NESTOR SANDOVAL, PETITIONER, VS. HON. DOROTEO CAÑEBA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, MANILA, BRANCH 20, DEPUTY SHERIFF OF MANILA (RTC, MANILA, BRANCH 20), AND ESTATE DEVELOPERS & INVESTO…

The issue in this petition is whether or not the ordinary courts have
jurisdiction over the collection of unpaid installments regarding a subdivision
lot.

On August
20, 1987 private
respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila for the collection of unpaid installments
regarding a subdivision lot, pursuant to a promissory note, plus interest.  On January 29, 1988 the trial court rendered a decision.

It appears that
petitioner was declared in default so much so that after receiving the evidence
of private respondent, the trial court rendered its decision on January
19, 1988, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, on the
allegations and the prayer of the complaint and the evidence adduced in support therefor,
judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the
following:

1.  The sum of P73,867.42
plus interest and other charges commencing from January 1, 1988 until fully paid;

2.  Such sum
which shall not be less than P2,000.00 or 25%
of the amount of delinquency whichever is greater, as and for attorney’s fees.

3.  Costs against the defendant.

SO
ORDERED.”^[1]

On September
28, 1988 the trial
court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce its decision
that had become final and executory.

On September
30, 1988 petitioner
filed a motion to vacate judgment and to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that its
decision is null and void.  A motion for
reconsideration of the writ of execution was also filed by petitioner.  An opposition to both motions was filed
by private respondent to which a reply was filed by petitioner.

On February
17, 1989 the trial
court denied the motion to vacate the judgment on the ground that it is now
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to do so.  It directed the issuance of a writ of
execution anew.

Hence the herein petition
wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion as follows:

“5.1.  The
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion and acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the complaint
before him notwithstanding that exclusive and original jurisdiction
over the subject-matter thereof
is vested with the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (NLRB) pursuant to PD 957.

5.2.   The respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion and acted without jurisdiction in refusing to vacate his judgment rendered without jurisdiction and
in issuing a writ of execution to
implement his abovesaid void judgment.”^[2]

The petition is
impressed with merit.

Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 957 the National Housing Authority (NHA) was given the exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide certain cases as follows:

“SECTION
1.  In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

A.  Unsound real estate business practices:

B.  Claims involving refund and any other
claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman. 
(Emphasis supplied.)”

The language of this
section, particularly, the second portion thereof, leaves no room for doubt that exclusive jurisdiction over the case between the
petitioner and private respondent is vested not on the RTC but on the NHA.  The NHA was re-named Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission and thereafter it was re-named
as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).^[3]

Undeniably the sum of money sought to be collected by private respondent from petitioner
represented unpaid installments of a subdivision
lot which the petitioner purchased. 
Petitioner alleges that he suspended payments thereof because of the
failure of the developer to develop the subdivision
pursuant to their agreement.

In Antipolo
Realty Corporation vs. National Housing Authority,^[4] the
suit which was filed with the NHA, likewise involved non-payment of installments over a subdivision lot, wherein this Court held that the
NHA has exclusive authority to hear and decide the case.

In Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Teresita Payawal,^[5] this Court ruled that upon the issuance of
Presidential Decree No. 957, the trial court may no longer assume jurisdiction over the cases enumerated in Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 397.  We even stated therein that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
has the authority to award damages in the exercise of this exclusive power
conferred upon it by Presidential Decree No. 1344.

In  Estate Developers and
Investors Corporation vs. Antonio Sarte and Erlinda Sarte, G.R. No. 93646, which is a case substantially
similar to the instant case, in a resolution of August 13, 1990 this Court upheld the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HLURB over the collection suit.

Considering that the trial court has no jurisdiction under the
circumstances obtaining in this case, the decision it rendered is null and void
ab initio.  It
is as if no decision was rendered by the trial court at all.

When as in this case the attention of the trial court is drawn to
its lack of competence and authority to act on the case, certainly the trial
court has a duty to vacate the judgment by declaring the same to be null and
void ab initio.

This is as it should be. 
Inasmuch as the questioned judgment is null and void,
it is, as above observed, as if no decision had been rendered by the trial court.  It cannot become final and executory,
much less can it be enforced by a writ of execution.

The trial court, rather than reiterating the issuance of a writ
of execution in this case, which it did, should have recalled and cancelled the
writ of execution of the judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The questioned decision of the trial court
dated January 29, 1988 is
hereby declared null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.  No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Page 35, Rollo.

^[2]
Page 7, Rollo.

^[3]
Executive Order No. 648, February 7, 1981 and Executive
Order No. 90, December 17, 1976.

^[4]
153 SCRA, 399 (1987).

^[5]
G.R. No. 84811, August 29, 1989.