “complexed” rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the
basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989;

III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be
only one prosecution for all the component acts of rebellion;

IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile
for trial for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829;

V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation
of presidential Decree No. 1829.  The
preliminary investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by patent
irregularities resulting in denial of due process.

On May 20, 1990
we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise
directed by this Court.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner
could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the
rebellion case earlier filed against him.

Respondent Judge Amin sustained the
charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed
against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law
while the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.

The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of
which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. No. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990).  The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to
reiterate the long standing proscription against splitting the component
offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure
reprobated in the Hernandez case. 
This Court recently declared:

“The rejection of both options shapes and determines the
primary ruling of the Court.  Which is
that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed on the occasion thereof,
either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect
of an activity that constitutes rebellion.”
(Emphasis supplied)

This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar.  If a person can not be charged with the complex
crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be
charged separately for two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive
or component element or committed in
furtherance of rebellion.

The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No.
1829 particularly Section 1 (c) which states:

“SECTION 1.  The penalty
of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a
fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any
person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes,
frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

xxx                                                xxx                                           xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any
person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed
any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest,
prosecution and conviction.”

xxx                                                xxx                                           xxx

The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner
entertained and accomodated Col. Honasan
by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house.  Knowing that
Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended.  And because of such failure the petitioner
prevented Col. Honasan’s arrest and conviction in
violation of Section 1 (c) of PD
No. 1829.

The rebellion charges
filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive
Col. Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan and some 100
rebel soldiers attended the mass and
birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of
December 1, 1989.  The information (Annex “C”, p. 3)
particularly reads that on “or
about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio
“Gringo” Honasan conferred with accused
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about 100
fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches”.  The prosecution thereby concluded that:

“In such a situation Sen. Enrile’s
talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan
in his house in the presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully
armed, can be inferred that they were
co-conspirators in the failed December coup.”
(Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)

As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the
rebellion charge constitute or include the very incident which gave rise to the
charge of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829.  Under the Department of Justice resolution
(Annex A, Rollo p. 49) there is only one crime of
rebellion complexed with murder and multiple
frustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions
for “harboring and concealing” Honasan and
100 other armed rebels under PD No.
1829.  The splitting of component
elements is readily apparent.

The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col.
Gringo Honasan. 
Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan,
petitioner’s alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in
furtherance of the crime of rebellion
thus constituting a component thereof. 
It was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of
rebellion.  As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:

“In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against
the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to
achieve a political purpose.  The decisive factor
is the intent or motive.” (p.
535)

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts.  It is described as a vast movement of men and
a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan
[CA] O.G. 1932).  Jurisprudence tells us
that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves
are deemed absorbed in the one
single crime of rebellion.  (People v.
Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People
v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960];
People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]).  In
this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan
is clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion.  It
cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge.  The case of People v. Prieto^[2] (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is
instructive:

“In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can
only be accomplished by some kind of action. 
Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a
mental operation.  (Cramer v. U.S.,
ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal
offense under another penal statute or provision, Even so, when the deed is
charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime
and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination
with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. 
Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution
for smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion
or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of
opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery
respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime
or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as
a constitutive ingredient of treason.”

 The prosecution tries to
distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable
under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal
Code; hence prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the
other.  This agument
is specious in rebellion cases.

 In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution’s theory must fail.  The rationale remains the same.  All crimes, whether punishable under a
special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or
committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and
can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves.  Thus:

“This does not detract, however, from the rule that the
ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by
the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom
or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.xxx
(People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)

The Hernandez and other related cases mention
common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion.  These common crimes refer to all acts of
violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the
Revised Penal Code.  The attendant
circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the
theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common
crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in
furtherance of the political offense.

The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator
Ponce Enrile with Colonel Honasan
is too intimately tied up with his allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same act to form two separate
crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.

Clearly, the petitioner’s alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his
act of conspiring with Honasan was committed in
connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as
absorbed by, merged in, and identified with the crime of rebellion punished in
Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.

“Thus, national, as well as international, laws and
jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes,
perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their
character as “common” offenses, and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which
they are mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot be punished separately from the
principal offense, or complexed with the same, to
justify the imposition of a graver penalty.” (People v. Hernandez, supra,
p. 541)

In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil.
659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty and convicted of the crime
of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegal possession of
firearms.  The Court ruled:

“An examination of the record, however, discloses that the
crime with which the accused is charged in the present case which is that of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary
element or ingredient in the crime of rebellion with which the same accused is
charged with other persons in a separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty and
was convicted.” (at page 662)

xxx                                                xxx                                           xxx

“xxx[T]he conclusion is inescapable
that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present case is already
absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further now would be to place
him in double jeopardy.” (at. page
663)

Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas
v. Panga, (G. R. No. 83341, January 30,
1990) where the Court had occasion to
pass upon a nearly similar issue.  In this
case, the petitioner Misolas, an alleged member of
the New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion
under Section 1 of PD 1866.  In his
motion to quash the information, the petitioner based his arguments on the Hernandez
and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of common crimes in
rebellion.  The Court, however,
clarified, to wit:

“x x x in
the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified
offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866.  HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX
CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.  NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR
SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.  Thus, the
rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no
application in this case.”

The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal
possession of firearms under PD 1866 because no separate prosecution for
subversion or rebellion had been filed.^[3]
The prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case
and charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of
P.D. 1829.  It cannot complex the rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder. 
Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of P.D.
1829 in Makati.  It should be noted that there is in fact a
separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City.  In such a case, the independent
prosecution under PD 1829 can not
prosper.

As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive
factor.  If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or
concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter
is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely
different.  But if the act is committed
with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it
should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being
punished separately.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried
separately under PD 1829 in addition to his being prosecuted in the rebellion
case.  With this ruling, there is no need
for the Court to pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The Information
in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED.  The writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining
respondent Judges and their successors in Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional
Trial Court of Makati, from holding the arraignment
of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further
proceedings therein is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., on official leave.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., on leave.

Medialdea, J., no part.

^[1]
Recently made the subject of a similar petition for certiorari and modified by
the Supreme Court into an information for the simple crime of rebellion in G.R.
Nos. 92163 & 92164, June 5, 1990.

^[2] The doctrine relied
upon was set down in treason cases but is applicable to rebellion cases.  As Justice 
McDonough opined, rebellion is treason of less magnitude (U.S. v. Lagnoasan, 3 Phil.
472, 484 1904).

^[3]
Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Abraham F. Sarmiento believe that PD 1866 is unconstitutional and
should be struck down as illegal per se. Justice Sarmiento
stated in his separate dissent
that PD 1866 is a bill of attainder, vague and violative
of the double jeopardy clause, and an instrument of repression.