MRCA, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 168, PASIG, M.M., SPOUSES DOMIN…

The petitioner prays this
Court to set aside the decision promulgated on January 18, 1989 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP
15745, affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing the complaint
for non-payment of the proper filing fees as the prayer of the complaint failed
to specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses sought to be recovered by it from the defendants, but left
them “to the discretion of this Honorable Court” or “to be
proven during the trial.” (p. 32, Rollo.)

Invoking the decision of this Court in Manchester Development
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562, the private respondents
(defendants in Civil Case No. 55740 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, entitled “MRCA, Inc. vs. Spouses
Domingo Sebastian, Jr., et al.”
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on July 15, 1988.  The
petitioner opposed the motion, but the trial court granted it in its order of August
10, 1988 (p. 54, Rollo).  The Court of
Appeals upheld the trial court, hence, this petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner argues that since the decision in Manchester
had not yet been published in the Official Gazette when its complaint was
filed, the ruling therein was ineffective; that said ruling may not be given
retroactive effect because it imposes a new penalty for its
non-observance:  the dismissal of the complaint
for want of jurisdiction; and, that it should not apply to the present case
because the petitioner herein (plaintiff in the trial court) had no fraudulent
intent to deprive the government of the proper docketing fee, unlike the
Manchester case where enormous amounts of damages were claimed in the body of
the complaint, but the amounts were not mentioned in the prayer thereof, to
mislead the clerk of court in computing the filing fees to be paid.

Petitioner’s argument
regarding the need for publication of the Manchester ruling in the Official Gazette before it may
be applied to other cases is not well taken. 
As pointed out by the private respondents in their comment on the
petition, publication in the Official Gazette is not a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down a new
rule of procedure, for “it is a
doctrine well established that
the procedure of the court may be changed at any time and become effective at
once, so long as it does not affect or change vested rights.” (Aguillon vs. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 508).  In a later case, this Court held thus:

“It is a
well-established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage.  Procedural laws are retrospective in that
sense and to that extent.  As the
resolution of October
1, 1945, relates to the mode of procedure, it is
applicable to cases pending in courts at the time of its adoption; but it can
not be invoked in and applied to the present case in which the decision had
become final before said resolution became effective.  In this case, the motion for reconsideration
filed by the defendant was denied on July 17, 1944, and a
second motion for re-hearing or consideration could not be filed after the
expiration of the period of fifteen days from promulgation of the order or
judgment deducting the time in which the first motion had been pending in this
Court (Section 1, Rule 54); for said period had already expired before the
adoption of the resolution on October 1, 1945. 
Therefore, the Court cannot now permit or allow the petitioner to file
any pleading or motion in the present case.” (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 765-766.)

The Manchester ruling was applied retroactively in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd., et al. vs. Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February
13, 1989, a case
that was already pending before Manchester was promulgated.

The complaint in this
case was filed on March 24, 1988, or ten months after Manchester was
promulgated on May 7, 1987, hence, Manchester should apply except for the fact
that it was modified in the Sun Insurance case, where we ruled that the court
may allow payment of the proper filing fee “within a reasonable time but
in no case beyond the prescriptive or reglementary
period.” We quote:

“1.  It is not simply the filing of the
complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter
or nature of the action.  Where the
filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied
by payment of the
docket fee, the court
may allow payment of
the fee within a
reasonable time but in
no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary
period.  (p.  80, Rollo.)

Intent to cheat the
government of the proper filing fees may not be presumed from the petitioner’s
omission to specify in the body and prayer of its complaint the amounts of
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees that it claims to have suffered
and/or incurred in its transaction with the private respondents.  The petitioner might not have computed its
damages yet, or probably did not have the evidence to prove them at the time it
filed its complaint.  In accordance with
our ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., the petitioner may be allowed to
amend its complaint for the purpose of specifying, in terms of pesos, how much
it claims as damages, and to pay the requisite filing fees therefor, provided its right of action has not yet
prescribed.  This the
petitioner is ready to do.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted.  The Order of the Regional Trial Court is
hereby set aside.  The complaint in Civil
Case No. 55740 (MRCA, Inc. vs. Domingo Sebastian, Jr. and Lilia Tioseco Sebastian) is reinstated and the petitioner is
allowed to amend the same by specifying the amounts of damages it seeks to
recover from the defendants (private respondents) and to pay the proper filing
fees therefor as computed by the Clerk of Court.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.