NICANOR T. SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND H.M. MONTENEGRO & ASSOCIATES, INC., RESPONDENTS.

The private respondent’s counsel has acted quite in character up to the end and even unto this
Court.  The respondent court should not
have been so forbearing.

The private respondent lost in a suit for damages in the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City.  It appealed to the respondent court and on
May 17, 1989, was required to file its brief within 45 days from notice.  The notice was received by its counsel on May
24, 1989.

The 45-day period expired on July 8, 1989.  No brief had been filed by the appellant nor had it at least moved for extension
of time to do so.

On September 19, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution
requiring the private respondent to show cause why its
appeal should not be considered abandoned or dismissed for its failure to file
the appellant’s brief.  This was ignored
by the private respondent.^[1]

On October 4, 1989, the petitioner filed a motion for the
dismissal of the private respondent’s appeal for failure to file the
appellant’s brief.  No action having been
taken thereon, it was reiterated on December 12, 1989.  There was no reaction from the private
respondent to either of the two motions.

On December 11,
1989, two hundred and one days from the
start of the 45-day reglementary period and after the
expiration of the 10-day period to show cause, the respondent court dismissed
the private respondent’s appeal pursuant to Section 1(f), Rule 50 of the Rules
of Court.^[2]

It was only after more than a month, on January 17, 1990, that
the private respondent roused itself and filed a motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of its appeal and for the admission of the appellant’s brief.  Its counsel alleged that an employee of
another client had taken the records of the case and had returned them only
after Christmas of 1989.  It also averred
that it could not file the appeal brief on time because of the aborted coup d’etat in December of that year and the
frequent power interruptions in the Makati area, where its office was located.

An opposition was filed by the petitioner, but the motion was
granted by the respondent court on February 21, 1990.^[3]
The resolution read in part:

The court has no way to determine the veracity of the claim of
defendant-appellant’s counsel that an employee of another client took the
records of the case from his office.  The
motion filed has no affidavit attached to the same.  However, the court could take judicial notice
of the electrical power interruption at Makati as well as the occurrence of the aborted coup.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, in the interest of substantial justice, the
resolution dated December 11, 1989 dismissing the appeal interposed by defendant-appellant is hereby RECONSIDERED
and the Brief filed is ADMITTED and appellees are given the reglementary
period of forty-five (45) days within which to file appellee’s
brief.

The petitioner’s own motion for reconsideration having been
denied, it has come to this Court to fault the reinstatement of the appeal with
grave abuse of discretion.

We find at the outset, considering the ground invoked, that the
petitioner should have filed a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court rather than a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.  We shall disregard this procedural lapse,
however, to correct the obvious flaw in the challenged resolutions.

The conduct of the private respondent and its counsel reveals a
careless disregard of the Rules of Court and,
indeed, even a contemptuous rejection of the authority of the respondent court.

Required to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for
failure to file the appellant’s brief,^[4] the private respondent and its
counsel saw fit not to dignify the warning with a response.  Only after the respondent court had dismissed
the appeal did it occur to them to move for reconsideration, and for reasons
too flimsy to be believed.

The respondent court itself noted that the motion for
reconsideration carried no supporting affidavits to prove the grounds
alleged.  There was no showing of how the
coup d’etat and the power interruptions prevented
the private respondent’s counsel from filing the appellant’s brief on
time.  Notably, the period for the filing
of the brief began on May 24, 1989, long before the failed November-December coup d’etat.

Other law offices similarly inconvenienced by the attempted coup d’etat and the power interruptions have not
been similarly remiss as the private respondent’s counsel.  Some of them have pleaded for more time to
meet 15-day or 30-day deadlines and have been accommodated.  But it is different in the case at bar, where the private respondent’s counsel had
delayed for more than four months and had not even asked for an extension.

Given
this inexcusable delay, the respondent court should not have been so
tolerant.  The appellee,
no less than the appellant, was entitled to speedy justice. 
Whether deliberate or not, the non-filing of the appellant’s brief on time had
the effect of postponing action on the judgment the petitioner had already won
in the trial court.  In reinstating the
appeal, the respondent court allowed itself to emasculate the policy of
expeditious judicial action mandated by the Constitution itself.

It has to be noted that the irresponsibility of the private
respondent’s counsel did not stop at the respondent court but has marred even
the proceedings in this Court.  In our resolution
dated June 20, 1990, we required the private respondent to file a Comment on the petition within ten
days from notice.  No such Comment was
filed.  The same counsel was required in
the resolution dated January 23, 1991, to show cause
why it should not be disciplined for failure to submit its Comment, and to
comply with the Court’s resolution.  It
has completely ignored that warning as if this Court did not deserve its
attention.

We will not countenance such disrespect.  All lawyers are expected to recognize the
authority of the Supreme Court and obey its lawful processes and orders.  For the failure of the private respondent to
submit its Comment, we have dispensed with and resolved this petition on the
basis of the pleadings and other available documents.  Moreover, for its intransigence and as a warning
to other lawyers who may be similarly disposed, the law office of Cruz, Palabyab, Llorin and Associates
is hereby fined in the amount of One Thousand Pesos, to be paid to the Cashier of the Court within ten days from notice of this
decision.  Any further disrespect or
disobedience of this Court by the said law firm shall be dealt with more
severely.

The record does not show if the private respondent condoned or
contributed to its counsel’s negligence. 
If it did not and feels it has reason to complain, it may file
administrative charges against such counsel with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities
that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party.   Adjective law is important in insuring the
effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy
administration of justice.  These rules
are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed, to
provide for a
system under which suitors may be heard in the correct form and manner
and at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge
whose authority they acknowledge.  The other alternative is the settlement of
their conflict through the barrel of a gun.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of
the respondent court reinstating the appeal in CA-GR CV No. 20225 is SET ASIDE,
with costs against the private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, p.
30.

^[2]
Ibid., p. 34.

^[3]
Id., p. 36.

^[4]
Id., p. 30.