SPOUSES HADJI ALI MAMADSUAL AND HADJI SALIKA MAMADSUAL, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COROCOY D. MOSON, SPOUSES KAGUI ABDULA MACARAPAN AND KAGUI RAKMA MACARAPAN AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF…

The
applicability of the regular rules of procedure and case law in this
jurisdiction to civil cases before the District Shari’a
Courts is the issue in this petition.

On November 14, 1988,
petitioner-spouses filed a complaint against private respondents for
“Quieting of Title To Property, Annulment of Original Certificates of
Title Nos. P-122 and P-138, and Damages, With Application
for Writ of Preliminary Injunction” with the Shari’a
District Court, 5th Shari’a District at Cotabato City.  Public respondent Register of Deeds of the
same city was impleaded as a nominal party.

Private respondents filed their answer dated December 1, 1988.

The issues having been joined, a pre-trial conference was held on
March 14, 1989 whereby Presiding Judge Hon. Corocoy
D. Moson issued a pre-trial order defining the issues
and directing the parties to submit statements (shudhud)
of at least two (2) competent
witnesses on the issues defined at the pre-trial conference and other evidence
(bayyina) setting forth the facts and the
law relied upon within ten (10) days from notice.

Petitioners filed the required sworn statements on April 17, 1989 but private
respondents failed to do so.

The case was set for trial on the merits on May 22, 1989 but it was postponed at the instance
of private respondents.  Other settings
were postponed for one reason or another. 
However, on July 4, 1989,
private respondents filed a pleading designated as “Amplification of
Affirmative or Special Defenses With Prayer for Dismissal of Complaint On the
Ground of Lack of Jurisdiction.” On the basis thereof, the trial court
issued an order on November 7, 1989
dismissing the complaint in this
manner:

“Before this Court, is a motion filed by defendants, through
their counsel, far amplification of affirmative or special defenses with prayer
for dismissal of the complaint on the
following grounds:  (1) That plaintiffs
have no title to the property which is the subject of this suit, hence, their
action to quiet title thereto is not proper; (2) that plaintiffs are not the
proper parties to ask for the annulment or cancellation of the certificates of
title of the defendants; and (3) that the action, being based on an implied trust, has already
prescribed and could not therefore be maintained.

Plaintiffs, through their counsel, vigorously opposed the motion,
and in a nutshell, their opposition may be stated as follows:  (1) On the issue of no title to the property
which is the subject-matter of
the case, plaintiffs contended that the title referred to by them in the
complaint means the legal title or
ownership or dominion over the land in dispute acquired by
them from their ancestors by operation of the law on succession; (2) On the
question of proper parties to ask for annulment, plaintiffs contended that they
are the real party in interest because they will be benefited by the judgment
or entitled to the avails of the suit in their own right, independent of any other interest, but with the authority of the law; and (3) on the question of prescription, plaintiffs
contended that since they are in possession of the land, an action to quiet
title does not prescribe.

Perusing the case from all
angles, and without losing track of the brilliant arguments presented by both
parties during the legal skirmishes, the court finds that in order that an
action for quieting of title shall prosper, it is necessary that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to the property which is the subject-matter of the
action.  On this score, the Civil Code of
the Philippines provides:

‘The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest
in the real property which is the subject-matter of the action.  He need not be in possession of said property.’ (Art. 477, Civil Code of the Philippines).

In the case at bar, plaintiffs
have no legal or equitable title to the
land in question.  Legal title means
registered ownership and equitable title meant beneficial ownership.  Since the plaintiffs have no legal or equitable title to the parcels of land in question, it is obvious that there is no cloud to be removed or to be prevented
from being cast upon.  The voice of
judicial conscience calls for the dismissal of the instant action.

Dwelling on the second question, even assuming for a moment that
the action is for annulment of the certificates of title, the court finds that
the plaintiffs are not the proper parties to bring the action, but rather the
Solicitor General.  And even assuming
further that the plaintiffs are the proper parties, the action has already prescribed
because the action partakes of the nature of reconveyance
which prescribes after ten years.  The
argument that the action has not
prescribed because plaintiffs are in possession of the property does not merit
the consideration of the court.  That
argument holds true only if plaintiffs have the legal or equitable title to the
property.

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the above-entitled case
is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action.”^[1]

A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners of said order
was denied by the trial court in an
order dated January 29, 1990 that reads as follows:

“Submitted for resolution by this Court is the Motion by plaintiffs
seeking reconsideration of the Order rendered on November 7, 1989, which order dismissed this case ‘for
lack of jurisdiction and cause of action.’

The motion asserts that the aforementioned order ‘has no legal
basis on the following grounds:

a)     
That the Honorable Court has jurisdiction to
hear and decide the (case) or the merits;

b)     
That the complaint has sufficient cause of
action; and

c)     
That the dismissal of the complaint is illegal.’

The first ground implies that this court is without alternative except to hear the case on the merits.  This assertion has no legal leg to
stand on, it being well-settled that the courts have the power to dismiss cases
before them upon a finding that they have no jurisdiction over them or have
lost the same, and that the act of
dismissing the cases on that
basis is a valid exercise of
jurisdiction.  Despite the lack or loss
of jurisdiction the order of dismissal is nevertheless valid.

On the second ground, the best test of the sufficiency of the cause
of action is the allegation in the
complaint.  The title over the land is
registered in the names of the defendants, and the annulment or cancellation
thereof is legally possible only
through an action for reversion by the
state.  If the case would be treated as one for reconveyance of title, the period within which the same
could be brought had already prescribed.

As regards the third  ground,
the defendants, in their opposition to the Motion, cited the case of Heirs of Olivas
vs. Judge Flor, G.R. 78343, decided on May 21, 1988, in which the Supreme Court held that a motion to dismiss filed
after the answer had already been
submitted within the reglementary period is not the
pleading prohibited by the Rules
on Summary Procedure, and what the Rule proscribes is a motion to dismiss which
would stop the running of the
period to file an answer and cause undue delay. 
As observed by the
defendants, Section 13 of the Ijra-at-al Mahakim Al Sharia’s is lifted from the provisions of the
Rules on Summary Procedure.

WHEREFORE, finding no cogent
and compelling reason to reconsider the Order of November 7, 1989, this Court hereby affirms the same
and further denies plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration.

SO ORDERED.“^[2]

Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari wherein
petitioners allege the following assignment of errors committed by the trial court:

“ASSIGNMENT
OF ERRORS

I.   THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT, SUCH ORDER HAVING DEPARTED FROM THE SPECIAL RULES
OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING THE SHARI’A COURTS (IJRA-AT AL MAHAKIM AL SHARI’A);

II.  THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT
HAS NO JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE PLAINTIFFS
ARE NOT THE PROPER PARTIES TO BRING THE ACTION AND/OR THE ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED;
AND

III. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
COMPLAINT HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION ON THE GROUND THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO
LEGAL OR EQUITABLE TITLE TO THE
LAND IN QUESTION.“^[3]

Petitioners allege that the lower court should not have considered
private respondents’ pleading which was in effect, a motion to dismiss, as it
is a pleading disallowed under Section 13 of the Ijra-At
Al Mahakim Al Shari’a.

However, under Section 16 of the Ijra-At
Al Mahakim Al Shari’a, it is specifically provided that the “Rules of Court shall
apply in a suppletory manner” in civil
cases.  Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court provides as follows:

“SECTION 5.  Pleading
grounds as affirmative defenses.  –
Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule, except improper
venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing may
be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss
had been filed.”

 From the foregoing, it is
clear the trial court properly
set the case for hearing on the affirmative defenses seeking dismissal of the
complaint raised by the private respondents in their answer.  What the Ijra-At Al
Mahakim Al Shari’a
proscribes is the filing of a motion to
dismiss in lieu of an answer which would stop the running of the period
to file an answer and cause undue delay. 
The prohibition is intended to put
a stop to the filing of dilatory
pleadings with the end in view of expediting proceedings before Shari’a courts.

The case of Heirs of Ricardo Olivas
vs. Flor,^[4]
involves the application of the Rules of Summary Procedure in special cases
before the Metropolitan and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.  The said
Rules disallow the filing of motions to dismiss, wherein this Court
held:

“In the guise of a
position paper, private respondents
filed a Motion to Dismiss.  While this is, indeed, a prohibited pleading (Section 15(1), Rule on Summary
Proceeding) it should be noted that the motion was filed after an Answer had
already been submitted within the reglementary period.  In essence, therefore, it is not the pleading
prohibited by the Rules on Summary Procedure.  What the rule proscribes is a Motion
to Dismiss, which would stop the running of the period to file an Answer and cause undue delay.”

Nevertheless, the Court finds the petition to be impressed with
merit.

The lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the action had prescribed.  The said court also observed that
inasmuch as it is one for reversion to the state of the property, the
same should be brought by the Solicitor General and not by the petitioners.

The Court disagrees.  A
reading of the complaint shows that
it is an action for quieting title. 
Therein, it is alleged that petitioners are in “actual, continuous,
and adverse possession” of the land in question “since time immemorial” in the concept of owners.^[5]

An action to quiet title is imprescriptible
if the plaintiffs are in possession of the property.^[6] In Sapto,
et al. vs. Fabiana,^[7] this Court held –

“x x x it
is an established rule of American jurisprudence (made applicable in this
jurisdiction by Art. 480 of the New Civil Code) that actions to quiet title to
property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible (44 Am. Jur. p. 47; Cooper vs. Rhea, 39 L.R.A. 930; Inland Empire
Land Co. vs. Grant County, 138 Wash. 439, 245 Pac. 14).

The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his
title to land quieted, as against one who is assertion some adverse claim or
lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in
actual possession of the land, claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for
this rule being that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action,
proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity in his
favor to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to assert any superior
equity in his favor.  He may wait until
his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right.  But the rule that the statute of limitations is
not available as a defense to an
action to remove a cloud from title can
only be invoked by a complainant when he
is in possession.  One who claims property
which is in the possession of another must, it seems, invoke his remedy within
the statutory period.  (44 Am. Jur. p. 47)”

In the same complaint, petitioners allege that recently private
respondents have disturbed their possession of the property by surreptitiously
constructing dikes.^[8]
The rule is that the petitioners may wait until their possession is disturbed or their title is attacked
before they may take steps to vindicate their right.  The statute of limitation is not available as a defense to an action to remove a
cloud from title over property
in possession of the petitioners.

The trial court held that in an action to quiet title the
plaintiff “must” have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the
subject matter of the action.”^[9]
It interpreted legal title to mean registered ownership and equitable title to
mean beneficial ownership.

It is not necessary
that the person seeking to quiet his title is the registered owner of the
property in question.

In Chacon,^[10] this Court considered the action to
be one for quieting of title where the plaintiffs alleged ownership and actual
possession since time immemorial of the property in question by themselves and
through their predecessors-in–interest, while defendants secured a
certificate of title over said property through fraud, misrepresentation and
deceit.

Thus, “title” to property does not necessarily mean the
original transfer certificate of title. 
It can connote acquisitive prescription by possession in the concept of
an owner thereof.^[11]
Indeed, one who has an equitable right or interest in the property may also
file an action to quiet title under the law.^[12]

Since the action in this case is one to quiet title to property whereby petitioners
claim to have acquired title to the same by
prescription, the property was thereby effectively withdrawn from the
public domain and became property of private ownership.  Thus, the ruling of the trial court that the
action being one for reversion only the Solicitor General can institute the
same has no cogent basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The questioned orders of the trial court
dated November 7, 1989 and January 23, 1990 are
hereby reversed and set aside, and the records of the case are remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan,
C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., on leave.

^[1] Pages 16 to 18, Rollo.

^[2]
Pages 32 to 33, Rollo.

^[3]
Page 6, Rollo.

^[4] 161 SCRA 393 (1988).

^[5] Paragraph 14, Complaint; Annex F to the
Petition.

^[6] Faja vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441
(1977); and Heirs of Segundo Uberas vs. CFI of
Negros Occidental; 86 SCRA 144 (1978).

^[7] 103 Phil. 683 (1958).

^[8] Chacon Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals,
124 SCRA 784 (1983); Faja vs.
Court of Appeals, supra; and Sapto, et al. vs. Fabiana, supra.

^[9] Citing Article 477 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

^[10] Supra.

^[11] Articles 540, 541, 1117 and 1130 of
the Civil Code.

^[12] Article 477, supra.