ZENAIDA ORCINO, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND RUFINA B. MOTI, RESPONDENTS.

The petitioner questions the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) which reversed the findings of the CSC Merit Systems Board and the
Department of Education, Culture, and Sports on the validity of the private
respondent’s reassignment.  She contends
that if the CSC resolutions are sustained, it would result in the “triumph
of discourtesy and insubordination over that of order and efficiency in the
performance of official duty.” (Rollo, p. 2)

On the other hand, the private respondent contends that the
declaration of excess teacher in the Malvar
Elementary School, her transfer by the Division Superintendent of City Schools
to another school, and other acts of harassment constitute removal not for
cause but because of personal ill-motives of the petitioner.

The comments filed by the private respondent and the Civil
Service Commission are treated as answers and the petition is decided
accordingly.  Significantly, the
Solicitor General agrees with
the petitioner and recommends that the CSC resolutions be set aside.

Rufina B. Moti
was appointed “National (City) Elementary Grades Teacher” in the Division of
City Schools, Manila on September 1, 1970.  Her status was “Regular (Permanent) Reappointment.” The position
to be filled was “Item No.
15-702, RA 4092 (Intermediate).”

The controversy which led to this case arose at the beginning of
school year 1984-1985 when the student population of Malvar Elementary School
significantly decreased.  Classes in the
intermediate level were reduced from eleven to ten resulting in an overall
excess of one teacher.  There was, however,
a vacancy in Grade IV in the primary level.

Following the “Guidelines Governing Excess Teachers”,
Circular No. 10, Series of 1982 of the Division of City Schools, the 58
teachers of Malvar
Elementary School were
evaluated.  The performance rating showed that Rufina
B. Moti ranked No. 55 with Rebecca Estrella, Elena Morelos, and
Rosario Alarcon ranking Nos. 56, 57, and 58
respectively.  When length of service and
relative fitness were added to performance ratings, Rufina
B. Moti ranked last. 
She was, therefore, declared as excess teacher.  When efforts to find an acceptable position
in the intermediate grades were unsuccessful, she was assigned to the Grade IV
class.

Respondent Moti refused to accept the
new assignment and insisted on any class provided it was in the
intermediate grades.  The refusal
prompted petitioner Zenaida Orcino, principal of the school, to recommend that Ms. Moti be
reassigned to another school.  The then
Superintendent Josefina Navarro assigned the respondent first to Lakandula Elementary School and later, to Moises Salvador Elementary School.

Instead of complying with the order of the Division
Superintendent, respondent Moti filed a protest with
the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS).  The MECS
sustained the Superintendent’s order and ruled that Ms. Moti’s
transfer to Moises
Salvador Elementary School
was justified by the facts and the law. 
The respondent decided to go to the Civil Service Commission.

The CSC Merit Systems Board ruled that the reassignment of Ms. Moti to another school was in order and dismissed her
complaint.  On appeal to the Commission
itself, the CSC set aside the orders of the Merit Systems Board and ordered Ms.
Moti restored to her former position of Grade VI
classroom teacher.  Disciplinary action
against petitioner Orcino was also ordered.  Hence, this petition

The petitioner raises the following arguments in her petition:

I

THE HONORABLE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION GRAVELY ERRED IN INTRODUCING
MATTERS BELIED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

II

THE COMMISSION A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THAT ‘APPROPRIATE
DISCIPLINARY ACTION’ BE METED ON PETITIONER ZENAIDA ORCINO WHO ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HER AUTHORITY AND SUSTAINED BY
HER SUPERIORS.

III

THE COMMISSION A QUO REVERSIBLY ERRED IN DEPRIVING PETITIONER
ZENAIDA ORCINO THE OPPORTUNITY TO REBUT THE CHARGES OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE LATTER’S APPEAL WITH THE COMMISSION.

IV

THE COMMISSION A QUO ERRED IN REINSTATING RUFINA MOTI DESPITE HER
PROVEN ACTS OF INSUBORDINATION AND ADAMANCE CLEARLY INIMICAL TO THE SERVICE. (Ppetition, pp. 5-6)

As a rule, the Court respects the factual findings of the Court
of Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies like the CSC, giving them a certain
measure of finality.  However, the rule
is not without clearly defined exceptions. 
Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals (in this case, the Civil Service Commission) are not conclusive
and may be set aside when:

x x x                 x x x                 x x x

x x x (1) the conclusion is
a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the
admission of both appellant and appellees [Roque v. Buan, 21 SCRA 648
{1967}]; (6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set forth
in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents [Garcia v. CA, 33 SCRA 622 {1970}]; and (9) when
the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence
and is contradicted by evidence on record [Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 243
{1970}].” (Tolentino v. De Jesus, 56 SCRA 167,
172 [1974])

In Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd.
Employees Association–Natu v.
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. (76 SCRA 50 [1977]), we ruled that factual findings of a
quasi-judicial institution which are not supported by substantial and credible
evidence do not bind this Court, e. g. the findings and conclusions have no
basis in the records or are contrary to the evidence on record or the factual
determinations of an appellate body are contrary to those of the initial
fact-finding agency.  (See also San
Miguel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 128 SCRA 180 [1984]; Cuales v. National Labor Relations Commission, 121 SCRA 812
[1983]; Chong Guan Trading v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 172 SCRA 831 [1989]; Villamor v. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 574
[1988]; Ongsiako v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 152
SCRA 627 [1987]; Metro Port Service, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 365
[1984]; and Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Metro Port Service, Inc., G.R. No.
83613, February 21, 1990)

In this particular case, both the Regional Director and the
Minister of the MECS and CSC’s own Merit System’s
Board sustained the recommendations made by the petitioner and upheld the
actions of the Division Superintendent of City Schools.  We have examined the records carefully and
agree with the Solicitor General that the questioned CSC resolutions are not
supported by the evidence on record.

There can be no question that the decreased enrollment in the Malvar Elementary School
led to a reduction of classes.  Faced
with an excess of teachers, it was the duty of the petitioner as school
principal to recommend a solution to the problem.

There is no factual basis for the CSC conclusion that the
reassignment of respondent Moti to another class or
another school violated her security of tenure and the statutory restriction that any reassignment should not
involve a reduction in rank, status or salary.

A reassignment from Grade VI to Grave IV involves no reduction in
rank, status, or salary.  There is no
showing in the records that there is less honor in
teaching Grades I to IV than in teaching Grades V to VI.  It is erroneous for the CSC to even intimate
that an intermediate teacher is demoted when asked to teach a lower grade.  The best teachers should welcome assignments
to teach Grade One as this is where young minds need the best guidance and
inspiration from talented and dedicated mentors.  In this case, the reassignment was not only
justified but also necessary.

As to whether the transfer from one school to another was
disciplinary, the records show that respondent Moti
was appointed “National (City) Elementary Grades Teacher” in the
Division of City Schools, Manila.  (Annex 1, Petition; Rollo,
p. 88) The Solicitor General
correctly observes that her appointment is without specific station and does
not specify any assignment as Grade VI teacher. 
As Elementary Grades Teacher, she could be assigned to any public
elementary school in Manila and
ordered to teach any Grade or subject within her competence.

The entries in the lower half of her appointment paper, alongside
and below the signature of the appointing authority are merely informative,
specifying where she would be assigned and stating some personal data.  The Solicitor General states that “these
words do not constitute the appointment.” (Manifestation in Lieu of
Comment, p. 16) Among them are – Position to be filled:  Item No. 15-702, Page No. 303, RA 4092
(Intermediate); Authorized Salary Range 35, Authorized Salary Rate 3264 and
such entries as title, place, and date of teacher’s examination, maiden name,
performance rating, highest educational attainment, last station, who recommended
her, etc.  (Rollo,
p. 88)

The respondent cannot rely on her initial assignment to fill a
specific vacancy in the Intermediate Grades in a particular school as giving her a vested right to that item.  She can be assigned to any grade anywhere in
the City of Manila in the best
interests of the service.

Neither can the alleged length of experience of the respondent
strengthen her case.  The CSC finding
that Ms. Moti taught Grade VI for 13 years is pointed
out by the Solicitor General as contradicted by the evidence.  It was only in 1983-1984 or the year before
her questioned transfer that she was assigned to Grade VI-2.  (Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, p. 14)

The CSC disregarded the record before it – the revised check list
to determine the allotment of teachers based on number of classes, the maximum
teaching loads in specific subject areas per teacher, the number of subject
preparations, and the table on how the number of classroom and special teachers
for a certain number of pupils and grades is determined.  The records show that all relevant factors
were considered when MECS and the Merit Systems Board reviewed the
Superintendent’s action and sustained it. 
(See Original Records, pp. 48-65)

There are other findings of the CSC which are contrary to the records.

The CSC stated that there could have been no reduction of
intermediate classes from eleven (11) to ten (10) because in 1984-1985, there were still the
same five sections in Grade VI.  This
is non-sequitur. 
“Intermediate” consists of Grades V and VI, not Grade VI
alone.  Moreover, teachers in those
grades teach according to subject areas instead of teaching all
subjects in one class of one grade.  This
matter was thoroughly studied by the Division Superintendent and she was not
misled on the number of classes and teachers in the
entire school before
she issued the appointments and transfer orders.  There is likewise nothing arbitrary in the
selection of the respondent as “excess” teacher.  She ranked 58th out of 58 teachers evaluated
for performance, length of service, and relative fitness.

The CSC found something wrong in the transfer of Merly Evangelista to Malvar Elementary School
and the reassignment of a provisional substitute teacher as elementary grade
teacher.  It also questioned why
respondent Moti was reassigned to Grade IV and then
transferred to two other schools in June and July, 1984.

The records show that when Ms. Moti
became an excess teacher and pending her assignment to Grade IV, she was asked
to do office work, library work, and other assignments.  There is nothing wrong in this.  She could not be twiddling her thumbs while
being paid her usual salaries.  She was
given her choice of a morning Grade IV class, with three other teachers
yielding to her.  When she refused,
another teacher was assigned to the morning class.  When she also turned down the remaining
afternoon class, another teacher was appointed. 
Precisely, the reassignments and the appointments subject of her complaints
were prompted by the changes in school population and her stubborn refusal to
obey lawful orders.  A cooperative
attitude and a certain degree of flexibility are required of all who profess to
be educators.

The CSC found personal motives, bias, and injustice behind the
petitioner’s acts.  That there is bad
blood between the petitioner and the private respondent is apparent from the
records.  On June 27, 1984 or one day
before the petitioner recommended to Superintendent Navarro that Ms. Moti be declared an “excess teacher”, the latter
filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan alleging among
others that Ms. Orcino was collecting P1.00 each from
teachers who failed to sign the city share payrolls and P10.00 each for the
purchase of an image of the Sto Niño
for the school premises.  This was,
however, immediately denied by some teachers who claimed that there were
contributions for whoever was following up their payrolls at City Hall and for
the Sto. Niño, but these
were purely voluntary on the teachers’ initiative and Ms. Orcino
had nothing to do with them.  The
complaint was dismissed by the Tanodbayan on March 20, 1985 (Original Records, pp.
4-9; pp. 93-96)

On the other hand, Ms. Orcino filed
also on June 28, 1984, a complaint with the Superintendent of City Schools
against Ms. Moti charging her with non­-cooperation
in specified school activities, reading newspapers during rehearsals for
graduation exercises even with the Principal and Assistant Principal around,
talking and laughing during baccalaureate mass to the annoyance of the priest,
refusal to submit lesson plan and record book and to sit with the evaluators of
the performance ratings and other acts of defiance of specified school
regulations.  The charges were found
valid and Director Modesta G. Boquiren
of the MECS National Capital Region fined Ms. Moti
the equivalent of five (5) days salary. 
(Original Records, pp. 38-47)

The private respondent charged Ms. Orcino
with coercing and embarassing her and telling her to
stop attending meetings of teacher associations, cease making representations
for better professional and economic benefits of teachers, avoid joining
delegations to Malacañang for the upgrading of
teachers’ benefits, etc.

Significantly, in all these charges and counter-­charges, the petitioner was sustained by the Division
Superintendent, Regional Director, Department Head, and CSC Merit Systems’
Board.  Only the CSC arrived at different
findings without, as earlier stated, any factual basis on record for its conclusions.

At any rate, even assuming that the CSC is correct and that its
findings are not based on surmises and presumptions, there is no explanation
why the petitioner, a purely recommendatory authority should
be the one penalized and disciplined while the Superintendent of City Schools
who ordered the transfer and the higher MECS authorities who did not reverse
it, remain free of blame.  If there was
any abuse of authority or arbitrariness, the Division Superintendent of City
Schools who makes all the
appointments, transfers, and other personnel action should have been charged
and not the Principal.  The
Superintendent could have rejected the recommendation to transfer Ms. Moti and ordered her retention in Malvar Elementary School
and the petitioner would have been bound to obey.

As earlier stated, an appointment as
“Elementary Grades Teacher” in Manila means that
the teacher can be assigned to any school in Manila.  The choice of grade, subject area, primary or intermediate level, school, and district is pure policy and the
determination as to the capabilities of the teacher and the assignment where
she would be most useful are, in the absence of arbitrariness or whimsicality,
best left to the administrators concerned. 
In Brillantes v. Guevarra (27 SCRA 138 [1969])
this Court held that an excellent principal in a model and centrally located
school may be transferred to a struggling school in a less attractive community to improve standards and to
“spur the improvement of small schools” (at p. 149).  In other words, the interest of the service
may dictate that the worst school should get the best principal.  The same principle applies to classroom
teachers.  No one has the vested right to
balk at difficult assignments ordered for the best interests of the
service.  There would be nothing
disciplinary in this and other transfers.

Because of the bad blood existing between Ms. Moti
and Ms. Orcino, the Division Superintendent of
Schools had to choose between transferring one or the other.  Since Ms. Moti was
clearly at fault, Superintendent Navarro exercised her sound discretion in
reassigning the private respondent to another school.  We see no error, much less grave abuse of
discretion in her choice.

Our ruling in Sta. Maria v. Lopez (31 SCRA 637, 652-654 [1970]) on transfers that are valid and which do not amount to removal
squarely applies:

x x
x              x
x x                 x x x

“4. 
Concededly transfers there are which do not amount to
removal.  Some such transfers can be effected without the need for charges being preferred,
without trial or hearing, and even without the consent of the employee.

“The clue to such transfers may be found in the ‘nature of the
appointment.’ Where the appointment does not indicate a specific station, an
employee may be transferred or reassigned provided the transfer affects no
substantial change in title, rank and salary. 
Thus, one who is appointed ‘principal in the Bureau of Public Schools’
and is designated to head a pilot school may be transferred to the post of
principal of another school.

“And the rule that outlaws unconsented
transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who is
appointed — not merely assigned — to a particular station.  Such a rule does not prescribe a transfer carried out under a
specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign
the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency.  The use of approved techniques or methods in
personnel management to harness the abilities of employees to promote optimum
public service cannot be objected to. 
Neither does illegality attach to the transfer or reassignment of an
officer pending the determination of an administrative charge against him, or
to the transfer of an employee from his assigned station to the main office, effected in good faith and in the interest of the service
pursuant to Section 32 of the Civil Service Act.”

And even assuming that Ms. Moti was not
at fault, it is not what pleases her but the best interests of the service
which form the primary criterion.  In
labor cases where relations between an employee and his employer are so
strained or where an employee would no longer be useful because his employer
has lost trust and confidence in him, this Court has ordered full backwages plus separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
even where the employee was eventually cleared of the charges.  Paramount
are the continued health and best interests of the
company and all its other employees.  (Bautista v. Inciong, 158 SCRA 665
[1988]; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, 152 SCRA 219 [1987]; Quezon
Electric Cooperative v. National Labor Relations Commission, 172 SCRA 88
[1989]; Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 174 SCRA 550 [1989]; and Citytrust
Finance Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 157 SCRA 87 [1988]).

The CSC should adopt the reasons behind the above policy when
considering the setting aside of reassignment or transfer orders.  Where the discipline and morale of a teaching
force, the peace and quiet essential to
the learning process, the welfare of the student body, and the educational
standards of a school require that unseemly wranglings
and squabbles should be abated, remedial acts such as those questioned in this
case should be sustained.

It is not the welfare of
the parties alone which is considered when disciplinary action involving
classroom teachers or school principals is taken.  The school children, their parents, other
teachers, the community and nation are all affected by what goes on in a
school.  Their interlocking
interests dictate that prudence and caution should be exercised when nullifying
remedial transfers and other corrective
actions.  Except when there is strong
showing of willful and arbitrary conduct, the school administrators deserve all
the assistance they can get in maintaining discipline in their schools and
solving the problems of education.  There
is no showing of arbitrary or ill-motivated conduct in this case.  The resolutions of the respondent CSC
are, therefore, tainted by grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The questioned RESOLUTIONS of the Civil
Service Commission are SET ASIDE.  The
private respondent’s COMPLAINT is DISMISSED.  The Temporary Restraining Order dated August 7, 1990 is made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.