G.R. No. 91129. August 25, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO PABLO Y DOLLOSO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Accused Antonio Pablo y Dolloso was charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cavite City on 29 January 1986 for violating Section 4, Article
II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972.[1]
The accusatory portion of the information reads:
“That on or about January 29, 1986, in the City of Cavite,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without legal authority, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly deliver and sell to a poseur buyer one (1)
slice of marijuana cake and one (1) aluminum foil of dried marijuana
leaves.”
The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 21-86.
Accused entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on 17 March
1986.[2]
At the trial, the prosecution established its case through the testimonies of
P/Sgt, Rodrigo Espiritu and T/Sgt. Jacinto dela Cruz, both members of the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) Unit stationed at Noveleta, Cavite, and Constancia
Franco-Salonga, a forensic chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The accused through his and his friend
Rodymir Calalang’s testimony, set up the defense of denial.
On 4 May 1987, the trial court promulgated its judgment
convicting the appellant of the crime charged and sentencing him:
“x x x to undergo imprisonment of from twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, to pay a fine
of P5,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
the costs.”[3]
Accused appealed from said decision through a notice of appeal
which does not indicate the court to which he is appealing.[4]
Considering the penalty imposed, the Branch Clerk of Court transmitted the
records of the case to the Court of Appeals[5] which
then docketed the same as C.A.-G.R. No. 05265.
In the Appellant’s Brief filed with the Court of Appeals,[6]
the accused makes the following assignment of errors:
“1. . . the Trial
Court erred in finding accused guilty of violation (sic) of Section 4, Article
II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended without the prosecution presenting the
‘Informer’ who was alleged to be the buyer of marijuana cake from the accused.
x x x
. . .the Trial Court erred in finding accused
guilty of the crime charged unsupported by positive facts and contrary to law
and evidence.
x x x
. . .the Trial Court erred in giving full credit to the testimonies
of Police Sgts. Rodrigo Espiritu and Jacinto de la Cruz who were not buyers of
the marijuana cake nor heard (sic) the conversation that took place between
accused and informer.
x x x
. . .the Trial Court erred in disregarding
and discrediting the testimony of accused and his corroborating witness and
without giving exculpatory weight to the evidence of the defense.”[7]
After the Appellee filed its Brief through the Office of the
Solicitor General, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision on 23 November 1989[8]
affirming the appealed decision with a modification of the penalty imposed for
being incorrect. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
modified in the sense that the accused-appellant Antonio Pablo y Dolloso is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation (sic) of Section 4, Republic
Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and
is sentenced to life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of P20,000.00, and the
cost.
However, the judgment herein shall not be entered and the case
shall be, as it is hereby certified to the Supreme Court and the entire records
thereof elevated thereto for review (Section 12, of Rule 124 of the Rules of
Court; People vs. Daniel, 86 SCRA 511; People vs. Ramos, 88 SCRA 486; People
vs. Centeno, 108 SCRA 710).
SO ORDERED.”[9]
Pursuant to the last paragraph of the dispositive portion, the
Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals forwarded to this Court the entire
records of this case, together with the transcript of the stenographic notes
and exhibits, on 8 December 1989.[10]
This Court required the accused to file his Brief, which he did
on 13 March 1990. He merely reiterated
the errors and arguments raised in the Brief he filed with the Court of
Appeals. The Solicitor General filed
the Appellee’s Brief on 21 June 1990.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are
as follows:
“At the trial the prosecution has established that at about
8:00 o’clock in the morning of January 28, 1986 an informer by the name of
‘Bobby’ told Sgt. Jacinto dela Cruz of the NARCOM Unit stationed at Noveleta,
Cavite that a certain ‘Boy Roberts’ whose real name is Antonio Pablo y Dolloso
(herein accused-appellant) of Cavite City was selling marijuana. Immediately Lt. Jorge Corpuz,
Officer-in-Charge, designated Sgt. Jacinto dela Cruz and Sgt. Rodrigo Espiritu
to form a team and conduct a ‘buy-bust operation.’ At 8:30 that same morning,
the team together with Bobby proceeded to Cavite City and arrived at around
9:00 o’clock at Dubai Street near San Sebastian College, Cavite City. From there, they went to Ejercito St., Sta
Cruz, Cavite, where Bobby pointed to the house of the accused. After closely watching the accused’s place
for some time, the team and Bobby returned to the place of the rendezvous near
San Sebastian College. Sgt. dela Cruz
instructed Bobby to buy from the accused one (1) slice of marijuana cake and
one (1) foil of marijuana leaves by using four (4) marked P5.00 bills. Sgt. dela Cruz supplied the amount of P20.00
in marked bills. They told Bobby to
give a pre-arranged signal, by lifting his shirt, after the marijuana cake and
marijuana leaves had been handed to him. Sgts. dela Cruz and Espiritu saw Bobby stop in front of the accused’s
house and called for ‘Boy Roberts’. The
latter appeared and after a short conversation, the aforenamed officers saw
Bobby hand the P20.00 marked bills to the accused who entered his residence and
after a while returned with something wrapped in a tin foil and gave it to
Bobby. Upon seeing the pre-arranged
signal, the two (2) officers swooped down on the accused and arrested him. On the spot, the officers recovered from the
accused the marked bills and from Bobby one slice of marijuana cake and one (1)
foil of marijuana leaves. The accused
did not resist arrest. Sgt. dela Cruz
and Sgt. Espiritu went inside the house of the accused. Upon further investigation the accused
brought out three (3) cakes of marijuana which he kept inside the refrigerator
and five (5) foils of marijuana leaves which he took from a yellow plastic can
near the water tank outside the house. The officers together the (sic) accused passed by the Cavite Police
Station before returning to their headquarters at Noveleta, Cavite. Thereafter, the accused without the
assistance of counsel was investigated by Sgt. Manolo.
On the same date, January 28, 1986, Lt. Jose Jorge E. Corpuz,
Officer-In-Charge of the Narcotic Command, Cavite District Office, Noveleta,
Cavite submitted to the Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Manila a
written request for laboratory examination to determine the presence of
prohibited or regulated drugs of the following: one (1) foil of marijuana dried leaves, three (3) bricks of
brownies cake (marijuana cakes), and five (5) foils of marijuana dried leaves
(Exh. A). The aforementioned specimens
were received by Research Chemist Constancia Franco Salonga (Exh. B). After conducting the microscopic, chemical,
and chromatographic examinations on (1) one small brick of brownie cake
allegedly containing marijuana and (2) one foil containing dried leaves
suspected to be marijuana, Research Chemist Ms. Salonga found that said
specimens gave positive results of marijuana (Exh. C-2). Ms. Salonga testified on the examinations
she conducted and the findings she made on the aforementioned specimens.
The defense of the accused-appellant, 34, consists of denials. According to him, he does not know Bobby but
knew the informer as Andoy. At about
10:00 in the morning of January 28, 1986, while he was fixing his bed on the
lawn inside the gate of his house, Sgt. dela Cruz, Sgt. Espiritu and Andoy
arrived in a motor vehicle. Immediately
after having alighted, Sgt. dela Cruz and Sgt. Espiritu pointed their guns at
him and told him to run. Andoy who was
carrying a brown paper bag went up his house. With ihis (sic) gun, Sgt. dela Cruz hit him (accused) three times while
at standing (sic) position and two times while lying prostrate on the drive
way. Sgt. Espiritu was pointing a gun
at him. A little later, Andoy came down
from the house carrying an orange colored bag which was the same bag presented
to the trial court by Fiscal Fred Aguilar. Andoy told the officers that the bag contained marijuana cake
(sic). Sgt. dela Cruz then told him to
go up the house and show them the bedroom. Sgt. dela Cruz directed Andoy to search the room, but they did not find
any marijuana there. Fifteen (15)
minutes thereafter, Sgt. Espiritu came up, carrying a yellow plastic container
which, according to the officer, was found near the water tank, and contained
marijuana. Andoy also searched the
bedroom of his mother, but he did not find anything. The accused knew Andoy as a NARCOM informer. The gas stove presented by Fiscal Aguilar
was taken from their house which they utilized whenever there is no electricity.
Accused-appellant also declared that Andoy nursed ill-feelings
against him, because he bested Andoy in their courtship of a certain Grace who
was a waitress at Violy’s refreshment parlor at San Antonio.
Accused-appellant denied that Sgt. dela Cruz had taken from him
four (4) P5.00 marked bills. He stated
that while he was being investigated at the NARCOM headquarters at Noveleta,
Sgt. dela Cruz took out from his wallet a P20.00 bill, which he asked to be
changed into four P5.00 bills upon which Sgt. dela Cruz placed markings.
However, on cross-examination, accused-appellant declared that he
does not know of any reason why Sgt. dela Cruz and Sgt. Espiritu would falsely
accuse him of selling prohibited drugs except what had happened between him and
Andoy, and that he would not know if the two (2) officers would connive with
Andoy to falsely accuse him of selling marijuana.
Corroborating the accused was Rodimar Calalang, 21, a friend of five (5) years and neighbor at
Ejercito St.”[11]
The first three (3) assigned errors raise the issue of whether or
not the evidence for the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused sold marijuana in violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended. It is the thesis
of the accused that without having presented the informer who posed as buyer,
the fact of sale could not be established.
In disposing of these assigned errors and issue, the Court of
Appeals held:
“We do not
agree. It has been established that
Sgt. dela Cruz gave Bobby, their informer, four (4) P5.00 marked bills with
which to buy marijuana cake and one (1) foil of marijuana dried leaves from
accused?appellant. Sgt. dela Cruz instructed Bobby that as
soon as the accused should have given or delivered the marijuana cake and
marijuana dried leaves to him, he would lift his shirt which was the signal for
them to make the arrest. Sgt. dela Cruz
and Sgt. Espiritu testified that they saw Bobby talk to the accused-appellant
and thereafter hand the P20.00 bill to him. Thereafter, accused appellant went inside his house and immediately came
back with the marijuana cake and one marijuana leaves (sic) in a tin foil. When Bobby lifted his shirt, the two (2)
officers swooped down on accused-appellant and arrested him. The fact that the two (2) officers did not
hear what conversation transpired between Bobby and the accused-appellant is
immaterial for the purpose of establishing the sale. Considering the fact that money was handed by Bobby to the
accused?appellant and immediately thereafter
the latter delivered to the former the subject marijuana cake and marijuana
leaves, there can be no transaction established other than that of a sale. The
burden of proof that it was not a sale was shifted to the accused?appellant. In the case at bar, the accused-appellant
did not overcome that burden. He did
not present any evidence to disprove that it was a sale either by himself or by
the informer whom he knew by the
name of Andoy. Consequently, the fact of sale stood unrebutted. Indeed, Section 2 of Republic Act 6425, as
amended par. (o) defines ‘sale’
to mean the act of giving a dangerous drug whether for money or any other
material consideration.”[12]
As to the fourth assigned error, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
trial court properly rejected the version of the accused. Thus:
“The defense which accused-appellant set up at the trial is
that the marijuana cake and the marijuana dried leaves submitted by the
prosecution to the lower court were planted evidence. The trial court who has observed the demeanor of the witnesses presented by both the
prosecution and the defense gave credence to the witnesses for the prosecution
and concluded that the crime charged in the information was proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Aside from the
settled rule that the findings of
fact of the trial court which depend upon the proper evaluation of credibility
of witnesses are given great weight on appeal and are not usually disturbed
unless there is a showing of strong and cogent reasons therefor,[13]
it is really incredible that Sgt. dela Cruz
and Sgt. Espiritu who
have not been shown to have any personal motive of falsely charging the accused
with a capital offense would do so merely to satisfy the alleged humiliation of
Andoy, the informer, whom the accused-appellant had allegedly bested in the
courtship of a certain Grace assuming such courtship to be true. And to what extent of moral influence or
ascendency (sic) has Andoy over the two officers who testified against him, the
accused-appellant has not even attempted to show. It has been repeatedly held that there is no test of the truth of
human testimony except its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of
mankind.[14]
To be believed the testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but must be credible in itself.[15]
Measured by this criteria, We cannot believe that Sgt. dela Cruz and Sgt.
Espiritu would have taken time and effort to drive from their headquarters at
Noveleta, Cavite to Ejercito St., Sta. Cruz, Cavite City and planted as
evidence the marijuana cake and marijuana leaves that were submitted to the
National Bureau of Investigation for examination and which were found to be
positive as to the presence of marijuana just to satisfy the whims of a certain
Andoy, who was known to the officers as Bobby, their informer. We hold that no reasonable prudent man would
believe appellant’s theory of defense, which was easy to concoct, but hard to
believe.”[16]
After a painstaking examination of the records of this case,
evaluation of the evidence adduced and review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals certified to Us, We find the latter to be fully supported by the
evidence; moreover, We rule that the modification of the sentence is correct,
except that the portion on subsidiary imprisonment should have been likewise
deleted.
Notwithstanding the sufficiency of the findings and conclusions
of the Court of Appeals, however, We wish to amplify certain points.
In support of his three (3) assigned errors, accused stresses
that: (a) there was no reason to
withhold the testimony of the poseur-buyer because the latter was known to him,
hence, the danger to the poseur-buyer’s person sought to be avoided by not
revealing his identity does not exist; the non-presentation then of the
poseur-buyer gives rise to the presumption that his testimony would be adverse
to the prosecution;[17] (b) it was improbable that he would
commit the offense because it is contrary to human experience for a drug pusher
to sell marijuana in the open;
and (c) there is no showing that the slice of marijuana cake and one foil of
dried marijuana leaves are the same items allegedly taken from him.
We find these contentions to
be bereft of merit.
There was no suppression of evidence when the poseur-buyer was
not presented. Firstly, his testimony
would at best be corroborative because Sgt. Dela Cruz and Sgt. Espiritu were
themselves eyewitnesses to the delivery of the marked P5.00 bills by Bobby, the
informer, to the accused and the subsequent delivery of the marijuana cake and
marijuana leaves by the latter to the former. His non-presentation was not fatal to
the prosecution’s case. Secondly, having admitted that Bobby is known to him, accused could have
called him to the witness stand as a hostile witness. Of course, if he chose this strategy he would be doing so at his
own risk. As held by this Court in People vs. Raul Fernandez:[18]
“There is as well no merit in the claim of the accused that
the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer as a witness is a clear suppression of
evidence. The testimony of the
poseur-buyer, if it were given, would at best be corroborative because Navarro
and Feliciano sufficiently established how the crime was committed. Thus his non-presentation was not fatal to
the prosecution’s case.[19] Of
course, it would be different if the police officers were unable to see the
actual sale of marijuana. In such a
situation, an exception arises and the poseur-buyer should be presented as a
witness.[20]
Besides, there is no showing in this case that the poseur-buyer was not
available for examination. If the
accused honestly believed that the testimony of such poseur-buyer would be
adverse to the prosecution, the former should have availed of the compulsory
process to have such poseur-buyer produced as witness, or even as a hostile
witness.”
The presumption laid down in Section 3(e), Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:
“(e) That evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced;”
does not apply when the testimony of the
witness is merely corroborative. As
early as 1912, in United States vs.
Gonzales,[21] this Court already held:
“When an act has been witnessed by several persons, the
prosecution has no need, nor is it obliged, to present all such witnesses, but
only those it deems necessary; it is enough that it employ such witnesses as in
its opinion may be sufficient to prove the facts alleged in the
complaint.”
In United States vs. Dinola,[22]
this Court pointedly ruled that:
“The presumption that the evidence omitted by a party would, if
presented, be adverse to him, is not applicable to merely corroborative
evidence.”
Neither does it apply in cases where the witness, as in this
case, is available to the accused[23]
because then, the evidence would have the same weight against one party as
against the other.[24]
In People vs. Andiza,[25] We
had the occasion to state that although Patrolman Hernandez and the civilian
informer could have been highly competent witnesses, being themselves the
poseur-buyers, their testimonies were not, however, indispensable in view of
the declarations of not only one (1), but two (2) other eyewitnesses. Their non-presentation as witnesses does not mean suppression of
testimony that is adverse to the prosecution. Besides, the matter of presenting witnesses is the prerogative of the Prosecutor.
And in the more recent case of People vs. Bati,[26] this Court held:
“In the case at bar, there were other prosecution witnesses
who testified and positively identified appellant as the principal participant
in the illegal transaction. Both
Patrolmen Luciano and Caraan actually witnessed the same and their
testimonies were based on their actual and personal knowledge of the events
that took place leading to appellant’s arrest. They may not have been within hearing distance, specially since
conversation would expectedly be carried on in hushed tones, but they were
certainly near enough to observe the movements of the appellant and the
buyer. Moreover, these prosecution
witnesses are all law enforcers and are, therefore, presumed to have regularly
performed their duties in the absence of proof to the contrary. (People vs. Agapito, G.R. No. 73786, Oct.
12, 1987).”
As to the second point, We have held in a number of cases that
drug pushing, when done on a small level, belongs to that class of crimes which
may be committed at any time and at any place. The fact that the parties are in a public place and in the presence of
other people may not always discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade
as these facts may even serve to camouflage the same.[27]
As to the third point, the prosecution, via the testimony of Sgt.
Espiritu, sufficiently established that the slice of marijuana cake and the
foil of dried marijuana leaves were the items taken from the accused. Thus, Sgt. Espiritu testified:
“Q Now,
in a plastic evidence bag
identified as Exh. E-6 the contents is (sic) a brick of marijuana cake as
testified to by the Forensic Chemist, what connection has that to the brick which
was the subject matter of the buy-bust operation?
A This
was the brick that he sold.
Q Why do you say so?
A We
asked him also to sign and his signature appears here.
Q Where?
A (witness
pointing to a signature over the brick)
x x x
Q Now,
what about that foil of marijuana cigarettes that was the result of the
buy-bust operation, where is it now?
A (witness
pointing to a foil of marijuana which was previously marked as Exh. E-5)
Q Why
are you sure that that is the foil of marijuana that was the result of that
buy-bust operation?
A We also have him signed, (sic) sir.
x x x
FISCAL
AGUILAR:
Q I
am showing to you a receipt dated January 8, 1986 certifying that the
undersigned has seized and taken possession of the property herein described
from Antonio Pablo y Dolloso, what connection has that receipt with the receipt
you issued?
A This
is the receipt of the property seized and that was prepared by Jacinto dela
Cruz.
FISCAL AGUILAR:
We request that the same
be marked as Exh. G.
Q Whose
signature is this, reading Jacinto dela Cruz?
A To
him (sic), sir.
Q Are
you (sic) present when it was signed by him?
A Yes,
sir.
Q Below
Sgt. dela Cruz’s signature is the signature of one Antonio Pablo, whose
signature is that?
A That
is Antonio Pablo’s signature, sir.
Q Were
you also present when he signed it?
A Yes,
sir.
FISCAL AGUILAR:
I request that these two
signatures be marked as Exh. G-1.
COURT:
Mark it.
FISCAL AGUILAR:
Immediately after these
items were confiscated or recovered from the accused, where did you take it
(sic)?
A It
was (sic) brought to the NBI for laboratory examination, sir.
Q Who
brought it there?
A CIC
Roberto Genido, sir.”[28]
Moreover, Constancia Franco Salonga, the forensic chemist who
examined the contents of the foil and brick of brownie cake obtained from the
accused, testified that after conducting microscopic, chemical and
chromatographic examinations thereon, she concluded that the same were positive
for marijuana.[29]
Finally, We come to the penalty imposed by the trial court which
is imprisonment “of from twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum,” and a fine of P5,000.00.
We are unable to trace the legal basis of this penalty. According to the Court of Appeals, the trial
court applied the provisions of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425 before
it was amended by P.D. No. 1675 which took effect on 17 February 1980. Before such amendment, the penalty provided
for in said section was “imprisonment ranging from twelve years and one
day to twenty years and a fine ranging from twelve thousand to twenty thousand
pesos;” however, should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under said
section be the proximate cause of the death of the victim thereof, the penalty
imposable was life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) to thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos.
Thus, even under the pre-amendment provision, the penalty imposed
is still incorrect for the trial court exceeded the maximum by one (1) day and
fixed the fine at an amount very much less than the minimum provided therein. It likewise designated the penalty as reclusion
temporal; nowhere in the law does such a designation appear. Perhaps, it thought all along that since the
range is that for reclusion temporal, it might be best to so designate
the penalty as such. Furthermore,
considering that the penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional,
no subsidiary imprisonment could be imposed pursuant to paragraph 3, Article 39
of the Revised Penal Code.
As amended by P.D. No.
1675, the penalty provided for Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425 is life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to
P30,000.000. However, the death
penalty can no longer be imposed pursuant to the 1987 Constitution.[30]
Accordingly, the proper penalty to be imposed should be life
imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the
decision appealed from finding the accused ANTONIO PABLO y DOLLOSO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No.
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and
sentencing him, as above
modified, to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., (Chairman), Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., on official
leave.
[1]
Rollo, 4.
[2]
Original Records, 7.
[3]
Id., 91-92.
[4]
Id., 95.
[5]
C.A., Rollo, 3.
[6]
Id., 25, et seq.
[7]
Pages 6, 12, 14 and 16 of Brief, no pagination in C.A. records.
[8]
C.A. Rollo, 37-44. Per Associate
Justice Celso L. Magsino, concurred in by Associate Justices Nathanael P. de
Pano, Jr. and Alicia V. Sempio-Diy.
[9]
At page 44.
[10]
Rollo, 2.
[11]
C.A. Rollo, 38-41.
[12]
C.A. Rollo, 41-42.
[13]
Citing People vs. Amoncio, 122
SCRA 687 [1983]; People vs. Laganson, 129 SCRA 333, 346 [1984]; People vs.
Akiran, 18 SCRA 239 [1966]; People vs. Cariño, 55 SCRA 576 [1974].
[14]
Citing People vs. Alto, 26 SCRA 342, 357 [1968]; Castañares vs.
Court of Appeals, 92 SCRA 567, 580 [1979]; People vs. Dayag, 56 SCRA 439
[1974].
[15]
Citing People vs. Baquiran, 20 SCRA 451, 454 [1967]; People vs.
Ilagan, 64 SCRA 170, 177 [1975]; People vs. Santos, 94 SCRA 277 [1979].
[16]
Rollo, 42-43.
[17]
Section 3(e), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
[18]
G.R. No. 86495, 13 May 1992.
[19]
Citing People vs. Vocente, 188 SCRA 100 [1990]; People vs.
Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 [1990]; People vs. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533
[1988].
[20]
Citing People vs. Olaes, 188 SCRA 91 [1990].
[21]
22 Phil. 325, 327 [1912]. See also
People vs. Marasigan, 51 Phil. 701 [1928].
[22]
37 Phil. 797, 801 [1918]. See also
People vs. Tuzon, 56 Phil. 649 [1932].
[23]
People vs. De Otero, 51 Phil. 201 [1927].
[24]
People vs. Morado, 4 SCRA 292 [1962], citing III MORAN’s Rules of Court, 1957 ed., 490.
[25]
164 SCRA 642 [1988].
[26]
189 SCRA 97 [1990].
[27]
People vs. Paco, 170, SCRA 681 [1989]; People vs. Rubio, 142 SCRA
329 [1986]; People vs. Toledo, 140 SCRA 259 [1985]; People vs.
Policarpio, 158 SCRA 85, [1988].
[28]
TSN, 23 June 1986, 6-9.
[29]
TSN, 12 May 1986, 1-11.
[30]
Section 19(1), Article III.