ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGA­GAWA (IBM), PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION), HON. CARMEN TALUSAN AND SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

The controversy at bar
had its origin in the “wage distortions” affecting the employees of
respondent San Miguel Corporation allegedly caused by Republic Act No. 6727,
otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act.

Upon the effectivity of the Act on June 5, 1989, the union known as “Ilaw at Buklod Ng Manggagawa
(IBM)” — said to represent 4,500 employees of San
Miguel Corporation, more or less, “working at the various plants, offices, and
warehouses located at the National Capital Region” — presented to the
company a “demand” for correction of the “significant distortion
in ** (the workers) wages.” In that “demand,” the Union
explicitly invoked Section 4 (d)
of RA 6727 which reads as follows:

“ * * * * *

“(d) * * * * *

Where the application of the increases in the wage rates under this
Section results in distortions as defined under existing laws in the wage
structure within an establishment and gives rise to a dispute therein, such
dispute shall first be settled voluntarily between the parties and in the event of a deadlock, the same shall be finally
resolved through compulsory arbitration by the regional branches of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) having jurisdiction over the
workplace.

It shall be mandatory for the NLRC to conduct continuous hearings
and decide any dispute arising under this Section within twenty (20) calendar
days from the time said dispute is formally submitted to it for
arbitration.  The pendency
of a dispute arising from a wage distortion shall not in any way delay the applicability
of the increase in the wage rates prescribed under this Section.”

But the Union claims that
that “demand” was ignored:^[1]

“The ** COMPANY ignored said demand by offering a measly
across-the-board wage increase of P7.00 per day, per employee, as against the
proposal of the UNION of P25.00 per day, per employee.  Later, the UNION reduced its proposal to
P15.00 per day, per employee by way of amicable settlement.

When the ** COMPANY rejected the reduced proposal of the UNION, the
members thereof, on their own accord, refused to render overtime services, most
especially at the Beer Bottling Plants at Polo, starting October 16,
1989.”

In this connection, the
workers involved issued a joint notice reading as follows:^[2]

“SAMA-SAMANG
PAHAYAG:  KAMING ARAWANG MANGGAGAWA NG
POLO BREWERY PAWANG KASAPI NG ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) AY NAGKAISANG
NAGPASYA NA IPATUPAD MUNA ANG EIGHT HOURS WORK SHIFT PANSAMANTALA HABANG HINDI
IPINATUTUPAD NG SMC MANAGEMENT ANG TAMANG WAGE DISTORTION.”

The Union’s position (set
out in the petition subsequently filed in this Court, infra) was that the workers’
refusal “to work beyond eight (8) hours everyday starting October 16,
1989” as a legitimate means of compelling SMC to correct “the
distortion in their wages brought about by the implementation of the said laws
(R.A. 6640 and R.A. 6727) to newly-hired employees.”^[3] That decision to observe the “eight
hours work shift” was implemented on October 16, 1989 by
“some 800 daily-paid workers at the Polo Plant’s production line (of San
Miguel Corporation [hereafter, simply SMC]), joined by others at statistical
quality control and warehouse, all members of ** IBM **.”^[4] There
ensued thereby a change in the work schedule which had been observed by
daily-paid workers at the Polo Plant for the past five (5) years, i.e.,
“ten (10) hours for the first shift and ten (10) to fourteen (14) hours
for the second shift, from Mondays to Fridays **; (and on) Saturdays, ** eight
(8) hours for both shifts” — a work schedule which, SMC says, the workers
had “welcomed, and encouraged”
because the automatic overtime built into the schedule “gave them a steady
source of extra-income,” and pursuant to which it (SMC) “planned its
production targets and budgets.”^[5]

This abandonment of the
long-standing schedule of work and the reversion to the eight-hour shift
apparently caused substantial losses to SMC. 
Its claim is that there ensued “from 16 October 1989 to 30 November
1989 alone ** work disruption and lower efficiency ** (resulting in turn, in)
lost production of 2,004,105 cases of beer ** ; that (i)n “money terms, SMC lost P174,657,598 in sales and
P48,904,311 in revenues ** (and the) Government lost excise tax revenue of P42
Million, computed at the rate of P21 per case collectible at the plant.”^[6] These losses occurred despite such measures
taken by SMC as organizing “a third shift composed of regular employees
and some contractuals,” and appeals “to the
Union members, through letters and memoranda and dialogues with their plant
delegates and shop stewards,” to adhere to the existing work schedule.

Thereafter, on October
18, 1989, SMC filed with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission a complaint against the Union and its members “to declare the
strike or slowdown illegal” and to terminate the employment of the union
officers and shop stewards.  The
complaint was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-10-04917.^[7]

Then on December 8, 1989,
on the claim that its action in the Arbitration Branch had as yet “yielded
no relief,” SMC filed another complaint against the Union and members
thereof, this time directly with the National Labor Relations Commission,
“to enjoin and restrain illegal slowdown and for damages, with prayer for
the issuance of a cease-and-desist and temporary restraining order.”^[8] Before acting on the application for
restraining order, the NLRC’s First Division first
directed SMC to present evidence in support of the application before a
commissioner, Labor Arbiter Carmen Talusan.  On December 19, 1989, said First Division
promulgated a Resolution on the basis of “the allegations of the
petitioner (SMC) and the evidence adduced ex parte in support of their
petition.” The Resolution –

1)     
authorized the issuance of “a Temporary
Restraining Order for a period of twenty (20) days ** upon ** a cash or surety
bond in the amount of P50,000.00 ** DIRECTING the respondents to CEASE and
DESIST from further committing the acts complained about particularly their not
complying with the work schedule established and implemented by the company
through the years or at the least since 1984, which schedule appears to have
been adhered to by the respondents until October 16, 1989 ** ;”

2)     
“set the incident on injunction for hearing before Labor
Arbiter Carmen Talusan on 27 December 1989 **.”

The Labor Arbiter
accordingly scheduled the incident for hearing on various dates: December 27
and 29, 1989, January 8, 11, 16, and 19, 1990. 
The first two settings were cancelled on account of the unavailability
of the Union’s counsel.  The hearing on
January 8, 1990 was postponed also at the instance of said counsel who declared
that the Union refused to recognize the NLRC’s
jurisdiction.  The hearings set on
January 11, 16 and 19, 1990 were taken up with the cross-examination of SMC’s
witness on the basis of his affidavit and supplemental affidavits.  The Union thereafter asked the Hearing
Officer to schedule other hearings.  SMC
objected.  The Hearing Officer announced
she would submit a report to the Commission relative to the extension of the
temporary restraining order of December 9, 1989, supra, prayed for by SMC.  Here the matter rested until February 14,
1990, when the Union filed the petition which commenced the special civil
action of certiorari and prohibition at bar.^[9]

In its petition, the
Union asserted that:

1)     
the “central issue
** is the application of the Eight-Hour Labor Law ** (i.e.) (m)ay an employer
force an employee to work everyday beyond eight hours a day?”

2)     
although the work schedule adopted by SMC with
built-in “automatic overtime,”^[10]
“tremendously increased its production of beer at lesser cost,” SMC
had been paying its workers “wages far below the productivity per
employee,” and turning a deaf ear to the Union’s demands for wage
increases;

3)      the NLRC had issued the temporary restraining order of
December 19, 1989 “with indecent haste, based on ex parte evidence of
SMC; and such an order had the effect of “forcing the workers to work
beyond eight (8) hours a day, everyday !!”

4)     
the members of the NLRC had no authority to act
as Commissioners because their appointments had not been confirmed by the Commission on Appointment; and

5)     
even assuming the
contrary, the NLRC, as an essentially appellate body, had no jurisdiction to
act on the plea for injunction in the first instance.

The petition thus prayed:

1)     
for judgment (a) annulling the Resolution of
December 19, 1990; (b) declaring mandatory the confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments of the appointments of National Labor Relations Commissioners;
and (c) ordering the removal “from the 201 files of employees any and all
memoranda or disciplinary action issued/imposed to the latter by reason of
their refusal to render overtime work;” and

2)      pending such judgment, restraining (a) the NLR
Commissioners “from discharging their power and authority under R.A. 6715
prior to their re-appointment and/or confirmation;” as well as (b) Arbiter
Talusan and the Commission from acing on the matter
or rendering a decision or issuing a permanent injunction therein, or otherwise
implementing said Resolution of December 19, 1989.

In traverse of the
petition, SMC filed a pleading entitled “Comment with Motion to Admit
Comment as Counter-Petition,” in which it contended that:

1)     
the workers’ abandonment of the regular work
schedule and their deliberate and wilful reduction of
the Polo plant’s production efficiency is a slowdown, which is an illegal and unprotected
concerted activity;

2)      against such a slowdown, the NLRC has
jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief in the first instance;

3)     
indeed, the NLRC has “the positive legal
duty and statutory obligation to enjoin the slowdown complained of and to
compel the parties to arbitrate **, (and) to effectuate the important national
policy of peaceful settlement of labor disputes through arbitration;”
accordingly, said NLRC “had no legal choice but to issue injunction to
enforce the reciprocal no lockout-no
slowdown and mandatory arbitration agreement of the parties;” and

4)     
the NLRC “gravely abused its discretion
when it refused to decide the application for injunction within the twenty day
period of its temporary restraining order, in violation of its own rules and
the repeated decisions of this ** Court.”

It is SMC’s submittal
that the coordinated reduction by the Union’s members of the work time
theretofore willingly and consistently observed by them, thereby causing
financial losses to the employer in order to compel it to yield to the demand
for correction of “wage distortions,” is an illegal and
“unprotected” activity.  It is,
SMC argues, contrary to the law and to the collective bargaining agreement
between it and the Union.  The argument
is correct and will be sustained.

Among the rights guaranteed to employees by the Labor Code is
that of engaging in concerted activities in order to attain their legitimate
objectives.  Article 263 of the Labor
Code, as amended, declares that in line with “the policy of the State to
encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining, ** (w)orkers shall have the right to engage in concerted
activities for purposes of
collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection.” A
similar right to engage in concerted activities for mutual benefit and
protection is tacitly and traditionally recognized in respect of employers.

The more common of these
concerted activities as far as employees are concerned are:  strikes — the temporary stoppage of work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute; picketing
— the marching to and fro at the employer’s premises, usually accompanied by
the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a
labor dispute; and boycotts — the concerted refusal to patronize an employer’s
goods or services and to persuade others to a like refusal.  On the other hand, the counterpart activity
that management may licitly undertake is the lockout — the temporary refusal
to furnish work on account of a labor dispute. 
In this connection, the same Article 263 provides that the “right
of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employer to
lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized
and respected.” The legality of these activities is usually dependent on
the legality of the purposes sought to be attained and the means employed therefor.

It goes without saying that these joint or coordinated activities
may be forbidden or restricted by law or contract.  In the particular instance of
“distortions of the wage structure within an establishment” resulting
from “the application of any prescribed wage increase by virtue of a law
or wage order,” Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a specific,
detailed and comprehensive procedure for the correction thereof, thereby
implicitly excluding strikes or lockouts or other concerted activities as a modes of settlement of the issue.  The provision^[11] states that?

” ** the
employer and the union shall negotiate to correct the distortions.  Any dispute arising from wage distortions
shall be resolved through the grievance
procedure under their collective bargaining agreement and, if it remains
unresolved, through voluntary
arbitration.  Unless otherwise
agreed by the parties in writing, such dispute shall be decided by the voluntary
arbitration or panel of voluntary arbitrators within ten (10) calendar
days from the time said dispute was referred to voluntary arbitration.

In cases where there are no collective agreements or recognized
labor unions, the employers and workers shall endeavor to correct such
distortions.  Any dispute arising therefrom shall be settled
through the National Conciliation and Mediation Board and, if it remains unresolved after
ten (10) calendar days of conciliation, shall be referred to the appropriate branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).  It shall be mandatory for the NLRC to
conduct continuous hearings and decide the dispute within twenty (20) calendar
days from the time said dispute is submitted for compulsory arbitration.

The pendency of a dispute arising from a
wage distortion shall not in any way
delay the applicability of any increase in prescribed wage rates pursuant to the provisions of law or
Wage Order.

*****.”

The legislative intent
that solution of the problem of wage distortions shall be sought by voluntary
negotiation or arbitration, and not by strikes, lockouts, or other concerted activities of the employees or
management, is made clear in the rules implementing RA 6727 issued by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment^[12] pursuant to the authority granted by Section
13 of the Act.^[13] Section 16, Chapter I of these implementing
rules, after reiterating the policy that wage distortions be first settled voluntarily by the parties and
eventually by compulsory arbitration, declares that, “Any issue involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for a
strike/lockout.”

Moreover, the collective
bargaining agreement between the SMC and the Union, relevant provisions of which are quoted by the former without
the latter’s demurring to the accuracy
of the quotation,^[14] also prescribes a similar eschewal of
strikes or other similar or related concerted activities as a mode of resolving
disputes or controversies, generally, said agreement clearly stating that
settlement of “all disputes, disagreements or controversies of any
kind” should be achieved by the stipulated grievance procedure and
ultimately by arbitration.  The
provisions are as follows:

“Section 1.  Any and all disputes, disagreements and
controversies of any kind between the COMPANY and the UNION and/or the workers
involving or relating to wages, hours of work, conditions of employment and/or
employer-employee relations arising during the effectivity
of this Agreement or any renewal thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in
accordance with the procedure set out in this Article.  No dispute, disagreement or controversy which
may be submitted to the grievance procedure in Article IX shall be presented
for arbitration unless all the steps of the grievance procedure are exhausted”
(Article V – Arbitration).

“Section 1.  The UNION agrees that there shall be no
strikes, walkouts, stoppage or slowdown of work, boycotts, secondary boycotts,
refusal to handle any merchandise, picketing, sit-down strikes of any kind,
sympathetic or general strikes, or any
other interference with any of the operations of the COMPANY during the
terms of this agreement” (Article VI).

The Union was thus
prohibited to declare and hold a strike or otherwise engage in non-peaceful
concerted activities for the settlement of its controversy with SMC in respect
of wage distortions, or for that matter, any other issue “involving or
relating to wages, hours of work, conditions of
employment and/or employer-employee relations.” The partial strike or
concerted refusal by the Union members to follow the five-year-old work
schedule which they had theretofore been observing, resorted to as a means of coercing
correction of “wage distortions,” was therefore forbidden by law and contract and, on this
account, illegal.

Awareness by the Union of the proscribed character of its
members’ collective activities, is clearly connoted by its attempt to justify those
activities as a means of protesting and obtaining redress against said members
working overtime every day from Monday to Friday (on an average of 12 hours),
and every Saturday (on 8-hour shifts),^[15] rather than as a measure to bring
about rectification of the wage distortions caused by RA 6727 — which was the
real cause of its differences with SMC. 
By concealing the real cause of their dispute with management (alleged
failure of correction of wage distortion), and trying to make it appear that
the controversy involved application of the eight-hour labor law, they
obviously hoped to remove their case from the operation of the rules
implementing RA 6727 that “Any issue involving wage distortion shall
not be a ground for a strike / lockout.” The stratagem cannot succeed.

In the first place, that it was indeed the wage distortion issue
that principally motivated the Union’s partial or limited strike is clear from
the facts.  The work schedule (with
“built-in overtime”) had not been forced upon the workers; it had
been agreed upon between SMC and its workers at the Polo Plant and indeed, had
been religiously followed with mutually beneficial results for the past five
(5) years.  Hence, it could not be
considered a matter of such great prejudice to the workers as to give rise to a controversy between them and
management.  Furthermore, the workers
never asked, nor were there ever any negotiations at their instance, for a change in that work schedule prior
to the strike.  What really bothered
them, and was in fact the subject of talks between their representatives and management, was the “wage
distortion” question, a fact made even more apparent by the joint notice
circulated by them prior to the strike, i.e., that they would adopt the
eight-hour work shift in the meantime pending correction by management of the
wage distortion (IPATUPAD MUNA ANG EIGHT HOURS WORK SHIFT
PANSAMANTALA HABANG HINDI IPINATUTUPAD NG SMC MANAGEMENT ANG TAMANG WAGE DISTORTION”).

In the second place, even if there were no such legal prohibition,
and even assuming the controversy really did not involve the wage distortions
caused by RA 6727, the concerted activity in question would still be illicit because contrary to the workers’ explicit contractual
commitment “that there shall be no strikes, walkouts, stoppage or slowdown
of work, boycotts, secondary boycotts, refusal to handle any merchandise,
picketing, sit-down strikes of any kind, sympathetic or general strikes, or any
other interference with any of the operations of the COMPANY during the term of
** (their collective bargaining) agreement.”^[16]

What has just been
said makes unnecessary resolution of SMC’s argument that the workers’ concerted refusal to adhere to the
work schedule in force for the last several years, is a slowdown, an inherently
illegal activity essentially illegal even in the absence of a no-strike clause
in a collective bargaining contract, or statute or rule.  The Court is in substantial agreement with
the petitioner’s concept of a slowdown as a “strike on the installment
plan;” as a wilful reduction in the rate of work
by concerted action of workers for the purpose of restricting the output of the
employer, in relation to a labor dispute; as an activity by which workers,
without a complete stoppage of work, retard production or their performance of
duties and functions to compel
management to grant their demands.^[17] The Court also agrees that such a slowdown
is generally condemned as inherently illicit and unjustifiable, because while
the employees “continue to work and remain at their positions and accept
the wages paid to them,” they at the same time “select what part of
their allotted tasks they care to perform of their own volition or refuse
openly or secretly, to the employer’s damage, to do other work;” in other
words, they “work on their own terms.”^[18] But whether or not the
workers’ activity in question — their concerted adoption of a different work
schedule than that prescribed by management and adhered to for several years —
constitutes a slowdown need not, as already stated, be gone into.  Suffice it to say that that activity is
contrary to the law, RA 6727, and the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.

The Union’s claim that the restraining order is void because
issued by Commissioners whose appointments had not been duly confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments should be as it is hereby given short shrift, for,
as the Solicitor General points out, it is an admitted fact that the members of
the respondent Commission were actually appointed by the President of the
Philippines on November 18, 1989; there is no evidence whatever in support of
the Union’s bare allegation that the appointments of said members had not been
confirmed; and the familiar presumption of regularity in appointment and in
performance of official duty exists in their favor.^[19]

Also untenable is the Union’s other argument that the respondent
NLRC Division had no jurisdiction to issue the temporary restraining order or
otherwise grant the preliminary injunction prayed for by SMC and that, even
assuming the contrary, the restraining order had been improperly issued.  The Court finds that the respondent
Commission had acted entirely in accord with applicable provisions of the Labor
Code.

Article 254 of the Code provides that “No temporary or permanent
injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor
disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity, except as otherwise
provided in Articles 218 and 264 * *.” Article 264 lists down specific
“prohibited activities” which may be forbidden or stopped by a
restraining order or injunction.  Article
218 inter
alia enumerates the powers of the National Labor
Relations Commission and lays down then conditions under which a restraining
order or preliminary injunction may issue, and the procedure to be followed in
issuing the same.

Among the powers expressly conferred on the Commission by Article
218 is the power to “enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened
commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the
performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained
or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or
render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party **.”

As a rule such restraining orders or injunctions do not issue ex parte, but only after compliance with the following requisites, to
wit:

a)  a hearing held
“after due and personal notice thereof has been served, in such manner as
the Commission shall direct, to all known persons against whom relief is
sought, and also to the Chief Executive and other public officials of the
province or city within which the unlawful acts have been threatened or
committed charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property;”

b)  reception
at the hearing of “testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for
cross-examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint made under
oath,” as well as “testimony in opposition thereto, if offered **
;”

c)   “a finding of fact by the Commission,
to the effect:

(1)   That
prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed and will
be continued unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining
order shall be issued on account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act,
except against the person or persons, association or organization making the
threat or committing the prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or
ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof;

(2)  
That substantial and irreparable injury to
complainant’s property will follow;

(3)  
That as to each item of relief to be granted,
greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than
will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief;

(4)  
That complainant has no adequate remedy at law;
and

(5)  
That the public officers charged with the duty
to protect complainant’s property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate
protection.”

However, a temporary
restraining order may be issued ex parte under the following conditions:

a)  the complainant
“shall also allege that, unless a temporary restraining order shall be
issued without notice, a substantial and irreparable injury to complainant’s
property will be unavoidable;”

b)      there is “testimony under oath,
sufficient, if sustained, to justify the Commission in issuing a temporary
injunction upon hearing after notice;”

c)   
the “complainant shall first file an
undertaking with adequate security in an amount to be fixed by the Commission
sufficient to recompense those enjoined for any loss, expense or damage caused
by the improvident or erroneous issuance of such order or injunction, including
all reasonable costs, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee, and expense of
defense against the order or against the granting of any injunctive relief
sought in the same proceeding and subsequently denied by the Commission;”
and

d)   
the “temporary restraining order shall be
effective for no longer than twenty (20) days and shall become void at the
expiration of said twenty (20) days.”

The reception of evidence
“for the application of a writ of injunction may be delegated by the
Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters who shall conduct such hearings in such
places as he may determine to be accessible to the parties and their witnesses
and shall submit thereafter his recommendation to the Commission.”

The record reveals that
the Commission exercised the power directly and plainly granted to it by
sub-paragraph (e) Article 217 in relation to Article 254 of the Code, and that
it faithfully observed the procedure and complied with the conditions for the
exercise of that power prescribed in said sub-paragraph (e).  It acted on SMC’s application for immediate
issuance of a temporary restraining order ex parte on the ground that
substantial and irreparable injury to its property would transpire before the
matter could be heard on notice; it, however, first directed SMC Labor Arbiter
Carmen Talusan to receive SMC’s testimonial evidence
in support of the application and thereafter submit her recommendation thereon;
it found SMC’s evidence adequate and issued the temporary restraining order
upon bond.  No irregularity may thus be
imputed to the respondent Commission in the issuance of that order.

In any event, the temporary restraining order had a lifetime of
only twenty (20) days and became void ipso facto at the expiration of that period.

In view of the foregoing factual and legal considerations, all
irresistibly leading to the basic conclusion that the concerted acts of the
members of petitioner Union in question are violative
of the law and their formal agreement with the employer, the latter’s
submittal, in its counter-petition that there was, in the premises, a
“legal duty and obligation” on the part of the respondent Commission
“to enjoin the unlawful and prohibited acts and omissions of petitioner IBM and
the workers complained of”^[20]
— a proposition with which, it must be said, the Office of the Solicitor
General concurs, asserting that the “failure of the respondent commission to
resolve the application for a writ of injunction is an abuse of discretion
especially in the light of the fact that the restraining order it earlier issued had already expired”^[21] — must perforce be conceded.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, the counter-petition is
GRANTED, and the case is REMANDED to the respondent Commission (First Division)
with instructions to immediately take such action thereon as is indicated by
and is otherwise in accord with, the findings and conclusions herein set forth.  Costs against petitioner.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,
concur.

Cruz, J., no part.

Gancayco, J., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 13: 
Petition, p. 12

^[2]
Id., pp. 47-48, 98

^[3]
Id., pp. 27-28

^[4]
Id., pp. 97 et seq.

^[5]
Id., pp. 96-97

^[6]
Id., p. 98

^[7]
Id., p. 49

^[8]
Id., pp. 42 et seq.:  Annex B of petition

^[9]
Id. pp. 34, 106-107

^[10]
10 hours for the first shift and 10 to 14 hours for the second shift, from
Mondays to Fridays, giving the workers, according to Management, “a steady
source of extra-income,” see footnote 4, supra

^[11]
Emphasis supplied; SEE also Sec. 4 (d), RA 6727, quote at page 1, supra

^[12]
On July 7, 1989, with effect as of July 1,1989

^[13]
“SEC. 13. The Secretary of Labor and Employment
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the
provisions of this Act.”

^[14]
Rollo, p.
101

^[15]
The Union opens its petition in this case with the statement that the “central
issue in the case at bar is the application of the Eight-Hour Labor Law ** (i.e.,
may) an employer force an employee to work everyday beyond eight hours a
day?”

^[16]
SEE footnote 14 and related text

^[17]
Rollo, pp. 109-110

^[18]
Id., pp. 110-112

^[19]
Id., pp. 242-243

^[20]
Id., pp 123-124

^[21]
Id., pp. 244, 246