ATTY. RIZAL P. ECHECHE, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT MALACAÑANG PALACE, MANILA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision* rendered by the Court of Appeals on April 7, 1989
in CA-G.R. SP No. 15514 entitled “Atty. Rizal P.
Echeche, Petitioner vs. Office of the President of the Philippines, Malacañang, Manila,
Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig,
and Secretary of the Budget and Management, Respondents,” (Annex
“A”; pp. 25-31, Rollo), petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration thereof having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution** dated August 24, 1989.  (Annex “B”; p. 33, Rollo)

The uncontroverted facts of the case
are:

Atty. Rizal P. Echeche
was employed at the Bureau of Mines
(now Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences) on June 27, 1974.  He
was, however, included in the lists of alleged undesirable and unfit public
servants who were purged under Letter of Instruction No. 309 dated August 22, 1975.

On November 3, 1975,
petitioner filed a letter-request for reinstatement with the Appeals Committee
created under Executive Order No. 370, series of 1975, which was forwarded by
the Office of the President to then Minister of Natural Resources in a
letter-referral dated February 8, 1978.  This was followed by another letter-request
dated July 7, 1982 which was again forwarded to the Minister of Natural
Resources and endorsed to the Bureau of Mines. The Bureau of Mines did not give
any comment on the petition, neither the Minister of Natural Resources.

Three years lapsed before his letter-request was initially acted
upon.  The Presidential Staff Director
forwarded to then Secretary Jose Leido, Jr., of the
Ministry of Natural Resources pertinent papers, relative to the petitions for
reinstatement of purged officials and employees of the Department, for action
and disposition.

On August 26, 1985, a Memorandum for the Minister of Natural
Resources was issued by Moreno B. Cruz, Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs
ordering the reinstatement of Atty. Rizal P. Echeche with payment of backwages
“because he was removed from the service without cause.” (Annex
“F”, Rollo, p. 77)

Finally, in a Resolution dated May 2, 1986, the Assistant
Secretary for Legal Affairs, Alexander C. Castro, of the Ministry of Natural
Resources, signing with authority from the Minister, ordered reinstatement, in
the following tenor:

“Wherefore, petitioner shall be reinstated as legal officer in
the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences with backwages
during the time of separation.  However,
he shall undergo a physical and psychological examination to determine his
fitness as a legal officer; otherwise, petitioner shall be retired for reasons
of disability or incapacity and be paid his corresponding benefits.”
(Comment of the Office of Solicitor General, p. 5; Rollo,
p. 108).

On November 18, 1986, petitioner
was reemployed as Legal Officer III by the Director of Mines and
Geo-Sciences; he was not reinstated to his former position because the
functions of Legal Officer II were transferred to Legal Officer III.

Petitioner sought payment of his back salaries, allowances, and
bonuses, pursuant to the Resolution of the Department of Natural
Resources.  The Director of Mines and Geo?Sciences
and Minister Carlos G. Dominguez of the Department of Natural
Resources recommended payment, thereof. 
(Ibid., p. 6; Rollo, p. 109)

The Department of Budget and Management referred the matter to
the Office of the Executive Secretary. 
The Office of the Executive Secretary denied request for payment because petitioner was merely
reemployed, not reinstated as he was never recommended by the Appeals Committee
for reinstatement.  His new appointment
was made pursuant to the grant of executive clemency and LOI 647 which confined
such presidential clemency to reemployment not reinstatement.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by Deputy
Executive Secretary Magdangal B. Elma, in the
following tenor:

“Based on the foregoing, the request of Echeche
for payment of back salaries, allowances, and bonuses was denied as he was then
‘considered under suspension without pay’.” (Ibid., p. 7; Rollo, p. 110).

On August 20, 1988, Atty. Rizal Echeche filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari directly
with the Supreme Court seeking the annulment of the decision of the Office of
the President.  The Supreme Court
referred the case to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit stating that “there is no
legal basis for granting the petitioner his request for back salaries,
allowances and bonuses” (Annex
“A”, Decision of Court of Appeals, p. 7; Rollo,
p. 31).

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of
Appeals denied the same.  Hence, this petition.

Petitioner, in his Reply to Comment, submits the following
issues:

I

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR
GRANTING PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR (SIC) BACKSALARIES, ALLOWANCES AND BONUSES.

II

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT RESPONDENT-PUBLIC OFFICIALS DID NOT COMMIT ANY ERROR IN DENYING
PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR THE PAYMENT OF BACK SALARIES, BONUSES AND ALLOWANCES.

III

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING
THE CASE OF “CLEMENTE VS. COA, G.R. No. L-47793, March 30, 1984” IN
THIS CASE.

IV

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE
DECIDED BY THE HON. SUPREME COURT.  (p.
128, Rollo)

Under the 1973
Constitution, Article XII-B, Section 3, provides that “no officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause
as provided by law.” This provision guarantees that the suspension or
dismissal can be made only “for cause as provided by law.” Dismissal
for cause does not necessarily mean that the dismissed officer or employee must
be charged in court or administratively and must be given his day in court or
afforded due process of law.  Dismissal
for cause implies that there is reasonable ground provided by law to justify
the dismissal of an officer or employee.

In the case at bar,
petitioner was dismissed under Letter of Instruction No. 309.  Petitioner contends that Letter of
Instruction No. 309 is unconstitutional because it violates the above
constitutional mandate.  He further
argues that there was no valid cause to purge him because “there was no
pending administrative, civil, or criminal charges against him.”
(Petition, p. 5; Rollo, p. 11)

Said issue has long been settled in the case of Clemente vs. Commission on Audit (128 SCRA 297), which the
appellate court correctly applied.  In
that case, the petitioner was also purged under LOI 309.  There was no pending administrative charge, or any disciplinary action against
him.  Eventually he was reinstated, and
he also sought the payment of back salaries. 
His request was denied by the executive department, which denial was
affirmed by the Supreme Court.  The
Supreme Court, through Justice (later Chief Justice) Makasiar,
ruled:

“As we see it, the “September 1975 Purge” is part of
the process of cleaning up the government machineries, which upon the
imposition of martial law, the President had taken to task.  xxx Too well known fact is the evil that
plagued government service.  Graft and
corruption among government employees and officers were too rampant in almost
all offices.  Numerous, public officials,
using their high positions for personal gain at the expense of the public, have
not lived up to the public trust.  The
program of reforms of the President in the New Society by instilling discipline
in the people, particularly those in the government service, and by weeding out
from the service employees and officials considered notoriously undesirable were envisioned as an answer to
the long felt need for restoring the confidence of the people in the
government.”

The constitutionality of LOI 309 was settled in the same case:

“The President, of course, did not order the “September
1975 purge” by a snap of his fingers. 
As adverted to earlier, the September, 1975 purge was made pursuant to
Letter of Instruction No. 309, series of 1975 which was issued under the
authority of Section 9, Article XVII of the Constitution, which vests upon the
incumbent President the power to remove officials and employees of the existing
government. Pertinent portion of Section 9 reads:

“Sec. 9.  All officials
and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the Philippines
shall continue in office unless otherwise provided by law or decree by the
incumbent President of the Philippines xxx.”

There is no reason for Us to deviate from settled rules and
jurisprudence.  LOI 309 is
constitutional.

The arguments of petitioner are premised on the
unconstitutionality of LOI 309.  His
request for payment of back salaries, bonuses and allowances depends upon his
argument that his “purge” from the public service in 1973 was in
gross violation of his constitutional rights to due process and therefore
patently illegal.  As shown in the previous discussion, LOI
309 is constitutional, hence the
dismissal of Atty. Rizal P. Echeche
was not illegal.

Petitioner’s right to back
salaries, allowances and bonuses
is without legal basis.  The Director of
the Bureau of Mines in
dismissing petitioner pursuant to LOI 309, cannot be said to have acted in bad faith and with
grave abuse of discretion.  There was no ill will or personal malice in dismissing petitioner.  In the absence of proof that the Director acted in bad faith and with grave abuse of discretion, petitioner is not
entitled to back salaries, bonuses and allowances. (Octot vs. Ibanez, et al., 111 SCRA 79).

Letter
of Instruction 647 gave
an opportunity
for the petitioner to be employed back. 
Section
1 of LOI 647 states:

“1.  All
officials and employees who were not
recommended for reinstatement by
the Appeals Committee but are qualified
to reenter the government service
are hereby granted executive clemency
for purpose of reemployment subject
to Civil Service Law and Rules if recommended by their respective department heads.”

The
grant of executive
clemency under LOI 647 was for the purpose of
reemployment, not reinstatement.  Reemployment implies that one is hired
anew, which
does not carry with it payment of backwages.

To bolster his position in his last assignment of errors, petitioner
argues that the Court of Appeals ruled on an order which has already become
final and executory. 
He reasoned that the order of the Minister of Natural Resources,
reinstating the petitioner and ordering the payment of his backwages,
has attained finality.  The Secretary of
Budget and Management failed to file any motion for reconsideration from the approval of payment.  The arguments of petitioner are not supported
by facts.  The order of the Minister of
Natural Resources did not attain finality, in the sense that it may no longer
be reviewed.  The acts of Ministers (now
Cabinet Secretaries) are reviewable by
the President in the exercise of his power of control.

“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices.  He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.” (1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17)

“Sec. 10.  The President
shall have control of the ministries.” (1973 Constitution, Art. VII)

Control means “the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify, or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter.” (Hebron
vs. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175) The President can, by virtue of his power of control,
review, modify, alter or nullify any action, or decision of his subordinate in
the executive departments, bureaus or offices under him.  (Oliveros-Torre vs.
Bayot, 58 SCRA 272; Ang-Angco
vs. Castillo, et al., 118 Phil. 1468). 
He can exercise this power motu proprio without
need of any appeal from any party.  (Oliveros-Torre vs. Bayot, supra).

The President is not
expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative
functions.  The Office of the Executive
Secretary is an auxiliary unit
which assists the President.  Under our
constitutional set-up, the Executive
Secretary acts for and in behalf of the President:  and by authority of the President, he has
undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order of the
Secretary of Natural Resources and other Cabinet Secretaries.  Where the Executive Secretary acts “by
authority of the President” his decision is that of the President.  (Lacson-Magallanes
Co., Inc. vs. Pano, 21 SCRA 895).

In
the case at bar, the Deputy Executive Secretary denied the request of the
petitioner for payment of back salaries, allowances and bonuses.  The decision of the Office of the Executive
Secretary must be given full faith and credit by our courts as an act of the
Chief Executive.  It does not matter, though,
that considering the extensive range of authority of the Executive Secretary,
the decisions of such office which are attributable to the Executive Secretary
have been performed by the Assistant or Deputy Executive Secretaries.  (Barte vs. Dichoso, 47 SCRA 77).

Hence, the questionable order of the Minister of Natural
Resources did not attain finality, and the Court of Appeals, therefore, did not
commit any error in ruling thereon.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby
DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, without
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., on leave.

* Penned by Associate Justice Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr. and
concurred in by Associate Justices Celso L. Magsino and Abelardo M. Dayrit.

** Resolved by Associate Justice Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr., and
concurred in by Associate Justices Celso L. Magsino and Abelardo M. Dayrit.