G.R. No. 83947. September 13, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DOMINADOR PARINGIT, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This case, a prosecution for rape, originated from a complaint filed
by the aggrieved party, Nida Pajar,
of San Vicente East, Asingan, Pangasinan,
a married woman and mother of three. On
the basis thereof, Fiscal Jorito C. Peralta of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, filed an
information and set forth the following:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal, upon sworn complaint
of Nida Pajar y Mercado,
accuses DOMINADOR PARINGIT y CABIDA, alias “Ador
Paringit“, of the crime of RAPE, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 15th day of October, 1985, at dawn, in Barangay San Vicente East, Municipality of Asingan, Province of Pangasinan,
New Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused entered the dwelling place of complaining
witness Nida Pajar y
Mercado and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge
of said Nida Pajar y
Mercado, against her will.
Contrary to Article 335, Revised Penal Code.[1]
The accused pleaded “not guilty” during arraignment.
The evidence for the prosecution discloses that on October 15, 1985, at or about dawn, Nida Pajar, 23 years old, was
inside her hut at San Vicente East, breastfeeding her baby. Aside from her three children, she was
alone. She alleged that her husband, Ricardo
Pajar, was then at San Vicente West, about 500 meters
from San Vicente East, attending a funeral wake. She stated that she was lying on the floor
when she saw the accused enter the hut through an opening (what appeared to be
the hut’s doorway). She also declared
that she recognized him by the light of a kerosene lamp ensconed
on a can inside. Thereupon, she rose and
shouted. The accused, however, embraced
her, covered her mouth, and landed two punches on her stomach. She claimed that she fell down, and that
thereafter, the accused “removed my panty and he abused me.”[2]
After that, the accused allegedly told her: “[D]o not tell Carding. [Her husband.] I will come back again.”[3]
When “Carding” returned, at or about five o’clock, she told him that “a certain
man abused me,”[4]
and that man was Dominador Paringit,
the accused. Her husband soon proceeded
to the house of his parents, who convinced her to leave no stone unturned in
bringing the accused to justice.
At around eight o’clock,
the Pajars saw the barangay
captain of San Vicente East, who accompanied them to the police station in Asingan, where Nida executed a
statement. Later, they saw Judge Narciso Ramos of the Municipal Circuit Court of Asingan, who conducted a preliminary investigation, and who
found probable cause for rape against the accused.
She also said that at about nine
o’clock, she sought a medical examination.
Ricardo Pajar testified, in turn, that
he had come from a wake at San Vicente West, when upon returning home, her wife
broke the tragic news. Then, together
with his wife and parents, he went to see the barangay
captain who led them to the police headquarters. He also said that the accused himself was
summoned by the police and was investigated.
He told the court that shortly, he took his wife to the municipal health
officer for examination.
He admitted having seen the accused at the wake but contended
that the latter left at about eleven o’clock
P.M. of October 14, 1985. On the other hand, he (Ricardo Pajar) left not until five
o’clock the following morning (October 15, 1985).
According to Dr. Ruperto Natividad, he examined Mrs. Pajar
on October 14, 1985
(should be October 15, 1985)
at or about 8:45 a.m., who saw her to
complain of rape. His report is as
follows:
II INTERNAL FINDINGS:
(a)
External genitalia: presence of abundant pubic hair, long curly
black in color
(b)
Labia majora and minora firm and coaptated,
brownish in color not swollen.
(c)
Vaginal
Canal: very lax, admit 2 examining fingers easily
with out pain or resistance and also admit the vaginal speculum with out pain
or resistance easily.
(d)
Vaginal Wall and Rogosities,
orifice are coaptated and lost, with
whitish–yellowish mucoid discharge around 1 cc
volume.
(e)
Cervix of the uterus: Soft, with old cervical laceration at 11:00 and 2:00
o’clock position.[5]
Thereafter, the prosecution rested.
The defense presented Rosendo Rosquita, Eleuterio Malong, and the accused himself.
Rosendo Rosquita
testified that on October 14, 1985,
he attended a wake of Alexander Bataen, a child of a
couple-friend, Salvador and Norma Bataen. He stated
that he stayed there until five o’clock
the following day. He said that he saw
the accused there, playing poker along with Eleuterio
Malong, a certain Robert Valdez and a few
others. They allegedly played until five o’clock of October 15, 1985 after which they went home together.
Eleuterio
Malong corroborated Rosendo
Rosquita’s testimony.
He said that from ten o’clock P.M.
of October 14, 1985 up to five o’clock the following morning. He averred that he, along with the accused, Rosendo Rosquita, and Robert
Valdez, left together.
The accused himself declared that he was at the wake from about ten o’clock on the night of October 14, 1985 until five o’clock in the morning of October 15, 1985. He said that he bided his time playing
poker. He reached the farm where he
worked at about 6:30 a.m., where he
chanced upon the Pajars along the way. They allegedly ignored one another. He claimed that the offended party had merely
mistaken him for another “Ador“, of Barangay San Juan, San Manuel, Pangasinan. He likewise contended that at the police
headquarters, Nida Pajar
denied that it was he who raped her.
The defense having rested, the prosecution presented a rebuttal witness,
Patrolman Severino Alvarado, who informed the court
that he interrogated the accused about the victim’s complaint, and the victim,
who admitted meeting the accused on their way to file her accusation.[6]
On April 20, 1988,
the lower court rendered judgment, declaring the accused guilty as charged,
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering
him to pay P30,000.00 in moral damages.[7]
Hence, this appeal.
The accused assigns two errors allegedly committed by the trial
court, first, in not acquitting him and second, in not giving weight to his
defense.
He notes: (1) the offended
party never mentioned the word “rape” in her recital; (2) she said
that it was her husband “Carding” who “abused” her; (3) she
did not offer a tenacious resistance in the course of the alleged rape; (4)
when the accused said “Do not tell Carding, I will come back again,”
it means that they had past sexual encounters, and the last one was voluntary;
(5) she could not have positively identified the accused as the culprit for lack
of sufficient illumination; (6) she did not confront the accused when they met
on her way to lodge a complaint; (7) she merely begrudged the accused whom she
suspected of taking her money; (8) Dr. Ruperto Natividad himself could not positively determine whether or
not she had been raped, or had recent sexual congress; (9) he found no sperm
cells notwithstanding the fact that the victim testified that the accused
ejaculated; (10) he found no hematoma or bruises on
any part of her body; (11) his report stated that he conducted his examination
on October 14, 1985, when the tragedy occurred on October 15, 1985; and (12)
Ricardo Pajar, the victim’s husband, said that his
wife informed her of the incident on September 15, 1985, not October 15, 1985.
He also maintains that he had successfully established his
defense of alibi by the corroboration of two witnesses.
It is axiom in rape cases that the lone testimony of the offended
party, if credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction.[8]
This is so because no decent and sensible woman will publicly admit being a
rape victim and thus run the risk of public contempt–the dire consequence of a
rape charge–unless she is, in fact, a rape victim.[9]
Nida Pajar
testified clearly and simply that on October
15, 1985, at dawn, the accused entered her hut and then ravished
her. At the trial, she never wavered in
her story, and the trial judge was convinced that it was a credible story. Albeit as a rule, this Court is bound by the
findings of the trial court, especially as to credibility of testimonies, we
are ourselves convinced, from a reading of the transcript of stenographic
notes, that she is indeed a credible witness.
Thus:
Q What
did Dominador Paringit do
while you were breast feeding your child?
A While
I was breast feeding my baby, I saw the accused enter the house and after that
I stood up and shouted.
Q When
you shouted, where was the accused Dominador Paringit?
A He
was already inside, sir.
Q How
far was he to you at that time?
A Right
infront of me, sir.
Q What
was he doing?
A He
embraced me and then he boxed my stomach.
Q How
many times did he box your stomach?
A Twice,
sir.
Q What
happened after he boxed your stomach?
A I
fell down, sir.
Q After
you fell down, what did Dominador Paringit
do?
A He
removed my panty and he abused me, sir.[10]
As we held in one case, “when a victim says that she has
been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that the rape has
been committed, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused
may be convicted on the basis thereof.”[11]
The alleged inconsistencies the accused refers to now involve
minor details that do not negate the existence of rape. The fact that Nida Pajar never used the word “rape” in the course of
her testimony was because of the sordid nature of the tale she was about to
tell, and its embarrassing impact on the audience before her. Thus, the prosecution was constrained to
move: “Your Honor, the witness is
reluctant of [sic] answering, we move for the exclusion of the audience.”[12]
In any event, she testified that the accused “got my womanhood,”[13]
that “he had intercourse with me,”[14]
and that “he abused me,”[15]
words that positively signify a forcible sexual encounter.
Her statement that it was her husband, “Carding” Pajar, who victimized her has been obviously taken out of
context. We turn specifically to her
testimony:
FISCAL PERALTA TO THE WITNESS
With the permission of
the Honorable Court, during the last hearing, you were able to testify
regarding the incident that happened to you on October 15, 1985 in the early morning. Now, we will continue with your testimony and
at this time, we will ask you what happened when you have recognized the
accused already inside your hut at that time.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT
What is your answer?
A He
abused me, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA
Who are you referring
to?
A My
husband, sir.
Q What
is the name of your husband?
A Carding,
sir.
Q What
happened when your husband Carding abused you?
A I
said a certain man came to the house and abused me, sir.
Q To
whom did you say that?
A I
said that to my husband, sir.[16]
xxx xxx xxx
Evidently, there had developed a communication gap between her
and the prosecution. It is clear,
however, that what she had wished to convey was the fact that another man had
taken advantage of her person, and that she informed her husband about it.
We have held that incongruities as to non-material particulars
“do not detract from the central fact of rape,”[17]
and are the products, at times and as in this case, of witnesses’ unfamiliarity
with the courtroom environment, apart from the fact, in the case at bar, that
the questions propounded were in English, a language in which the aggrieved
party was apparently not conversant fully, considering her educational
attainment. The trial judge was himself
forced to question Mrs. Pajar:
COURT
Do you understand the
question?
A Yes,
sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT
Mrs. Pajar,
what is your highest educational attainment?
A Elementary,
sir.
COURT
Did you graduate?
A Yes,
sir.
COURT
You never reached high
school?
A No
sir.[18]
xxx xxx xxx
We are not convinced either, of the accused’s
pretenses that Mrs. Pajar never offered enough
resistance. As she testified, the
accused struck her twice in the abdominal area, for which she dropped to the
floor. As she lay helpless, the accused
consummated his lustful purpose. In one
decision, this Court held that force is relative, and it need only be shown
that the accused had resorted to intimidation, sufficient to weaken another’s
defenses.[19]
The accused’s warning, after violating
Mrs. Pajar’s honor, “[d]o not tell Carding, I
will come back again,” does not denote an existing “past”
between Mrs. Pajar and the accused. There is nothing in that statement that would
purvey this impression. It exists only
in the accused’s imagination.
We likewise believe that the victim had sufficiently identified
the accused, as the guilty party. Her
hut was lighted by a kerosene lamp, and we have ruled that the lighting
produced by a gasera enables one to identify
positively, persons in the dark of night.[20]
The fact that Mrs. Pajar failed or
refused to confront the accused the morning after is nothing conclusive. It does not perish claims of rape.
The accused’s insistence that Mrs. Nida Pajar implicated him to get
even for an act of theft she believed the accused was earlier responsible for,
is devoid of merit. As the Court has
time and again indicated, no self-respecting Filipina, in accusing another of
rape, would risk the perpetual stigma of a scarlet letter, unless her charges
were true. It is unimaginable, more so
in this case, that Mrs. Pajar would voluntarily open
herself to public ridicule only for the flimsy reason that the accused had
earlier stolen her money.
The accused also makes capital of the inconclusiveness of Dr. Ruperto Natividad’s medical
report, first, that it makes no finding that the victim had been raped; second,
the doctor found the victim’s sexual organ negative for sperm cells; and third,
no bruises or injuries were found on the victim’s body.
To begin with, a medical finding is by itself unnecessary to show
rape.[21]
As the Court earlier declared, the lone testimony of the offended party is
sufficient, if otherwise credible. The
presence or absence of traces of spermatozoa is too, immaterial, since it is
penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation, that makes for rape.[22]
It is true that the victim, at the trial, alleged that the accused had seminal
discharges, and that she felt them, but quite manifestly, she was
mistaken. At any rate, the nagging fact
remains that the accused did penetrate her, and when she told the trial judge
that he did, she said all that needed to be said.
The absence of bruise marks on her torso is not absolutely
essential. Not all blows leave marks.
The discrepancies as to dates–Dr. Natividad
declared that he prepared his report on October 14, 1985 while Ricardo Pajar
declared that the incident happened on September
15, 1985–are simply due to lapses of memory. Moreover, Dr. Natividad
later rectified his error.[23]
On the question of Ricardo Pajar’s misstatement, that
the event transpired on September 15,
1985, we credit that also to the failure of memory, bearing in mind
that Pajar testified almost two years after the
tragedy. In all events, these errors do
not erase the fact that rape had been committed, whatever the date on which it
happened.
All told, we can not sustain the accused’s
objections and denials.
And most of all, we can not accept his argument of alibi. For alibi to prosper, it must be shown that
it was physically impossible for the accused to have gone to the scene of the
crime at the time it happened.[24]
The place he claimed he was at the time, San Vicente West, attending a wake,
was only 500 meters away from the locus criminis. He would have easily slipped out of sight for
a few minutes and returned to the wake unnoticed.
The accused has not, finally, ascribed any motive upon the
complainant why she should falsify evidence against him.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
[1]
Original Records, 1.
[2] T.s.n., Session of March
2, 1987, 14.
[3] Id.,
16.
[4] Id.,
17.
[5]
Original Records, id., 8.
[6]
See rollo, 39.
[7] Id.,
45.
[8]
People vs. Sarra, G.R. No. 78530, March 6, 1990.
[9] Supra.
[10] T.s.n., Session of March
2, 1987, id., 14.
[11]
People v. Avero, No. L-76483, August 30, 1988, 115 SCRA 130.
[12] T.s.n., Session of January
13, 1987, 6.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.,
7.
[15] T.s.n., Session of March
2, 1987, id., 10.
[16] Id.,
9, 10.
[17]
People v. Cayago, No. L-47398, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 586, 596.
[18] T.s.n., id., 8, 9-10.
[19]
People v. Sarra, supra.
[20]
People v. Almenario, No. L-66430, April 17, 1989, 172 SCRA 268.
[21]
People v. Cayago, supra.
[22]
People v. Somera, No. L-47275, February 21, 1989, 170 SCRA 428.
[23]
See t.s.n., Session of March 2, 1985, id., 7.
[24]
Among a host of cases, see People v. Loveria,
G.R. No. 79138, July 2, 1990,
one of the latest cases on this point.