PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CAMILO MANUEL, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

In rape cases, conflicting versions of the complainant and the
accused are inevitable and are to be expected. The judicial task is to unravel the skeins of dissonance in their
respective testimonies and on which matter the factual findings of the trial
court are of invaluable help. In the
case at bar, we have gone further by carefully scrutinizing the records and the
transcripts of testimonies since it is as much our responsibility and concern
to, in a manner of speaking, sift the apocryphal chaff from the veridical
grain. After all, while complainant
cries for justice, the accused enjoys the presumption of innocence.

This case is on appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino, Branch 31,^[1]
convicting accused-appellant Camilo Manuel of raping a 15-year old girl and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
the accessories provided by law, to indemnify the victim in the amount of
P20,000.00 by way of moral damages, and to pay the costs.

The prosecution evidence as presented by the Solicitor General,
with the corresponding documentation, is as follows:

“At the early dawn of November 28, 1987, complainant Dolores Biag,
a 15-year old and single college student, along with seven (7) other persons,
were hiking home to Pinaripad, Aglipay, Quirino (pp.2-4, 15, 16-17, tsn,
October 12, 1988; pp. 4-5, 13, tsn, May 9, 1989). They came from sitio Dalemdem, Pinaripad, Aglipay, Quirino where they attended a birthday party of one
of their friends (p. 4, tsn, October 12, 1988; p. 304, tsn, May 9, 1989).

“After their other companions were already in their respective
houses, appellant Camilo Manuel, who was behind the complainant and Benita
Cabigat, suddenly grabbed complainant’s hand, twisted it at her back, covered
her mouth with his hand and dragged her to a waiting shed (pp. 6-7, 22-23, 25,
26, 27, 28-29, tsn, October 12, 1988). At this juncture, Benita Cabigat ran away (pp. 23, 24, tsn, ibid.).

“At the waiting shed, appellant made his sexual advances (pp.
7-8, 28, tsn, ibid.). Initially,
complainant resisted (pp. 6-8, 28, 29, 30, 31, tsn, Oct. 12, 1988; p. 9, tsn,
Dec. 12, 1988). But appellant boxed her
twice which rendered her unconscious (pp. 8, 31, tsn, Oct. 12, 1988; p. 9, tsn,
Dec. 12, 1988; p. 16, tsn, Jan. 9, 1989). Thus, appellant succeeded in ravishing and deflowering her (p. 8, tsn,
Oct. 12, 1988; p. 7, tsn, June 26, 1989).

“After she regained consciousness, appellant was no longer
there and she was writhing in pain (p. 8, tsn, Oct. 12, 1988; p. 14, tsn, Dec.
12, 1988; p. 8, tsn, June 26, 1989). Her clothes were torn (pp. 11-13, tsn, Oct. 12, 1988; p. 4, tsn, Jan. 9,
1989). Then she cried (p. 9, tsn, Oct.
12, 1988; 9-10, tsn, Dec. 12, 1988).

“Hearing her cries, Benita Cabigat came to her succor (p. 9, tsn,
Oct. 12, 1988; pp. 12-13, tsn, Dec. 12, 1988; p. 8, tsn, May 9, 1989; pp. 8-9,
tsn, June 26, 1989). Cabigat brought
complainant to the house of Cabigat’s sister (pp. 10, 12, tsn, Dec. 12, 1988;
pp. 11-12, tsn, Jan. 9, 1989; pp. 9, 20, 22, tsn, May 9, 1989). When asked why complainant was crying, she
did not answer (pp. 8-9, 20-21, tsn, May 9, 1989). Cabigat then accompanied her home (p. 9, tsn, Oct. 12, 1988; pp.
10, 21, tsn, May 9, 1989).

“Upon reaching their house, complainant revealed everything to
her parents, that her honor and reputation could no longer be redeemed (p. 9,
tsn, Oct. 12, 1988; pp. 4, 10, tsn, Dec. 12, 1988; pp. 3-4, tsn. Jan. 9,
1989). Her mother immediately reported
the incident to their Barangay Captain who happens to be the uncle of appellant
(pp. 4, 11, tsn, Dec. 12, 1988; pp. 4-5, 7, tsn, Jan. 9, 1989; pp. 2, 3, 7,
tsn. May 8, 1989). Appellant’s parents,
their daughter-in-law and brother went to complainant’s house to settle amicably
the case. Appellant would marry
complainant (pp. 4-5, 6, tsn, Dec. 12, 1988; p. 7, tsn, Jan. 9, 1989; pp. 4-6,
9-10, 13, tsn, May 8, 1989; pp. 4, 21, tsn, Sept. 4, 1989).

“Complainant, however, refused to marry appellant (p. 6, tsn,
Dec. 12, 1988; pp. 7-8, tsn, Jan. 9, 1989; pp. 10-11, tsn, May 9, 1989). On November 30, 1989, she together with her
mother and brother went to the Integrated National Police of Aglipay, Quirino
and formally filed her complaint against appellant (pp. 9-10, tsn, Oct. 12,
1989; pp. 9-10, tsn, Jan. 9, 1989).

“The Medico Legal Examination of complainant conducted by the
Aglipay District Hospital, Aglipay, Quirino on November 30, 1989 at 2 p.m.
shows the following findings:

‘EXTERNAL EXAMINATION:

-Nape – kissmark

-Neck – kissmark left side

-Chest – kissmark clavicular area left.

-Abdomen – linear abrasion with slight
hematoma

-External genitalia:

a. Labia majora left inflammed (sic)

b. Perineum right reddish

INTERNAL EXAMINATION:

-Vagina inflammed (sic)

-Hymenal laceration at 1 o’clock 10
o’clock slight hematoma at 1 o’clock

-Mucoid discharge, brownish color

VAGINA SMEAR:

-Negative for sperm cells’

(pp. 4-5, Appellant’s Brief; pp. 3-­9,
tsn, March 8, 1989).” ^[2]

In his defense, appellant makes the following submissions which,
for parity of presentation and comparative evaluation, we likewise reproduce at
length:

“The evidence of the defense consist of the testimonies of
Nolasco Manuel (barangay captain of Pinaripad, Aglipay, Quirino at the time of
the incident and brother of defendant-appellant’s father), Benita Cabigat-­Daquioag
(who was listed as a prosecution witness, wife of the cousin of the
defendant-appellant), Camilo Manuel (defendant-appellant), and Adelaida Basa
Manuel (sister?in-law of defendant-appellant). From the testimonies of the defense witnesses, the following
facts were established: that Camilo
Manuel is the neighbor of the complainant; that they attended the same school
when they were in high school; that they were sweethearts since 1986; that
complainant used to go to the house of defendant-appellant to watch television
shows, during which times she used to talk to the accused in the veranda
(porch) of the latter’s house prior to November 28, 1987, and she attended
prayers (padasal) in the house of the defendant-appellant; that accused sent
love letters to the complainant; that on the night of November 27, 1987,
complainant and defendant-appellant, together with other companions attended a
dance party at Dalemdem, Aglipay, Quirino and left the place and went home to
Pinaripad at about 12:00 o’clock midnight by hiking; that on their way home, he
and the complainant held each other’s shoulders until they reached the yard of
complainant where they talked while Benita Cabigat proceeded to their house;
that complainant did not enter their house, but instead invited the
defendant-appellant to the waiting shed nearby in order that they could talk;
that while in the waiting shed, complainant asked the defendant-appellant while
(sic) the latter did not honor her invitation to visit her in their house to
which defendant-appellant answered that he was already studying in Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya that’s why he could not have visited her; that after their short
conversation, they kissed and embraced each other and when the complainant laid
down, the defendant-appellant continued romancing her while complainant removed
her panty, defendant-appellant went on top of her and they had sexual
intercourse for about twenty-minutes; that after their sexual intercourse,
complainant asked defendant-appellant to talk to her parents in order to
arrange their marriage, but defendant-appellant told complainant that he could
not marry her yet because he was still studying, that was the time when
complainant asked the defendant-appellant to just leave her and go home which
he did; that at about 2:00 o’clock dawn of that same day, Mrs. Leoncia Biag,
mother of complainant, went to the barangay captain of Pinaripad, Aglipay,
Quirino in the person of Nolasco Manuel, uncle of defendant-appellant and
father of the wife of Mrs. Leoncia Biag’s nephew, and sought his assistance
because her daughter was abused by defendant-appellant; that barangay captain
Nolasco Manuel followed to (sic) the house of Mrs. Leoncia Biag where she
talked to the complainant who told her that she was kissed by
defendant-appellant and when she asked her again, she said that was all that
transpired; that after interrogating the complainant, the barangay captain advised
the parents of complainant to settle the matter because they are related so
Mrs. Leoncia Biag told the barangay captain to call for the parents of the
defendant-appellant so that they could talk; that the barangay captain went to
the house of defendant-appellant and told to (sic) the father of the
defendant-appellant about the request of Mrs. Leoncia-Biag; that when asked by
the barangay captain what happened, defendant?appellant admitted that he
had sexual intercourse with the complainant and when asked if he is willing to
marry the complainant, he said he was willing because she is his sweetheart so
his parents willingly acceded that defendant-appellant marry the complainant;
that about 4:00 o’clock of the same dawn, the barangay captain, Mrs. Adelaida
Base Manuel (sister-in-law) of defendant-appellant who was then living in (sic)
the same roof with the latter, and her husband went to the house of complainant
and Mrs. Adelaida Basa Manuel asked the complainant, in the presence of Mrs.
Leoncia Biag, what really transpired between her and defendant-appellant, to
which the complainant answered that she was kissed and embraced by the
defendant-appellant, and when asked if she wanted to have the
defendant-appellant marry her, complainant answered in the affirmative provided
she will not encounter hardship in his company; that when Mrs. Adelaida Basa
Manuel heard complainant’s answers, she (Mrs. Adelaida Manuel) informed
complainant’s father, together with the barangay captain and her husband, about
the decision of complainant, but soon thereafter complainant’s mother joined
them and informed them that complainant is no longer willing to marry the
defendant-appellant, hence Mrs. Adelaida Manuel, her husband and the barangay
captain asked permission to go home in the meantime while they (complainant’s
family) will have to think it over; that after Mrs. Adelaida Manuel, her
husband, and the barangay captain left the complainant’s house, defendant?appellant’s
father and the barangay captain again went to talk to the complainant’s family
whence Mrs. Leoncia Biag informed them that her daughter did not like to marry
the defendant-appellant but she proposed to settle the matter for P1,000.00
provided the defendant-appellant will not do it again; that because they had only
P500.00, the barangay captain offered said amount which was agreed to by
complainant’s family; that the delivery of the amount was scheduled but it was
not carried through because they (complainant’s family) lost their temper until
they filed the instant case; that when defendant-appellant’s family went to the
house of complainant, their purpose was to talk about the marriage between
complainant and the defendant-appellant; that defendant-appellant did not go
with them because he was anyway willing to marry the complainant;

“Defendant-appellant did not offer any documentary evidence,
and the prosecution did not offer any rebuttal evidence also.” ^[3]

After appraising the contrariant evidence presented by the
parties the court a quo found the version of appellant to be
highly improbable. It believed that the
evidence of record yields sufficient proof of the commission of the crime of
rape by appellant, hence it rendered the judgment of conviction stated at the
outset of his decision. Appellant,
however, contends that he was erroneously convicted as the evidence does not
substantiate his guilt beyond peradventure of a doubt.

We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial
court. The general rule is that the
findings of the judge who tried the case and heard the witnesses are not to be
disturbed on appeal.^[4]
Moreover, it is a well-established principle that conclusions as to credibility
in rape cases lie heavily on the trial court.^[5]

Thus, the Supreme Court is enjoined from casually modifying or
rejecting the trial court’s factual findings. Such factual findings, particularly the trial judge’s assessment of the
credibility of the testimony of the witnesses, are accorded great respect on
appeal for the trial judge enjoys the advantage of directly and at first hand
observing and examining the testimonial and other proofs as they are presented
at the trial and he is, therefore, better situated to form accurate impressions
and conclusions on the basis thereof.^[6]

On the other hand, we are constantly aware that while rape is a
most detestable crime, and ought to be severely and impartially punished, it is
an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved but harder to be defended by
the party accused, though innocent. As
is usually the case, the testimony of the complainant would be the only
evidence presented by the prosecution on how the alleged rape was perpetrated,
and the same should be regarded with utmost caution and the person charged with
the offense should not be convicted unless the complainant’s testimony is
impeccable and rings true throughout.^[7]

We are gratified to note, however, that the trial court arrived
at its conclusion from considerations anchored on human experience and
recognized in law and jurisprudence, as herein under synthesized.

Thus, it emphasized that the testimony of a barrio lass on how
she was deflowered is no trivial matter considering the inbred modesty and
antipathy of a Filipino woman to air in public things that affect her honor,
hence it is hard to conceive that complainant would admit the ignominy she had
undergone if this were not true.^[8]

We agree with its disquisition that a young girl like the
complainant would not file, fabricate or concoct the rape charge in the present
case. We approve its reliance on People
vs. Balane, et al.^[9] where
we said that it is hard to believe that an artless and guileless barrio girl, a
mere teenager, would publicly disclose that she had been raped and thereby
foreclose the probability of a blissful married life and, instead, expose
herself to the ordeal and embarrassment of public trial, subject her private
parts to examination, allow her honor to be sullied, and heap upon herself
untold humiliation unless she is honestly motivated by a strong desire to bring
to justice the culprit who had grievously wronged her.

It noted that the medical report conclusively shows the absence
of any indication that the complainant had known any other man, as interpreted
by the examining physician, Dr. Era L. Patac, thus lending more credibility to
the fact that complainant was indeed sexually abused by appellant.

It pointed out that the offer of appellant’s family to simply
settle the case constitutes an implied admission of guilt, the rule being that
“(i)n criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal
negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise
by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt.”^[10]

As it also aptly observed, the propositions or insinuations of
marriage were all rejected by complainant, which acts reinforce her credibility
and resolute desire to bring to the bar of justice the man who had ruined her
life and shattered her future.

In People vs. Manzano,^[11] we
held that the attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the case with the
complainant was considered an implied admission of guilt. We have further ruled that an offer of
marriage by the accused, during the investigation of the rape case, is also an
admission of guilt.^[12]

On the other hand, while appellant claims that he and the
complainant were sweethearts, he miserably failed to substantiate this
allegation. He had never even actually
visited the victim in her home prior to the rape, nor could he come up with any
other proof of his alleged past romantic relations with the complainant.

In People vs. Valdez, supra, the Court definitely
found a similar story of the appellant therein to be untrue on the ground that
if the said appellant and complainant were really sweethearts, the latter would
have readily accepted the former’s proposal of marriage. Had there been love between the two, the
girl would not have jeopardized their relationship by exposing everything to
her mother and to the authorities, much less by filing a complaint for rape
against him and publicly testifying therein.

On the foregoing premises and our own calibration of the
evidence, we are convinced that the pretensions of appellant must be rejected
and the case of the People should be sustained.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with
the modification that the amount of the indemnity which accused-appellant
should pay is hereby increased to thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) in
accordance with the present decisional rule thereon.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by Judge Carlos T. Aggabao.

^[2]
Brief for the Appellee, 2-6.

^[3]
Brief for Accused-Appellant, 6-11.

^[4]
People vs. Dilao, et al., 100 SCRA 358 (1980); People vs. Baduya,
182 SCRA 57 (1990).

^[5]People
vs. Partulan, 156 SCRA 489 (1987).

^[6]
People vs. Bravo, 180 SCRA 694 (1989).

^[7]
People vs. Del Pilar, 164 SCRA 280 (1980).

^[8]
People vs. Enclarinal, 180 SCRA 106 (1990).

^[9]
123 SCRA 614 (1983).

^[10]
Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules of Court.

^[11]
118 SCRA 705 (1982).

^[12]
People vs. Valdez, 150 SCRA 405 (1987).