G.R. No. 66838. December 02, 1991
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER, VS. PROCTER & GAMBLE PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION AND THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
FELICIANO, J.:
For the taxable year 1974 ending on 30 June 1974, and the taxable
year 1975 ending 30 June 1975, private respondent Procter and Gamble Philippine
Manufacturing Corporation (“P&G-Phil.”) declared dividends
payable to its parent company and sole stockholder, Procter and Gamble Co., Inc. (USA) (“P&G-USA”),
amounting to P24,164,946.30, from which dividends the amount of
P8,457,731.21 representing the thirty-five percent (35%) withholding tax at
source was deducted.
On 5 January 1977, private respondent P&G-Phil. filed with
petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue a claim for refund or tax credit in
the amount of P4,832,989.26 claiming, among other
things, that pursuant to Section 24 (b) (1) of the National Internal Revenue
Code (“NIRC”),[1]
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 369, the applicable rate of withholding
tax on the dividends remitted was only fifteen percent (15%) (and not thirty-five percent [35%]) of the dividends.
There being no responsive action on the part of the Commissioner, P&G-Phil., on 13 July 1977, filed a petition for
review with public respondent Court of Tax Appeals (“CTA”) docketed
as CTA Case No. 2883. On 31 January 1984, the CTA rendered a decision
ordering petitioner Commissioner to refund or grant the tax credit in the amount of P4,832,989.00.
On appeal by the Commissioner, the Court through its Second
Division reversed the decision of the CTA and held that:
(a) P&G-USA,
and not private respondent P&G-Phil., was the proper party to claim the
refund or tax credit here involved;
(b) “there is nothing in Section 902 or other
provisions of the US Tax Code that allows a credit against the US tax due from
P&G-USA of taxes deemed to have been paid in the Philippines equivalent to
twenty percent (20%) which represents the difference between the regular tax of
thirty-five percent (35%) on corporations and the tax of fifteen percent (15%)
on dividends;” and
(c) private respondent
P&G-Phil. failed to meet certain conditions necessary in order that
“the dividends received by its non-resident parent company in the US
(P&G-USA) may be subject to the preferential tax rate of 15% instead of
35%.”
These holdings were questioned in P&G-Phil.’s
Motion for Reconsideration and we will deal with them seriatim in this Resolution resolving that Motion.
I
1. There are certain preliminary aspects of the
question of the capacity of P&G-Phil. to bring the present claim for refund
or tax credit, which need to be examined.
This question was raised for the first time on appeal, i.e., in the
proceedings before this Court on the Petition for Review filed by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The
question was not raised by the Commissioner on the administrative level,
and neither was it raised by him before the CTA.
We believe that the Bureau of Internal Revenue (“BIR”)
should not be allowed to defeat an otherwise valid claim for refund by raising
this question of alleged incapacity for the first time on appeal before this
Court. This is clearly a matter of procedure. Petitioner does not pretend that
P&G-Phil., should it succeed in the claim for refund, is likely to run
away, as it were, with the refund instead of transmitting such refund or tax
credit to its parent and sole stockholder.
It is commonplace that in the absence of explicit statutory provisions
to the contrary, the government must follow the same rules of procedure which
bind private parties. It is, for
instance, clear that the government is held to compliance with the provisions
of Circular No. 1-88 of this Court in exactly the same way that private
litigants are held to such compliance, save only in respect of the matter of
filing fees from which the Republic of the Philippines is exempt by the Rules
of Court.
More importantly, there arises here a question of fairness should
the BIR, unlike any other litigant, be allowed to raise for the first time on
appeal questions which had not been litigated either in the lower court or on
the administrative level. For, if
petitioner had at the earliest possible opportunity, i.e., at the
administrative level, demanded that P&G-Phil. produce an express authorizaÂtion
from its parent corporation to bring the claim for refund, then P&G-Phil.
would have been able forthwith to secure and produce such authorization before
filing the action in the instant case.
The action here was commenced just before expiration of the two (2)-year prescriptive period.
2. The question of the capacity of
P&G-Phil. to bring the claim for refund has substantive dimensions as well which, as will be seen below, also ultimately
relate to fairness.
Under Section 306 of the NIRC, a claim for refund or tax credit
filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is essential for maintenance of
a suit for recovery of taxes allegedly erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected:
“Sec. 306. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally
collected. — No suit or
proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any
national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or
illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been
collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in
any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been
duly filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; but such suit or proceeding
may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under
protest or duress. In any case, no such
suit or proceedÂing shall be begun after the expiration of two years from the
date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that
may arise after payment: x x x.”
(Underscoring supplied)
Section 309 (3) of the NIRC, in turn,
provides:
“Section
309. Authority
of Commissioner to Take Compromises and to Refund Taxes. — The Commissioner may:
x x
x x
x x x x
x
(3) credit or refund
taxes erroneously or illegally received, x x x. No credit or
refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files
in writing with the Commissioner a claim for credit or refund within
two (2) years after the payment of the tax
or penalty.” (As amended by P.D. No. 69) (Emphasis supplied)
Since the claim for refund was filed by
P&G-Phil., the question which arises is: is P&G-Phil. a “taxpayer”
under Section 309 (3) of the NIRC? The
term “taxpayer” is defined in our NIRC as referring to “any
person subject to tax imposed by the Title [on Tax on Income].”[2]
It thus becomes important to note that under Section 53 (c) of the NIRC, the withholding agent who is
“required to deduct and withhold any tax” is made “personally
liable for such tax” and indeed is indemnified against any claims and
demands which the stockholder might wish to make in questioning the amount of
payments effected by the withholding agent in accordance with the provisions of the NIRC. The withholding agent, P&G-Phil., is directly
and independently liable[3]
for the correct amount of the tax that should be withheld from the dividend
remittances. The withholding agent is,
moreover, subject to and liable for deficiency assessments, surcharges and
penalties should the amount of the tax withheld be finally found to be less
than the amount that should have been withheld under law.
A “person liable for tax” has been held to be a
“person subject to tax” and properly considered a
“taxpayer.”[4]
The terms “liable for tax” and “subject to tax” both
connote legal obligation or duty to pay a tax.
It is very difficult, indeed conceptually impossible, to consider a
person who is statutorily made “liable for tax” as not
“subject to tax.” By any
reasonable standard, such a person should be regarded as a party in interest, or as a person having sufficient legal interest,
to bring a suit for refund of taxes he believes were illegally collected from
him.
In Philippine Guaranty
Company, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[5]
this Court pointed out that a withholding agent
is in fact the agent both of the government and of the taxpayer, and that the withholding agent is not an
ordinary government agent:
“The law sets no condition for the personal liability of
the withholding agent to attach. The
reason is to compel the withholding agent to withhold the tax under all circumstances. In effect, the responsibility for the
collection of the tax as well as the payment thereof is concentrated upon the
person over whom the GovernÂment has jurisdiction. Thus, the withholding agent is
constituted the agent of both
the Government and the taxpayer. With respect to the collection and/or
withholding of the tax, he is the Government’s agent. In regard to the filing of the necessary
income tax return and the payment of the tax to the Government, he is the agent
of the taxpayer. The withholding agent,
therefore, is no ordinary government agent especially because under Section 53
(c) he is held personally liable for the tax he is duty bound to withhold;
whereas the Commissioner and his deputies are not made liable by law.”[6] (Emphases supplied)
If, as pointed out in Philippine
Guaranty, the withholding agent is also an agent of the beneficial owner of
the dividends with respect to the filing of the necessary income tax return and
with respect to actual payment of the tax to the government, such authority may
reasonably be held to include the authority to file a claim for refund and to
bring an action for recovery of such claim.
This implied authority is especially warranted where, as in the instant
case, the withholding agent is the wholly owned subsidiary of the
parent-stockholder and therefore, at all times, under the effective
control of such parent-stockholder.
In the circumstances of this case, it seems particularly unreal to deny
the implied authority of P&G-Phil. to claim a refund and to commence an action
for such refund.
We believe that, even now, there is nothing to preclude the BIR
from requiring P&G-Phil. to show some written or telexed confirmation by P&G-USA of the subsidiary’s
authority to claim the refund or tax credit and to remit the proceeds of the
refund, or to apply the tax credit to some Philippine tax obligation of
P&G-USA, before actual payment of the refund or issuance of a tax credit
certificate. What appears to be
vitiated by basic unfairness is petitioner’s position that, although
P&G-Phil. is directly and personally liable to the Government for the taxes
and any deficiency assessments to be collected, the Government is not legally
liable for a
refund simply because it did not demand a written confirmation of
P&G-Phil.’s implied authority from the very
beginning. A sovereign government should
act honorably and fairly at all times, even vis-a-vis
taxpayers.
We believe and so hold
that, under the circumstances of this case, P&G-Phil. is properly regarded
as a “taxpayer” within the meaning of Section 309, NIRC, and as
impliedly authorized to file the claim for refund and the suit to recover such
claim.
II
1. We turn to the principal substantive
question before us; the applicability to the dividend remittances by
P&G-Phil. to P&G-USA of the fifteen percent (15%) tax rate provided for
in the following portion of Section 24 (b)(1) of the NIRC:
“(b)
Tax on foreign corporations.
-?
(1) Non-resident corporation. — A foreign corporation not engaged in trade
and business in the Philippines,
x x x, shall pay a tax equal
to 35% of the gross income receipt during its taxable year from all sources within the Philippines,
as x x x dividends x x x. Provided, still further, that on
dividends received from a domestic corporaÂtion liable to tax under this
Chapter, the tax shall be 15% of the dividends, which shall be collected and
paid as provided
in Section 53 (d) of this Code, subject to the condition that the country in
which the non-resident foreign corporation is domiciled shall allow a credit
against the tax due from the non-resident foreign corporation, taxes deemed to
have been paid in the Philippines equivalent to 20% which represents the
difference between the regular tax (35%) on corporations and the tax (15%) on
dividends as provided in this Section x x x.”
The ordinary thirty-five percent (35%) tax rate applicable to
dividend remittances to non-resident corporate stockholders of a Philippine
corporation, goes down to fifteen percent (15%) if the country of domicile of
the foreign stockholder corporation “shall allow” such foreign
corporation a tax credit for “taxes deemed paid in the Philippines,”
applicable against the tax payable to the domiciliary country by the foreign
stockholder corporation. In other words,
in the instant case, the reduced fifteen percent
(15%) dividend tax rate is applicable if the USA “shall allow”
to P&G-USA a tax credit for “taxes deemed paid in the
Philippines” applicable against the US taxes of P&G-USA. The NIRC specifies that such tax credit for
“taxes deemed paid in the Philippines” must, as a minimum, reach an amount equivalent to twenty (20)
percentage points which represents the difference between the regular
thirty-five percent (35%) dividend tax rate and the preferred fifteen percent
(15%) dividend tax rate.
It is important to note that
Section 24 (b)(1), NIRC, does not
require that the US must give a
“deemed paid” tax credit for the dividend tax (20 percentage
points) waived by the Philippines in making applicable the preferred
dividend tax rate of fifteen percent (15%).
In other words, our NIRC does not require that the US tax law deem the parent?corporation
to have paid the twenty (20) percentage points of dividend tax waived by
the Philippines. The NIRC only requires that the US
“shall allow” P&G-USA a “deemed paid” tax credit in an
amount equivalent to the twenty (20) percentage points waived by the Philippines.
2. The question arises: Did the US
law comply with the above requirement?
The relevant provisions of the US Internal Revenue Code (“Tax
Code”) are the following:
“SEC. 901
— Taxes of foreign
countries and possessions of United States.
(a) Allowance of credit. — If the taxpayer chooses to have the
benefits of this subpart, the tax imposed by this chapter shall, subject
to the applicable limitation of section 904, be credited with the amounts
provided in the applicable paragraph of subsection (b) plus, in the case of a
corporation, the taxes deemed to have been paid under sections 902 and
960. Such choice for any taxable year
may be made or changed at any time before the expiration of the period
prescribed for making a claim for credit or refund of the tax imposed by this
chapter for such taxable year. The
credit shall not be allowed against the tax imposed by section 531 (relating to
the tax on accumulated earnings), against the additional tax imposed for the
taxable year under section 1333 (relating to war loss recoveries) or under
section 1351 (relating to recoveries of foreign expropriation losses), or against the personal holding company tax
imposed by section 541.
(b) Amount allowed. — Subject to the applicable limitation of
section 904, the following amounts shall be allowed as the credit under
subsection (a):
(a) Citizens and domestic corporations. — In the case of a citizen of the United
States and of a domestic corporation, the amount of any income, war profits,
and excess profits taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign
country or to any possession of the United States; and
x x x x x
x x
x x
SEC. 902.
— Credit for corporate stockholders in foreign corporation.
(A) Treatment of Taxes Paid by Foreign Corporation – For purposes of this
subject, a domestic corporation which owns at least 10 percent of the
voting stock of a foreign corporation from which it receives dividends in any
taxable year shall –
x x x x x
x x
x x
(2) to the extent such dividends are paid by
such foreign corporation out of accumulated profits [as defined in
subsection (c) (1) (b)] of a year for which
such foreign corporation is a less-developed country corporation, be deemed
to have paid the same proportion of any income, war profits, or excess
profits taxes paid or deemed to be paid by such foreign corporation
to any foreign country or to any possession of the United States on or
with respect to such accumulated profits, which the amount of such dividends bears to the amount
of such accumulated profits.
x x x x x x x
x x
(c) Applicable Rules
(1) Accumulated profits defined. — For purposes of this section, the term
‘accumulated profits’ means with respect to any foreign corporation,
(A) for purposes of subsections (a) (1) and (b)
(1), the amount of its gains, profits, or income computed without reduction by
the amount of the income, war profits, and excess profits taxes imposed on or
with respect to such profits or income by any foreign country. x x x; and
(B) for purposes of
subsections (a) (2) and (b) (2), the amount of its gains, profits, or income
in excess of the income, war
profits, and excess profits taxes imposed on or with respect to such
profits or income.
The Secretary or his delegate shall have full power to determine
from the accumulated profits of what year or years such dividends were paid,
treating dividends paid in the first 20 days of any year as having been paid
from the accumulated profits of the preceding year or years (unless to his satisfaction shows otherwise), and in other
respects treating dividends as having been paid from the most recently
accumulated gains, profits, or earning.
x x x x
x x.” (Emphases
supplied)
Close examination of the above quoted
provisions of the US Tax Code[7]
shows the following:
a. US law (Section 901, Tax Code) grants
P&G-USA a tax credit for the amount of the dividend tax actually
paid (i.e., withheld) from the dividend remittances to P&G-USA;
b. US law (Section 902, US Tax Code) grants to
P&G-USA a “deemed paid” tax credit[8]
for a proportionate part of the corporate income tax actually paid to the Philippines by P&G-Phil.
The parent-corporation P&G-USA is
“deemed to have paid” a portion of the Philippine corporate income
tax although that tax was actually paid by its Philippine subsidiary,
P&G-Phil., not by P&G-USA. This
“deemed paid” concept merely reflects economic reality, since the
Philippine corporate income tax was in fact paid and deducted from revenues earned
in the Philippines, thus reducing the amount remittable as dividends to P&G-USA.
In other words, US
tax law treats the Philippine corporate income tax as if it came out of the
pocket, as it were, of P&G-USA as a part of the economic cost of carrying on business
operations in the Philippines
through the medium of P&G-Phil. and here earning profits. What is, under US
law, deemed paid by P&G-USA are not “phantom taxes” but
instead Philippine corporate income taxes actually paid here by
P&G-Phil., which
are very real indeed.
It is also useful to note that both (i)
the tax credit for the Philippine dividend tax actually withheld, and (ii) the
tax credit for the Philippine corporate income tax actually paid by
P&G-Phil. but “deemed paid” by P&G-USA, are tax credits
available or applicable against the US corporate income tax of P&G-USA.
These tax credits are allowed because of the US
congressional desire to avoid or reduce double taxation of the same income
stream.[9]
In order to determine whether US tax law complies with the
requirements for applicability of the reduced or preferential fifteen percent
(15%) dividend tax rate under Section 24 (b)(1), NIRC, it is necessary:
a. to
determine the amount of the 20 percentage points dividend tax waived by
the Philippine government under Section 24 (b) (1), NIRC, and which hence goes
to P&G-USA;
b. to
determine the amount of the “deemed paid” tax credit which US
tax law must allow to P&G-USA; and
c. to
ascertain that the amount of the “deemed paid” tax credit
allowed by US law is at least equal to the amount of the dividend tax waived by the Philippine Government.
Amount (a), i.e., the amount of the dividend tax waived by the
Philippine government is arithmetically determined in the following manner:
P100.00 ——— Pretax net corporate income earned by P&G-Phil.
x 35% ——— Regular
Philippine corporate income tax rate
P 35.00 ——— Paid to the BIR by P&G-Phil. as Philippine
corporate income tax.
P100.00
–
35.00
P65.00 ——– Available for remittance as dividends to P&G-USA
P65.00 ——– Dividends remittable to P&G-USA
x 35% ——– Regular
Philippine dividend tax rate under Section 24 (b)(1), NIRC
P 22.75 ——– Regular dividend tax
P 65.00 ——– Dividends remittable to P&G-USA
x 15% ——– Reduced
dividend tax rate under Section 24 (b)(1), NIRC
P 9.75 ——– Reduced dividend tax
22.75 ——– Regular dividend tax under Section 24 (b)(1), NIRC
– 9.75 ——– Reduced dividend
tax under Section 24 (b)(1), NIRC
P 13.00 ——– Amount of dividend tax waived by Philippine
government under Section 24 (b) (1), NIRC.
Thus, amount (a) above is P13.00 for
every P100.00 of pre-tax net income earned by P&G-Phil. Amount (a) is also the minimum amount
of the “deemed paid” tax credit that US tax law shall allow if
P&G-USA is to qualify for the reduced or preferential dividend tax rate
under Section 24 (b)(1), NIRC.
Amount (b) above, i.e., the amount of the “deemed paid”
tax credit which US tax law allows under Section 902, Tax Code, may be computed
arithmetically as follows:
P 65.00
——- Dividends
remittable to P&G-USA
– 9.75 ——- Dividend tax
withheld at the reduced (15%) rate
P 55.25 ——- Dividends
actually remitted to P&G-USA
P35.00 ——- Philippine corporate income tax paid by
P&G-Phil to the BIR
Dividends actually
remitted by P&G?Phil. to P&G-USA P55.25
____________________________________________ = ___________ x P35.00 = P29.75[10]
Amount of accumulated profits earned by P&G-Phil.
P65.00
in
excess of income tax
Thus, for every P55.25 of dividends
actually remitted (after withholding at the rate of 15%) by P&G-Phil.
to its US parent P&G-USA, a tax credit of P29.75 is allowed by
Section 902 US Tax Code for Philippine corporate income tax “deemed
paid” by the parent but actually paid by the wholly-owned subsidiary.
Since P29.75 is much higher than P13.00 (the amount of dividend
tax waived by the Philippine government), Section 902, US Tax Code,
specifically and clearly complies with the requirements of Section 24 (b)(1), NIRC.
3. It is important to note
also that the foregoing reading of Sections 901 and 902 of the US Tax Code is
identical with the reading of the BIR of Sections 901 and 902 as shown by
administrative rulings issued by the BIR.
The first Ruling was issued in 1976, i.e., BIR Ruling No. 76-004,
rendered by then Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue Efren
I. Plana, later Associate Justice of this Court, the
relevant portion of which stated:
“However, after a restudy of the decision in the American Chicle Company case and the provisions of Sections 901 and
902 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, we find merit in your contention that
our computation of the credit which the U.S. tax law allows in such cases
is erroneous as the amount of tax ‘deemed paid’ to the Philippine government
for purposes of credit against the U.S. tax by the recipient of dividends
includes a portion of the amount of income tax paid by the corporation
declaring the dividend in addition to the tax withheld from the dividend
remitted. In other words, the U.S. government will allow a credit to the U.S. corporation or
recipient of the dividend,
in addition to the amount of tax actually withheld, a portion of the income
tax paid by the corporation declaring the dividend. Thus, if a Philippine corporation wholly
owned by a U.S. corporation has a net income of P100,000,
it will pay P25,000 Philippine income
tax thereon in accordance with Section 24(a) of the Tax Code. The net income,
after income tax, which is P75,000, will then be
declared as dividend to the U.S. corporation at 15% tax, or P11,250, will be withheld therefrom. Under the
aforementioned sections of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, U.S. corporation receiving the dividend can
utilize as credit against its U.S. tax payable on said dividends the amount P30,000 composed of:
(1) The tax ‘deemed paid’ or indirectly
paid on the dividend arrived at as follows:
P75,000 x P25,000 =
P18,750
100,000*
(2) The amount of 15%
of P75,000 withheld = 11,250
P30,000
The amount of P18,750 deemed paid and to be credited against the U.S. tax on the
dividends received by the U.S. corporation from a Philippine subsidiary is
clearly more than 20% requirement of Presidential Decree No. 369 as 20% of
P75,000.00 the dividends to be remitted under the above example, amounts to
P15,000.00 only.
In the light of the foregoing, BIR Ruling No. 75-005 dated
September 10, 1975 is hereby amended in the sense that the dividends to be
remitted by your client to its parent company shall be subject to the withholding tax at the rate of 15%
only.
This ruling shall have force and effect only for as long as the present pertinent provisions
of the U.S. Federal Tax Code, which are the bases of the ruling, are not
revoked, amended and modified, the effect of which will reduce the percentage
of tax deemed paid and creditable
against the U.S. tax on dividends remitted by a foreign corporation to
a U.S. corporation.” (Emphases supplied)
The 1976 Ruling was reiterated in, e.g., BIR Ruling dated 22 July 1981 addressed to Basic Foods
Corporation and BIR Ruling dated 20
October 1987 addressed to Castillo, Laman,
Tan and Associates. In other words, the
1976 Ruling of Hon. Efren I. Plana
was reiterated by the BIR even as the case at bar was pending before the CTA
and this Court.
4. We should not overlook
the fact that the concept of “deemed paid” tax credit, which is
embodied in Section 902, US Tax Code, is exactly the same “deemed
paid” tax credit found in our NIRC and which Philippine tax law allows
to Philippine corporations which have operations abroad (say, in the United
States) and which, therefore, pay income taxes to the US government.
Section 30 (c) (3) and (8), NIRC, provides:
“Sec.
30. Deductions
from Gross Income. — In computing net income, there shall be
allowed as deductions — x x x
(c) Taxes. — x x x
x x
x x
x x x x x
(3) Credits
against tax for taxes of foreign countries.
— If the taxpayer signifies in his return his desire to have the
benefits of this paragraphs, the tax imposed by this Title shall be credited
with x x x
(a) Citizen and Domestic Corporation. — In the case of a citizen of the
Philippines and of domestic corporation, the amount of net income, war profits or excess profits, taxes
paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign country.”
(Emphases supplied)
Under
Section 30 (c)(3)(a), NIRC, above, the BIR must
give a tax credit to a
Philippine corporation for taxes actually paid by it to the US
government — e.g., for taxes collected by
the US
government on dividend remittances to the Philippine corporation. This Section of the NIRC is the equivalent of
Section 901 of the US Tax Code.
Section 30 (c)(8), NIRC, is practically
identical with Section 902 of the US Tax Code, and provides as follows:
“(8) Taxes
of foreign subsidiary. — For the
purposes of this subsection a domestic
corporation which owns a majority
of the voting stock of a foreign corporation from which it receives
dividends in any taxable year shall be deemed to have paid the same proportion of any income, war-profits, or excess-profits taxes
paid by such foreign corporation to any foreign country, upon or with
respect to the accumulated profits of such foreign corporation from which
such dividends were paid, which the amount of such dividends bears to the
amount of such accumulated profits: Provided, That the amount of tax
deemed to have been paid under this subsection shall in no case exceed the same
proportion of the tax against which credit is taken which the amount of such
dividends bears to the amount of the entire net income of the domestic corporation in which such dividends
are included. The term ‘accumulated
profits’ when used in this subsection in reference to a foreign
corporation, means the amount of its gains, profits, or income in
excess of the income,, war-profits, and excess-profits taxes imposed
upon or with respect to such profits or income; and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall have full power to determine from the
accumulated profits of what year or years such dividends were paid; treating dividends paid in the first sixty
days of any year as having been paid from the accumulated profits of the
preceding year or years (unless to his satisfaction shown
otherwise), and in other respects treating dividends as having been paid from
the most recently accumulated gains, profits, or earnings. In the case of a foreign corporaÂtion, the
income, war-profits, and excess-profits taxes of which are determined on the
basis of an accounting period of less than one year, the word ‘year’ as used in
this subsection shall be construed to mean such accounting period.”
(Emphases supplied)
Under the above quoted Section 30 (c)(8), NIRC, the BIR must give a tax credit to a Philippine
parent corporation for taxes “deemed paid” by it, that is, e.g., for
taxes paid to the US
by the US
subsidiary of a Philippine-parent corporation.
The Philippine parent or corporate stockholder is
“deemed” under our NIRC to have paid a proportionate part of
the US
corporate income tax paid by its US
subsidiary, although such US
tax was actually paid by the subsidiary and not by the Philippine parent.
Clearly, the “deemed paid” tax credit which, under
Section 24 (b)(1), NIRC, must be allowed by US law to P&G-USA, is the same
“deemed paid” tax credit that Philippine law allows to a Philippine corporation with a
wholly- or majority-owned subsidiary in (for instance) the US. The “deemed paid” tax credit
allowed in Section 902, US Tax Code, is no more a credit for “phantom
taxes” than is the “deemed paid” tax credit granted in Section
30 (c)(8), NIRC.
III
1. The Second Division of
the Court, in holding that the applicable dividend tax rate in the instant case
was the regular thirty-five percent (35%) rate rather than the reduced rate of
fifteen percent (15%), held that P&G-Phil. had failed to prove that its
parent, P&G-USA, had in fact been given by the US tax authorities a “deemed paid” tax credit
in the amount required by Section 24 (b)(1), NIRC.
We believe, in the first place, that we must distinguish between
the legal question before this Court from questions of
administrative implementation arising after the legal question has been
answered. The basic legal issue is, of course, this: which is the applicable
dividend tax rate in the instant case: the regular thirty-five percent (35%)
rate or the reduced fifteen percent (15%) rate?
The question of whether or not P&G-USA is in fact given by the US
tax authorities a “deemed paid” tax credit in the required amount,
relates to the administrative implementation of the applicable reduced tax
rate.
In the second place, Section 24 (b)(1), NIRC, does not in
fact require that the “deemed paid” tax credit shall have actually
been granted before the applicable dividend tax rate goes down from
thirty-five percent (35%) to fifteen percent (15%). As noted several times earlier, Section 24
(b)(1), NIRC, merely requires, in the case at bar, that the USA “shall allow a credit
against the tax due from [P&G-USA for] taxes deemed to have been paid in
the Philippines x x x.” There is
neither statutory provision nor revenue regulation issued by the Secretary of
Finance requiring the actual grant of the “deemed paid” tax credit by
the US Internal Revenue Service to P&G-USA before the preferential fifteen
percent (15%) dividend rate becomes applicable.
Section 24 (b)(1), NIRC, does not create a tax exemption
nor does it provide a tax credit; it is a provision which specifies when a
particular (reduced) tax rate is legally applicable.
In the third place, the position originally
taken by the Second Division results in a severe practical problem of
administrative circularity. The
Second Division in effect held that the reduced dividend tax rate is not
applicable until the US
tax credit for “deemed paid” taxes is actually given in the required minimum amount by the
US Internal Revenue Service to P&G-USA.
But, the US
“deemed paid” tax credit cannot be given by the US tax
authorities unless dividends have actually been remitted to the US, which means
that the Philippine dividend tax, at the rate here applicable, was actually
imposed and collected.[11]
It is this practical or operating circularity that is in fact avoided by our
BIR when it issues rulings that the tax laws of particular foreign
jurisdictions (e.g., Republic of Vanuatu,[12]
Hongkong,[13]
Denmark,[14]
etc.) comply with the requirements set out in Section 24 (b)(1), NIRC, for
applicability of the fifteen percent (15%) tax rate. Once such a ruling is rendered, the Philippine subsidiary begins to
withhold at the reduced dividend tax rate.
A requirement relating to administrative implementation is not
properly imposed as a condition
for the applicabiÂlity, as a matter
of law, of a
particular tax rate. Upon the other
hand, upon the determination or recognition of the applicability of the reduced
tax rate, there is nothing to prevent the BIR from issuing implementing
regulations that would require P&G-Phil., or any Philippine corporation
similarly situated, to certify to the BIR the amount of the “deemed
paid” tax credit actually subsequently granted by the US tax authorities to P&G-USA or a
US parent corporation for the taxable year involved. Since the US tax laws can and do change, such
implementing regulations could also provide that failure of P&G-Phil. to
submit such certification within a certain period of time, would result in the
imposition of a deficiency assessment for the twenty (20) percentage points
differential. The task of this Court is
to settle which tax rate is applicable, considering the state of US
law at a given time. We should leave details relating to
administrative implementation where they properly belong — with the BIR.
2. An interpretation of a
tax statute that produces a revenue flow for the government is not, for that
reason alone, necessarily the correct reading of the statute. There are many tax statutes or provisions
which are designed, not to trigger off an instant surge of revenues, but rather
to achieve longer-term and broader-gauge fiscal and economic objectives. The task of our Court is to give effect to the
legislative design and objectives as they are written into the statute even if,
as in the case at bar, some revenues have to be foregone in that process.
The economic objectives sought to be achieved by the Philippine
Government by reducing the thirty-five percent (35%) dividend rate to fifteen
percent (15%) are set out in the preambular clauses
of P.D. No. 369 which amended Section 24 (b)(1), NIRC, into its present form:
“WHEREAS, it is
imperative to adopt measures responsive
to the requirements of a developing economy foremost of which is the financing of economic development programs;
WHEREAS, nonresident foreign corporations with investments in the Philippines
are taxed on their earnings from dividends at the rate of 35%;
WHEREAS, in order to encourage more capital investment for large
projects an appropriate tax need be imposed on dividends received by
non-resident foreign corporations in the same manner as the tax imposed on interest on foreign
loans;
x
x x x x x x x x“
(Emphases supplied)
More simply put, Section 24 (b)(1), NIRC, seeks to promote the in-flow of
foreign equity investment in the Philippines by reducing the tax cost of
earning profits here and thereby increasing the net dividends remittable to the
investor. The foreign investor, however,
would not benefit from the reduction of the Philippine dividend tax rate unless
its home country gives it some relief from double taxation (i.e., second-tier
taxation) (the home country would simply have more “post-R.P. tax”
income to subject to its own taxing power) by allowing the investor additional
tax credits which would be applicable against the tax payable to such home
country. Accordingly, Section 24 (b)(1),
NIRC, requires the home or domiciliary country to give the investor corporation
a “deemed paid” tax credit at least equal in amount to the twenty
(20) percentage points of dividend tax foregone by the Philippines, in the
assumption that a positive incentive effect would thereby be felt by the
investor.
The net effect upon the foreign investor may be shown
arithmetically in the following manner:
P65.00 ——— Dividends remittable to P&G-USA (please see
page 16 above)
– 9.75 ——— Reduced R.P.
dividend tax withheld by P&G-Phil.
P55.25 ——— Dividends
actually remitted to P&G-USA
P55.25
x 46% ——— Maximum US corporate income tax rate
P25.415 ——— US
corporate tax payable by P&G-USA without tax credits
P25.415
– 9.75 ——— US tax credit
for RP dividend tax withheld by P&G-Phil. at 15% (Section 901, US Tax Code)
P15.66 ——— US corporate income tax payable after Section
901 tax credit.
P55.25
-15.66
P39.59 ——— Amount
received by P&G-USA net of R.P. and U.S.
taxes without “deemed paid” tax credit.
P25.415
-29.75 ——— “Deemed
paid” tax credit under Section 902 US Tax Code (please see page 18 above)
– 0 – ——— US
corporate income tax payable on dividends remitted by P&G-Phil. to
P&G-USA after Section 902 tax
credit.
P55.25 ——— Amount received by P&G-USA net of RP and US taxes after
Section 902 tax credit.
It will be seen that the “deemed paid” tax credit
allowed by Section 902, US Tax Code, could offset the US corporate income tax
payable on the dividends remitted by P&G-Phil. The result, in fine, could be that
P&G-USA would after US
tax credits, still wind up with P55.25, the full amount of the dividends
remitted to P&G-USA net of Philippine taxes. In the calculation of the Philippine
Government, this should encourage additional investment or re-investment in the
Philippines by
P&G-USA.
3. It remains only to note
that under the Philippines
-United States Convention “With Respect to Taxes on Income,”[15]
the Philippines,
by a treaty commitment,
reduced the regular rate of dividend tax to a maximum of twenty percent (20%)
of the gross amount of dividends paid to US
parent corporations:
“Article
11. — Dividends
x x
x x
x x x x x
(2) The rate of tax imposed by one of the
Contracting States on dividends derived from sources within that Contracting
State by a resident of the other Contracting
State shall not exceed —
(a) 25 percent of the gross amount of the
dividend; or
(b) When the recipient is a
corporation, 20 percent of the gross amount of the dividend if during the
part of the paying corporation’s taxable year which precedes the date of payment
of the dividend and during the whole of its prior taxable year (if any), at
least 10 percent of the outstanding shares of the voting stock of the paying
corporation was owned by the recipient corporation.”
x x x x x x x x x“
(Emphases supplied)
The Tax Convention, at the same time,
established a treaty obligation on the part of the United
States that it “shall allow” to a US
parent corporation receiving dividends from its Philippine subsidiary “a
[tax] credit for the approÂpriate amount of taxes paid or accrued to the Philippines
by the Philippine [subsidiary] —-.”[16]
This is, of course, precisely the “deemed paid” tax credit provided
for in Section 902, US Tax Code, discussed above. Clearly, there is here on the part of the Philippines
a deliberate undertaking to reduce the regular dividend tax rate of thirty-five
percent (35%). Since, however, the
treaty rate of twenty percent (20%) is a maximum rate, there is still a
differential or additional reduction of five (5) percentage points which compliance
of US law (Section 902) with the requirements of Section 24 (b)(1), NIRC, makes available in respect of
dividends from a Philippine subsidiary.
We conclude that private respondent P&G-Phil. is entitled to
the tax refund or tax credit which it seeks.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court Resolved to
GRANT private respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration dated 11 May 1988, to SET ASIDE the
Decision of the Second Division of the Court promulgated on 15 April 1988, and
in lieu thereof, to REINSTATE and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Tax
Appeals in CTA Case No. 2883 dated 31 January 1984 and to DENY the Petition for
Review for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Romero, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., joins J. Paras in his dissenting opinion.
Fernan, C.J., on leave.
Cruz and Bidin, JJ., see concurring opinion.
[1]
We refer here (unless otherwise expressly indicated) to the provisions of
the NIRC as they existed during the relevant taxable years and at the time the
claim for refund was made. We shall
hereafter refer simply to the NIRC.
[2] Section 20 (n), NIRC (as renumbered and
re-arranged by Executive Order No. 273, 1
January 1988).
[3]
E.g., Section 51 (e), NIRC:
“Sec. 51. Returns
and payment of taxes withheld at source.
— x x x
x x x x x x x x x
(e) Surcharge and interest for
failure to deduct and withhold. —
If the withholding agent, in violation of the provisions of the
preceding section and implementing regulations thereunder,
fails to deduct and withhold the amount of tax required under said section and
regulations, he shall be liable to pay in addition to the tax required
to be deducted and withheld, a surcharge of fifty per centum if the
failure is due to willful neglect or with intent to defraud the Government, or
twenty-five per centum if the failure is not due to such causes, plus
interest at the rate of fourteen per centum per annum from the time the tax
is required to be withheld until the date of assessment.
xx x x x x x x x“
Section 251 (Id.):
“Sec. 251. Failure of
a withholding agent to collect and remit tax. — Any person required to collect,
account for, and remit any tax imposed by this Code who willfully fails to collect such tax, or account for and
remit such tax, or willfully assists in any manner to evade any such tax or the payment thereof, shall,
in addition to other penalties provided for under this Chapter, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax not collected, or not accounted for and remitted.”
(Emphases supplied)
[4]
Houston Street
Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 84 F. 2nd. 821 (1936); Bank of America v. Anglim, 138 F. 2nd. 7 (1943).
[5]
15 SCRA 1 (1965).
[6]
15 SCRA at 4.
[7]
The following detailed examination of
the tenor and import of Sections 901 and 902 of the US Tax Code is,
regrettably, made necessary by the fact that the original decision of the
Second Division overlooked those Sections in their entirety. In the original opinion in 160 SCRA 560
(1988), immediately after Section 902, US Tax Code is quoted, the following
appears: “To Our mind, there is nothing in the aforecited
provision that would justify tax return of the disputed 15% to the private
respondent” (160 SCRA at 567). No
further discussion of Section 902 was offered.
[8]
Sometimes also called a
“derivative” tax credit or an “indirect” tax credit; Bittker and Ebb, United States Taxation of
Foreign Income and Foreign Persons, 319 (2nd Ed., 1968).
[9] American Chicle Co.
v. U.S., 316 US 450, 86 L. ed. 1591
(1942); W.K. Buckley, Inc. v. C.I.R., 158 F. 2d. 158 (1946).
[10]
In his dissenting opinion, Paras, J. writes that “the amount of the tax
credit purportedly being allowed is not fixed or ascertained, hence we do not
know whether or not the tax credit contemplated is within the limits set forth
in the law” (Dissent, p. 6) Section 902 US Tax Code does not specify
particular fixed amounts or percentages as tax credits; what it does specify in
Section 902(A)(2) and (C)(1)(B) is a proportion expressed in the
fraction:
dividends actually
remitted by P&G-Phil. to P&G-USA
______________________________________________
amount of accumulated
profits earned by P&G-Phil. in excess of income tax
The actual or absolute amount of the tax credit allowed by Section 902
will obviously depend on the actual values of the numerator and the denominator
used in the fraction specified. The
point is that the establishment of the proportion or fraction in Section 902
renders the tax credit there allowed determinate and determinable.
* The denominator used by Com. Plana is the
total pre-tax income of the Philippine subsidiary. Under Section 902 (c)(1)(B),
US Tax Code, quoted earlier, the denominator should be the amount of income of the subsidiary in excess of [Philippine] income tax.
[11]
The US tax authorities cannot determine the amount
of the “deemed paid” credit to be given because the correct proportion cannot be determined: the numerator of the fraction
is unknown, until remittance of the dividends by P&G-Phil. is in fact effected. Please see computation, supra, p. 17.
[12] BIR Ruling dated 21 March 1983, addressed to the Tax Division, Sycip, Gorres, Velayo and Company.
[13]
BIR Ruling dated 13
October 1981, addressed
to Mr.
A.R. Sarvino,
Manager-Securities, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation.
[14]
BIR Ruling dated 31
January 1983,
addressed to the Tax Division, Sycip, Gorres, Velayo and Company.
[15]
Text in 7 Philippine Treaty Series 523;
signed on 1 October 1976 and effective on 16 October 1982 upon ratificaÂtion by both Governments and
exchange of instruments of ratification.
[16]
Art. 23(1), Tax Convention; the same
treaty imposes a similar obligation upon the Philippines to give to the
Philippine parent of a US subsidiary a tax credit for the
appropriate amount of US taxes paid by the US subsidiary. (Art. 23[2], id) Thus, Sec. 902
US Tax Code and Sec. 30(c)(8), NIRC, have been in effect been converted into treaty commitments of the
United
States and the Philippines, respectively, in respect of US and
Philippine corporations.
66838 : December 2, 1991 : J. Bidin : En Banc : Concurring Opinion
Clean
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Concurring Opinion
BIDIN, J.:
I agree with the opinion of my esteemed brother, Mr. Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano. However, I wish
to add some observations of my own, since I happen to be the ponente in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Wander Philippines, Inc. (160 SCRA 573 [1988]), a case
which reached a conclusion that is diametrically opposite to that sought to be
reached in the instant Motion for Reconsideration.
1. In page 5 of his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Edgardo L.
Paras argues that the failure of petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
raise before the Court of Tax Appeals the issue of who should be the real party
in interest in claiming a refund
cannot prejudice the government, as such failure is merely a procedural defect;
and that moreover, the government can never be in estoppel, especially in
matters involving taxes. In a word, the
dissenting opinion insists that errors of its agents should not jeopardize the
government’s position.
The above rule should not be taken absolutely and literally; if
it were, the government would never lose any litigation which is clearly not
true. The issue involved here is not
merely one of procedure; it is also one of fairness; whether the government
should be subject to the same stringent conditions applicable to an ordinary
litigant. As the Court had declared in
Wander:
“x x x To allow a litigant to assume a different posture when
he comes before the court and challenge the position he had accepted at the
administrative level, would be to sanction a procedure whereby the Court —
which is supposed to review administrative determinations — would not review,
but determine and decide for the first time, a question not raised at the
administrative forum. x x x” (160
SCRA at 566-577)
Had petitioner been forthright earlier and required from private
respondent proof of authority from its parent corporation, Procter and Gamble USA,
to prosecute the claim for refund, private respondent would doubtless have been
able to show proof of such authority. By
any account, it would be rank injustice now at this late stage to require
petitioner to submit such proof.
2. In page 8 of his dissenting opinion, Paras, J., stressed
that private respondent had failed: (1)
to show the actual amount credited by the US government against the income tax
due from P & G USA on the dividends received from private respondent; (2)
to present the 1975 income tax return of P & G USA when the dividends were
received; and (3) to submit any duly authenticated document showing that the US
government credited the 20% tax deemed paid in the Philippines.
I agree with the main opinion of my colleague, Feliciano, J.,
specifically in page 23 et seq. thereof, which, as I understand
it, explains that the US tax authorities are unable to determine the amount of the “deemed
paid” credit to be given P & G
USA so long as the numerator of
the fraction, i.e., dividends actually remitted by P & G-Phil to P & G
USA, is still unknown. Stated in other
words, until dividends have actually been remitted to the US
(which presupposes an actual imposition and collection of the applicable
Philippine dividend tax rate), the US
tax authorities cannot determine the “deemed paid” portion of the tax
credit sought by P & G USA. To
require private respondent to show documentary proof of its parent corporation
having actually received the “deemed paid” tax credit from the proper
tax authorities, would be like putting the cart before the horse. The only way of cutting through this (what
Feliciano, J., termed) “circularity”
is for our BIR to issue rulings (as they have been doing) to the effect that
the tax laws of particular foreign jurisdictions, e.g., USA, comply with the
requirements in our tax code for applicability of the reduced 15% dividend tax
rate. Thereafter, the taxpayer can be
required to submit, within a reasonable period, proof of the amount of
“deemed paid” tax credit actually granted by the foreign tax
authority. Imposing such a resolutory
condition should resolve the knotty problem of circularity.
3. Page 8 of the dissenting opinion of Paras, J., further
declares that tax refunds, being in the
nature of tax exemptions, are to be construed strictissimi juris
against the person or entity claiming the exemption; and that refunds
cannot be permitted to exist upon “vague implications.”
Notwithstanding the foregoing canon of construction, the
fundamental rule is still that a judge must ascertain and give effect to the
legislative intent embodied in a particular provision of law. If a statute (including a tax statute
reducing a certain tax rate) is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its ordinary meaning and applied without interpretation. In the instant case, the dissenting opinion
of Paras, J., itself concedes that the basic purpose of Pres. Decree No.
369, when it was promulgated in 1975 to amend Section 24(b), [1] of the
National Internal Revenue Code, was “to decrease the tax liability”
of the foreign capital investor and thereby to promote more inward foreign
investment. The same dissenting opinion
hastens to add, however, that the granting of a reduced dividend tax rate
“is premised on reciprocity.”
4. Nowhere in the provisions of P.D. No. 369 or in the National
Internal Revenue Code itself would one find reciprocity specified as a
condition for the granting of the reduced dividend tax rate in Section 24 (b),
[1], NIRC. Upon the other hand, where
the law-making authority intended to impose a requirement of reciprocity as a
condition for grant of a privilege, the legislature does so expressly
and clearly. For example, the
gross estate of non-citizens and non-residents of the Philippines
normally includes intangible personal property situated in the Philippines,
for purposes of application of the estate tax and donor’s tax. However,
under Section 98 of the NIRC (as amended by P.D. 1457), no taxes will be
collected by the Philippines in respect of such intangible personal property if
the law or the foreign country of which the decedent was a citizen and resident
at the time of his death allows a similar exemption from transfer or death
taxes in respect of intangible personal property located in such foreign
country and owned by Philippine citizens not residing in that foreign country.
There is no statutory requirement of reciprocity imposed as a
condition for grant of the reduced dividend tax rate of 15%. Moreover, for the Court to impose such a
requirement of reciprocity would be to
contradict the basic policy underlying P.D. 369 which amended Section 24(b),
[1], NIRC. P.D. 369 was promulgated in the effort to
promote the inflow of foreign investment capital into the Philippines. A requirement of reciprocity, i.e., a requirement that the U.S. grant a
similar reduction of U.S. dividend taxes on remittances by the U.S. subsidiaries
of Philippine corporations, would assume a
desire on the part of the U.S. and
of the Philippines to attract the flow of Philippine capital into
the U.S.. But the Philippines
precisely is a capital importing, and
not a capital exporting country.
If the Philippines
had surplus capital to export, it would not need to import foreign capital into
the Philippines. In other words, to require dividend tax
reciprocity from a foreign jurisdiction would be to actively encourage
Philippine corporations to invest outside the Philippines,
which would be inconsistent with the notion of attracting foreign capital into
the Philippines
in the first place.
5. Finally, in page 15 of
his dissenting opinion, Paras, J., brings up the fact that:
“Wander cited as authority a BIR ruling dated May 19, 1977, which requires a
remittance tax of only 15%. The mere
fact that in this Procter and Gamble case, the BIR desires to charge 35%
indicates that the BIR ruling cited in Wander has been obviously discarded
today by the BIR. Clearly, there has
been a change of mind on the part of the BIR.”
As pointed out by Feliciano, J., in his main opinion, even
while the instant case was pending before the Court of Tax Appeals and this
Court, the administrative rulings issued by the BIR from 1976 until as late as
1987, recognized the “deemed paid” credit referred to in Section 902
of the U.S. Tax Code. To date, no
contrary ruling has been issued by the BIR.
For all the foregoing reasons, private respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration should be granted and I vote accordingly.
66838 : J. Cruz : En Banc : Concurring Opinion
Clean
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Concurring OPINION
CRUZ, J.:
I join Mr. Justice
Feliciano in his excellent analysis of the difficult issues we are now asked to
resolve.
As I understand it, the intention of Section 24(b) of our Tax
Code is to attract foreign investors to this country by reducing their 35%
dividend tax rate to 15% if their own state allows them a deemed paid tax
credit at least equal in amount to the 20% waived by the Philippines. This tax credit would offset the tax payable
by them on their profits to their home state.
In effect, both the Philippines
and the home state of the foreign investors reduce their respective tax
“take” of those profits and the investors wind up with more left in
their pockets. Under this arrangement,
the total taxes to be paid by the foreign investors may be confined to the 35%
corporate income tax and 15% dividend tax only, both payable to the
Philippines, with the US tax liability being offset wholly or substantially by
the US “deemed paid” tax credits.
Without this arrangement, the foreign investors will have to pay
to the local state (in addition to the 35% corporate income tax) a 35% dividend
tax and another 35% or more to their home state or a total of 70% or more on
the same amount of dividends. In this
circumstance, it is not likely that many such foreign investors, given the
onerous burden of the two-tier tax system, i.e., local state plus
home state, will be encouraged to do business in the local state.
It is conceded that the law will “not trigger off an instant
surge of revenue,” as indeed the tax collectible by the Republic from the
foreign investor is considerably reduced.
This may appear unacceptable to the superficial viewer. But this reduction is in fact the price we
have to offer to persuade the foreign company to invest in our country and
contribute to our economic development.
The benefit to us may not be immediately available in instant revenues
but it will be realized later, and in greater measure, in terms of a more
stable and robust economy.
: 66838 : December 2, 1991 : J. Paras : En Banc : Dissenting Opinion
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dissenting OPINION
PARAS, J.:
I dissent.
The decision of the Second Division of this Court in the case of
“Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Procter & Gamble Philippine
Manufacturing Corporation, et al.,” G.R. No. 66838, promulgated on April 15,
1988 is sought to be reviewed in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
private respondent. Procter & Gamble
Philippines (PMC-Phils., for brevity) assails the Court’s findings that:
“(a) private respondent (PMC-Phils.) is not a
proper party to claim the refund/tax credit;
“(b) there is nothing in Section 902 or other
provision of the US Tax Code that allows a credit against the U.S. tax due from
PMC-U.S.A of taxes deemed to have been paid in the Phils. equivalent to 20%
which represents the difference between the regular tax of 35% on corporations
and the tax of 15% on dividends;
“(c) private respondent failed to meet certain
conditions necessary in order that the dividends received by the nonÂresident
parent company in the U.S. may be subject to the preferential 15% tax instead
of 35%.” (pp. 200-201, Motion for Reconsideration)
Private respondent’s position is based principally on the
decision rendered by the Third Division of this Court in the case of
“Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Wander Philippines, Inc. and the
Court of Tax Appeals,” G.R. No. 68375, promulgated likewise on April 15,
1988 which bears the same issues as in the case at bar, but held an apparent
contrary view. Private respondent advances
the theory that since the Wander decision had already become final and
executory it should be a precedent in deciding similar issues as in this case
at hand.
Yet, it must be noted that the Wander decision had become final
and executory only by reason of the failure of the petitioner therein to file
its motion for reconsideration in due time.
Petitioner received the notice of judgment on April 22, 1988 but filed a
Motion for Reconsideration only on June 6, 1988, or after the decision had
already become final and executory on May 9, 1988. Considering that entry of final judgment had
already been made on May 9, 1988, the Third Division resolved to note without
action the said Motion. Apparently
therefore, the merits of the motion for reconsideration were not passed upon by
the Court.
The 1987 Constitution provides that a doctrine or principle of
law previously laid down either eÂn banc or in Division may be
modified or reversed by the court en banc. The case is now before this Court en banc and
the decision that will be handed down will put to rest the present controversy.
It is true that private respondent, as withholding agent, is
obliged by law to withhold and to pay over to the Philippine government the tax
on the income of the taxpayer, PMC-U.S.A. (parent company). However, such fact does not necessarily
connote that private respondent is the real party in interest to claim
reimbursement of the tax alleged to have been overpaid. Payment of tax is an obligation physically
passed off by law on the withholding agent, if any, but the act of claiming tax
refund is a right that, in a strict sense, belongs to the taxpayer which is
private respondent’s parent company. The
role or function of PMC-Phils., as the remitter or payor of the dividend
income, is merely to insure the collection of the dividend income taxes due to
the Philippine government from the taxpayer, “PMC-U.S.A.,” the non
resident foreign corporation not engaged in trade or business in the
Philippines, as “PMC-U.S.A.” is subject to tax equivalent to thirty
five percent (35%) of the gross income received from “PMC-Phils.” in
the Philippines “as…dividends…” (Sec. 24 [b], Phil. Tax
Code). Being a mere withholding agent of
the government and the real party in interest being the parent company in the
United States, private respondent cannot claim refund of the alleged overpaid
taxes. Such right properly belongs to
PMC-U.S.A. It is therefore clear that as
held by the Supreme Court in a series of cases, the action in the Court of Tax
Appeals as well as in this Court should have been brought in the name of the
parent company as petitioner and not in the name of the withholding agent. This is because the action should be brought
under the name of the real party in interest.
(See Salonga v. Warner Barnes, & Co., Ltd., 88 Phil. 125; Sutherland,
Code Pleading, Practice, & Forms, p. 11; Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua,
L-17091, Sept. 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 113, Gabutas v. Castellanes, L-17323, June 23,
1965, 14 SCRA 376; Rep. v. PNB, L-16485, January 30, 1945).
Rule 3, Sec. 2 of the Rules of court provides:
“SEC. 2. Parties in
interest. – Every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. All persons having an interest in the subject
of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as
plaintiffs. All persons who claim an
interest in the controversy or the subject thereof adverse to the plaintiff, or
who are necessary to a complete determination or settlement of the questions
involved therein shall be joined as defendants.”
It is true that under the Internal Revenue Code the withholding
agent may be sued by itself if no remittance tax is paid, or if what was paid
is less than what is due. From this,
Justice Feliciano claims that in case of an overpayment (or claim for
refund) the agent must be given the right to sue the Commissioner by itself
(that is, the agent here is also a real party in interest). He further claims that to deny this right
would be unfair. This is not
so. While payment of the tax due is an
OBLIGATION of the agent, the obtaining of a refund is a RIGHT. While every obligation has a corresponding
right (and vice-versa), the obligation to pay the complete tax has the
corresponding right of the government to demand the deficiency; and the right
of the agent to demand a refund corresponds to the government’s duty to
refund. Certainly, the obligation
of the withholding agent to pay in full does not correspond to its right
to claim for the refund. It is evident
therefore that the real party in interest in this claim for reimbursement is
the principal (the mother corporation) and NOT the agent.
This suit therefore for refund must be DISMISSED.
In like manner, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s
failure to raise before the Court of Tax Appeals the issue relating to the real
party in interest to claim the refund cannot, and should not, prejudice the
government. Such is merely a procedural
defect. It is axiomatic that the
government can never be in estoppel, particularly in matters involving
taxes. Thus, for example, the payment by
the tax-payer of income taxes, pursuant to a BIR assessment does not preclude
the government from making further assessments. The errors or omissions of certain
administrative officers should never be allowed to jeopardize the government’s
financial position. (See: Phil. Long Distance Tel. Co. v. Coll. of
Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674; Lewin v. Galang, L-15253, Oct. 31, 1960; Coll.
of Internal Revenue v. Ellen Wood McGrath, L-12710, L-12721, Feb. 28, 1961;
Perez v. Perez, L-14874, Sept. 30, 1960; Republic v. Caballero, 79 SCRA 179;
Favis v. Municipality of Sabongan, LÂ-26522, Feb. 27, 1963)
As regards the issue of whether PMC-U.S.A. is entitled under the
U.S. Tax Code to a United States Foreign Tax Credit equivalent to at least 20
percentage paid portion spared or waived as otherwise deemed waived by the
government, We reiterate our ruling that while apparently, a tax-credit
is given, there is actually nothing in Section 902 of the U.S. Internal
Revenue Code, as amended by Public Law 87-834 that would justify tax return of
the disputed 15% to the private respondent.
This is because the amount of tax credit purportedly being allowed is
not fixed or ascertained, hence we do not know whether or not the tax credit
contemplated is within the limits set forth in the law. While the mathematical computations in
Justice Feliciano’s separate opinion appear to be correct, the
computations suffer from a basic defect, that is, we have no way of knowing or
checking the figure used as premises. In
view of the ambiguity of Sec. 902 itself, we can conclude that no real tax
credit was really intended. In the
interpretation of tax statutes, it is axiomatic that as between the interest of
multinational corporations and the interest of our own government, it
would be far better, in the absence of definitive guidelines, to favor the
national interest. As correctly pointed
out by the Solicitor General:
” …
the tax-sparing credit operates on dummy, fictional or phantom taxes,
being considered as if paid by the foreign taxing authority, the host country.
“In the context of the case at bar,
therefore, the thirty five (35%) percent on the dividend income of PMC-U.S.A.
would be reduced to fifteen (15%) percent if & only if
reciprocally PMC-U.S.A.’s home country, the United States, not only would
allow against PMC-U.S.A’s U.S. income tax liability a foreign tax credit
for the fifteen (15%) percentage-point portion of the thirty five (35%) percent
Phil. dividend tax actually paid or accrued but also would allow
a foreign tax ‘sparing’ credit for the twenty (20%) percentage-point portion
spared, waived, forgiven or otherwise deemed as if paid by the
Phil. gov’t. by virtue of the ‘tax credit sparing’ proviso of Sec. 24(b), Phil.
Tax Code.” (Reply Brief, pp. 23-24; Rollo, pp. 239-240).
Evidently, the U.S. foreign tax credit system operates only
on foreign taxes actually paid by U.S. corporate taxpayers, whether
directly or indirectly. Nowhere under a
statute or under a tax treaty, does the U.S. government recognize much less
permit any foreign tax credit for spared or ghost taxes, as in reality the U.S.
foreign-tax credit mechanism under Sections 901-905 of the U.S. Internal
Revenue Code does not apply to phantom dividend taxes in the form of dividend
taxes waived, spared or otherwise considered “as if” paid by any
foreign taxing authority, including that of the Philippine government.
Beyond that, the private respondent failed: (1) to show the actual amount credited by the
U.S. government against the income tax due from PMC-U.S.A. on the dividends
received from private respondent; (2) to present the income tax return of its
parent company for 1975 when the dividends were received; and (3) to submit any
duly authenticated document showing that the U.S. government credited the 20% tax
deemed paid in the Philippines.
Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such, they are regarded as in derogation
of sovereign authority and to be construed strictissimi juris
against the person or entity claiming the exemption. The burden of proof is upon him who claims
the exemption in his favor and he must be able to justify his claim by the
clearest grant of organic or statute law …. and cannot be permitted to exist
upon vague implications. (Asiatic
Petroleum Co. v. Llanes, 49 Phil. 466; Northern Phil. Tobacco Corp. v. Mun. of
Agoo, La Union, 31 SCRA 304; Rogan v. Commissioner, 30 SCRA 968; Asturias Sugar
Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617; Davao Light and Power
Co. Inc. v. Commissioner of Custom, 44 SCRA 122). Thus, when tax exemption is claimed, it must
be shown indubitably to exist, for every presumption is against it, and a well
founded doubt is fatal to the claim (Farrington v. Tennessee & Country
Shelby, 95 U.S. 679, 686; Manila Electric Co. v. Vera, L-29987, Oct. 22, 1975;
Manila Electric Co. v. Tabios, L-23847, Oct. 22, 1975, 67 SCRA 451).
It will be remembered that the tax credit appertaining to
remittances abroad of dividend earned here in the Philippines was amplified in
Presidential Decree No. 369 promulgated in 1975, the purpose of which was to
“encourage more capital investment for large projects.” And its
ultimate purpose is to decrease the tax liability of the corporation
concerned. But this granting of a preferential
right is premised on reciprocity, without which there is clearly a derogation
of our country’s financial sovereignty.
No such reciprocity has been proved, nor does it actually exist. At this juncture, it would be useful to bear
in mind the following observations:
The continuing and ever-increasing transnational movement of
goods and services, the emergence of multinational corporations and the rise in
foreign investments has brought about tremendous pressures on the tax system to
strengthen its competence and capability to deal effectively with issues
arising from the foregoing phenomena.
International taxation refers to the operationalization of the
tax system on an international level. As
it is, international taxation deals with the tax treatment of goods and
services transferred on a global basis, multinational corporations and foreign
investments.
Since the guiding philosophy behind international trade is free
flow of goods and services, it goes without saying that the principal objective
of international taxation is to see through this ideal by way of
feasible taxation arrangements which recognize each country’s sovereignty in
the matter of taxation, the need for revenue and the attainment of certain
policy objectives.
The institution of feasible taxation arrangements, however, is
hard to come by. To begin with,
international tax subjects are obviously more complicated than their domestic
counter-parts. Hence, the devise of
taxation arrangements to deal with such complications requires a welter of
information and data build-up which generally are not readily obtainable and
available. Also, caution must be
exercised so that whatever taxation arrangements are set up, the same do not
get in the way of free flow of goods and services, exchange of technology,
movement of capital and investment initiatives.
A cardinal principle adhered to in international taxation is the avoidance
of double taxation.
The phenomenon of double taxation (i.e., taxing an item more than once)
arises because of global movement of goods and services. Double taxation also occurs because of
overlaps in tax jurisdictions resulting in the taxation of taxable items by the
country of source or location (source or situs rule) and the taxation of
the same items by the country of residence or nationality of the taxpayer (domiciliary
or nationality principle).
An item may, therefore, be taxed in full in the country of source
because it originated there, and in another country because the recipient is a
resident or citizen of that country. If
the taxes in both countries are substantial and no tax relief is offered, the
resulting double taxation would serve as a discouragement to the activity that
gives rise to the taxable item.
As a way out of double taxation, countries enter into tax
treaties. A tax treaty[1]
is a bilateral convention (but may be made multilateral) entered into between
sovereign states for purposes of eliminating double taxation on income and
capital, preventing fiscal evasion, promoting mutual trade and investment, and
according fair and equitable tax treatment to foreign residents or nationals.[2]
A more general way of mitigating the impact of double taxation is
to recognize the foreign tax either as a tax credit or an item
of deduction.
Whether the recipient resorts to tax credit or deduction is dependent
on the tax advantage or savings that would be derived therefrom.
A principal defect of the tax credit system is when low tax rates
or special tax concessions are granted in a country for the obvious reason of
encouraging foreign investments. For
instance, if the usual tax rate is 35 percent but a concession rate accrues to
the country of the investor rather than to the investor himself. To obviate this, a tax sparing provision may
be stipulated. With tax sparing, taxes
exempted or reduced are considered as having been fully paid.
To illustrate:
“X” Foreign
Corporation income 100
Tax rate (35%) 35
RP
income
100
Tax rate (general, 35% concession rate, 15%) 15
1. “X” Foreign Corp.
Tax Liability without Tax Sparing
“X”
Foreign Corporation income 100
RP income 100
Total Income 200
“X” tax payable 70
Less:
RP tax 15
Net “X” tax payable 55
2. “X” Foreign Corp.
Tax Liability with Tax Sparing
“X” Foreign Corp. income 100
RP income 100
Total income 200
“X” Foreign Corp. tax payable
70
Less:
RP tax (35% of 100, 35
the difference of
20%-between
35% and 15%, deemed
paid to RP)
Net “X” Foreign Corp. tax
payable 35
By way of resume, We may say that the Wander decision of the Third
Division cannot, and should not result in the reversal of the Procter &
Gamble decision for the following reasons:
1) The Wander decision cannot serve as a
precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis. It was promulgated on the same day the
decision of the Second Division was promulgated, and while Wander has attained
finality this is simply because no motion for reconsideration thereof was filed
within a reasonable period. Thus, said
Motion for Reconsideration was theoretically never taken into account by said
Third Division.
2) Assuming that stare decisis can
apply, We reiterate what a former noted jurist Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla aptly
said: “More pregnant than anything
else is that the court shall be right.” We hereby cite settled doctrines
from a treatise on Civil Law:
“We adhere in our country to the doctrine of stare decisis
(let it stand, et non quieta movere) for reasons of
stability in the law. The doctrine,
which is really ‘adherence to precedents,’ states that once a case has been
decided one way, then another case, involving exactly the same point at issue,
should be decided in the same manner.
“Of course, when a case has been decided erroneously such an
error must not be perpetuated by blind obedience to the doctrine of stare
decisis. No matter how sound a
doctrine may be, and no matter how long it has been followed thru the years,
still if found to be contrary to law, it must be abandoned. The principle of stare decisis
does not and should not apply when there is a conflict between the precedent
and the law (Tan Chong v. Sec. of Labor, 79 Phil. 249).
“While stability in the law is eminently to be desired, idolatrous
reverence for precedent, simply, as precedent, no longer rules. More pregnant than anything else is that the
court shall be right (Phil., Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 59 Phil. 30).”
3) Wander deals with tax relations between the
Philippines and Switzerland, a country with which we have a pending tax treaty;
our Procter & Gamble case deals with relations between the Philippines and
the United States, a country with which we had no tax treaty, at the time the
taxes herein were collected.
4) Wander cited as authority a BIR Ruling dated
May 19, 1977, which requires a remittance tax of only 15%. The mere fact that in this Procter and Gamble
case the B.I.R. desires to charge 35% indicates that the B.I.R. Ruling cited in
Wander has been obviously discarded today by the B.I.R. Clearly, there has been a change of mind on
the part of the B.I.R.
5) Wander imposes a tax of 15% without stating
whether or not reciprocity on the part of Switzerland exists. It is evident that without reciprocity the
desired consequences of the tax credit under P.D. No. 369 would be rendered
unattainable.
6) In the instant case, the amount of the tax
credit deductible and other pertinent financial data have not been presented,
and therefore even were we inclined to grant the tax credit claimed, we find
ourselves unable to compute the proper amount thereof.
7) And finally, as stated at the very outset,
Procter & Gamble Philippines or P.M.C (Phils.) is not the proper party to
bring up the case.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals should be
REVERSED and the motion for reconsideration of our own decision should be
DENIED.
[1]
There are two types of credit systems.
The first, is the underlying credit system which requires the other
contracting state to credit not only the 15% Philippine tax into company
dividends but also the 35% Philippine tax on corporations in respect of profits
out of which such dividends were paid.
The Philippine corporation is assured of sufficient creditable taxes to
cover their total tax liabilities in their home country and in effect will no
longer pay taxes therein. The other type
provides that if any tax relief is given by the Philippines pursuant to its own
development program, the other contracting state will grant credit for the
amount of the Philippine tax which would have been payable but for such relief.
[2]
The Philippines, for one, has entered into a number of tax treaties in pursuit
of the foregoing objectives. The extent
of tax treaties entered into by the Philippines may be seen from the following
tabulation:
Table 1 – RP Tax Treaties
RP – West Germany Ratified on Jan. 1, 1985
RP – Malaysia Ratified on Jan. 1, 1985
RP – Nigeria, Concluded in September,
Netherlands October
and November, 1985,
and Spain respectively
(documents
ready for signature)
RP – Yugoslavia Negotiated in Belgrade,
Sept. 30 – Oct. 4,
1985
Pending
Ratification Signed Ratified
RP – Italy Dec. 5, 1980 Nov. 28, 1983
RP – Brazil Sept. 29, 1983
RP – East Germany Feb. 17, 1984
RP – Korea Feb. 21, 1984
Pending
Signature
Negotiations
concluded on
RP – Sweden (renegotiated)- May 11, 1978
RP – Romania Feb. 1, 1983
RP- Sri Lanka June 10, 1083
RP – Norway Nov. 11, 1983
RP – India March 30, 1984
RP – Nigeria Sept. 27, 1985
RP – Netherlands Oct. 8, 1985
RP – Spain Nov. 22, 1985