ROMEO J. ORDONEZ, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. ALFREDO J. GUSTILO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAVITE, BRANCH XVI, CAVITE CITY, MUNICIPALITY OF ROS…

This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to annul, on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the (1) Decision dated May 24, 1985;
(2) Order dated May 27, 1987 and (3) Order dated December 24, 1987, all issued
in Civil Case No. N-4367 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
Branch XV, Cavite
City entitled “Valeriano
Espiritu v. Municipality
of Rosario, Province of Cavite and Hon. Calixto
D. Enriquez in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Rosario, Cavite.

The pertinent background facts are:

Valeriano Espiritu,
herein private respondent filed on April
22, 1983, a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, against
respondents Municipality
of Rosario, Cavite and Calixto Enriquez, the latter in his capacity as Mayor of said municipality,
to enforce their agreement contained in a Reclamation Contract.  In his
complaint, Espiritu prayed that the Municipality
of Rosario, together with Enriquez,
be ordered to convey to him 323,996 square meters of the reclaimed portion of
the foreshore land of the town.  Espiritu filed the action in his capacity as the assignee
of the Salinas Development Corporation (SADECO), the entity which reclaimed the
area in question by virtue of a Reclamation Contract entered into between it and the Municipality
of Rosario, represented by Enriquez as Municipal Mayor.  The case
was docketed as Civil Case
No. 4367 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch XVI, Cavite City.

In its answer, defendant municipality resisted plaintiff’s claim
stating that it was barred by the statute of limitation; the contract has been
substantially amended, modified and supplemented; and plaintiff has not
performed his reciprocal obligation.

The barangay captain of Tejeros Convention, Rosario,
Cavite, herein petitioner Romeo J. Ordonez, together with seven (7) other municipal and barangay officials intervened, and in their Answer-in?Intervention, they alleged that
no actual reclamation was done
by the plaintiff and the area
being claimed by the plaintiff
came about by natural accretion; the reclamation contract between the
contractor and the municipality is either void, voidable,
or disadvantageous to the defendant municipality.

The issues having been joined the trial court set the case for
the mandatory pre-trial conference on November
15, 1984.

At this scheduled pre-trial conference, all the litigants
including the intervenors, with their respective
counsel, were present.  In said
conference, plaintiff Espiritu and defendant
municipality, manifested to the court that having arrived at a satisfactory settlement, they would submit a
compromise agreement at a later date.

On the other hand, the intervenors asked
the court that they be allowed to present their evidence to prove their defense
asserted in their answer-in-intervention. 
For the said purpose, hearing was held on December 13, 1984 wherein Ernesto Andico,
vice-mayor testified.  Another hearing
was also held on January 24, 1985
where Vice-Governor Jose M. Ricafrente, Jr. of the Province
of Cavite,
and petitioner’s counsel in the instant case, also testified.

On May 20, 1985,
the principal litigants filed with respondent trial court their promised
compromise agreement.  The parties agreed
that 208,664 square meters of the reclaimed area were to be alloted to the plaintiff and 211,331 square meters thereof
were to be given to defendant municipality.

On May 24, 1985,
the trial court approved the compromise agreement and rendered a decision in accordance
therewith.  The intervenors
received their copy of the decision on September
19, 1985 thru
Vice-Mayor Ernesto Andico.  The decision being already final, it was duly executed to the satisfaction of the principal litigants.

On October 17, 1985
and July 2, 1987 additional
hearings were held where the intervenors presented
three (3) additional witnesses.

On June 24, 1987,
the intervenors filed a motion to set aside the
compromise agreement dated May 15,
1985.  This was denied by the
trial court, thru respondent Judge Alfredo Gustilo
(the former presiding judge, Judge Alejandro Silapan
having already retired) in its Order dated November 27, 1987, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

“It appears
that on May 24, 1985, the
former Presiding Judge of this Court approved the said Compromise Agreement
and rendered a judgment on the basis thereof. 
It is settled that a judgment approving a compromise agreement is final
and immediately executory.  (Samonte v. Samonte, 64 SCRA 524). 
The motion in question therefore cannot be granted as it has the effect
of annulling the judgment of this Court which has already become final and,
according to the plaintiff, already executed.

“The Motion to Set Aside Compromise Agreement cannot even be
considered as a motion for reconsideration because the Court can no longer set
aside, amend or modify its judgment which has become final.  Neither can the said motion be deemed as a
petition for relief under Rule 38
of the Rules of Court, since to set aside a judgment based upon a compromise
agreement under the said Rule, the petition for relief must be filed not later
than six (6) months from the date it was rendered.  (Bodiongan v. Ceniza, 102 Phil. 750). 
The decision of the Court based on the Compromise Agreement was rendered
on May 24, 1985.  On the other hand, the present Motion to Set
Aside Compromise Agreement was filed only on June 24, 1987. 
Moreover, under Section 3 of Rule 38, the petition for relief from
judgment should be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment sought to be set aside.  The intervenor in this case received a copy of the decision
based on the Compromise Agreement on September
19, 1985.  If the instant
motion be construed as an independent action to annul a judgment, this Court
would not have jurisdiction over it inasmuch as under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, an action for the annulment of a judgment of the
Regional Trial Court falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals.

Additionally, the intervenors have not
convincingly shown that defendant Mayor Enriquez was not authorized to sign the
Compromise Agreement in behalf of the Municipality
of Rosario.  On the contrary, the Mayor has in his favor
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.  (Sec. 5 [m], Rule 131,
Rules of Court.) Likewise, they failed to sufficiently explain why and
how the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement have contravened the law, morals, good customs and public
policy.” (pp. 41-42, Rollo).

Meanwhile, on August 10,
1987, plaintiff Espiritu filed a
manifestation and Motion praying that the proceedings be terminated and that
the case be considered closed, which motion respondent
judge granted in his Order dated
December 24, 1987.  The pertinent portion of the said Order
reads-

“In support of his motion to terminate the proceedings, the
plaintiff argued that further trial in this case will be an exercise in futility,
considering that the issues raised by the intervenors
have become moot and academic in view of the decision of the Court based on the
Compromise Agreement submitted by the plaintiff and the defendants.

“This contention appears to be well taken.  The decision of the Court based on the
Compromise Agreement has in effect resolved the issues raised by the intervenors, i.e., whether the reclamation contract entered
into between the town of Rosario and the Salinas Development Corporation, the
predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiff, is null and void; and whether or not
there was actual reclamation done by the said entity.  This is so, for the decision of the Court
based on the Compromise Agreement has impliedly recognized the validity of the said reclamation contract
and the fact that the tract of land divided between the plaintiff and the
defendant municipality of Rosario pursuant to the Compromise Agreement was the
product of the reclamation efforts undertaken by the Salinas Development
Corporation, which subsequently assigned its rights to the plaintiff.

“The continuation of the trial in this case will be
useless.  Should the intervenors
fail to adduce evidence showing that the reclamation contract was null and void
and that no actual reclamation was undertaken by the Salinas Development
Corporation, the correctness and propriety of the decision of the Court based
on the Compromise Agreement would be strengthened.  Even if they would succeed in proving that
the reclamation contract was null and void and that the area in question came
into being through the natural action of the sea and not through the
reclamation done by the Salinas Development Corporation, still the said
decision could no longer be set aside, inasmuch as it has already become final
and, according to the plaintiff, already executed.  The continuation of the reception of the
evidence for the intervenors clearly appears to serve
no purpose at all.

xxx    xxx       xxx

“WHEREFORE, the Manifestation and Motion dated August 6, 1987, filed by the
plaintiff, is granted, and the trial of this case is declared terminated and
this case is considered closed.

“This order modifies the pre-trial order dated November 15,
1984 of this Court, insofar as the said order has allowed the intervenors to adduce evidence in support of their
contention that the land in question was not reclaimed by the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest but the
product of accretion, and that the reclamation contract between the defendants
and the Salinas Development Corporation was null and void.

“SO ORDERED.” (pp. 45-47, Rollo)

In assailing the aforementioned Decision and Orders of the trial
court, petitioner Romeo Ordonez (one of the intervenors,
the other seven intervenors did not join him in this
petition) raises the following issues, to wit:

1. Whether or not the lower court erred in stopping/preventing the intervenors from further presenting their evidence in
support of their Answer-in­Intervention.

2.       Whether or not the
lower court erred in approving the compromise agreement of May 20, 1985 and
rendering a decision based thereon dated May 24, 1985, inspite
of the clear lack of authority on the part of respondent Calixto
D. Enriquez to bind the Municipality of Rosario because of the absence of an
enabling ordinance from the Sangguniang Bayan of Rosario, Cavite
empowering him to enter into said compromise agreement.

We answer both issues in the negative.

Intervention is defined as a
“proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is
permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in
claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in
resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of
them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others;
the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to pending
legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party thereto for the
protection of some right or interest alleged by him to be affected by such
proceedings.” (Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. the Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch 39, et al, G.R. No. 89909, September 21,
1990)

An intervention has been regarded as “merely collateral or
accessory or ancillary to the principal action and not an independent
proceeding; an interlocutory proceeding dependent on or subsidiary to, the case
between the original parties.” (Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. 1) The
main action having ceased to exist, there is no pending proceeding whereon the
intervention may be based.  (Barangay Matictic v. Elbinias, 148 SCRA 83, 89)

As we recently ruled in Camacho
v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 79564, December 24, 1989 –

“There is no question that intervention is only collateral or
ancillary to the main action.  Hence, it
was previously ruled that the final dismissal of the principal action results in the dismissal of said ancillary action.”
(underscoring supplied)

A judgment approving a compromise agreement is final and
immediately executory.  (Samonte v. Samonte, 64 SCRA 524) All pending issues will become moot
and academic once a compromise
submitted by the parties is approved by the trial court.  (Berenguer v. Arcangel, 149 SCRA 164)

In the case at bar, the compromise agreement submitted by the
plaintiff and the defendants and the decision approving the same recognized the
validity of the Reclamation
Contract and the fact that the tract of land involved was the result of the
reclamation done by SADECO.  In their
answer-in-intervention, petitioner alleges that there was no reclamation
undertaken by SADECO, that the land in
question was the result of accretion from the sea and that the Reclamation Contract
is null and void.  Clearly then, the
compromise agreement and the decision had in effect resolved the aforementioned
issues raised by the intervenors.  As aptly observed by the trial court, the
continuation of the reception of the intervenors‘
evidence would serve no purpose at all. 
Should intervenors fail to prove that the
Reclamation Contract is null and void and that no actual reclamation was made,
the correctness and propriety of the decision based on the compromise agreement
would be strengthened.  Upon the other
hand, should they succeed in proving that the contract is null and void, and
that the area in question came into being through the natural action of the
sea, still the decision of the lower court could no longer be set aside,
inasmuch as it has already become final and executed.

There is, therefore, no merit to the claim of petitioner that the
lower court “unceremoniouly
terminated the proceedings” even “without the intervenors completing their evidence.” (Memorandum
for Petitioner, p. 140, 143, Rollo) Precisely, the
court a quo gave
credence and weight to the compromise agreement and denied the claims of the intervenors which were controverting
the theories of the plaintiff and the defendants.  In other words, due process had been accorded
the intervenors. 
It would have been different had the court not taken into consideration
the claims of the intervenors.

The petitioner cannot claim ignorance of the filing of the
compromise agreement.  As can be gleaned
from the pre-trial order, the intervenors were
represented during the pre-trial conferences, where the plaintiff and the
defendants intimated that they would submit a compromise agreement.  The intervenors did
not interpose any opposition to the manifestation of the plaintiff and
defendants that they would be amicably settling their dispute.  The compromise agreement was filed in court
on May 20, 1985.  It was approved by the lower court on May 24, 1985.  Before its approval no opposition had been
filed questioning its legality.  The intervenors received their copy of the decision on September 19, 1985.  They did not file any motion for
reconsideration to suspend its finality. 
It was only on June 24, 1987,
or after the lapse of almost two (2) years when they filed a motion to set
aside the compromise agreement.  It
should be emphasized at this juncture that the decision based on the compromise
agreement had long been executed.

Anent the other issue raised – whether or not respondent mayor needed another authority from the Sangguniang Bayan
to sign the compromise agreement, suffice it to state that the mayor
need not secure another authority from the Sandiganbayan
under Section 141 (c) and (i) of the Local Government
Code, which state that –

“Section 141.  (1) The Mayor shall be the Chief Executive of
the municipal government and shall exercise such powers, duties and functions
as provided in this code and other laws. 
(2) He shall:

xxx       xxx       xxx

‘(c)         Represent the
municipality in its business transactions and sign on its behalf all contracts,
obligations and official documents made in accordance with law or ordinance.

‘(i)           Direct the formulation of municipal
development plans and programs, and once
approved by the Sangunian Bayan,
supervise and direct the execution and implementation thereof.’”
(p. 115, Rollo)

because the
execution of the Compromise Agreement is but an act implementing the
reclamation contract duly approved by
the Sangguniang Bayan.

Further, the terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are beneficial to the municipality
because the share of Espiritu has been reduced
considerably from the 80% agreed upon in the reclamation contract.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is
DISMISSED.  Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman),
Padilla, Sarmiento, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.