PETER JOHN D. CALDERON, PETITIONER, VS. BARTOLOME CARALE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION; EDNA BONTO PEREZ, LOURDES C. JAVIER, ERNESTO G.…

Controversy is focused
anew on Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

“Sec. 16.  The President
shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appoint­ments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution.  He shall also appoint
all other officers of the Government whose appoint­ments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.  The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of depart­ments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

“The President shall have the power to make appointments during
the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.”^[1]

The power of the
Commission on Appointments (CA for brevity) to confirm appointments, contained
in the aforequoted paragraph 1 of Sec. 16, Art. VII,
was first construed in Sarmiento III vs. Mison^[2] as follows:

“x x x it
is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau
head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the
consent of the Commis­sion on Appointments is required.  As a matter of fact, as already pointed out,
while the 1935 Constitution includes ‘heads of bureaus’ among those officers
whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987
Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of ‘heads
of bureaus’ from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.

“x x x
Consequently, we rule that the Presi­dent of the Philippines acted within her
constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without
submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation.  x x
x.”

“x x x In
the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and
expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII.  Consequently, there was no reason to use in
the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word ‘alone’ after the word
‘President’ in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of
lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads
of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President)
may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without
need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence
of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.” (underlining supplied)

Next came Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Salonga,^[3] this time involving the appointment of the
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. 
Adhering to the doctrine in Mison, the
Court explained:

“x x x
Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among
the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution, appoint­ments to which are to be made with the confirma­tion of
the Commission on Appointments, it follows that the appointment by the
President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or
participation of the Commission on Appointments.  To be more precise, the appointment of the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights is not specifically
provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on
Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.  The President appoints the Chairman and
Members of the Commis­sion on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in
Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments because they are among the officers of government ‘whom he (the
President) may be authorized by law to appoint.’ And Section 2(c), Executive
Order No. 163, 5 May 1987,
authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission
on Human Rights.”

Consistent with its rulings in Mison
and Bautista, in Teresita Quintos Deles, et al. v. The Commission on Constitu­tional
Commissions, et al.,^[4]
the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over appointments
by the President of sectoral representatives in
Congress was upheld because:

“x x x
Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives
in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the
President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it
is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the
House of Representatives are among the ‘other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President in this Constitution,’ referred to in the first
sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.”

From the three   (3) cases above-mentioned, these doctrines
are deducible:

1.  Confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those
officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in
the president (like sectoral repre­sentatives to
Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service
and Election).

2.  Confirmation is not
required when the President appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights).  Also, as
observed in Mison, when Congress creates
inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in
an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are considered
as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.

Sometime in March 1989,
RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code
(PD 442) was approved.  It provides in
Section 13 thereof as follows:

“x     x     x

The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commis­sioners and other
Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.  Appoint­ments
to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the
predecessor.  The Executive Labor
Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and shall be subject
to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.”^[5]

Pursuant to said law (RA
6715), President Aquino appointed the Chairman and
Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers
sectors.  The appointments stated that
the appointees may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the
office.  After said appointments,
then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued
Administrative Order No. 161, series of 1989, designating the places of
assignment of the newly appointed commissioners.

This petition for prohibition questions the constitu­tionality
and legality of the permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines
to the respon­dents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715.

Petitioner insists on a mandatory
compliance with RA 6715 which has in its favor the presumption of
validity.  RA 6715 is not, according to
petitioner, an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained
in Section 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by
the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16
of Article VII of the Constitution. 
Petitioner claims that the Mison and
Bautista rulings are not decisive of the issue
in this case for in the case at bar, the
President issued permanent appointments to the respondents without submitting
them to the CA for confirmation despite passage of
a law (RA 6715) which requires the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of such appointments.

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715
which amended the Labor Code transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding
the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments without
constitutional basis.  Mison and Bautista laid the issue to rest,
says the Solicitor General, with the following exposition:

“As interpreted by this Honorable Court in the Mison case, confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments is required exclusively for the heads of executive departments,
ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various
Constitutional Commissions.  With respect
to the other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the
law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required.

“Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the
list of officers whose appointments must be confirmed by the Commission on
Appoint­ments, the Constitution would have said so by adding the phrase
“and other officers required by law” at the end of the first
sentence, or the phrase, “with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments” at the end of the second sentence.  Evidently, our Constitution has significantly
omitted to provide for such additions.

“The original text of Section 16 of Article VII of the present
Constitution as embodied in
Resolution No. 517 of the Constitutional Commis­sion reads as follows:

‘The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the excutive
departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein other­wise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.  The Congress may by law vest the appointment
of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts or in the heads of
the department.’

“Three points should be noted regarding sub­section 3 of
Section 10 of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution and in the original text of
Section 16 of Article VII of the present Constitution as proposed in Resolution
No. 517.

“First, in both of them, the appointments of heads of bureaus
were required to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

“Second, in both of them, the appointments of other officers,
“whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law to appoint”
are expressly made subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.  However, in the final
version of Resolution No. 517, as embodied in Section 16 of Article VII of the
present Consti­tution, the appointment of the above mentioned officers (heads
of bureaus; other officers whose appointments are not provided for by law; and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint) are excluded from the list
of those officers whose appointments are to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.  This amendment, reflected
in Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution, clearly shows the intent of
the framers to exclude such appointments from the requirement of confir­mation
by the Commission on Appointments.

“Third, under the 1935 Constitution the word
“nominate” qualifies the entire Subsection 3 of Section 10 of Article
VII thereof.

“Respondent reiterates that if confirmation is required, the
three (3) stage process of nomina­tion, confirmation and appointment
operates.  This is only true of the first
group enumerated in Section 16, but the word nominate does not any more appear
in the 2nd and 3rd sentences.  There­fore,
the president’s appointment pursuant to the 2nd and 3rd sentences need no
confirmation.”^[6]

The only issue to be resolved by the Court in the present case is
whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
appoint­ments extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16,
Art. VII of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.

To resolve the issue, we go back to Mison where the Court stated:

“x x x
there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.  These four (4) groups, to which we will
hereafter refer from time to time, are:

‘First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution;

‘Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law;

‘Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint;

‘Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may
by law vest in the President alone.'”^[7]

Mison also opined:

“In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there
were two (2) major changes proposed and approved by the Commission.  These were (1) the exclusion of the
appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of confir­mation by the
Commission on Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of appointments made under
the second sentence of the section from the same requirement.  x x x.”

The second sentence of Sec.
16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the President
may be authorized by law to appoint.

Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the
second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more
specifically under the “third groups” of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint. 
Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the
officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments
requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.  To the extent that RA 6715 requires
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of
respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it
is unconstitutional because:

1.  It amends by
legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by
adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and

2.  It amends by legislation
the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are
otherwise entrusted only with the President.

Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative.  Determining their constitutionality is a judicial
function.  The Court respects the
laudable intention of the legislature. 
Regretfully, however, the constitutional infirmity of Sec. 13 of RA 6715
amending Art. 215 of the Labor Code, insofar as it requires confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments over appointments of the Chairman and Members of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is, as we see it, beyond redemption
if we are to render fealty to the mandate of the Constitution in Sec. 16, Art.
VII thereof.

Supreme Court decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution
shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.10 No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court
in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or
reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.11

“x x x The
interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the
law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court’s
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the
law thus construed intends to effectuate. 
The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of
the legal maxim ‘legis interpretado
legis vim obtinent‘ – the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force
of law.”12

The rulings in Mison, Bautista and Quintos-Deles have interpreted Art. VII, Sec. 16 consistently in one
manner.  Can legislation expand a
constitutional provision after the Supreme Court has interpreted it?

In Endencia and Jugo vs. David,13 the Court
held:

“By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act
No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a
decrease of compensation.  This is a
clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase
‘which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,’ found in
section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of
judicial officers.”

x x
x                                           x
x x

‘The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass
any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage,
so as to give it any binding weight with the courts.  A legislative definition of a word as used in
a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used else­where; otherwise, the legislature
would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term.  (11 Am. Jur., 914,
italics supplied).

‘The legislature cannot, upon passing law which violates a consti­tutional
provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a
declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional
inhibition.’ (11 Am., Jur., 919, italics supplied).

“We have already said that the Legislature under our form of
government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not
to interpret them.  This is more true
with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is
not within the sphere of the Legislative department.  If the Legislature may declare what a law
means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after
the courts have in actual case ascertained its meaning by interpretation and
applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in
judicial processes and court decisions. 
Under such a system, a final court determination of a case based on a
judicial interpretation of the law or of the Constitution may be undermined or
even annulled by a subse­quent and different interpretation of the law or of
the Constitution by the Legislative department. 
That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the fundamental principles of our
constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the
separation of powers.”14
(underscoring supplied)

Congress, of course, must interpret the Constitution, must
estimate the scope of its constitutional powers when it sets out to enact
legislation and it must take into account the relevant constitutional
prohibitions.15

“x x
x The Constitution did not change with public
opinion.

It is not only the same words, but the same in meaning….: and as
long as it it speaks not only in the same words, but
with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the
hands of its framers, and was voted and adopted by the people …”16

The function of the Court in passing upon an act of Congress is
to “lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the
statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the
former” and to “announce its considered judgment upon the
question.”17

It cannot be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution was deliberately, not
unconsciously, intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a departure
from the system embodied in the 1935 Constitution
where the Commission on Appointments exercised the power of confirmation over
almost all presidential appointments, leading to many cases of abuse of such
power of confirmation.  Subsection 3, Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution provided:

“3.     The President
shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall
appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the
Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of
captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose appoint­ments
are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint; x x x“

The deliberate limitation on the power of confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments over presidential appoint­ments, embodied in Sec.
16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitu­tion, has undoubtedly evoked the displeasure
and disapproval of members of Congress. 
The solution to the apparent problem, if indeed a problem, is not
judicial or legislative but constitutional. 
A future constitutional convention or Congress sitting as a constituent
(constitutional) assembly may then consider either a return to the 1935
Constitutional provisions or the adoption of a hybrid system between the 1935
and 1987 constitutional provisions. 
Until then, it is the duty of the Court to apply the 1987 Constitution
in accordance with what it says and not in accordance with how the legislature
or the executive would want it interpreted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.  Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA
6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
of appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and
effect.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera,
Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., see
concurring opinion.

Cruz, J., see dissent.

Bellosillo, J., took no part
in the deliberations.

^[1]
Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution

^[2]
G.R. No. 79974, 17 December 1987,
156 SCRA 549

^[3]
G.R. No. 86439, 13 April 1989,
172 SCRA 160

^[4]
G.R. No. 83216, 4 September 1989,
177 SCRA 259, 260

^[5]
Rollo, pp. 10-11

^[6]
Memorandum for respondents, Rollo, p. 8

^[7]
Supra at pp. 553-554

10 Art. 8, New Civil Code of the Philippines

11 Art. VIII, Sec. 4(3), 1987
Constitution

12 People vs. Jabinal, G.R. No. L-30061, 27 February 1974, 55 SCRA 607

13 G.R. Nos. L-6355-56, 31 August 1953, 93 Phil. 699

14 Ibid., pp. 701-702

15 Swisher, Carl Brent, The Supreme
Court in Modern Role, NYU Press, Inc., 1958, pp. 34-35

16 Ibid., former
Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott vs. Sandford, 19 Howard 393, 407, (1857), p. 147

17 Ibid., Justice
Roberts in United States
vs. Butler, 297 U.S.
I, 62-63 (1936), p. 170.

6 pt
6 pt
0
3

6 pt
6 pt
0
3