CARCON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND UNIVET AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, INC., RESPONDENTS.

Presented in the proceedings at bar is the question of whether or
not the omission of the Trial Court to actually conduct a hearing on a motion
for summary judgment is so grave a defect as to render void the summary
judgment subsequently promulgated.

The question originated from an action brought in the Regional
Trial Court by Univet Agricultural Products, Inc.
against Carcon Development Corporation.  By that action, Univet
sought to recover the sum of P31,853.25 — representing the balance of the price of veterinary preparations and products sold and
delivered by it to Carcon from December, 1980 to
July, 1981 in the aggregate sum of P116,925.00 — plus interest at 12% per annum and 25% as attorney’s fees. 
To its complaint Univet attached the
corresponding invoices (identified as
Annexes A to F, inclusive).

In its Answer with
Counterclaim, Carcon:

a) ADMITTED –

1) the parties’ personal circumstances set out in the complaint;
and

2) the purchase of veterinary preparations and products thru Univet’s sales agent, Noli Itun;

b) DENIED LIABILITY, alleging that –

1) due to financial failures, Carcon had
paid Univet in hogs, thru its agent, Noli Itun;

2) the total value of the hogs delivered to Itun
was P238,349.20 (the delivery receipts being attached to the answer, signed by Itun, but without reference to Univet);

3) it thus results that it
is Univet in fact which is indebted to it in the sum
of P121,424.20 (P238,349.20 minus P116,925.00);

and

c) SET UP A COUNTERCLAIM for said alleged excess payment amounting
to P121,424.20.

On November 14, 1983,
Univet filed a MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.  Attached to it were the affidavits of (1) Conrado Baylon, its Marketing
Director and National Sales Manager, and (2) Winston T. Young, its Credit
Supervisor.  The affiants asserted of
their own knowledge that Univet had never authorized Noli Itun or any one to accept
payment in kind from Carcon; Carcon’s
receipts all show nothing more than deliveries to Noli
Itun in his personal capacity, not to Univet; and Itun in fact had been
discharged from his employment precisely because it had been discovered that he
was engaging in business with Carcon, among others,
for his own account.

The motion for summary judgment contained a notice of hearing,
set by the movant on November 25, 1983. 
On this date of hearing, however, there was no appearance for Carcon.  What the
Trial Court did with respect to said motion for summary judgment, was to issue
an Order, giving “defendant ** ten (10) days from receipt (t)hereof within
which to file its opposition, after which the same is deemed submitted for
decision.”

Pursuant thereto, Carcon submitted its
opposition to the motion for summary judgment under date of December 5, 1983.  That opposition was not verified.  No opposing affidavits were attached to
it.  It simply made the claim that:

(1) trial was needful since the special and affirmative defenses
in the answer did in truth raise genuine issues;

(2) it had paid Univet in kind thru Noli Itun, but no receipts had
ever been issued by Univet;

(3) moreover, there was no detailed statement by Univet precisely showing the debt of P31,853.25 being
claimed in its complaint.

The Trial Court
then rendered the summary judgment prayed for, on December 12, 1983. 
In it the Court recited the above stated facts, and concluded that after
examining the pleadings, affidavits and supporting papers filed by the parties,
summary judgment was proper as no genuine issue had been raised as to any
material fact.  The judgment authorized recovery
by Univet of the amount by it claimed, P31,853.25,
with interest at 12% p.a. from June 10, 1982 (when the complaint was filed)
until fully paid, as well as 15% of the total amount awarded as attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses.

This judgment was, on appeal,^[1]
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its own Decision dated March 1, 1989.^[2]
The latter decision was afterwards assailed in this Court by Carcon, which in its petition for review on certiorari,
prayed for its setting aside, and for the remand of the case “to the Trial
Court for trial on the merits.” This Court denied the petition, by
Resolution dated July 10, 1989,
“it appearing that only questions of facts are raised in this case and no
reversible error is otherwise shown in the challenged judgment.”

Carcon’s motion for reconsideration
dated August 17, 1989 asks the Court to set aside
this Resolution.  The motion will be
denied for lack of merit.  A few words
will however be devoted to the question presented in the opening paragraph of
this opinion.

It is noteworthy that Univet complied
with Section 3 of Rule 34, which requires that a motion for summary judgment
should be served at least 10 days before the time specified for the
hearing.  In its motion, Univet fixed the time of hearing thereof at November 25, 1983 (11 days from date
thereof, November 14, 1983).

Since the defendant did not appear on the date set for hearing, November 25, 1983, the Court gave it
10 days from notice within which
to file opposing affidavits pursuant to the same Section 3, Rule 34, viz.:  “The adverse party prior to the day of
hearing may serve opposing affidavits.”

The defendant filed an unverified opposition and did not submit
affidavits in traverse of those of Univet; and since,
after submitting the opposition, it did not ask for a hearing, or any other
additional relief, it evidently acquiesced to the judge’s directive that upon
submission of the opposition, the matter would be deemed “submitted for
resolution.”

The theory of summary judgment is that although an answer may on
its face appear to tender issues — requiring trial — yet if it is
demonstrated by affidavits, depositions, or admissions that those issues are
not genuine, but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with
the trial and rendering summary judgment for plaintiff.^[3]
The court is expected to act chiefly on the basis of the affidavits,
depositions, admissions submitted by the movant, and
those of the other party in opposition thereto.^[4]
The hearing contemplated (with 10-day notice) is for the purpose of determining
whether the issues are genuine or not, not to receive evidence on the issues
set up in the pleadings.  A hearing is
not thus de riguer.  The
matter may be resolved, and usually is, on the basis of affidavits,
depositions, admissions.  This is not to
say that a hearing may be regarded as a superfluity.  It is not, and the Court has plenary
discretion to determine the necessity therefor.  Under the circumstances of this case,
however, a hearing would have served no purpose, and was clearly
unnecessary.  The summary judgment here
was justified, considering the absence of opposing affidavits to contradict the
sworn declarations of Univet’s officials, which
demonstrate that the issues raised in the answer are sham, not genuine.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for
lack of merit.

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino,
and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Docketed in the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. CV No. 05858

^[2]
Per Victor, J, with whom concurred Ejercito and Kalalo, JJ.

^[3]
SEE Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto,
156 SCRA 753, 762

^[4]
Id., citing Cadirao v. Estenzo, 132 SCRA 93, in turn citing Viajar
v. Estenzo, 89 SCRA 684; Gorospe v. Santos, 69 SCRA 191, 203; de Leon v.
Faustino, G.R. No. L-15804, Nov. 29, 1960; PNB v. Philippine Leather
Co., Inc., et al., G.R. No. L-10884, Mar.
31, 1959; Bautista, et al. v.
Gonzalez, 78 Phil. 390; Jugador v. de
Vera, G.R. No. L-6308, Mar. 30, 1954