PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARIANO CORVERA, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. TRANQUILINO CALO, JR., BELLARMINO ALLOCOD AND HON. NICOLAS LAPEÑA, JR., HON. EMETERIO C. CUI AND HON. JUSTO …

This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for a
restraining order seeking to set aside the decision, dated May 16, 1989 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 17142, affirming the order, dated February 24,
1989 of respondent judge Jose C. Adao issued in
Criminal Case No. 3464, entitled People vs. Pablo Macapas,
Atty. Tranquilino Calo, Jr.
and Bellarmino Allocod for
murder, granting bail to accused-private respondents therein.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On March 10, 1988,
Mariano Corvera, Sr. (father of private petitioner),
was gunned down inside the courtroom of the RTC of Butuan
City, Br. II.  The following day, a
complaint was filed before the Office of the City Fiscal of Butuan
City, charging the alleged assailant, Pablo Macapas
(at large), the herein private respondents and two (2) unidentified persons,
with murder.  Investigating City Fiscal
Mariano Balansag found a prima facie case and
prepared the corresponding Information for Murder against private respondents
as accused.  Private respondents filed a
motion for reconsideration.  On August 19, 1988, Fiscal Mariano Balansag was gunned down near his residence as he was about
to report to his office.  An information for murder was eventually filed in connection
with the death of Mariano Corvera, Sr. on November 29, 1988, before the
Regional Trial Court, Butuan
City, Branch IV, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 3464 recommending “no bail” for the
accused-respondents.  On December 6, 1988, private petitioner
moved for a re-raffle of the
case.  On December 8, 1988.  Executive Judge Rosarito Dabalos issued an order
directing a re-raffle, and at the same time, fixing the amount of bail for
private respondents at P50,000.00 each.

On December 19, 1988,
private petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a
restraining order in the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
16383, assailing the December 8, 1988
order of Judge Dabalos granting bail to the accused
without hearing.  In a resolution dated
January 31, 1989, the Court of Appeals set aside the assailed order and
directed the trial court: “(a) to immediately issue and serve new warrants
of arrest against private respondents as well as the accused at-large Pablo Macapas; (b) to determine without delay by conducting the
requisite hearing whether the evidence of guilt is strong: and thereafter (c)
to resolve whether or not bail should be granted, and in the affirmative, to
fix the same in accordance with law.”

On remand of the case, Judge Dabalos
inhibited himself from hearing the said case and referred it to Judge Jose C. Adao. Marathon hearings were held on
February 10, 14 and 15, 1989 to determine whether the evidence of guilt was
strong.  On February 24, 1989, Judge Adao
issued an order, pertinent portions of which read:

“The court honestly believes that the quantum of evidence
presented during the summary hearing is not yet sufficient to deny bail as to
the accused Tranquilino Calo,
Jr. and Bellarmino Allocod.  The accused Pablo Macapas
should not be granted bail since the evidence so far presented points to him as
the killer.

In view of the foregoing, pursuant to the bail bond guidelines as
provided for in Sec. 6 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended, the Court fixes the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
as bail for the provisional liberty of the accused Tranquilino
Calo, Jr., and Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) as bail for the provisional liberty of the accused Bellarmino Allocod.

SO ORDERED.”

On March 8, 1989, private petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari with restraining
order before this Court, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 87194, seeking to annul the February 24, 1989 order of Judge Adao
granting bail to
accused-respondents.  In a resolution
dated March 15, 1989, this
Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Adao
from enforcing the questioned order and to recommit private respondents to jail
if they have already been discharged. 
The Court further referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (where
it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 17142).

On May 16, 1989,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition (CA-G.R. SP
No. 17142).

Hence, this petition for certiorari with
prayer for a restraining order.

On July 6, 1989,
this Court issued a temporary restraining order directing public respondents to
cease and desist from enforcing or from allowing further enforcement of the May 16, 1989 decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 17142, and cancelling the order dated February 24, 1989 of Judge Adao.

Under date of August 9,
1989, private respondents filed a Motion for Bail, but it was
denied in the resolution dated October
5, 1989.

The grounds relied upon in support of the petition are:

A.   THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY AND/OR COM­MITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE GROUND THAT THE
PETITIONER HAS NO CAPACITY TO BRING THE PETITION WITHOUT THE PRIOR IMPRIMATUR
OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL.

B.   THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY AND/OR COM­MITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL JUDGE GRANTING
BAIL TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IS NOT TAINTED WITH SERIOUS
ARBITRARINESS.”

Corollary to the first ground, private petitioner contends that
as stated in the petition, the said petition was filed subject to the control
of the Solicitor General; that in deciding to bring the petition, he was impelled
by an extraordinary sense of urgency; and that the grant of bail to private
respondents engulfed him with an acute demand for urgent relief.

As to the second ground, private petitioner maintains that there
was gross disregard of overwhelming evidence of guilt and that private
respondents did not present even a single witness to rebut the facts
established by the prosecution.

This Court finds merit in the petition.

While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the
Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, or represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings
pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals (Republic vs. Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]), the ends of substantial
justice would be better served, and the issues in this action could be
determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner, by entertaining the
petition at bar.  As an offended party in
a criminal case, private petitioner has sufficient personality and a valid
grievance against Judge Adao’s order granting bail to
the alleged murderers of his (private petitioner’s) father.

In Paredes vs. Gopengco,
29 SCRA 688 (1969), this Court ruled that the offended parties in criminal
cases have sufficient interest and personality as “person(s)
aggrieved” to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari
under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the
liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their object,
thus:

“Furthermore, as offended parties in the pending criminal case
before petitioner judge, it cannot be gainsaid that respondents have sufficient
interest and personality as ‘person(s) aggrieved’ by petitioner judge’s ruling
on his non-disqualification to file the special civil action under sections 1
and 2 of Rule 65.  Recently, in line with
the underlying spirit of a liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order
to promote their object, as against the literal interpretation of Rule 110,
section 2, we held, overruling the implication of an earlier case, that a widow
possesses the right as an offended party to file a criminal complaint for the
murder of her deceased husband.” (Id, p. 699)

Indeed, in a companion case (G.R. No. 87932) entitled People, et
al. vs. Hon. Zenaida P. Placer, et al. promulgated July 20, 1989.  We disqualified the therein respondent Judge Zenaida P. Placer to whom Criminal Case No. 3464 was
subsequently raffled for trial on the merits, from hearing the case and ordered
a change of venue from Butuan City to Cagayan de Oro City to avoid a
miscarriage of justice pursuant to Section V(4), Article VIII of the
Constitution.

Coming back to the case at bar, the Court of Appeals held that
the issuance of the order dated February 24, 1989 granting bail to
accused-respondents was neither whimsical nor capricious because “formal
hearings were conducted on the petition for bail and the 24-page assailed order
includes a detailed summary of the testimonies of the five (5) prosecution
witnesses and Exhibits “A” to “E” for the
prosecution.”

The mere fact that formal hearings were conducted does not
preclude a finding of arbitrariness and denial of due process.  As pointed out by private petitioner, the
evidence submitted by the prosecution to the effect that private respondent Tranquilino Calo, Jr., slipped
the fatal gun to the alleged assailant, Pablo Macapas,
and that private respondent Bellarmino Allocod was the driver of the get-away vehicle used by Macapas was not considered by the appellate court.  This is regrettable because, as alleged by
private petitioner, private respondents did not deny such evidence by their
failure to present any witness to controvert it and that such evidence
established conspiracy among private respondents and Macapas.

Be that as it may, the prosecution was scheduled to present nine
(9) witnesses, whose names were duly submitted to the trial court, at the
hearings held to determine whether the evidence of guilt against private
respondents was strong, but after hearing the fifth witness, Judge Adao insisted on terminating the proceedings (pp. 11; 62, Rollo).  In view
thereof, private petitioner contends that Judge Adao’s
order granting bail to private respondents “smacked of grave and patent
abuse of discretion.”

We agree.  The order dated February 24, 1989 granting bail to
accused-respondents should have been declared null and void and in violation of
procedural due process.  The prosecution
in the instant case was not given adequate opportunity to prove that there is
strong evidence of guilt and to present within a reasonable time all the
evidence it desired to present.

In  a similar case (People
vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 [1968]), this Court held:

“The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution
was deprived of procedural due process. 
The answer is in the affirmative. 
We are of the considered opinion
that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a
capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a
regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within
a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the
court should resolve the motion for bail. 
If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil
action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a
violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail
should be considered void on that ground. 
The orders complained of dated October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, having been
issued in violation of procedural due process, must be considered null and
void.”

In the same vein, this Court held in
People vs. Sola (103 SCRA 393 [1981]), to wit:

“’The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a
defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of
an opportunity to defend.  Privileges so
fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be
acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of
incriminating proof.  But justice, though
due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. 
The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a
filament.  We are to keep the balance
true.’  This norm which is of the very
essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires that the
prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt.”

The failure of Judge Adao to observe
the concept of fairness which is the essence of due process in the case at bar
should not have been lost sight of.

Finally, the Court notes that in a resolution dated July 20, 1989 issued in G.R. No.
87932, the records of Criminal Case No. 3464 subject of the instant petition
were ordered transmitted to Judge Alfredo Lagamon at Cagayan de Oro City for change of
venue and proper disposition in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is Granted.  The decision dated May 16, 1989 of the Court of Appeals is Set Aside
and the temporary restraining order issued on July 6, 1989 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Sarmiento, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, J., no part, on account of close personal relationship to a party.

Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., on leave.