G.R. No. L-27876. April 22, 1992
ADELAIDA S. MANECLANG, IN HER CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE MARGARITA SURI SANTOS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JUAN T. BAUN AND AMPARO S. BAUN, ET …
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The issue presented in this case is the validity of a sale of a
parcel of land by the administrator of an intestate estate made pursuant to a
petition for authority to sell and an order granting it which were filed and
entered, respectively, without notice to the heirs of the decedent.
The records disclose that on 12 June 1947, Margarita Suri
Santos died intestate. She was survived
by her husband Severo Maneclang
and nine (9) children. On 30 July 1947, a petition for the
settlement of her estate was filed by Hector S. Maneclang,
one of her legitimate children, with the Court of First Instance at Dagupan City,
Pangasinan; the case was docketed as Special Proc.
No. 3028. At the time of the filing of
the petition, the ages of her children were as follows:
Hector Maneclang — 21 years old
Cesar Maneclang — 19
Oscar Maneclang — 17
Amanda Maneclang — 16
Adelaida Maneclang — 13
Linda Maneclang — 7
Priscila Maneclang — 6
Natividad Maneclang — 3
Teresita Manacling — 2
No guardian ad litem
was appointed by the court for the minor children.
Margarita left several parcels of land, among which is Lot No.
203 of the Cadastral Survey of Dagupan City
containing an area of 7,401 square meters, more or less, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1393.
On 2 September 1949, Pedro M. Feliciano, the administrator of the
intestate estate of Margarita, filed a petition in SP Proc. No. 3028 asking the
court to give him “the authority to dispose of so much of the estate that
is necessary to meet the debts enumerated” in the petition. While notice thereof was given to the
surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang,
through his counsel, Atty. Teofilo Guadiz, no such notice was sent to the heirs of Margarita.
On 9 September 1949,
despite the absence of notice to the heirs, the intestate court issued an Order
“authorizing the administrator to mortgage or sell so much of the
properties of the estate for the purposes (sic) of paying off the obligations”
referred to in the petition.
Pursuant to this Order, Oscar Maneclang,
the new administrator of the intestate estate, executed on 4 October 1952 a deed of sale[1]
in favor of the City of Dagupan,
represented by its mayor, Angel B. Fernandez, of a portion consisting of 4,515
square meters of the aforementioned Lot. No. 203 for and
in consideration of P11,687.50. This
sale was approved by the intestate court on 15 March 1954.
The City of Dagupan
immediately took possession of the land and constructed thereon a public
market, known as the Perez Boulevard Public Market, at a cost of P100,000.00
more or less. It has been in continuous
and uninterrupted possession of the property since the construction of the market.[2]
Some other parcels of land belonging to the intestate estate were
sold by the administrator pursuant to the same authority granted by the 9 September 1949 Order.[3]
On 28 September 1965, the new judicial administratrix
of the intestate estate, Adelaida S. Maneclang, daughter of the late Margarita Suri Santos, filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action for the annulment of the sales made by
the previous administrator pursuant to the Order of 9 September 1949,
cancellation of titles, recovery of possession and damages against the vendees
Juan T. Baun and Amparo Baun, Marcelo Operaña and Aurora Pagurayan, Crispino Tandoc and Brigida Tandoc, Jose Infante and Mercedes
Uy Santos, Roberto Cabugao,
Basilisa Callanta and Fe Callanta, Ricardo Bravo and Francisca Estrada, the City of Dagupan, and Constantino Daroya and Marciana Caramat[4]
The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. D-1785. The cause of action against the City of Dagupan centers around the deed of
sale executed in its favor on 4
October 1952 by former judicial administrator Oscar S. Maneclang. In its
Answer filed on 5 November 1965,[5]
the City of Dagupan interposed the following
affirmative defenses: (a) the sale in
its favor is valid, legal and above board; (b) plaintiff has no cause of action
against it, or that the same, if any, had prescribed since the complaint was
filed thirteen (13) years after the execution of the sale; (c) plaintiff is
barred by estoppel and by laches;
(d) it is a buyer in good faith, and (e) it has introduced necessary and useful
improvements and constructed a supermarket worth P200,000.00; hence, assuming arguendo that the sale was illegal, it has the right
to retain the land and the improvements until it is reimbursed for the said
improvements.
On 30 March 1966,
plaintiff and the City of Dagupan
entered into a Stipulation of Facts wherein they agreed on the facts earlier
adverted to. They, however, agreed: (a) to adduce evidence concerning the
reasonable rental of the property in question and other facts not embodied
therein but which are material and vital to the final determination of the
case, and (b) to request the court to take judicial notice of SP Proc. No.
3028.
The evidence adduced by plaintiff discloses that Oscar Maneclang was induced by its then incumbent Mayor, Atty.
Angel B. Fernandez, to sell the property to the City of Dagupan
and that the said City has been leasing the premises out to numerous tenants at
the rate of P0.83 per square meter per month, or a total monthly rental of
P3,747.45, since 4 October 1952.[6]
On 9 November 1966,
the trial court rendered a partial decision in Civil Case No. D-1785 against
the City of Dagupan,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby
renders judgment:
(a)
Annuling
(sic) the Deed of Sale
executed by the Administrator on October
4, 1952 (Exh. F) being null and void ab initio;
(b)
Ordering the cancellation of the
Certificate of Title issued in favor of the defendant City of Dagupan by virtue of said Deed of Sale, and directing the
Register of Deeds of said City to issue a new Certificate of Title in favor of
the plaintiff as Administratrix covering the property
in question;
(c)
Ordering the defendant
City of Dagupan
to restore the possession to the plaintiff in her capacity as Judicial Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Margarita Suri Santos of the parcel of land in question, together
with all the improvements thereon existing;
(d)
Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to pay the plaintiff the sum of P584,602.20 as accumulated
rentals or reasonable value of the use of the property in question from October
4, 1952 up to the filing of the complaint in 1965, plus interest thereon at the
rate of 6% per annum from the later date;
(e)
Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to pay a monthly rental or reasonable value of its
occupation of the premises in the amount of P3,747.45 from October 9, 1965 up
to the date the possession of the premises is delivered (sic) the plaintiff by
said defendant, and
(f)
Ordering the plaintiff to reimburse
the defendant City
of Dagupan the sums of P100,000.00 and P11,687.50
both amounts to be deducted from the amount due the plaintiff from said
defendant.
Defendant shall also pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.”[7]
In arriving at the said disposition, the trial court held that:
(a)
Under Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court,[8]
which is similar to the provisions of Section 722 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, it is essential and mandatory that the interested parties be given
notices of the application for authority to sell the estate or any portion
thereof which is pending settlement in a probate court. As held in the early case of Estate of Gamboa vs. Floranza,[9]
an order issued by a probate court for the sale of real property belonging to
the estate of a deceased person would be void if no notice for the hearing of
the petition for such sale is given as required by said Section 722. Under this section, when such a petition is
made, the court shall designate a time and place for the hearing and shall
require notice of the petition and of the time and place of such hearing to be
given in a newspaper of general circulation; moreover, the court may require
the giving of such further notice as it deems proper.
In the instant case, no
notice of the application was given to the heirs; hence, both the order
granting authority to sell and the deed of sale executed in favor of the City
of Dagupan
pursuant thereto, are null and void.
(b)
Estoppel
does not lie against plaintiff as no estoppel can be
predicated on an illegal act and estoppel is founded
on ignorance. In the instant case, the
nullity is by reason of the non?observance of the requirements of law
regarding notice; this legal defect or deficiency deprived the probate court of
its jurisdiction to dispose of the property of the estate. Besides, the City of Dagupan was represented in the
transaction by lawyers who are presumed to know the law. This being the case, they should not be
allowed to plead estoppel; finally, estoppel cannot give validity to an act which is prohibited
by law or is against public policy. [10]
(c)
Laches
and prescription do not apply. The deed
of sale being void ab initio,
it is in contemplation of law inexistent and therefore the right of the
plaintiff to bring the action for the declaration of inexistence of such contract
does not prescribe.[11]
(d)
The City of Dagupan
is not a purchaser in good faith and for value as the former judicial
administrator, Oscar Maneclang, testified that he was
induced by then incumbent Mayor of the City Atty. Angel B. Fernandez, and by
then City Councilor Atty. Teofilo Guadiz,
Sr. to sell the property; moreover, the City Fiscal signed as witness to the
deed of sale. These lawyers are presumed
to know the law.
Not satisfied with the decision, the City of Dagupan appealed to this Court[12]
alleging that said decision is contrary to law, the facts and the evidence on
record, and that the amount involved exceeds P500,000.00.
In its Brief, the City of Dagupan submits the following
assigned errors:
“FIRST ERROR
THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SALE
EXECUTED BY THE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR TO THE CITY OF DAGUPAN
IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
SECOND ERROR
THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF IS NOT IN ESTOPPEL FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY
OF THE SALE.
THIRD ERROR
THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY LACHES AND
PRESCRIPTION.
FOURTH ERROR
THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN DECLARING THAT DEFENDANT CITY
OF DAGUPAN IS NOT A PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE.
FIFTH ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANT CITY OF DAGUPAN TO PAY
THE PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF P584,602.20 AS ACCUMULATED RENTALS OR REASONABLE VALUE
OF (sic) THE USE OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION FROM OCTOBER 4, 1952 UP TO THE
FILING OF THE COMPLAINT IN 1965, PLUS INTEREST THEREON AT THE RATE OF 6% PER
ANNUM FROM THE LATER DATE.
SIXTH ERROR
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEFENDANT CITY OF DAGUPAN TO
PAY A MONTHLY RENTAL OR, REASONABLE VALUE OF (sic) ITS OCCUPATION OF THE
PREMISES IN THE AMOUNT OF P3,747.45 FROM OCTOBER 9, 1965 UP TO THE DATE THE
POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES IS DELIVERED TO THE PLAINTIFF BY SAID
DEFENDANT.”
We shall consider these assigned errors sequentially.
1. In support of the first,
appellant maintains that notice of the application for authority to sell was
given to Severo Maneclang,
surviving spouse of Margarita. As the
designated legal representative of the minor children in accordance with
Article 320 of the Civil Code, notice to him is deemed sufficient notice to the
latter; moreover, after Oscar Maneclang signed the
deed of sale[13]
in his capacity as judicial administrator, he “sent copies of his annual
report and the deed of sale to Severo Maneclang, and his brothers Hector Maneclang
and Oscar Maneclang and sister Amanda Maneclang, all of legal ages (sic), while the other minor
heirs received theirs through his lawyer.”[14]
Besides, per Flores vs. Ang Bansing,[15]
the sale of property by the judicial administrator cannot be set aside on the
sole ground of lack of notice.
These contentions are without merit.
Article 320 of the Civil Code does not apply. While the petition for authority to sell was
filed on 2 September 1949,
the Civil Code took effect only on 30
August 1950.[16]
Thus, the governing law at the time of the filing of the petition was Article
159 of the Civil Code of Spain which provides as follows:
“The father, or in his default, the mother, shall be the legal
administrator of the property of the children who are subject to parental
authority.”
However, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on
guardianship impliedly repealed those of the Civil code relating to that
portion of the patria potestad
(parental authority) which gave to the parents the administration and usufruct
of their minor children’s property; said parents were however entitled, under
normal conditions, to the custody and care of the persons of their minor
children.[17]
Article 320 of the present Civil Code, taken from the aforesaid
Article 159, incorporates the amendment that if the property under
administration is worth more than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00), the father or
the mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First
Instance. This provision then restores
the old rule[18]
which made the father or mother, as such, the administrator of the child’s
property. Be that as it may, it does not
follow that for purposes of complying with the requirement of notice under Rule
89 of the Rules of Court, notice to the father is notice to the children. Sections 2, 4 and 7 of said Rule state
explicitly that the notice, which must be in writing, must be given to the heirs,
devisees, and legatees and that the court shall fix a time and place for
hearing such petition and cause notice to be given to the interested parties.
There can be no dispute that if the heirs were duly represented
by counsel or by a guardian ad litem in
the case of the minors, the notice may be given to such counsel or guardian ad
litem.
In this case, however, only the surviving spouse, Severo
Maneclang, was notified through his counsel. Two of the heirs, Hector Maneclang
and Oscar Maneclang, who were then of legal age, were
not represented by counsel. The
remaining seven (7) children were still minors with no guardian ad litem having been appointed to represent them. Obviously then, the requirement of notice was
not satisfied. The requisite set forth
in the aforesaid sections of Rule 89 are mandatory and essential. Without them, the authority to sell, the sale
itself and the order approving it would be null and void ab
initio.[19]
The reason behind this requirement is that the heirs, as the presumptive owners[20]
since they succeed to all the rights and obligations of the deceased from the
moment of the latter’s death,[21]
are the persons directly affected by the sale or mortgage and therefore cannot
be deprived of the property except in the manner provided by law.
Consequently, for want of notice to the children, the Order of 9 September 1949 granting the
application, the sale in question of 4
October 1952 and the Order of 15 March 1954 approving the sale are all void ab initio as
against said children. Severo Maneclang, however, stands
on different ground altogether. Having
been duly notified of the application, he was bound by the said order, sale and
approval of the latter. However, the
only interest which Severo Maneclang
would have over the property is his right of usufruct which is equal to that
corresponding by way of legitime pertaining to each
of the surviving children pursuant to Article 834 of the Civil Code of Spain,
the governing law at that time since Margarita Suri
Santos died before the effectivity of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.
2. Estoppel is unavailable as an
argument against the administratrix of the estate and
against the children.
As to the former, this Court, in Boñaga
vs. Soler,
supra, reiterated the rule “that a decedent’s representative
is not estopped to question the validity of his own
void deed purporting to convey land;[22]
and if this be true of the administrator as to his own acts, a fortiori,
his successor can not be estopped to question the
acts of his predecessor are not conformable to law.”[23]
Not being the party who petitioned the court for authority to sell and who
executed the sale, she cannot be held liable for any act or omission which could
give rise to estoppel. Under Article 1431 of the Civil Code, through
estoppel an admission or representation is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as
against the person relying thereon. In estoppel by pais, as
related to the party sought to be estopped, it is
necessary that there be a concurrence of the following requisites: (a) conduct amounting to false representation
or concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the
impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those
which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (b) intent, or at least
expectation that this conduct shall be acted upon, or at least influenced by
the other party; and (c) knowledge, actual or constructive of the actual facts.[24]
In estoppel by conduct, on the other hand, (a) there
must have been a representation or concealment of material facts; (b) the
representation must have been with knowledge of the facts; (c) the party to
whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter; and (d) it
must have been made with the intention that the other party would act upon it.[25]
As to the latter, considering that, except as to Oscar Maneclang who executed the deed of sale in his capacity as
judicial administrator, the rest of the heirs did not participate in such sale,
and considering further that the action was filed solely by the administratrix without the children being impleaded as parties plaintiffs or intervenors,
there is neither rhyme nor reason to hold these heirs in estoppel. For having executed the deed of sale, Oscar Maneclang is deemed to have assented to both the motion for
and the actual order granting the authority to sell. Estoppel operates
solely against him.
3. As to prescription, this Court ruled in the Boñaga case that “[a]ctions
to declare the inexistence of contracts do not prescribe (Art. 1410, N.C.C.), a
principle applied even before the effectivity of the
new Civil Code (Eugenio, et al. vs. Perdido, et al., supra., citing Tipton vs. Velasco,
6 Phil. 67, and Sabas vs. Germa,
66 Phil. 471).”
4. Laches is different from
prescription. As this Court held in Nielson
& Co., Inc. vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.,[26]
the defense of laches applies independently of
prescription. While prescription is
concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned
with the effect of delay. Prescription
is a matter of time; laches is principally a question
of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded
on some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the
parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at
law. Prescription is based on fixed
time, laches is not.
The essential elements of laches are
the following: (1) conduct on the part
of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation
of which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2)
delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of
the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his
suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.[27]
In the instant case, from the time the deed of sale in favor of
the City of Dagupan was executed on 4 October 1952,
up to the time of the filing of the complaint for annulment on 28 September
1965, twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-four (24) days had elapsed.
The respective ages of the children of Margarita Suri Santos on these two dates were, more or less, as follows:
Upon execution of At the filing
the deed of sale of the complaint
Hector Maneclang 26 39
Cesar Maneclang 24 37
Oscar Maneclang 22 35
Amanda Maneclang 21 34
Adelaida Maneclang 18 31
Linda Maneclang 12 25
Priscila Maneclang
11 24
Natividad Maneclang 8 21
Teresita Maneclang 7 20
It is an undisputed fact that the City of
Dagupan
immediately took possession of the property and constructed thereon a public
market; such possession was open, uninterrupted and continuous. Obviously, Hector, Cesar, Oscar and Amanda
were already of legal age when the deed of sale was executed. As it was Oscar who executed the deed of sale,
he cannot be expected to renounce his own act.
With respect to Hector, Cesar and Amanda, they should have taken
immediate steps to protect their rights.
Their failure to do so for thirteen (13) years amounted to such inaction
and delay as to constitute laches. This conclusion, however, cannot apply to the
rest of the children — Adelaida, Linda, Priscila, Natividad and Teresita — who were then minors and not represented by any
legal representative. They could not
have filed an action to protect their interests; hence, neither delay nor
negligence could be attributed to them as a basis for laches. Accordingly, the estate is entitled to
recover 5/9 of the questioned property.
5. In ruling out good faith, the trial court took into account
the testimony of Oscar Maneclang to the effect that
it was Mayor Fernandez of Dagupan
City and Councilor Teofilo Guadiz, Sr., both
lawyers, who induced him to sell the property and that the execution of the
sale was witnessed by the City Fiscal.
We are unable to agree.
While the order granting the motion for authority to sell was
actually issued on 9 September 1949,
the same was secured during the incumbency of the then judicial administrator
Pedro Feliciano. Even if it is to be
assumed that Mayor Fernandez and Councilor Guadiz
induced Oscar Maneclang to sell the property, the
fact remains that there was already the order authorizing the sale. Having been issued by a judge who was
lawfully appointed to his position, he was disputably presumed to have acted in
the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and that his official duty was regularly
performed.[28]
It was not incumbent upon them to go beyond the order to find out if indeed
there was a valid motion for authority to sell.
Otherwise, no order of any court can be relied upon by the parties. Under Article 526 of the Civil Code, a
possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his title
or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it; furthermore, mistake upon
a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith. It implies freedom from knowledge and
circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry.[29]
We find no circumstance in this case to have alerted the vendee, the City of Dagupan, to a possible flaw or
defect in the authority of the judicial administrator to sell the
property. Since good faith is always
presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests
the burden of proof,[30]
it was incumbent upon the administrator to establish such proof, which We find
to be wanting. However, Article 528 of
the Civil Code provides that: “Possession
acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from
tie moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he
possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.” The filing of a case
alleging bad faith on the part of a vendee gives cause for cessation of good
faith.
In Tacas vs. Tobon,[31]
this Court held that if there are no other facts from which the interruption of
good faith may be determined, and an action is filed to recover possession,
good faith ceases from the date of receipt of the summons to appear at the
trial and if such date does not appear in the record, that of the filing of the
answer would control.[32]
The date of service of summons to the City of Dagupan in Civil Case No. D-1785
is not clear from the record. Its
Answer, however, was filed on 5 November l965.
Accordingly, its possession in good faith must be considered to have
lasted up to that date. As a possessor
in good faith, it was entitled to all the fruits of the property and was under no
obligation to pay any rental to the intestate estate of Margarita for the use
thereof. Under Article 544 of the Civil
Code, a possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the
possession is legally interrupted. Thus,
the trial court committed an error when it ordered the City of Dagupan to pay accumulated rentals
in the amount of P584,602.20 from 4
October 1952 up to the filing of the complaint.
6. However, upon the filing of the Answer, the City of Dagupan already became a possessor
in bad faith. This brings Us to the
issue of reasonable rentals, which the trial court fixed at P3,747.45 a
month. The basis therefor
is the monthly earnings of the city from the lessees of the market stalls
inside the Perez Boulevard Supermarket.
The lessees were paying rental at the rate of P0.83 per square
meter. Appellant maintains that this is
both unfair and unjust. The property in
question is located near the Chinese cemetery and at the time of the questioned
sale, it had no access to the national road, was located “in the
hinterland” and, as admitted by the former judicial administrator, Oscar Maneclang, the persons who built houses thereon prior to
the sale paid only P6.00 to P8.00 as monthly rentals and the total income from
them amounted only to P40.00 a month.
Appellant contends that it is this income which should be made the basis
for determining the reasonable rental for the use of the property.
There is merit in this contention since indeed, if the rental
value of the property had increased, it would be because of the construction by
the City of Dagupan
of the public market and not as a consequence of any act imputable to the
intestate estate. It cannot, however, be
denied that considering that the property is located within the city, its value
would never decrease; neither can it be asserted that its price remained
constant. On the contrary, the land
appreciated in value at least annually, if not monthly. It is the opinion of this Court that the
reasonable compensation for the use of the property should be fixed at
P1,000.00 a month. Taking into account
the fact that Severo Maneclang,
insofar as his usufructuary right is concerned, but
only until his death, is precluded from assailing the sale, having been
properly notified of the motion for authority to sell and considering further
that the heirs, Hector, Cesar, Oscar and Amanda, all surnamed Maneclang, are, as discussed above, barred by laches, only those portions of the monthly rentals which
correspond to the presumptive shares of Adelaida,
Linda, Priscila, Natividad
and Teresita, all surnamed Maneclang,
to the extent untouched by the usufructuary right of Severo Maneclang, should be paid
by the City of Dagupan. There is no showing as to when Severo Maneclang died; this date
of death is necessary to be able to determine the cessation of his usufructuary right and the commencement of the full
enjoyment of the fruits of the property by the unaffected heirs. Under the circumstances, and for facility of
computation, We hereby fix the presumptive shares in the rentals of the aforenamed unaffected heirs at P500.00 a month, or at
P100.00 each, effective 5 November 1965 until the City of Dagupan
shall have effectively delivered to the intestate estate 5/9 of the property in
question. The latter, however, shall
reimburse the City of Dagupan of that portion of the
real estate taxes it had paid on the land corresponding to 5/9 of the lot
commencing from taxable year 1965 until said 5/9 part is effectively delivered
to the intestate estate.
Pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code, the City of Dagupan may retain possession of
the property until it shall have been fully reimbursed the value of the
building in the amount of P100,000.00 and 5/9 of the purchase price amounting
to P6,493.05.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the
decision in all respects, except to the extent as above modified. As modified, (a) the sale in favor of the
City of Dagupan, executed on 4 October 1952 (Exhibit
“F”), is hereby declared null and void; however, by reason of estoppel and laches as abovestated, only 5/9 of the subject property representing
the presumptive shares of Adelaida, Linda, Priscila, Natividad and Teresita, all surnamed Maneclang,
may be recovered; (b) subject, however, to its right to retain the property
until it shall have been refunded the amounts of P100,000.00 and P6,493.05, the
City of Dagupan is hereby ordered to reconvey to the intestate estate of Margarita Suri Santos 5/9 of the property in question, for which
purpose said parties shall cause the appropriate partition thereof, expenses
for which shall be borne by them proportionately; and (c) the City of Dagupan is further ordered to pay reasonable compensation
for the use of 5/9 of the property in question at the rate of P500.00 a month
from 5 November 1965 until it shall have effectively delivered the possession
of the property to the intestate estate of Margarita Suri
Santos. Upon the other hand, said
intestate estate is hereby ordered to refund to the City of Dagupan
that portion of the real estate taxes the latter had paid for the lot
corresponding to 5/9 thereof effective taxable year 1965 and until the latter
shall have been delivered to said intestate estate.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin,
and Romero, JJ., concur.
[1]
Exhibit “F”.
[2]
Stipulation of Facts submitted by the parties in Civil Case No. D-1787, Record
on Appeal 17-21.
[3] Id.,
24.
[4]
Record on Appeal, 2-11.
[5] Id.,
13-17.
[6]
Decision of the trial court, Record on Appeal, 32-33.
[7] Record
on Appeal, 33-35.
[8]
Now Rule 89.
[9]
12 Phil. 193 [1908]; see also Boñaga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755 [1961].
[10]
Citing Eugenio vs. Perdido,
L-7083, 19 May 1955.
[11]
Citing Article 1410, Civil Code; Tipton vs. Velasco, 6 Phil. 67 [1906]; Asturias vs. Court of
Appeals, 9 SCRA 131 [1963].
[12]
Record on Appeal, 35-36.
[13] Op.
cit., Exhibit “F”.
[14]
Brief for Appellant, 7-8.
[15]
C.A.-G.R. No. 22746-R, 16 July 1959.
[16]
Lara vs. Del Rosario, 94 Phil. 778 [1954].
[17] lbañez de Aldecoa vs. Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, 30 Phil. 228 [1915].
[18]
PARAS, E.L. Civil Code of the Philippines
Annotated, vol. I, eleventh ed. 1984, 742.
[19] Boñaga vs. Soler, supra.,
citing Arcilla vs. David, 77 Phil. 718 [1946]
and Gabriel vs. Encarnacion, L-6736, 4 May 1954. See also The Estate of Luis Gamboa Carpizo vs. Floranza, 12 Phil. 191 [1908], applying and interpreting a
similar provision of the Code of Civil Procedure.
[20] Ortaliz vs. The Registrar of Deeds of the Province
of Occidental Negros, 55 Phil. 33 [1930].
[21] Buenaventura
and Del Rosario vs. Ramos, 43 Phil. 704 [1922].
[22]
Citing Chase vs. Cartwright, 22 Am. St. Rep.
207, and cases cited; Meeks vs. Olpherts, 25
L. Ed. (U.S.)
735; 21 Am. Jur. 756, s. 667.
[23]
Citing Cf. Walker vs. Portland Savings Bank, LRA 1915 E, p. 840; 21 Am. Jur. p. 820, s. 785.
[24] Kalalo vs. Luz, 34 SCRA 337 [1970].
[25]
De Castro vs. Ginete, 27 SCRA 623 [1969].
[26]
18 SCRA 1040 [1966], citing 30 C.J.S. 522; Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, vol.
2, 5th ed. 177.
[27]
Go Chi Gun vs. Go Cho, 96 Phil. 622 [1955];
Abraham vs. Recto-Kasten, 4 SCRA 298 [1962]; Vergara vs. Vergara, 5
SCRA 53 [1962]; Yusingco vs. Ong Hing Lian,
42 SCRA 589 [1971].
[28]
Section 3 (n) and (m), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
[29]
TOLENTINO, A., Civil Code of the Philippines,
vol. II, 1983 ed., 217.
[30]
Article 527, Civil Code.
[31] 53
Phil. 356 [1929].
[32]
TOLENTINO, op. cit., 226.