G.R. No. 89114. December 02, 1991
FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, MATEO A. T. CAPARAS, AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENTS.
PADILLA, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the resolution
of the Sandiganbayan, dated 21 April 1989, denying
his motion for a bill of particulars as well as its resolution, dated 29
May 1989, which denied his motion for reconsideration; to compel the respondent
PCGG to prepare and file a bill of particulars, or that said respondent be
ordered to exclude petitioner as defendant in Civil Case No. 0035 should they
fail to submit the said bill of particulars;
and to enjoin the respondent Sandiganbayan from
further proceeding against petitioner until the bill of particulars is
submitted, claiming that the respondent Sandiganbayan
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
promulgating the aforesaid resolutions and that there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy for him in the ordinary course of law other
than the present petition.
As prayed for, this Court issued on 1 August 1989 a temporary
restraining order “effective immediately and continuing until further
orders from this Court, ordering the respondent Sandiganbayan
to CEASE and DESIST from further proceeding in Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG 35),
entitled “Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin (Kokoy)
Romualdez, et al.” pending before it.[1]
The antecedents are as follows:
On 31 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the PCGG, and assisted by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035, entitled “Republic
of the Philippines vs. Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, et al.” for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.[2]
The principal defendants in the said Civil Case No. 0035 are
Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez,
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.
Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. was included as defendant in Civil
Case No. 0035 on the theory
that: (1) he acted in unlawful concert
with the principal defendants in the misappropriation and theft of public
funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery,
embezzlement and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen
abuse of power;[3]
(2) he acted as dummy, nominee or agent, by allowing himself to be
incorporator, director, board member and/or stockholder of corporations
beneficially held and/or controlled by the principal defendants;[4]
(3) he acted singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another,
in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public
officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen
violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines, embarked upon a
systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth;[5]
(4) he (petitioner) taking undue advantage of his position as Chairman of the
Commission on Audit and with grave failure to perform his constitutional duties
as such Chairman, acting in concert with defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos, facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements
and questionable use of government funds;[6]
and (5) he acted as dummy, nominee and/or agent by allowing himself to be used
as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions,
orders and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff, or to be incorporator,
director, or member of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by
defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin (Kokoy)
Romualdez and Juliette
Gomez Romualdez in order to conceal and prevent
recovery of assets illegally obtained.[7]
On 11 April 1988, after his motion for production and inspection of documents[8]
was denied by respondent court in its resolution[9]
dated 9 March 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars,[10]
alleging inter alia
that he is sued for acts allegedly committed by him as (a) a public
officer-Chairman of the Commission on Audit, (b) as a private individual, and (c) in both capacities, in a complaint couched in too general terms
and shorn of particulars that would inform him of the factual and legal basis
thereof, and that to enable him to understand and know with certainty the
particular acts allegedly committed by him and which he is now charged with
culpability, it is necessary that plaintiff furnish him the particulars sought
therein relative to the averments in paragraphs 2, 9(a), 15, 7 and 17 of the
Second Amended Complaint so that he can intelligently prepare his responsive
pleading and prepare for
trial. The particulars sought for in the
said motion are as follows:
“a. Relative to the averments in paragraphs 2, 9(a) and 15 of the Second Amended Complaint:
i) What are the dates of the resolutions (if on
appeal) or the acts (if otherwise) issued or performed by herein defendant
which allowed the facilitation of, and made possible the, withdrawals,
disbursements and questionable use of government funds;
ii) What ministries or Departments, offices or
agencies of the government were involved in these questionable use of
government funds;
iii) What are the names of the auditors who had the
original audit jurisdiction over the said withdrawals, disbursements and
questionable use of government funds;
iv) How much government funds were involved in
these questionable disbursements, individually and in totally?
v) Were the disbursements brought to herein
defendant for action on pre-audit, post-audit or otherwise or where they
initiated and/or allowed release by herein defendant alone, without them
undergoing usual governmental audit procedures, or in violation thereof?
vi) What were herein defendant’s other acts or
omission or participation in the matter of allowing such disbursements and
questionable use of government funds, if any?
b. Relative
to paragraphs 7 and 17 of the Second Amended Complaint:
i) In what particular contract, dealing,
transaction and/or relationship of any nature of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.
Marcos, Juliette Gomez Romualdez
or Benjamin T. Romualdez did herein defendant act as
dummy, nominee or agent? Please specify
the dealings, the dates, the corporations or entities involved, the government
offices involved and the private and public documents, if any, showing herein
defendant’s complicity, since he is not aware of any such instance. More basically, please specify whether the
defendant is a dummy or nominee or agent and of which corporation or
transaction?
ii) What particular government concession, order
and/or policy obtained by Ferdinand E. Marcos, or Imelda R. Marcos, or Juliette Gomez Romualdez and/or
Benjamin T. Romualdez allowed them either singly or
jointly to accumulate ill-gotten wealth by using herein defendant as instrument
for their accomplishment. Likewise
please identify the nature of the transactions, the dates and the document
showing complicity, on the part of herein defendant; he is not aware of any
such instance.
iii) Please specify the name or denominate the
particular government concession, order and/or policy prejudicial to the
interest of the government which was obtained by either of the above-named four
defendants through the participation of herein defendant as a dummy, nominee or
agent of herein defendant. Please
likewise identify the government office involved, the dates and other
particulars, likewise defendant is not aware of any such instance.
iv) Please name and specify the corporation
whether stock or non-stock, whether government or private, beneficially held
and/or controlled by either of the four above defendants, where herein
defendant is an incorporator, director or member and where his inclusion as
such incorporator, director or member of the corporation was made in order to
conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained by the aforementioned
four defendants, how many shares are involved and what are their values, how and when have they been acquired.”
The Solicitor General, for and in behalf of respondents (except
the respondent Sandiganbayan), opposed the motion.[11]
After the petitioner had filed his reply[12]
thereto, the respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated on 21 April 1990 a resolution[13]
denying the petitioner’s motion for a bill of particulars on the ground that
the particulars sought by petitioner are evidentiary in
nature, the pertinent part of which resolution
reads, as follows:
“We are of the considered opinion that the allegations in the
Expanded Complaint are quite clear and sufficient enough for defendant-movant to know the nature and scope of the causes of action
upon which plaintiff seeks relief. They
provide the factual scenario which, coupled with other allegations set forth in
the ‘Common Averments’ and further specified in the ‘Specific Averments’ of
herein defendant-movant and his co-defendants’
illegal acts which are within defendant-movant’s
peculiar and intimate knowledge as a government official and corporate
executive, will enable him to make the proper admission, denials or
qualifications, set out affirmative and/or special defenses and thereafter
prepare for trial. Evidentiary facts or matters
are not essential in the pleading of the cause of action, nor to details or
probative value or particulars of evidence by which these material evidence are
to be established (Remitere vs. Yulu,
6 SCRA 251). The matters which he seeks
are evidentiary in nature and, being within his intimate or personal knowledge
may be denied or admitted by him or if deemed necessary, be the subject of
other forms of discovery.”[14]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration[15]
but this was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan in
its resolution[16]
dated 29 May 1990.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition.
The principal issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan
acted with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the disputed resolutions.
Petitioner argues that the allegations of the Second Amended
Complaint in Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG 35) pertaining to him state only
conclusions of fact and law, inferences of
facts from facts not pleaded and mere presumptions, not ultimate facts
as required by the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, the respondent Sandiganbayan,
by and through the Solicitor General, contends that the essential elements of
an action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth are: (1) an accumulation of assets, properties and
other possessions; (2) of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates,
business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees; and (3) whose value is out
of proportion to their known lawful income, and that the ultimate facts
establishing these three (3) essential elements of an action for recovery of
ill-gotten wealth are sufficiently alleged in the complaint. Hence, petitioner is not entitled to a bill
of particulars.
A complaint is defined as a concise statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause or causes of action.[17]
Like all other pleadings allowed by the Rules of Court,[18]
the complaint shall contain in a methodical and logical form a plain, concise
and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for
his claim, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts.[19]
Its office, purpose or function is to inform the defendant clearly and
definitely of the claims made against him so that he may be prepared to meet the
issues at the trial. The complaint
should inform the defendant of all the material facts on which the plaintiff
relies to support his demand; it should state the theory of a cause of action
which forms the bases of the plaintiff’s claim of liability.[20]
The rules on pleading speak of two (2) kinds of facts: the first, the “ultimate facts”,
and the second, the “evidentiary facts.” In Remitere vs. Vda. de Yulo,[21] the term “ultimate facts”
was defined and explained as follows:
“The term ‘ultimate facts’ as used in Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, means the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of
action. A fact is essential if it cannot
be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action
insufficient. x x
x” (Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 1963 ed., p.
213).
“Ultimate facts are
important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the
primary right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful acts or
omissions of the defendant. The term
does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by
which these material elements are to be established. It refers to principal, determinate,
constitutive facts, upon the existence of which, the entire cause of action
rests.”
while the term “evidentiary
fact” has been defined in the following tenor:
“Those facts which are
necessary for determination of the ultimate facts; they are the premises upon
which conclusions of ultimate facts are based.
Womack v. Industrial Comm., 168 Colo. 364, 451 P.2d 761, 764. Facts which furnish evidence of existence of
some other fact.”[22]
Where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute the
three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the
correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right, the complaint states a cause of
action, otherwise, the complaint must succumb to a motion to dismiss on that
ground of failure to state a cause of action.[23]
However, where the allegations of the complaint are vague, indefinite, or in
the form of conclusions, the proper recourse would
be, not a motion to dismiss, but a motion
for a bill of particulars.[24]
Thus, Section 1, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading
is permitted by these rules, within ten (10) days after service of the pleading
upon him, a party may move for a more definite statement or for a bill of
particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to
prepare for trial. Such motion shall
point out the defects complained of and the details desired.”
In this connection, the following allegations have been held as
mere conclusions of law, inferences from facts not alleged or opinion of the
pleader: (a) the allegations that
defendants-appellees were “actuated by ulterior
motives, contrary to law and
morals, with abuse of their advantageous position as employers, in gross and
evident bad faith and without giving plaintiff ….. his due, wilfully,
maliciously, unlawfully, and in summary and arbitrary manner”, are
conclusions of law, inferences from facts not alleged and expressions of
opinion unsupported by factual premises;[25]
(b) an allegation of duty in terms unaccompanied by a statement of facts
showing the existence of the duty, is a mere conclusion of law, unless there is
a relation set forth from which the law raises the duty;[26]
(c) an averment ….. that an act was “unlawful” or
“wrongful” is a mere legal conclusion or opinion of the pleader;[27]
(d) the allegation that there was a violation of trust was plainly a conclusion
of law, for “a mere allegation that it was the duty of a party to do this or
that, or that he was guilty of a breach of duty, is a statement of a
conclusion, not of a fact”;[28]
(e) an allegation that a contract is valid or void, is a mere conclusion of
law;[29]
(f) the averment in the complaint that “defendant usurped the office of
Senator of the Philippines” is a conclusion of law — not a statement of
fact – inasmuch as the particular facts on which the alleged usurpation is
predicated are not set forth
therein;[30]
and (g) the averment that “with intent of circumventing the constitutional
prohibition that ‘no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed
or suspended except for cause as provided by law’, respondents maliciously and
illegally for the purpose of political persecution and political vengeance, reverted
the fund of the salary item x x x
and furthermore eliminated or abolished the said position effective 1 July
1960″ is a mere conclusion of law unsupported by factual premises.[31]
Bearing in mind the foregoing rules on pleading and case law, let
us now examine the allegations
of the Second Amended Complaint against
the petitioner to determine whether or not they were averred with
sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his
responsive pleading or to prepare for trial. If the allegations of the said complaint are
vague, indefinite or in the form of conclusions, then petitioner is entitled to
a bill of particulars.
The allegations in the
complaint pertaining to the alleged culpable and unlawful acts of herein
petitioner are quoted hereunder as follows:
“GENERAL AVERMENTS
OF
DEFENDANTS’ ILLEGAL ACTS
“9. (a) From the early years of his presidency,
Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos took undue advantage of his powers as
President. All throughout the period
from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986, he gravely abused
his powers under martial law and ruled as Dictator under the 1973
Marcos-promulgated Constitution.
Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, together with other Defendants, acting
singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, in
flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public
officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen
violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines, embarked upon a systematic
plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth;
(b) Upon his unfettered discretion, and sole
authority, for the purpose of implementing the plan referred to above,
Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos ordered and caused, among others:
(b-i) the massive and unlawful withdrawal of funds,
securities, reserves and other assets and property from the National Treasury,
the Central Bank, the other financial institutions and depositories of
Plaintiff;
(b-ii) the transfer
of such funds, securities, reserves and other assets and property to payees or
transferees of his choice and whether and in what manner such transactions
should be recorded in the books and records of these institutions and other
depositories of Plaintiff;
10. Among others, in furtherance of the plan and acting
in the manner referred to above, in unlawful concerted with one another and
with gross abuse of power and authority, Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos;
x x
x x
x x
b. Converted government-owned and controlled
corporations into private enterprises and appropriated them and/or their assets
for their own benefit and enrichment;
c. Awarded contracts with the Government to
their relatives, business associates, dummies, nominees, agents or persons who
were beholden to said Defendants, under terms and conditions grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the Government;
d. Misappropriated, embezzled and/or converted
to their own use funds of Government financial institutions, particularly those
allocated to the Office of the President and other ministries and agencies of
the Government including, those conveniently denominated as intelligence or
counter-insurgency funds, as well as funds provided to Plaintiff by foreign
countries, multinationals, public and private financial institutions;
e. Raided Government financial and banking
institutions of billions of pesos in loans, guarantees and other types of
financial accommodations to finance dubious and/or overpriced projects of
favored corporations or individuals and misused and/or converted to their own
use and benefit deposits found therein to the financial ruin of the Plaintiff
and the Filipino people;
xxx xxx
h. Sold, conveyed and/or transferred Government
property, real and/or personal, to corporations beneficially held and/or
controlled by them or through third persons, under such terms and conditions
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the Government;
i. Engaged
in other illegal and improper acts and practices designed to defraud Plaintiff
and the Filipino people, or otherwise misappropriated and converted to their
own use, benefit and enrichment the lawful patrimony and revenues of Plaintiff
and the Filipino people.
11. Among the assets acquired by Defendants in
the manner above-described and discoverd by the
Commission in the exercise of its official responsibilities are funds and other
property listed in Annex ‘A’ hereof and made an integral part of this
Complaint.
12. Defendants, acting singly or collectively,
and/or in unlawful concert with one another, for the purpose of preventing
disclosure and avoiding discovery of their unmitigated plunder of the National
Treasury and of their other illegal acts, and employing, the services of
prominent lawyers, accountants, financial experts, businessmen and other
persons, deposited, kept and invested funds, securities and other assets
estimated at billions of US dollars in various banks, financial institutions,
trust or investment companies and with persons here and abroad.
V
SPECIFIC AVERMENTS
OF
DEFENDANTS’ ILLEGAL ACTS
x x
x x x
x
14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy)
Romualdez and Juliette
Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or in
unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and
taking undue advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with the
latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and strategems
to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino
people, among others:
(a) obtained, with the active collaboration of
Defendants Senen J. Gabaldon,
Mario D. Camacho, Mamerto Nepomuceno,
Carlos J. Valdes, Delia Tantuico, Jovencio
F. Cinco, Cesar C. Zalamea
and Francisco Tantuico, control of some of the
biggest business enterprises in the Philippines, such as, the Manila Electric
Company (MERALCO), Benguet Consolidated Mining
Corporation (BENGUET) and the Pilipinas Shell
Corporation, by employing devious financial schemes and techniques calculated
to require the massive infusion and hemmorrhage of
government funds with minimum or negligible ‘cash?out’ from Defendant
Benjamin Romualdez.
The following are the general features of a classic take-over bid by
Defendant Benjamin Romualdez:
x x
x x
x x
(ii) The shares were held in the name of
corporations which were organized soldely (sic) for
the purpose of holding title to them.
These corporations did not have any operating history nor any financial
track record. Projected cash flow
consisted almost solely of future and contingent dividends on the shares
held. In spite of these limitations,
these companies enjoyed excellent credit lines from banks and other financial
institutions, as evidenced by the millions of pesos in loan and guarantees
outstanding in their books;
(iii) The ‘seed money’ used to wrest control came
from government and taxpayers’ money in the form of millions of pesos in loans,
guarantees and standby L/C’s from government financial institutions, notably
the DBP and PNB, which were in turn rediscounted with the Central Bank;
(iv) Additional funding was provided from the
related interests; and
(v) This instricate
(sic) skein of inter-corporate dealings was controlled and administered by an
exclusive and closely knit group of interlocking directorate and officership.
x x
x x
x x
(g) Secured, in a veiled attempt to justify MERALCO’s anomalous acquisition of the electric
cooperatives, with the active collaborations of Defendants Cesar E. A. Virata, Juanito R. Remulla, Isidro Rodriguez, Jose C. Hernandez, Pedro Dumol, Ricardo C. Galing,
Francisco C. Gatmaitan, Mario D. Camacho and the rest
of the Defendants, the approval by Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos and his
cabinet of the so-called ‘Three-Year Program for the Extension of MERALCO’s Services to Areas Within The 60-Kilometer Radius
of Manila’, which required government capital investment amounting to millions
of pesos;
xxx xxx
(1) Caused the National Investment and
Development Corporation (NIDC) to dispose of its interest in the oil plants
located in Tanauan, Leyte,
which were owned and operated by its subsidiary, the NIDC Oil Mills, Inc., in
favor of the SOLOIL, Inc., a corporation beneficially held and controlled by
Defendant Benjamin Romualdez, with the active
collaboration of Defendants Jose Sandejas, Francisco
Tantuico and Dominador
G. Ingco, under terms and conditions grossly disadvantageous
to NIDC, to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino
people.
15. Defendant Francisco Tantuico,
taking undue advantage of his position as Chairman of the Commission on Audit
and with grave failure to perform his constitutional duties as such Chairman,
acting in concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos,
facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements and questionable
use of government funds as stated in the foregoing paragraphs to the grave and
irreparable damage and injury of Plaintiff and the entire Filipino people.
x x
x x
x x
17. The following Defendants acted as dummies,
nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves (i) to
be used as instruments in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government
concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to Plaintiff, or (ii) to be
incorporators, directors, or members of corporations held and/or controlled by
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin (Kokoy)
Romualdez, and Juliette
Gomez Romualdez in order conceal (sic) and prevent
recovery of assets illegally obtained: Francisco
Tantuico x x x.
17. a. THE NAMES OF SOME OF THE CORPORATIONS
BENEFICALLY HELD AND/OR CONTROLLED BY THE DEFENDANTS BENJAMIN (KOKOY)
ROMUALDEZ, FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS WHERE THE
POSITIONS/PARTICIPATIONS AND/OR INVOLVEMENTS OF SOME OF THE DEFENDANTS AS
DUMMIES, NOMINEES AND/OR AGENTS ARE INDICATED ARE LISTED IN ANNEX ‘B’ HEREOF
AND MADE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THIS COMPLAINT.
x x
x x x
x
18. The acts of Defendants, singly or
collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, constitute gross
abuse of official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust and
fiduciary obligations, acquisition of unexplained wealth, brazen abuse of
official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust and fiduciary
obligations, acquisition of unexplained wealth, brazen abuse of right and
power, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff
and the Filipino people. (Underscoring supplied)
Let us now analyze and discuss the allegations of the complaint
in relation to which the petitioner pleads for a bill of particulars.
As quoted above,
paragraph 9(a) of the complaint alleges that “Defendant Ferdinand E.
Marcos, together with other Defendants, acting singly or collectively,
and/or in unlawful concert with one another, in flagrant breach of public trust
and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross and
scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution
and laws of the Philippines, embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth.” In the
light of the rules on pleading and case law cited above, the allegations that
defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos,
together with the other defendants “embarked upon a systematic plan to
accumulate ill-gotten wealth” and that said defendants acted “in
flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public
officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right and in brazen violation of
the Constitution and laws of the Philippines”, are conclusions
of law unsupported by factual premises.
Nothing is said in the complaint about the petitioner’s acts in
execution of the alleged “systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten
wealth”, or which are supposed to constitute “flagrant breach of
public trust”, “gross and scandalous abuse of right and power”,
and “violations of the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines”. The complaint does
not even allege what duties the petitioner failed to perform, or the particular
rights he abused.
Likewise, paragraph 15 avers that “defendant Francisco Tantuico, taking undue advantage of his position as
Chairman of the Commission on Audit and with grave failure to perform his
constitutional duties as such Chairman, acting in concert with Defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos facilitated and made possible the
withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of government funds as stated
in the foregoing paragraphs to the grave and irreparable damage and injury of
Plaintiff and the entire Filipino people.” In like manner, the allegation
that petitioner “took undue advantage of his position as Chairman of the
Commission on Audit,” that he “failed to perform his constitutional
duties as such Chairman,” and acting in concert with Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos, “facilitated and made possible the withdrawals,
disbursements, and questionable use of government funds as stated in the foregoing
paragraphs, to the grave and irreparable damage and injury of plaintiff and the
entire Filipino people”, are mere conclusions of law. Nowhere in the complaint is there any
allegation as to how such duty came about, or what petitioner’s duties were,
with respect to the alleged withdrawals and disbursements or how petitioner
facilitated the alleged withdrawals, disbursements, or conversion of public
funds and properties, nor an allegation from where the withdrawals and
disbursements came from, except for a general allegation that they came from
the national treasury. On top of that,
the complaint does not even contain any factual allegation which would show
that whatever withdrawals, disbursements, or conversions were made, were indeed
subject to audit by the COA.
In this connection, it may well be stated that the Commission on
Audit (COA) is an independent, constitutional commission, which has no power or
authority to withdraw, disburse, or use funds and property pertaining to other
government offices or agencies. This is done by the agency or office itself,
the chief or head of which is
primarily and directly responsible for the funds and property pertaining to
such office or agency.[32]
The COA is merely authorized to audit, examine and settle accounts of the
various government offices or agencies, and this task is performed not by the
Chairman of the COA but by the COA auditors assigned to the government office
or agency subject to COA audit.
Thus, in each agency of the government, there is an auditing unit
headed by an auditor, whose duty is to audit and settle the accounts, funds,
financial transactions, and resources of the agency under his audit
jurisdiction.[33]
The decision of the auditor is appealable to the
Regional Director,[34]
whose decision, is in turn, appealable to the COA Manager.[35]
Any party dissatisfied with the decision of the COA Manager may bring the
matter on appeal to the Commission proper, a collegiate body exercising
quasi-judicial functions, composed of three (3) COA Commissioners, with the COA
Chairman as presiding officer.[36]
It is only at this stage that the COA Chairman would come to know of the matter
and be called upon to act on the same, and only if an aggrieved party brings
the matter on appeal.
In other words, the Chairman of the COA does not participate in
or personally audit all disbursements and withdrawals of government funds, as
well as transactions involving government property. The averments in the particular paragraph of
the complaint merely assume that petitioner participated in or personally
audited all disbursements and withdrawals of government funds, and all
transactions involving government property.
Hence, the alleged withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of government
funds could not have been, as held by respondent Sandiganbayan,
“within the peculiar and intimate knowledge of petitioner as Chairman of
the COA.”
The complaint further avers in paragraph 17 that “(t)he
following Defendants acted as dummies,
nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves (i) to
be instruments in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government
concessions, order and/or policies prejudicial to Plaintiff, or (ii) to be
incorporators, directors, or members of corporations beneficially held and/or
controlled by Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin (Kokoy) T. Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez in order
to conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained: Francisco Tantuico x x x.”[37]
Again, the allegation that petitioner acted as dummy, nominee, or agent by
allowing himself “to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten
wealth through government concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to
Plaintiff” or “to be (an) incorporator, director, or member of
corporations beneficially held and/or controlled” by the Marcoses and Romualdezes, is a
conclusion of law without factual basis.
The complaint does not contain any allegation as to how
petitioner became, or why he is perceived to be, a dummy, nominee or
agent. Besides, there is no averment in
the complaint how petitioner allowed himself to be used as instrument in the
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, what the concessions, orders and/or policies
prejudicial to plaintiff are, why they are prejudicial, and what petitioner had
to do with the granting, issuance, and or formulation of such concessions,
orders, and/or policies. Moreover, Annex
“A” of the complaint lists down sixty-one (61) corporations which are
supposed to be beneficially owned or controlled by the Marcoses
and Romualdezes.
However, the complaint does not state which corporations petitioner is
supposed to be a stockholder, director, member, dummy, nominee and/or
agent. More significantly, the petitioner’s
name does not even appear in Annex “B” of the complaint, which is a
listing of the alleged “Positions and Participations of Some
Defendants”.
The allegations in the complaint, above-referred to, pertaining
to petitioner are, therefore, deficient in that they merely articulate conclusions
of law and presumptions unsupported by factual premises. Hence, without the particulars prayed for in
petitioner’s motion for a bill of particulars, it can be said the petitioner
can not intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and for trial.
Furthermore, the particulars prayed for, such as, names of
persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of
property for identification purposes, the particular transactions involving
withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would
support the conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in
nature. On the contrary, those
particulars are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in
the complaint in order that the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the
claims made against him to the end that he may be prepared to meet the issues
at the trial.
Thus, it has been held that the purpose or object of a bill of
particulars is —
“x x x to
amplify or limit a pleading, specify more minutely and particularly a claim or
defense set up and pleaded in general terms, give information, not contained in
the pleading, to the opposite party and the court as to the precise nature,
character, scope, and extent of the cause of action or defense relied on by the
pleader, and apprise the opposite party of the case which he has to meet, to
the end that the proof at the trial may be limited to the matters specified,
and in order that surprise at, and needless preparation for, the trial may be
avoided, and that the opposite party may be aided in framing his answering
pleading and preparing for trial. It has
also been stated that it is the function or purpose of a bill of particulars to
define, clarify, particularize, and limit or circumscribe the issues in the
case, to expedite the trial, and assist the court. A general function or purpose of a bill of
particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice in the case when that cannot
be accomplished without the aid of such
a bill.”[38]
Anent the contention of the Solicitor General that the petitioner
is not entitled to a bill of particulars because the ultimate facts
constituting the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action for recovery
of ill-gotten wealth have been sufficiently alleged in the complaint, it would
suffice to state that in a motion for a bill of particulars, the only question
to be resolved is whether or not the allegations of the complaint are averred
with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable the movant
properly to prepare his responsive pleading and to prepare for trial. As already discussed, the allegations of the
complaint pertaining to the herein petitioner are deficient because the
averments therein are mere conclusions of law or presumptions, unsupported by
factual premises.
In the light of the foregoing, the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
promulgating the questioned resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED and the resolutions dated 21 April 1989 and 29 May 1989 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
respondents are hereby ordered to PREPARE and FILE a Bill of Particulars containing the facts prayed for by
petitioner within TWENTY (20) DAYS from notice, and should they fail to submit
the said Bill of Particulars, respondent Sandiganbayan,
is ordered TO EXCLUDE the herein petitioner as defendant in Civil Case No.
0035.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, and Davide, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Romero, J., no part.
Fernan, C.J., on leave.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 219-220
[2]
Ibid., p. 57
[3]
Second Amended Complaint, par. 2
[4]
Ibid., par. 7
[5]
Ibid., par. 9 (a)
[6]
Ibid., par. 15
[7]
Ibid., par. 17
[8]
Ibid., p. 116
[9]
Ibid., p. 144
[10]
Ibid., p. 162
[11]
Rollo, p. 180
[12]
Ibid., p. 191
[13]
Ibid., p. 198
[14]
Ibid., pp. 201-202
[15]
Ibid., p. 204
[16]
Ibid., p. 217
[17]
Rules of Court, Rule 6, Sec. 3
[18]
Id., Rule 6, Sec. 2
[19]
Id., Rule 8, Sec. 1
[20]
Martin, Notes & Comments, Rules of
Court, Vol. 1, 1986 ed., p. 279, citing
71 c.d.s., Sec. 63(b), p. 19
[21]
G.R. No. L-19751, 28 February 1966,
16 SCRA 251
[22]
Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed., p. 500
[23]
Mathay, et al. vs. The Consolidated Bank &
Trust Co., et al., G.R. No. L-23136, 28
August 1974, 58 SCRA 559
[24]
Abe, et al. vs. Foster Wheeler Corporation and Caltex,
100 Phil. 198, 206
[25]
De Dios vs. Bristol
Laboratories (Phils.) Inc., G.R. No. L-25530, 29 January 1974, 55 SCRA 349, 356
[26]
Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank & Trust Co., supra
[27]
Ibid.
[28]
Ibid.
[29]
Remitere vs. Vda. de Yulo, supra
[30]
Rodriguez vs. Tan, 91 Phil. 724
[31]
Llanto vs. Ali Dimaporo,
et al., G.R. No. L-21905, 31 March
1966, 16 SCRA 599, 605
[32]
PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the “Government Auditing Code of the Philippines”,
Sections 2 and 201(1)
[33]
Id., Sections 20 and 43
[34]
Id., Section 19
[35]
Id., Section 17
[36]
Id., Sections 6 and 48
[37]
Paragraph 7 of the Complaint also alleges that petitioner “acted as dummy,
nominee or agent, by allowing himself to be incorporator, director, board
member and or stockholder of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled
by Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez,
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.”
[38]
Tan, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 84195, 11 December 1989, 180 SCRA 34, 42-43