SUNSET VIEW CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND EVELYN A. LORENZO, RESPONDENTS.

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Sunset View
Condominium Corporation (SUNSET VIEW) seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) of 17 August 1987 affirming the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter of 22 April 1986 which ordered the reinstatement of respondent
Evelyn A. Lorenzo to her former employment with petitioner with payment of
backwages from the date of her dismissal until her reinstatement.

Respondent Lorenzo
started to work with petitioner corporation as clerk-typist on probationary
basis. She became a permanent employee on 1 January 1979 and was
appointed administrative secretary in 1980.

On 4 October 1985,
respondent Lorenzo received from Amado A. Castro, President of petitioner
corporation, a memorandum informing her of her suspension effective immediately
until further notice in view of evidence linking her to irregularities in
Sunset View Towers. She was also given
five (5) days to show cause why her services should not be terminated.

The following day, 5
October 1985, respondent Lorenzo wrote Castro stating that she could not comply
with the latter’s order set forth in
his memorandum as there were no
specific charges supporting her suspension.

Notwithstanding
respondent’s letter to the President of petitioner, the latter proceeded with
respondent’s suspension. Petitioner
stopped paying her salary on 5 November 1985 and failed to give her 13th month
pay for that year. Even after the lapse
of thirty (30) days from the date of her suspension, respondent was not
reinstated nor paid her salary.

Hence, respondent Lorenzo
filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal suspension. In her position paper, she prayed for
reinstatement, back wages, 13th month pay for 1985, moral or exemplary damages,
and attorney’s fees.

Petitioner filed its
position paper on 13 February 1986 alleging that prior to 4 October 1985
management had discovered that respondent Lorenzo had tampered with three (3)
duplicate copies of official receipts she had issued to condominium unit owners
by erasing and replacing the amounts written thereon with lesser amounts, and
appropriating the difference for herself; that she was confronted by petitioner
concerning the tampered receipts
and given an opportunity to
return the amounts she had appropriated, but failed to do so; consequently,
petitioner issued its memorandum of 4 October 1985 suspending her from her
employment.

In her reply to
petitioner’s position paper, private respondent denied the offense imputed to
her and the allegation she was confronted by petitioner concerning the
falsification. She contended that the
handwriting in the falsified copies of the receipts was not hers but that of
somebody else, and requested the Labor Arbiter to order the production of the
originals of the questioned receipts.

On motion of respondent
Lorenzo, the Labor Arbiter issued subpoena duces tecum to Amado A. Castro, President of petitioner
corporation, to bring the original and duplicate copies of the three (3)
questioned official receipts at the hearing of 24 March 1986.

At the hearing before the Labor Arbiter on 24 March 1986,
petitioner presented the original and duplicate copies of the questioned
official receipts, with counsel for private respondent making the following
observations: that in the duplicates of
Official Receipts Nos. 18986 and 18987 the words and figures representing
amounts received appeared to have been erased and substituted with lesser
amounts, and that the handwriting in the altered figures were different from
the accepted handwriting of respondent Lorenzo in the original receipts.

On 22 April 1986, Labor Arbiter Nestor C. Lim rendered a decision finding illegal and
unjustified the indefinite suspension of respondent Lorenzo as it amounted to
her constructive dismissal, and ordering her reinstatement with full back wages
from the date of dismissal until reinstated, plus payment of her 13th month pay
for 1985, moral damages and attorney’s fees. The Labor Arbiter also concluded that respondent was not properly
apprised of the particular offense she was charged with that gave rise to her
suspension.

Despite repeated requests of respondent Lorenzo for petitioner to
particularize or clarify the infraction
that she allegedly committed, petitioner refused to shed light on the reasons
for her suspension. She was only
informed of the charge of falsification against her when petitioner raised this
matter for the first time in its position paper before the Labor Arbiter who
upheld the observations of her counsel that the handwriting of the altered
figures in the duplicate copies of the questioned official receipts were quite
different and distinct from her accepted handwriting appearing on the receipts, thus creating doubt on the
contention that she had participated in the falsification of the duplicate
copies of the official receipts to the prejudice of petitioner.

Not satisfied with the
decision of the Labor Arbiter, petitioner corporation appealed the same to the
respondent Commission. On 17 August
1987, the latter affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter and declared that
private respondent did not commit the offense attributed to her. Respondent Commission likewise sustained the
order for her reinstatement and the award of full back wages and 13th month pay
for 1985, deleting however the award of moral damages and attorney’s fees.

In its petition, SUNSET
VIEW raises the following issue before this Court: whether respondent Commission committed grave abuse of discretion
in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding illegal the suspension
and dismissal of Lorenzo.

Petitioner claims that
respondent Commission did not consider
the fact that private respondent
was the one who received the malversed amounts and that she had control and
custody of the official receipts, that even for the sake of argument that she
was not the one who altered the duplicate receipts, still, she had been remiss in her duty to see to it that the receipts reflected the true amounts
received from the unit owners.

The burden of proof that
the employee is responsible for an alleged misconduct and that his
participation therein has rendered him unworthy to remain in his position, is
on the employer. The question of
whether respondent altered or tampered with the official receipts so that she
can appropriate the difference is a question of fact which is for the
respondent Commission, as a trier of facts, to determine. Factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies,
like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but at
times even finality when such findings are supported by substantial evidence.^[1] The
truth or falsehood of alleged facts is not for the Supreme Court to re-­examine. The probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them may no
longer be inquired into. This Court
steps in and exercises its power of review only when on the basis of facts the inference or
conclusion arrived at is manifestly erroneous.

In the present case, we
find that respondent NLRC did not abuse its discretion, much less gravely, when
it concluded that private respondent was not responsible for falsifying the
receipts in question. There is no
evidence directly pointing to respondent as the perpetrator of the
offense. Neither is there any showing
that she is guilty of negligence in handling the receipts which led to the
falsification thereof by other persons.

Petitioner does not deny
that as administrative assistant or secretary to the project manager, private
respondent has the duty to assist her superior in the daily operation of the
affairs of the condominium building of petitioner corporation, a function more
akin to general housekeeping.^[2]

The Manager and all the
personnel hold office inside a small room where the built-in cabinet used for keeping
duplicate receipts is located. It is
the accountant who holds the key to the cabinet and together with the
accounting clerk is in charge of the safekeeping of the receipts and corporate funds. While respondent Lorenzo also accepted
payments and issued receipts, she endorsed all collections and duplicate
receipts everyday to the accountant, who then turned over the collections and
receipts to the collector for deposit.^[3]

Taking into account this usual procedure, it is evident that any
irregularity that may arise from the collection of payments would be
immediately known. However, as found by
the Labor Arbiter and respondent NLRC, it took almost one year and a half for
petitioner to discover the anomaly. The
official receipts allegedly falsified were dated May 1984, while the memorandum
suspending respondent Lorenzo was issued only in October 1985. Even then, the issue of falsification of
receipts was raised by petitioner as a ground
for suspension of respondent only when it submitted its position paper before
the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the Labor Arbiter and respondent
NLRC are correct in doubting the veracity of the charge of petitioner against
respondent Lorenzo.

Petitioner also submits that it was not furnished copy of
respondent Lorenzo’s manifestation on her observations on the handwriting in
the altered figures on the receipts. It
argues that this resulted in a denial of the opportunity to present its side of
the controversy, especially when the Labor Arbiter adopted the observations in
the respondent’s manifestation.

The position of petitioner cannot be sustained. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.^[4]
The failure of respondent to furnish petitioner copy of the manifestation which
she submitted to the Labor Arbiter was not fatal as to invalidate his
decision. Such technical defect was
cured when petitioner was allowed to appeal from the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and later to file a motion for reconsideration with respondent NLRC.^[5]
Further, Art. 221 of the Labor Code provides that “in any proceeding before the
Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law or equity shall not be controlling, and it is the spirit and
intention of the Labor Code that the
Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively
and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest
of due process.”

Respondent Lorenzo having
been illegally suspended and dismissed, she should be reinstated to her
previous position with back wages for a period of three (3) years without
qualification and deduction, and without loss of seniority rights. However, if reinstatement is no longer
feasible, petitioner should pay respondent Lorenzo, in addition to back wages, separation pay in an amount equivalent to one
(1) month salary for every year of service.^[6]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commission of 17 August 1987 is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the amount of back
wages to be paid by petitioner to private respondent Evelyn A. Lorenzo shall be
for a period of three (3) years without qualification and deduction, and if
reinstatement is no longer feasible, petitioner shall be liable to pay private
respondent, in addition to back wages, separation pay in the amount of one (1)
month for every year of service.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., and
Quiason, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 96191, 4 March
1991.

^[2]
Comment to the Petition, Rollo, p. 80.

^[3]
Comment to the Petition, Rollo, p. 80.

^[4]
Bautista v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 81374, 30 April 1991, 196 SCRA
470.

^[5]
Gen. Milling Corp. v. Torres, G.R. No. 93666, 22 April 1991, 196 SCRA
215.

^[6]
Asphalt & Cement Pavers, Inc. v. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. No. 74563, 20
June 1988, 162 SCRA 312; Torillo v. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. 77205, 27 May
1991, 197 SCRA 471.