FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPM…

Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner
sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another
letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda
of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking:  (1) the reinstatement of its timber license
agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos administration;
(2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development
and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry
laws, rules and  regulations; and, (3)
the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs
found in the concession area [Annexes “6” and “7” of the
Petition; Rollo, pp. 54-63.]

Petitioner made the following allegations:

(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license
agreement designated as TLA No. 87 with the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued
an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of
public forest land with an area of
54,920 hectares located in the municipality
of Maddela, province of Nueva
Vizcaya* from
October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990;

(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development [hereinafter referred to as “Bureau”], Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all
logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya
and Quirino provinces, and cancelling
the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires,
pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of
Natural Resources Teodoro Pena [Annex “5”
of the Petition; Rollo, p. 49];

(c) That on August 25,
1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, the contents
of which were as follows:

PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE
PRESIDENT YOU ARE REQUESTED TO STOP ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS TO CONSERVE
REMAINING FORESTS PLEASE CONDUCT THE ORDERLY PULLOUT OF LOGGING MACHINERIES AND
EQUIPMENT AND COORDINATE WITH THE RESPECTIVE DISTRICT FORESTERS FOR THE
INVENTORY OF LOGS CUT PRIOR TO THIS ORDER THE SUBMISSION OF A COMPLIANCE REPORT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS SHALL BE
APPRECIATED – [Annex “4” of the Petition; Rollo,
p. 48];

(d) That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement,
it immediately sent a letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which
sought reconsideration of the Bureau’s directive, citing in support thereof its
contributions to forest conservation and alleging that it was not given the
opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging operations
[Annex “6” of the Petition; Rollo, pp.
50-53], but no favorable action was taken on this letter;

(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or
26,000 hectares of the area formerly covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to
Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation under TLA No. 356 which was set
to expire on July 31, 2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by
Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license; and,

(f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by
relatives or cronies of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.

Acting on petitioner’s letter, the MNR through then Minister
Ernesto Maceda issued an order dated July 22,
1986 denying petitioner’s request. 
The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the
due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege which could be
withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner
was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten
concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983.  Moreover, emphasis was made of the total ban
of logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya,
Quirino and Ifugao imposed
on April 2, 1986, thus:

*        *           *

It should be recalled that [petitioner’s] earlier request for
reinstatement has been denied in view of the total ban of all logging
operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva
Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao which was imposed for reasons of conservation and
national security.

The Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the great
responsibility it bear [sic] in respect to
forests.  It considers itself the trustee
thereof.  This being the case, it has to
ensure the availability of forest resources not only for the present, but also for the future generations of
Filipinos.

On the other hand, the activities of the insurgents in these parts
of the country are well documented. 
Their financial demands on logging concessionaires are well known.  The government, therefore, is well within its
right to deprive its enemy of sources of funds in order to preserve itself, its
established institutions and the liberty and democratic way of life of its
people.

*        *           *

[Annex “9” of the Petition, pp.
2-4; Rollo, pp. 65-67.]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforestated
order reiterating, among others, its request that TLA No. 356 issued to private
respondent be declared null and void. 
The MNR however denied this motion in an order dated September
15, 1986, stating in part:

*        *           *

Regarding [petitioner’s] request that the award of a 26,000 hectare
portion of TLA No. 87 to Twin Peaks Realty Development Corporation under TLA
No. 356 be declared null and void, suffice it to say that the Ministry is now
in the process of reviewing all contracts, permits or other form of privileges
for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of natural
resources entered into, granted, issued or acquired before the issuance of
Proclamation No. 3, otherwise known as the Freedom Constitution for the purpose
of amending, modifying or revoking them when the national interest so requires.

*        *           *

The Ministry, through the Bureau of Forest Development, has
jurisdiction and authority over all forest lands.  On the basis of this authority, the Ministry
issued the order banning all logging operations/activities in Quirino province, among others, where movant’s
former concession area is located. 
Therefore, the issuance of an order disallowing any person or entity
from removing cut or uncut logs from the portion of TLA No. 87, now under TLA
No. 356, would constitute an unnecessary or superfluous act on the part of the
Ministry:

*        *           *

[Annex “11” of the Petition, pp.
3-4; Rollo, pp. 77-78.]

On November 26, 1986,
petitioner’s supplemental motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.  Meanwhile, per MNR Administrative Order No. 54,
series of 1986, issued on November
26, 1986, the logging ban in the province
of Quirino
was lifted.

Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to
the Office of the President.  In a
resolution dated July 6, 1987,
the Office of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied
petitioner’s appeal for lack of merit. 
The Office of the President ruled that the appeal of petitioner was
prematurely filed, the matter not having been terminated in the MNR.  Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied on August 14, 1987.

Hence, petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for certiorari,
with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction, on August 27, 1987.  On October
13, 1987, it filed a supplement to its petition for certiorari. 
Thereafter, public and private respondents submitted their respective
comments, and petitioner filed its consolidated reply thereto.  In a
resolution dated May 22, 1989,
the Court resolved to give due course to the petition.

After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the Court finds several factors which militate against the
issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner.

1. Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse
final and executory administrative orders does not constitute grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the
decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the
force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine
of res judicata.  These
decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties
as though the same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction.  The rule of res
iudicata thus forbids the reopening of a
matter once determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive
jurisdiction [See Brillantes v. Castro, 99
Phil. 497 (1956); Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc.
v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; San Luis v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989.]

In the case at bar, petitioner’s letters to the Office of the
President and the MNR [now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR)] dated March 17, 1986 and April 2, 1986, respectively, sought the
reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest
Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as
the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private
respondents in 1984.

But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its
remedies under the law, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No. 705 as amended, for
attacking the validity of these
administrative actions until after 1986. 
By the time petitioner sent its letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly
appointed Minister of the MNR, requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau
actions, these were already settled matters as far as petitioner was concerned
[See Rueda v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 106
Phil. 300 (1959); Danan v. Aspillera,
G.R. No. L-17305. 
November 28,
1962, 6 SCRA 609; Ocampo
v. Arboleda, G.R. No. L-48190,
August 31,
1987, 153 SCRA 374.]

No particular significance can be attached to petitioner’s letter
dated September 19, 1983 which petitioner claimed to have sent to then
President Marcos [Annex
“6” of Petition, Rollo, pp. 50-53], seeking
the reconsideration of the 1983 order issued by Director Cortes of the Bureau.  It must be pointed out that the averments in
this letter are entirely different from the charges of fraud against officials
under the previous resume made by petitioner in its letters to public
respondents herein.  In the letter to
then President Marcos, petitioner simply contested its inclusion in the list of
concessionaires, whose licenses were cancelled, by defending its record of
selective logging and reforestation practices in the subject concession
area.  Yet, no other administrative steps
appear to have been taken by petitioner until 1986, despite the fact that the
alleged fraudulent scheme became apparent in 1984 as evidenced by the awarding
of the subject timber concession area to other entities in that year.

2. Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the
benefits of a writ of certiorari in the present case because he failed
to file his petition within a reasonable period.

The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the
instant petition is whether or not public respondents herein acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to
overturn administrative orders issued by their predecessors in the past
regime.  Yet, what the petition
ultimately seeks is the nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling
TLA No. 87 and granting TLA No. 356 to private respondent, which were issued
way back in 1983 and 1984, respectively.

Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take
judicial recourse to have the earlier administrative actions reviewed by the
courts through a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its
cause.  For although no specific time
frame is fixed for the institution of a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must nevertheless
be done within a “reasonable time”. 
The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for certiorari
is the “reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from the
commission of the acts complained of up to the institution of the proceeding to
annul the same” [Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No.
56761, November 19, 1982, 118
SCRA 566, 571.] And failure to file the petition for certiorari within a
reasonable period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse
legal consequences of laches [Municipality
of Career v. Court of First
Instance of Cebu, G.R. No. L-31628,
December 27,
1982, 119 SCRA 392.]

Laches is defined as the failure or
neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled thereto has either abandoned it of declined to assert it.  [Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450,
April 15,
1968, 23 SCRA 29; Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339, December 2, 1987, 156 SCRA 113.] The rule is that unreasonable delay on the
part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may, depending upon
the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself.  Verily, the laws did these who are vigilant,
not those who sleep upon their rights (Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt) [See Buenaventura
v. David. 37 Phil. 435 (1918).]

In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at
least three years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and
1984.  Considering that
petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction,
was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from
the courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes
unreasonable and
inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches.  Accordingly,
the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not
lie.

3. Finally, there is
a more significant factor which bars the
issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and against public respondents herein.  It is
precisely this factor which prevents the Court from departing from the
general application of the rules enunciated above.

A cursory reading of the assailed
orders issued by public respondent Minister Maceda of the MNR, which were affirmed by the Office of the President, will
disclose public policy considerations which effectively forestall judicial interference in the case at bar.

Public respondents
herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to develop
and conserve the country’s
natural resources, have indicated an ongoing
department evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and
permits or licenses issued, under
the previous dispensation.  In fact,
both the executive and legislative departments of the incumbent administration are presently taking stock of its
environmental policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands and developing
an agenda for future programs for their conservation and
rehabilitation.

The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing global
concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their
crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system.  The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be
disputed, most especially in this country. 
The Court takes judicial notice of the profligate waste of the country’s
forest resources which has not only resulted in the irreversible loss of flora
and fauna peculiar to the region, but has produced even more disastrous and
lasting economic and social effects.  The
delicate balance of nature having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and
droughts has been triggered and the supply of food and energy resources
required by the people seriously depleted.

While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass
profit and to meet the country’s immediate financial requirements, the more
essential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment
demands effective and circumspect
action from the government to check further denudation of whatever remains of
the forest lands.  Nothing less is
expected of the government, in view of the clear constitutional command to
maintain a balanced and healthful ecology. 
Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SEC. 16. 
The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and
multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the
judiciary will stand clear.  A long line
of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted
with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge
and training of such agencies [See Espinosa v. Makalintal,
79 Phil. 134 (1947); Coloso v. Board of Accountancy,
92 Phil. 938 (1953); Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905
(1960); Suarez v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19828, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 461; Ganitano v. Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-21167, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Villegas v. Auditor General, G.R. No.
L-21352, November 29, 1966.
18 SCRA 877; Manuel v. Villena,
G.R. No. L-28218, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 745; Lacuesta v. Herrera, G.R.
No. L-33646, January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 115; Lianga Bay Logging Co.,
Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637,
July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80.] More so where, as in the present case, the
interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at
large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation.  For this Court recognizes the wide latitude
of discretion possessed by the government in determining the appropriate
actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper
parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources [Director
of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183; Lim, Sr. v. The Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-26990,
August 31,
1970, 34 SCRA 751.] Timber
licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which
the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted.  And
it can hardly be gainsaid that
they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not
vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein.  They may be validly amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national
interests so require.  Thus, they are not
deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See
Sections 3 (ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended.  Also,
Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302.]

In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing
discussion more than suffice to justify the Court’s refusal to interfere in the
DENR evaluation of timber licenses and permits issued under the previous
regime, or to pre-empt the adoption
of appropriate corrective measures by the department.

Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern
regarding alleged irregularities in the issuance of timber license agreements
to a number of logging concessionaires.

The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country’s timber
resources, if done in contravention of the procedure outlined in the law, or as
a result of fraud and undue influence exerted on department officials, is
indicative of an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of the State’s power to
regulate the use and
exploitation of forest resources.  The
alleged practice of bestowing “special favors” to preferred individuals,
regardless of merit, would be an abuse of this power.  And this Court will not be a party to a flagrant mockery of the
avowed public policy of
conservation enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.  Therefore, should the appropriate case be
brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of officials in
the DENR and related bureaus with respect to the implementation of this public
policy, the Court will not hesitate to step in and wield its authority, when
invoked, in the exercise of judicial powers under the Constitution [Section 1,
Article VIII.]

However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents herein, the Court
finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the
affirmative reliefs sought.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

* As a result of the creation of
the province of Quirino, the municipality
of Maddela
is now deemed part of the Quirino province.