PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NESTOR ESPEJO Y ESPINO, PABLO PAPIONA Y CAHIPE AND GENARO AGUIRRE, ACCUSED. NESTOR ESPEJO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Only accused-appellant Nestor Espejo y Espino invokes our review in this appeal from the decision^[1]
of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 12, in
Criminal Case No. 76-M-87 promulgated on May 29, 1989, finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P30,000.00.  For lack of evidence, the other accused,
Pablo Papiona, was acquitted while the third accused,
Genaro Aguirre, was not tried and has remained at
large.^[2]

The facts of the case as found by and stated in the decision of
the court a quo are as follows:

“In the evening of June
12, 1986, at about 11:30,
a man silently entered the house of Police Corporal Jose Salonga
y Bernabe of San Jose del Monte Police Station of Bulacan, who was then sleeping in a bed with his wife Pilar and their three young children.  The house was at the Barangay
Dulong Bayan in the
Municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.  Cpl. Salonga and
his family were lying in bed inside their bedroom without its lights on, next
to the dining room where the light was open. 
Between him and his wife in the bed was their 6-year old child, their
youngest.

“The intruder tip-toed inside the bedroom and, standing just
at the foot of the bed, pointed an armalite rifle at
the sleeping police corporal.  It was
then that his wife Pilar felt the presence of someone
inside the room.  As soon as she opened
her eyes and saw him pointing an armalite at her
husband, the gun fired.  The burst drove
several bullets in the body of Cpl. Salonga, killing
him instantly.  His wife and their second
child screamed as the gunman fled from the house.  She kept on shouting, ‘Dios
ko po, Dios
ko po, ang
akin pong asawa ay binaril!
Dios ko, patay na po
ang asawa ko!’ Their child cried, ‘Inang, Inang, ang Daddy ko namatay na!’

“Minutes later, the mother of Pilar
from a neighboring house arrived, followed by Barangay
Captain Bernardo Aguirre and Cpl. Eusebio German,
both of whom were also of Barangay Dulong Bayan, the latter a
co-police officer of her slain husband at the San Jose Police Station.  Cpl. German was able to recover several empty
bullet shells from the scene.  After
viewing the body of the victim and finding out from Pilar
the time of the incident, the two officers left, as more people arrived that
night, only to come back later on with Capt. Eleazar
Jimenez, their Station Commander, and Mayor Reynaldo Villano
of San Jose del Monte.  Confused and
crying Pilar was able to say that she saw her
husband’s assailant.  Capt. Jimenez,
however, told her that she had no evidence to prove what she said.  So she just talked to Celso
Reyes, her ‘compadre’ and also a police officer of
that town who advised her to seek the help of the PC CIS, instead.

“That early morning of the following
day, June 13, Capt. Jimenez brought Pilar to the
police station for investigation.  There
at about 5:00 o’clock her written
statement (Exh. ‘1’) was taken by PFC Rudy L. Pastores, the Asst. Chief of investigation and Intelligence
Section.  Among other things, said
statement contained the following question and answer (Exh.
‘1-b’):

‘7.   T   Nakita mo ba ang taong
bumaril sa asawa mo?

     S   Nakita
ko po ngunit,
Hindi ko xxxxxxxx namukhaan.’

“That same day at about 5:00
in the afternoon, after having been informed on the telephone by Pat. Celso Reyes of the death of Cpl. Salonga,
the former police station commander of San Jose del Monte, Major Romeo Maganto, came to the house of Pilar
and talked to her about the incident. 
The said police major, the Chief of the Narcotics Division, Western
Police District, thereafter formed a police team for the apprehension of the
suspects whose identity and aliases were furnished by their so-called
‘grapevine’ or confidential police informer.

“So on the night of June
28, 1986, acting on a confidential information, Major Maganto and his team waited for the suspects at the Moravilla Disco Pub in Marilao, Bulacan, and apprehended Nestor Espejo
y Espino and Pablo Paiona
(sic) y Cahipe when the two arrived at about 10:00 with the police informer.  They were brought to Metro Manila and turned
over to the PC CIS in Quezon
City for investigation the following day, but only
after Major Maganto subjected them to his own
investigation or questioning about the killing of Cpl. Salonga.

“At the PC CIS in Camp Crame,  Q.C., Nestor E. Espejo
gave a nine-page statement in Tagalog (Exh. ‘C’-‘C-9’; Exh.’2′-‘2-1’) to Police Corporal Avelino C. Abogado at 11:10 in the morning of June 30, 1986, inside the office of the Special
Operations Group (SOG).  In that unsworn statement there was the admission by suspect Espejo that he was the actual gunman who shot Police
Corporal Salonga to death with an armalite,
and his implication of the other suspect Paiona (sic)
and a certain Aguirre and Pfc. Rudy Pastores of the
San Jose del Monte Police Station as the brains behind the killing.

“At 8:38 in the
evening of the same day, the widow, Pilar Salonga, gave her own statement under oath (Exh. ‘A’-‘A-4’) to the same ClS
investigator, Cpl. Abogado, wherein she pointed and
picked out Nestor E. Espejo, ‘in a line-up composed
of S/Sgt. Alfredo Huggins, Nestor Espejo and Pablo Papiona’, as the very same person she saw shoot her
sleeping husband.  She also said in that
statement that when Espejo did the shooting, behind
him was another person she could, however, no longer recognize.

“On July 1, 1986,
Cpl. Avelino C. Abogado
submitted to Lt. Col. Serafin V. Santos, Deputy Chief
of the SOG, his investigation report (Exh. ‘B’-‘B-5’)
recommending ‘the referral of the case (of MURDER) to the MTC, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan, in the case of Aguirre, Espejo, Papiona and a certain Cris, while of (sic) that of Pfc. Rudy Pastores
x x x to the Staff Judge
Advocate, Capcom’. 
On the same date Col. Santos signed the transmittal to the Municipal
Trial Court of San Jose del Monte of the result of his Group’s investigation
‘requesting appropriate preliminary investigation relative to a case of MURDER
(RPC 248) wherein the defendants are:  Espejo and Papiona (both under
custody) and Aguirre, Pastores and Cris Doe (all at large).'”^[3]

Affirming the findings of said municipal trial court in its preliminary
investigation of the case, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan
filed an information against the appellant herein, Papiona
and Aguirre, to wit:

“That on or about the 12th day of June, 1986, in the
municipality of San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Nestor Espejo y Espino,
Pablo Papiona y Cahipe and Genaro Aguirre, together with Pfc. Rudy Pastores
against whom proceedings are being taken by the military authorities, with
intent to kill one Jose Salonga y Bernabe,
conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and
shoot with a firearm they were then provided the said Jose Salonga
y Bernabe, hitting the latter on the different parts
of his body, thereby causing him serious physical injuries which directly
caused his death.”^[4]

After trial, the lower court declared the extrajudicial
confession of appellant inadmissible, mainly because it was given in violation
of the constitutional requirement  that
any person under investigation must be assisted by a competent and independent
counsel, preferably of his own choice, which requirement the court noted was
not complied with when appellant was  put
under custodial investigation.^[5]
This, however, did not prevent the court from rendering a judgment of
conviction upon reliance mainly on the forthright testimony of Pilar Salonga,
the victim’s widow, who testified that she saw appellant shoot her husband.^[6]

In traversing such
finding, appellant’s brief imputes error on the trial court for not giving more
credence to the earlier statement of
the lone eyewitness given the day following the shooting, which, as reproduced in the trial court’s decision, reads:

“7.   T   Nakita mo ba ang taong
bumaril sa asawa mo?

         S   Nakita
ko po ngunit
hindi ko xxxxxxxx namukhaan.”

Moreover, appellant insists that it was
impossible for the supposed eyewitness to
have seen, much less to have
recognized, the gunman because there
was no light in the bedroom.^[7]

The conviction must be upheld.

Firmly entrenched is the rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial
court are entitled to great weight on
appeal and should not be disturbed, unless for strong and valid reasons,
because the trial court is in a better position to examine as well as to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying in the case.^[8]
Although there are admitted exceptions
to this rule, we find no cogent basis for their application in the present
case.  Contrary to appellant’s
submission, the conclusions of the trial court are fully substantiated and
supported by the evidence on record.

The fact that the lone eyewitness gave an earlier statement that
she saw but was allegedly not able to see the face of the gunman does not
destroy the fidelity of her subsequent statement taken eighteen (18) days after
the shooting where she identified the appellant as the assailant.  At the time the first statement was taken,
she really could not have been expected to give accurate and intelligible
answers, as her condition then
was nothing short of being in a state of mental and emotional shock considering
her traumatic experience and the recency
thereof.  A woman and a wife and mother
at that, it would too much to expect her to respond with equanimity after the
harrowing attack to which she and her
family had just been exposed.  In fact, said
witness testified that she was then so
confused when that statement was read to her that she could not even remember having made that statement.^[9]

As aptly observed by the trial court:

“x x x The
witness, however, claims that when she was brought along to the police station
to give that statement barely five (5) hours from the time her husband was
peppered with bullets at her side lying asleep in bed with only their youngest
child between them, she was still in a confused state of mind.  She said during the trial that she signed the
same after it was read to her, but she was not able to understand its contents
(TSN, pp. 11, 23 & 24, March 19, 1987). 
Considering the trauma of that shocking experience she had just been
through, that explanation she gives is not hard to accept.  The Court can just imagine the bloody mess
her husband had been turned into after being shot with a powerful automatic
rifle right in their bed in her stark presence before her very eyes.  And the realization of the great danger upon
her own person and those of her young children of being themselves shot in the
same bed, must have horrified her so much. 
It is reasonable, therefore, not to expect her to get over it in just a
few hours and have the calm, sharpness and stability of mind to be able to relate
the incident and tell what she saw to one and all with vivid detail and
accuracy.”^[10]

Besides, there is no truth to appellant’s averment that the
witness never told any one of those who first came to the scene of the crime,
among them the town mayor, Reynaldo Villano, a fellow
officer of her husband, Corporal Eusebio German, the
station commander and a certain Captain Jimenez, that she saw and recognized
the gunman.^[11]
A perusal of her testimony on cross-examination, other than the truncated
portion of her aforesaid statement to which appellant would want this Court to
focus and limit its attention, reveals otherwise, as witness this exchange on
the stand:

“Q    According to you, the only question asked of
you by Cpl. German was what time did the incident occurred (sic) and they asked
you no other question even after he fetched the Station Commander.  Did you not volunteer to him, either German
or the Station Commander, that you saw who shot your husband?

A      I told the Station Commander that the
assailant passed this way and the Station Commander told me that I have no
evidence on that, sir.

Q    But you did not insist in telling him
nor German that you saw the
assailant?

A     Cpl.
German and myself were not able to talk with each other because he left immediately,
sir.

Q    Yes,
but when he returned together with Capt. Jimenez, you did not tell him, for
(sic) Jimenez, that you saw the assailant?

A     I
told him but Capt. Jimenez told me that I have no evidence for that, sir.”^[12]

Significantly, the statement which appellant would like to be accorded credence obviously appears to
have been deliberately slanted and framed so as not to reflect what the witness
really intended to impart.  It is
noteworthy that the answer of the witness which the defense would exploit was
elicited from her by Pfc. Rudy
L. Pastores, the investigator who is himself one of
the accused and who, according to the decision of the court a quo
has reportedly gone into
hiding.  The trial court also
specifically noted that the word “makilala”
or “nakilala”
written immediately before the word
“namukhaan” was crossed out with a series
of the letter “x,” and thereby replaced with the succeeding word
“namukhaan.” As it correctly observed, this was “(o)bviously done to
change the impact of the answer
and make it mean that the witness
failed to see the face of the man”
and thereafter “conveniently 
provide the opportunity to question the credibility of the victim’s
widow as far as the identity of the actual killer of her husband is
concerned.” We agree that what said eyewitness really meant was that she
saw the person who shot her husband but she did not know him or who he was
(“makilala” or “nakilala“)
but that she actually saw his
face as she even remembered the shape thereof and the height of his nose.^[13]

In any case, the defenses and explanations by appellant cannot
stand in the face of his positive identification by the witness during the
investigation at the CIS office and, later, at the trial.  It is an established jurisprudential rule that
as between the positive declaration of the prosecution witness and the negative
denials of the accused, the former deserves more credence,^[14]
especially where, as in this case, there is no showing whatsoever why the
witness would foist such a serious
liability on appellant.  It is also
readily apparent that appellant’s defense consists only of his sole uncorroborated and bare denial of
participation in the crime.

Appellant’s insistence that it was well-nigh impossible for the
witness to have seen, much less
to have recognized, the assailant is debunked by the salient portions of the
witness’ testimony thereon:

“Q   Now
that evening when this incident occurred you were already asleep, is that
correct?

 A
   I was awaken (sic) when I felt that
somebody was standing near our feet, sir.

Q    Is
it not true that you were awaken (sic) by a burst of gunfire?

A     No,
sir, before the burst of that gun I was already awaken (sic).

Q    And
you saw Espejo before he fired at your husband?

A     Yes,
sir.

Q    He
was standing or approaching your husband when you saw him first?

A     He
was standing on the place where our feet was (sic), sir.

Q    At
that particular time he was not yet aiming the gun at your husband, is that
correct?

A     The
gun was already pointed at my husband, sir.

Q    You did not wake (sic) your husband?

A     I
was not able to wake him up anymore
because the gun was already
fired, sir.

Q    And
this shooting of your husband occurred right
inside your bedroom?

A     Yes,
sir.

Q    You
and your husband were lying together?

A     Yes,
sir.

Q    With
your three children?

A     Yes,
sir.

Q    And
you, your husband and your children were occupying one bed?

A     Yes, sir.

Q    How
many were you on bed on that evening?

A 
   Five (5), sir.

Q    And
of course you were under a mosquito net?

A     No,
sir.

A     .
. . . Because our bedroom has
screen.

Q    And
your windows were closed?

A
    The windows were open because
there were screens, sir.

Q    And
of course there was no light in the bedroom?

A     None,
sir.

Q    There
being no light in the bedroom, it was quite dark inside the bedroom, is it not?

A     It
was bright because the light in
our dining room was opened, sir.

Q    And
you are saying that you recognize the accused under that (sic) circumstances?

A 
   I saw him, sir.

Q    You
saw him but you were not positive that you knew him?

A     When
we
met at the CIS Office, sir, I recognized him.

Q    Do
you still recall how he was attired, how he was dressed that evening?

A     He
was wearing a maong
jacket (long sleeves), sir.

Q
   How about the pants?

A 
   As if it was also a maong pants because it is black, sir.

Q    Was
his face covered with mask?

A.
   No, sir.

Q    Was
he wearing a hat?

A 
   No, sir.

Q    Was
he wearing a footwear?

A     I
was not able to see his feet,
sir.

Q    You
did not notice Espejo entered (sic) your room?

A     When
I saw him, he was already
standing towards our feet, sir.

Q    How
far was he, more or less, away from you?

A     Near
only because he was standing towards our feet,
sir.”^[15]

Indeed, while evidence as to
the identity of the accused as the person who committed the crime should be
carefully analyzed, and we have exerted efforts to that end, the Court has
consistently held that “where conditions of visibility are favorable and
the witness does not appear to be biased against the man on the dock, his or
her assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be
accepted.  And this is more so where the
witness is the victim or his near-relative, as in the case at bar, because
these (people) usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants.”^[16]

Finally, the argument that the testimony of the lone eyewitness
was uncorroborated, hence it is not sufficient to sustain the conviction of
appellant, is belied by the records.  In
the first place, it is not uncorroborated. 
The unassailed testimony of prosecution
witness Ruther Batuigas, a journalist who interviewed the accused upon their
arrest, yields ample support to the eyewitness’ testimony.  Witness Batuigas
categorically established the following facts:

“Q   Who
in particular, Mr. Witness, did you interview?

A     Mr. Espejo
and the other accused I forgot his name. 
They were two (2) of them.

Q    You
are referring to the two (2) accused in this case?

A     Yes,
sir.

x x
x

Q    What  was – who did you interview first, Mr.
Witness, if you still recall?

A     I
interviewed both of them at the same time, sir.

Q    What
was the tenor of your interview to both of them?

A      Well, I asked them if it is true that they
were the ones, especially Mr. Espejo, was the one
being accused to have murdered Cpl. Jose Salonga.

Q    And
what was the reply of accused Espejo?

A     He
admitted to me that he was the alleged gunman of Cpl. Salonga.

Q    What
about Papiona, did you bother to ask him about his
participation?

A     Yes,
sir.

Q    What
was his reply?

A      He admitted that he was with Mr. Espejo and the other guy but he pointed to Mr. Espejo as the only gunman, the only one who fired an armalite to (sic) the late Cpl. Salonga.

x x
x

Q    During
the entire investigation, Mr. Witness, did you notice anything unusual, if you
could recall?

A     Well,
nothing unusual because my observation with (sic) Mr. Espejo
and his co-accused was that they were very willing witnesses at the first time
I interviewed them.  In fact as if they
were bragging for what they have committed.  In fact Mr. Espejo was
bragging that he was the only one, he
admitted to me that he was the one who fired an armalite
to (sic) the victim, Mr. Salonga, while
sleeping.”^[17]

It will be noted that the interview testified to by Batuigas was not part of the formal investigation of the
accused hence it is not within the proscription against extrajudicial
confessions extracted without the assistance of counsel.  Neither is the testimony of said witness barred
by the hearsay rule since it establishes the fact that said statements were
made to him by the accused in the tenor stated in his testimony.^[18]

Furthermore, the eyewitness’ testimony itself was given
unhesitatingly and in a very straightforward manner, devoid of any material
flaws.  Despite exhaustive interrogation,
her credibility remained unshaken, indubitable proof of the veracity of her declaration.  As such, even her lone testimony is
sufficient to convict.^[19]

WHEREFORE, the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
Penned by Judge Crisanto C. Concepcion.

^[2]
Rollo, 24-25.

^[3]
Ibid., 17-19.

^[4]
Ibid., id.

^[5]
Ibid., 20.

^[6] Ibid., 21.

^[7]
Ibid., 34.

^[8]
People vs. Pimentel, et al., 147 SCRA 25 (1987); People vs. Grefiel,
etc., 125 SCRA 102 (1983); People vs.
Fernandez, 124 SCRA 319 (1983).

^[9]
TSN, March 19, 1987, 23-25.

^[10]
Rollo, 21.

^[11]
Ibid., 35.

^[12]
TSN, March 19, 1987, 21-22.

^[13]
Rollo, 22.

^[14]
People vs. Macabenta, etc., 170 SCRA 298
(1989); People vs. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521 (1986); People vs.
Plaza, et al., 140 SCRA 277 (1985).

^[15]
TSN, March 19, 1987, 17-20.

^[16]
People vs. Alvarez, et al., 169 SCRA 730 (1989); People vs.
Bernat, 120 SCRA 918 (1983).

^[17]
TSN, January 4, 1989, 15-20.

^[18]
People vs. Cusi, etc., et al., 14 SCRA 944
(1965).

^[19]
People vs. Trigo, G.R. No. 74515, June 14, 1989; People vs. Vengco, etc., et al., 127 SCRA 242 (1984).