VICTOR DE JESUS, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EDDIE R. ROJAS, MTCC, BR. II, GENERAL SANTOS CITY, CITY PROSECUTOR FRANKLIN GACAL AND SALUSTIANO SONIDO, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Victor de Jesus, then Director and Finance Officer of
Southern Island Colleges, together with his octogenarian stepmother, Eugenia de
Jesus, who was then the Directress-Chairman of the Board of Directors, was
charged with violation of Section 28 (h) of the Social Security Law for failure
to remit the SSS loan amortizations of private respondent Salustiano Sonido, an
employee, in the amount of P583.35 covering the period from January to August
1988. The Information, signed by Third
Assistant City Prosecutor Andres Lorenzo, Jr., was filed with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Br. II, General Santos City, docketed as Crim. Case No.
16886-2, presided by respondent Judge Eddie R. Rojas.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information on the ground
that (a) the City Prosecutor was not authorized to file the Information in the
absence of prior authority from the SSS; (b) the SSS and not the MTCC has
jurisdiction over the case; (c) the criminal action has been extinguished by
the sale of his shares in the school before the complaint for estafa was filed
against him and his stepmother; and, (d) damage as an element of estafa was not
present in view of Sec. 22 (b) of the Social Security Law which guarantees
enjoyment of SSS benefits by the employee notwithstanding failure of his
employer to remit deductions.

On 27 February 1991, respondent Judge denied the motion to quash
for lack of merit.^[1]

Petitioner challenged before the Court of Appeals by way of a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus the Order of
respondent Judge denying his motion to quash.

On 31 July 1991, the appellate court dismissed the petition
holding thus –

“We refrain from any discussion on the merits of this case
since it involves an Order of a
Municipal Trial Court whose decisions are not directly reviewable by this
Court. x x x x The instant petition
should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court, the proper and competent
tribunal.”^[2]

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by respondent
Court of Appeals on 28 August 1991, petitioner now comes to Us seeking inter
alia to set aside the resolutions dismissing his petition.

Outright, We discern a procedural misconception by the Court of
Appeals of its jurisdiction over matters brought to it by way of petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus from Municipal Trial Courts. Obviously, it is error to hold that
decisions of Municipal Trial Courts are not directly reviewable by the Court of
Appeals, and that such petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial
Court being “the proper and competent tribunal.”

Under Sec. 9 of B.P. 129, the Court of Appeals has original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus and quo
warranto, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction is concurrent with that of
the Supreme Court^[3]
and with the Regional Trial Courts, for writs enforceable within their
respective regions.^[4]

Indeed, the refusal of the Court of Appeals to take cognizance of
the petition would have been proper prior to the effectivity of B. P. 129^[5]
when the writ of certiorari was available in the appellate court only in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As
explained in Breslin vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co.^[6] –

“A writ of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari
against a lower court is said to be in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals within the meaning of section 30 of Republic Act No. 296,
known as the ‘Judiciary Act of 1948,’ and the corresponding provision of the
former Organic Act of the Court of Appeals, if the latter has jurisdiction to
review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the
former, and said writs are issued by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of
its supervisory power or jurisdiction over the wrongful acts or omissions of
the lower court that are not appealable. But if the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction it could not
issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari in aid of an
appellate jurisdiction which it does not have x x x x”

Perforce, the Resolutions of 31 July and 28 August 1991 must be
reversed for want of basis in law.

While We are not unaware of the practice of the Court of Appeals
of remanding to the proper Regional Trial Court for appropriate disposition
petitions of this nature, yet, this is done only when there is no cogent reason
advanced why the appellate court should hear the case. Plainly, therefore, respondent Court of
Appeals could still have transmitted the petition to the Regional Trial Court
of General Santos City not because the former has no jurisdiction but more of
convenience and propriety as the latter court exercises administrative
supervision over the Municipal Trial Court as the next higher tribunal in the
judicial hierarchy, instead of the Court of Appeals. Indeed, such established practice is not without basis. For, in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto,^[7] penned by Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa
(then Associate Justice), this Court discussed quite extensively the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional
Trial Court over judgments and orders of Municipal Courts –

“We turn now to the second question posed x x x as to the
propriety of a direct resort to this Court for the remedy of mandamus or other extraordinary writ against a municipal court, instead
of an attempt to initially obtain that relief from the Regional Trial Court of
the district or the Court of Appeals, both of which tribunals share this
Court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ. As a matter of policy such a direct recourse to this Court should not be
allowed. The Supreme Court is a court
of last resort, and must so remain if it is
to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental
charter and immemorial tradition. It
cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the
first instance. Its original
jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised
only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist
therefore. Hence, that jurisdiction
should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the
Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another, are not controllable by the
Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of
an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or
a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific
action for the writ’s procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a
policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.”

Ordinarily, the next step would be to remand this case to the
Court of Appeals to resolve the propriety of the denial of petitioner’s motion
to quash. But this is no longer
necessary. Since the records are with
Us, We are now in a position to settle the issue with dispatch. Consequently, We opt to meet the issue right
here if only to obviate further delay in this seemingly uncomplicated case.

On the first ground raised by petitioner, Sec. 28 (i) of the
Social Security Law provides:

“(i)     Criminal action arising from a violation of the provisions of this Act may be commenced
by the SSS or the employee
concerned either under this Act or in appropriate cases under the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, That such criminal action may be filed by the SSS in the city or municipality where the SSS
provincial or regional office is
located if the violation was committed within its territorial jurisdiction or
in Metro Manila, at the option of the
SSS.”^[8]

Clearly, prior consent of the Social Security System (SSS) is not
essential before an employee can commence a criminal action arising from a
violation of the Social Security
Law. In other words, whether
under the Social Security Law or
“in appropriate cases under the Revised Penal Code”, the
employee can institute criminal suits independently of the SSS.

On the second ground, petitioner submits that it is the SSS and
not the regular courts which is empowered to prosecute the alleged estafa
pursuant to Sec. 5 of the Social Security Law. This is untenable. Section 5
provides:

“SEC. 5. Settlement
of Disputes.- (a)
Any dispute arising under this Act with respect to coverage, benefits,
contributions and penalties thereon or any
other matter related thereto, shall
be cognizable, by the Commission, and any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by the
Commission, or any of its members, or by hearing officers duly authorized by the Commission and decided
within twenty days after the submission of the evidence. The filing, determination and settlement of
dispute shall he governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission.”^[9]

The foregoing defines the “dispute” falling within the
coverage of the Social Security Law and lays down the procedure to be followed
by the SSS in any case filed before it with respect to such
“dispute”. Definitely,
prosecution of criminal offenses is not alluded to above, as this will require
further legislation to clothe the SSS with the necessary jurisdiction. Consequently, the SSS is not vested with
legal competence to adjudicate criminal complaints and must necessarily seek
recourse in the regular courts for the prosecution of criminal actions arising
from violations of the Revised Penal Code and the Social Security Law.^[10]

On the third ground, it must be stressed that criminal liability
is personal to the offender and cannot be transferred to another by
contract. Criminal culpability attaches
to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant,
liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. The time of filing of the criminal complaint
is material only for determining prescription. Consequently, petitioner’s reported transfer of his shares in the
Southern Island Colleges to Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Colleges did not
extinguish his criminal liability nor transfer the same to his vendee or
assignee.

On the fourth ground, the argument that there is no estafa for want
of damage since the employee’s entitlement to SSS benefits is not impaired by
his employer’s neglect to remit loan payments from his compensation is likewise
untenable. It must be noted that
petitioner was charged in connection with Sec. 28 (h) of the Social Security
Law which states:

“(h)    Any employer who,
after deducting the monthly contributions or loan amortizations from his
employee’s compensation, fails to remit the said deductions to the SSS within
thirty days from the date they became due shall be presumed to have
misappropriated such contributions or loan amortizations and shall suffer the
penalties provided in Article Three Hundred Fifteen of the Revised Penal
Code,”^[11]

and not under Art. 315 of the Revised
Penal Code, which is material only in
determining the penalty to be imposed.

Section 28 (h) speaks of two elements which must concur: (1) the employer deducts monthly
contributions or loan amortizations from his employee’s compensation, and (2)
said employer fails to remit said deductions to the SSS within 30 days from the
date they fall due, after which the employer is ipso facto presumed
to have misappropriated such contributions or amortizations of the employee and
accordingly penalized under Art. 315 of the Penal Code. Plainly, damage is not an element in the act
punished under Sec. 28 (h) as differentiated from the ordinary estafa wherein
deceit and damage are considered essential elements.

Other arguments advanced by petitioner which were not contained
in his motion to quash may not be passed upon in this extraordinary petition,
for no abuse of discretion may be ascribed to respondent Judge when he was not
provided with the opportunity to rule thereon.

WHEREFORE, as regards the
Resolutions of 31 July and 28 August 1991 of respondent Court of Appeals, the
same are SET ASIDE. However, with respect to the Order of
27 February 1991 of respondent Judge, the writ prayed for is denied and the petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit, hereby AFFIRMING
his Order denying petitioner’s motion to quash. Consequently, respondent Judge is directed
to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. 16886-2 pending before his court.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, and
Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Petition, Annex “F-1”. Rollo,
p. 58.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 34.

^[3]
Sec. 5 [1], Art. VIII,
Constitution.

^[4]
Sec. 21, B.P. 129.

^[5]
January 17, 1983, E.O. No. 864.

^[6]
84 Phil. 618, 622-623
(1949).

^[7]
G.R.
No. 74766, December 21, 1987; 156 SCRA 753.

^[8]
As
amended by Sec. 15, P.D. 24, S-1972, Sec. 19, P.D. 735, S-1975, and Sec. 13, P.D. 1202, S-1977.

^[9]
As
amended by Sec. 3, R.A. 2658; Sec. 2, R.A. 4857, and Sec. 3, P.D. 735, S-1975.

^[10]
Sec. 28 (i), R.A. 1161, as
amended.

^[11]
As amended by Sec. 15, P.D.
24, S-1972.