PENTAGON SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCY, PETITIONER, VS. VICENTE T. JIMENEZ, ET. AL., AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SECOND DIVISION, RESPONDENTS.

The issue raised by
petitioner is whether there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC in upholding the sheriff’s issuance of Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution against licensed firearms owned
and used by the petitioner, a security
agency, in its operations.

Petitioner, a single
proprietorship engaged in security services, was ordered to pay the amount of
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETEEN PESOS AND FOUR CENTAVOS
(P157,119.04) representing wages and COLA
differentials due its employees, as computed in a Decision of the NLRC dated 21
February 1986.  On 22 June 1988, a notice of garnishment was issued against
petitioner, addressed to the PC-SUSIA c/o Col. Norberto M. Lina, Camp Crame, EDSA, Q.C.  On 5 June 1988,
Deputy Sheriff Silvino B. Santos issued a Notice of
Levy and Sale on Execution of
Personal Properties against herein petitioner, which personal properties are
the licensed firearms in question.

Petitioner filed an urgent petition to quash Notice of Levy and Sale
on Execution, claiming exemption from execution under Sec. 12, par (b), Rule 39
of the Rules of Court.

Labor Arbiter Eduardo Magno denied the
petition.  The Motion for Reconsideration
was likewise denied.  On 21 March 1989, the NLRC issued its
resolution which is the subject of this petition.

The NLRC held:

“Respondent is a security agency.  It is admitted that the licensed firearm is an important implement used in the
business but this licensed firearm is
not the tools and implements exempted from execution.  x x x The question, therefore is
whether a person can run his
trade or employment without such licensed firearm.  The answer is in the affirmative since the
person can still run the business or engage in his trade even without such
firearm because there are other alternatives open to him.

“Besides, there is no showing that the levied firearms are the
only firearms that the respondent-appellant has in its possession.  We affirmatively believe therefore that there
are firearms still hidden in its armory sufficient enough to answer the call of
its security trade or business.  In the
remote assumption that no firearms remains in respondent’s custody, as
practically flowing from the view of Labor Arbiter Magno,
respondent can lease or buy from legitimate sources.  There (sic) are some of the alternatives
which even common layman can expediently comprehend.”

The Solicitor General’s as well as private respondent’s comments
submit that firearms of a security agency are not exempt from execution under
Rule 39, Sec. 12, par. b of the Rules of Court which
provides:

“Sec. 12.  Property exempt from
execution.  – Except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other,
shall be exempt from execution:

‘(b) Tools and
implements neces­sarily used by him in his trade or employment;’”

Respondents contend that from the above
provision, three (3) things can be deduced, viz:

“(a) Except
in paragraphs (j) and (m), Sec. 12, Rule 39, Rules of Court, the exemptions are
accorded to individual debtors.

(b)  The exempt properties are used personally
by the debtor or his family, or as tools or implements of the debtor in his
trade or employment.

(c)  The
properties are necessary for the livelihood of the debtor and his
family.” (Rollo, p. 58)

The term “tools and implements” refers to instruments
of husbandry or manual labor needed by an artisan craftsman or laborer to
obtain his living.  Here petitioner is a
business enterprise.  It does not use the
firearms personal­ly, but they are used by its employees.  Not being a natural person, petitioner cannot
claim that the firearms are necessary for its livelihood.  Private respondent invites the Court to take
judicial notice of the fact that there are security guards rendering service
without firearms.

Petitioner without filing any reply moves for the resolution of
the petition.

There is no question, in our mind, that a security agency without firearms to equip its guards is useless.

However, it would appear that the exemption contemplated by the
provision involved is personal, available only to a natural person, such as a
dentist’s dental chair and electric fan (Helen v. de Leon, G.R. No. L-16412, 30 Nov. 1962).  As pointed out by the Solicitor General, if
proper­ties used in business are exempt from execution, there can hardly be an
instance when a judgment claim can be enforced against the business entity.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED.  However, for security reasons, and to prevent
the possibility that the firearms to be sold at the execution sale may fall
into the hands of lawless and subversive elements, the sale at public auction should be with the
prior clearance and under supervision of the PC-INP authorities.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.